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Tell me "how" you seek, and I will tell you "what" you are seeking.
Ludwig Wittgestein, Philosophical Grammar
You have asked me whether, and I have answered with the how. Faith can do without
the whether, but if it is asked, the only way it can be answered is with the how; and so
long as the how is not established the whether will not cease to come and go.
Gustav Theodor Fechner, Leben nach dem Tode
ABSTRACT
S0ren Kierkegaard's thesis, "Truth is Subjectivity", is presented in Concluding
Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, as the central philosophical
concept of his pseudonymous authorship. Contrary to most readings, it is argued here
that Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle is epistemologically normative, not for
ethical and religious beliefs only, but for a wider, general epistemology as well. The
significance of Kierkegaard's claim that truth is subjectivity is that Kierkegaard is
recasting epistemological issues in theological and ethical terms.
Part One argues that Kierkegaard formulates his subjectivity principle as a
response to the Enlightenment epistemologies, specifically of Kant and Hegel, and
more generally Descartes, that seek to ground epistemology infallibly in the
metaphysical resources of human rationality. Kierkegaard limits the scope of reason
and philosophy in a manner that is reminiscent of the late Wittgenstein, and
understands the activity of philosophy as analogous to grammar. What is glossed over
by Enlightenment epistemology is the human subject's involvement in any act of
belief. Rather than seeing human subjectivity as a hindrance to the pursuit of truth,
Kierkegaard understands subjectivity (for humans) to be the means of attaining truth.
There are two basic types of subjectivity for Kierkegaard. Constitutional
subjectivity refers to human persons as beings who achieve subjectivity, or a first-
person perspective on the world. Reflexive subjectivity, on the other hand, refers to
the general subject-forming activities that comprise the process of becoming
subjective, and has as its primary constituent a reflective component. These senses of
subjectivity combine to provide Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle with its
normative and critical capacity.
Part Two outlines how Kierkegaard's two senses of subjectivity function
normatively with respect to beliefs. This section demonstrates that Kierkegaard's
grammar of subjectivity in the end is a grammar of belief also. The conclusion of the
dissertation is that Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle is a meta-epistemological
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References to works of S0ren Kierkegaard will employ the abbreviations in the
following list. The primary English translation of Kierkegaard's works used in the
notes (except in specially noted cases) will be the newly completed Princeton
University Press translations of Kierkegaard's literary corpus, Kierkegaard's
Writings, ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 26 volumes (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978-1999). These works will be indicated by KW followed by the
volume number and page number(s). Immediately following this reference, preceded
by a forward-slash, are the corresponding volume and page numbers in the third
Danish edition of S0ren Kierkegaard's Samlede Vcerker [The Collected Works of
S0ren Kierkegaard], ed. A.B. Drachmann, J.L. Heiburg, and H.O. Lange, 20 volumes
(Copenhagen: Glydendalske Boghandel, 1962). The following is an example of such
a citation: KW VIII 50/SV VI 143.
English reference to the journals and miscellaneous writings of Kierkegaard are
from S0ren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H.
Hong, assisted by Gregor Malantschuk, 7 Volumes, (Bloomigton: Indianna
University Press, 1967-1978). As listed below, the abbreviation is/P, and is followed
by a forward-slash and the location of the miscellany in S0ren Kierkegaard's
Papirer[S0ren Kierkegaard's Papers], volumes I-XI3 and XII-XVI, ed. P.A. Heiburg,
vii
V. Kuhr, and E. Torsting, first edition, 16 volumes in 25 tomes (Copenhagen:
Gyldendahl, 1968-1970). The abbreviation, listed below, is Pap., followed by the
volume, group, and entry numbers. For example: JP I 560/Pap. XI2 A 49.
Kierkegaard's Works in Danish
SV Spren Kierkegaard's Samlede Vcerker, Volumes I-XX
Pap. S0ren Kierkegaard's Papirer, Volumes I-XVI3
Kierkegaard's Works in English
KW Kierkegaard's Writings, Volumes I-XXVI




Modern theorizers are so foolishly objective that they completely forget that the thinker
[her/]himself is like the flutist's instrument and that it is of utmost importance to know
one's instrument . . . yes, of a quite different kind of importance, for the thinker has a
relation of infinite inwardness to [her/]his object such as no flutist has to [her/]his
instrument.
Spren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
The aim of this project is to investigate the role played by the pseudonymous
formulation of the "subjectivity principle" in Spren Kierkegaard's (1813-1855)
understanding of the nature and regulation of belief, as a significant alternative to
modernist, Enlightenment epistemology. Our contention is that Johannes
Climacus's thesis, "truth is subjectivity", provides a doctrine which inaugurates
Kierkegaard as the first thinker in Western philosophy to wrestle with the issues of
subjectivity and belief in a self-consciously post/after-modem manner. Thus the
problem we want to address revolves around two central questions. The first
question asks what the Climacus's subjectivity principle is and how it functions as a
critique of modem epistemology, and the second question concerns how this
Kierkegaardian emphasis on subjectivity makes sense as an epistemolgical principle.
We will attempt, then, to address the question: Can there be an epistemology of
subjectivity and, if so, what shape does this take in the Kierkegaardian literature? In
this investigation into the significance of Kierkegaard's epistemology for the post-
Enlightenment situation, it is not my intention to unpack these concerns so handily
referred to as "postmodern",1 but rather to address the general situation resulting
from the materialisation of them. I will further argue that in Kierkegaard's
philosophy of subjectivity we have (already in the nineteenth century) a viable way to
move the discussion forward, beyond the narrow province of Enlightenment
epistemology.
1 It is by no means clear as to what properly counts as "postmodern". The term here is simply used
to designate the conditions materialising after modernity.
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Finding an epistemological theory in Kierkegaard's writings is similar to piecing
together scattered parts of a puzzle. Nowhere in the Kierkegaardian literature is there
an explicitly spelled out epistemologioal theory, although his literature as a whole is
fueled by epistemic concerns, and there are (scant) specific passages in which he
makes epistemological statements. This leaves us in the position of having to make
the best sense we can of his de facto epistemology by treating the various comments
and principles we find throughout the various strains and strands of his literature
and evaluating them for their epistemogical relevance.
What will help us in this task with respect to the subjectivity principle is to
distinguish between weta-epistemology and substantive epistemology.2 Meta-
epistemology, as the name suggests, is not first-order epistemology, but is (roughly)
reflection on the nature, conduct, methodology, and prospects of epistemology.
Substantive epistemology, on the other hand, attempts to do epistemology.
Substantive epistemology pursues the defining features of knowledge and the
specific conditions under which justification and truth are obtained for beliefs. In
other words, substantive epistemology tells us when we have a clear instance of
knowledge and when we do not, and gives us a method for making these
determinations. Kierkegaard engages in very little substantive epistemology in his
writings, and, at any rate, it is apparent that his subjectivity principle is more
obviously a meta-epistemological position—on how to go about the tasks of
epistemology—than it is prescribing a set of procedures. The subjectivity principle,
therefore, is treated in this project as a meta-epistemological principle that tells us
about the nature of the epistemological task, and to that degree limits and delimits
how that task this will proceed. What is not offered in this project is a full-scale
(substantive) epistemology that tells us what epistemological reflection will uncover,
how doxastic practices are structured, what the criteria of epistemic justification and
2 William Alston uses this distinction (although it is not peculiar to him) in, "A 'Doxastic
Practice' Approach to Epistemology", in Knowledge and Skepticism, ed. Marjorie Clay and Kieth
Lehrer (London: Westview Press, 1989), 24.
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rationality are, etc. Such a substantive epistemological enterprise may be possible to
perform on Kierkegaard's writings, but it is not the task of this thesis.3
What is offered here is admittedly a reading of Kierkegaard's texts—one that
presumes to offer a great deal by way of explanation, but does not claim exclusivity.
The method used acknowledges that the concepts employed throughout the strata of
the Kierkegaardian literature are contextually situated, but examines them for their
explanatory power and relevance for present-day issues. This approach will remain
sensitive to historical-critical concerns, but focuses more on forming a conceptual
link running through the Kierkegaardian texts that makes sense of them.
Writing on Kierkegaard's Thought
Any attempt to write on Kierkegaard's thought is confronted with a unique set
of objections that one is not faced with when writing on most other thinkers.
Kierkegaard's insistence upon, and preoccupation with, human subjectivity, the
existentiell, appears prima facie to undermine any attempt to objectively state,
discuss, analyse, or get to the (objective) "truth" of his thought. Is he not the
prophet of the Paradox and the Absurd? Is he not the harbinger of irrationality and
subjective truth, and does he not insist that direct communication is not possible, that
truth must be communicated indirectly? Is it not contradictory and self-refuting to
attempt an academic and philosophical inquiry into the thought of someone whose
exclusive interest was Being in subjectivity, to the exclusion of the objectivity of
abstract thinking?
These are all legitimate objections and demand a response, but it is in large
measure one of the subsidiary functions of this thesis to undermine these sorts of
concerns. All of the aforesaid objections stem from a common denominator—one
that takes Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle to be a denial of objective truth or
knowledge, and subsequently interprets his category of the paradox as an assertion
that the resources of human reason are wholly bankrupt, superfluous, and unreliable
3 For an attempt at discerning Kierkegaard's substantive epistemology, see Marilyn Gaye Piety.
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as a means of aiding humans in the pursuit of truth. This position is a caricature of
Kierkegaard's thought and a prosaic, inadequate reading of his literature.
Kierkegaard is surely emphasising being over thinking, and subjectivity over
objectivity, but his insistence that being (human existence) cannot be thought does
not mean that being cannot be thought about. It is instead a reminder that the
concepts we employ when thinking about something are not identical to actually
being that thing (as it is as it goes about being what it is). In all our talk about being
we must not forget that we are simply letting "ideas compare with ideas", which is
legitimate in itself, and that "all this contending is still at a distance and is like
shadowboxing".4
In light of this, we may conduct academic inquiries into Kierkegaard's thought
with no (necessary) impunity to the integrity and internal coherence of its subject
matter.5 One must take great care to never mistake the academic exercise with a
qualitative transformation in one's essential being, or to think that one has
communicated that ability to someone else simply by virtue of a philosophical
treatise. We must keep clear in our minds that our ability to think correctly about
reality does not correspondingly translate into our being appropriately in that reality.
On Kierkegaard's account, if we are fully or appropriately to be in reality, and thus
achieve a type of existential understanding of what this means, we must also think
correctly about reality. Linguistic expressions of this understanding and
philosophical remarks designed to articulate its inner logic, are legitimate and even
necessary when confusion reigns. However, these linguistic exercises do not amount
to this special understanding but are only expressions of it.6 Kierkegaard himself
"Kierkegaard On Knowledge", (Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 1994).
4 KW XVI 1S/SV XII 81.
5 Indeed, in Postscript Climacus argues that: "To ask abstractly (even though it is proper to ask
about it abstractly, since the particular, the accidental, is indeed a constituent of the actual and in
direct opposition to abstraction) and to answer abstractly is not nearly as difficult as to ask and
answer what it means that this definite something is an actuality. Abstraction disregards this
definite something, but the difficulty lies in joining this definite something and the ideality of
thinking by willing to think it"; KW XII. 1 301-02/SV X 9, my italics.
6 Paul L. Holmer, "Post-Kierkegaard: Remarks About Being a Person", in Kierkegaard's Truth:The
Disclosure of the Self. Psychiatry and the Humanities, Volume 5, ed. Joseph H. Smith (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 11-12 (my italics).
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engaged in written philosophical and theological discourse (and even wrote a
Magisters dissertation in philosophy) in order to "remove confusion" and oppose
wrong thinking. Paul Holmer notes that for Kierkegaard,
The ideal structure of things is open to every [hu]man who has a capacity to reason
abstractly - one can therefore know that subjectivity is truth. . . . The definition is for the
philosophical, the reality is for all. ... Kierkegaard is objective about this subjectivity -
but again he is consistent. He never says that the objective propositional form he gives to
truth is the truth itself. His definition is ideal - it exists for another's thought.7
This dissertation engages in the same type of intellectual exercise Kierkegaard
himself engages in and seeks to explore one of the central "doctrines" of
Kierkegaard's writings and to make explicit the philosophical and academic
resources of this for the world of ideas.
Reading Kierkegaard
Kierkegaard's penchant for signing pseudonyms to certain of his works (often
referred to as his "aesthetic" works), while publishing others ("religious" works)
under his own name, opens an hermeneutical Pandora's Box.8 To make matters
more complicated, Kierkegaard repeatedly refuses his 'authorial rights' to a
privileged interpretation of the pseudonymous books, claiming to have, "no
knowledge of their meaning except as a reader".9 Accordingly, there are virtually as
many readings of his authorship as there are scholars who approach this task.10 No
7 Paul L. Holmer, "Kierkegaard and Truth: An Analysis of the Presuppositions Integral to His
Defintion of the Truth" (Ph. D. diss., Yale Unversity, 1945), 272.
8 Joakim Garff wrestles admirably with this issue in his, "The Eyes of Argus: The Point of View
and Points of View on Kierkegaard's Work as an Author", in Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader , eds.
Jonathan Ree and Jane Chamberlain (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 75-102. Garff draws out
many of the seminal issues one confronts in Kierkegaardian exegesis. His salutary contribution in
this piece is his rigorous demonstration that Kierkegaard's progressive (and vacillating)
understanding of his own authorship and its "meaning" was ambivalent and ultimately was an issue
he never completely resolved. However, whereas Garff finds this to undermine the "normative
status" of Kierkegaard's various comments on the authorship, I am more optimistic about the
possibility of finding a unity in the plurality of points of view represented in Kierkegaard's
authorship. In many respects, Kierkegaard's understanding of his authorship is irrelevant to this
task.
9 KW XII. 1 626/SV X 285.
10 For example, David Gouwens identifies 12 categories of approaches to reading Volume One of
Kierkegaard's Either/Or alone. See David J. Gouwens, "Kierkegaard's Either/Or, Part One: Patterns
of Interpretations", in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Either/Or, Part One (Macon, GA:
Mercer University Press, 1995), 5-50. For other discussions of the relevant literature regarding
approaches to interpreting Kierkegaard see: Roger Poole, "The Unknown Kierkegaard: Twentieth-
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doubt this lack of academic unanimity was, in some respects, an aim of
Kierkegaard's strategy of imposing pseudonymous authors between "himself' and
"his" works. While the significance of the pseudonyms cannot be fully addressed
at this point, it is necessary to indicate Kierkegaard's authorship will be approached
in this study.11
The general strategy will be to take the pseudonyms seriously but also (at
various times and in specific contexts) to refer to them interchangeably with
Kierkegaard himself, as belonging to the literary corpus written (historically) by
him.12 Kierkegaard's pseudonyms are understood to express different ontological
perspectives or ways being in the world, with divergent points of view revolving
around one central concern: "[the problem of] becoming a Christian in
Christendom".13 In other words, Kierkegaard claims that becoming a Christian is
the one unific issue his authorship, both direct and indirect, pseudonymous and
veronymous,14 is an attempt to address. In this case, the individual pseudonyms are
Century Receptions", in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard , eds. Alastair Hannay and
Gordon D. Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 48-75; C. Stephen Evans,
Chapter One, "Reading Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Literature", and Chapter Two, "Reading
Johannes Climacus", in Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript": The Religious Philosophy of
Johannes Climacus (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983), 1-32; C. Stephen Evans,
Chapter One, "On Reading Kierkegaard and Johannes Climacus", in Passionate Reason: Making
Sense ofKierkegaard's "Philosophical Fragments" (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press,
1992), 1-12; and Steven M. Emmanuel, Chapter One, "Revelations of Self in the Pseudonymous
Authorship", in Kierkegaard and the Concept ofRevelation (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1996), 1-22.
11 The following is not intended to be a defence of a position. It is rather an outline of the position
adopted throughout this project. A full-scale defence of this position on Kierkegaard's authorship is
beyond the scope of this project and the reader is referred to Steven Emmanuel's and C. Stephen
Evans's polemical discussions of this point noted above.
12 In "A First and Last Explanation" which he, under his own name, appended to the Postscript in
order to "explain" his relationship with the pseudonyms, Kierkegaard requests: "Therefore, if it
should occur to anyone to want to quote a particular passage from the [pseudonymous] books, it is
my wish, my prayer, that he will do me the kindness of citing the respective pseudonymous
author's name, not mine . . . My role is the joint role of being the secretary and, quite ironically,
the dialectically reduplicated author of the authors. . .. but on the other hand I am very literally and
directly the author of, for example, the upbuilding discourses [published alongside every
pseudonymous work] and of every word in them"; KW XII. 1 621/SV X 287.
13 See Kierkegaard's statement in KW XII 90/SV XVIII 137: "Thus my entire work as an author
revolves around: becoming a Christian in Christendom".
14 The neologism "veronymous" will be used throughout the dissertation as the opposite of
pseudonymous, to indicate those writings Kierkegaard wrote under his own name. This word occurs
in some places in the literature on Kierkegaard. It is adopted and used here because it is an efficient
device to communicate that a work or quote of Kierkegaard's is one that he either wrote or
published without appending a pseudonym, under his own name.
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conceived as aesthetic constructions of Kierkegaard's literary imagination designed
to provide a communicative space15 in which the readers are confronted by a set of
existential possibilities that they must relate to then own existence.16
It is on this basis, and not because he has abandoned all concepts of human
agency, that Kierkegaard refuses his authorial rights to interpret the pseudonymous
authorship. In Point ofView he comments on his relationship to the pseudonyms,
If I were to begin qua author to protest [on behalf of his right to a privileged
interpretation], I might easily bring to confusion the whole work, which from first to last
is dialectical. . . So I cannot make any protestation [about how to be understood] ... for
qua [hu]man I may be justified in protesting, and it may be my religious duty to make
protestation. But this cannot be confounded with authorship: qua author it does not avail
much that I protest qua [hu]man that I intended this or that".17
Here Kierkegaard affirms that he had express intentions "qua human"18 for his
pseudonyms and that they were intended to produce a unified effect on his
"reader". What he categorically refuses to do is to interpret how this ought to play
out in the reader's imagination (the realm of ideas). The importance of this is
underscored for Kierkegaard precisely because he has very specific intentions for
his literary production which he dare not jeopardise and thereby "bring confusion
to the whole work". His pseudonymous dialectic is designed specifically to engage
the reader's imagination in relation to her/his own actual, concrete historicity (i.e.,
her/his existence). Kierkegaard therefore rightly denies his own authority to interpret
15 This Edward Mooney's apt term from his Selves in Discord and Resolve: Kierkegaard's Moral-
Religious Psychology in Either/Or and Sickness Unto Death (London: Routledge, 1996), p. xii.
16 Kierkegaard's pseudonyms are treated in more depth in Chapter Two of the dissertation.
17 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, trans. Walter Lowrie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939),
p. 15. Lowrie's translation is preferred to make this point, over the Hongs's, who translate the
same passage thus: "If I qua author must first make declarations [that the author must know what
is best], I easily alter the writing, which from first to last is dialectical. Consequently I cannot
make any declaration ... In other words, qua human being I may be justified in making a
declaration, and from the religious point of view it may be my duty to make a declaration. But this
must not be confused with the authorship—qua author it does not help very much that I qua human
being declare that I have intended this or that"; KW XXII 33/SV XVIII 87.
18 Kierkegaard's distinction between "qua [hu]man" and "qua author" refers to his concept of
different modes of being in the world, corresponding to his theory of existence spheres. On this
reading the "qua [hujman" distinction is a reference to Kierkegaard's ethical-religious self—his
"true" self, if you will—that assumes responsibility for itself as a unified subjectivity with ethical
obligations and therefore is fundamentally concerned with actualising itself in a concrete, historical
existence. The "qua author" is a reference to his aesthetic mode of being in the world, which deals
in possibilities, not actualities, and therefore is the realm of thought, imagination, and knowledge.
Kierkegaard's theory of existence spheres (or "stages") is part of the subject matter of Chapter Six
and is more fully explained there.
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how this will happen for the reader. S/he must take this responsibility upon
her/himself.19 Kierkegaard is not, however, denying that he had intentions, nor that
he can communicate them, nor that these intentions have in some respect a regulative
capacity.20 Kierkegaard in fact states that his intentions are normative—just not in
respect to the essential truth of his authorship.21
The approach to Kierkegaard outlined above is a species of the genus of
Kierkegaardian interpretations referred to by Roger Poole as "the blunt reading"
because in this I "may be counted as one of those who take the pseudonymity
seriously and yet manage to argue consequently and rigorously within those
constraints at a philosophical level".22 Poole finds these "fundamentalist and
literalist assumptions" about "readerly intentionality" to render "the entire
19 Compare Paul Holmer's comment that, "Kierkegaard was not trying to conceal himself in the
pseudonymous authorship. Rather, he thought it presposterous to invoke his own authority for
something like a fundamental mode of living and erected ideal 'personae' really to divert attention
from himself and to maximize the actication of the capabilities and power of each of his readers.
The intrusion of the author's authority would vitiate the creation and sustaining of an authorizing
activity on the part of the reader". See Holmer, "Post-Kierkegaard: Remarks About Being a
Person", 11.
20 Compare Sheila Walsh's statement against Joakim Garff's deconstructive reading of Kierkegaard:
"Kierkegaard maintains the possibility of ambiguity of interpretation by readers while at the same
time setting forth three criteria of substantiation: 1) the phenomenon cannot be explained in any
other way; 2) in this particular way it can be explained in every detail; and 3) the explanation fits at
every point KW XXII 34/SV XVIII 88. Kierkegaard applies these criteria to the thesis that he is a
religious author and finds that explanation incongruous because it cannot explain the edifying
discourses". See Sylvia Walsh, "Reading Kierkegaard With Kierkegaard Against Garff', Sfiren
Kierkegaard's Newsletter 38: (July 1999), 6. For Garff's response to Walsh see, Joakim Garff,
"Reading Oneself', Sfiren Kierkegaard's Newsletter 38: (July 1999), 9-14.
21Kierkegaard has Climacus carefully distinguish between essential truth, which pertains to
Socratic ethical self-knowledge, and accidental truth, which consists in information about the
universe. Essential truth is "the highest truth for an existing person". See Chapter Four of this
dissertation for more on this distinction. While Kierkegaard does not believe propositions actually
exist, in the sense that humans do—they instead have a kind of thought-existence unlike existing
in actuality—he does believe that as ideal objects they are instantiated as acts or states of existing
beings. These propositions may express cognitive relationships to the objectively real world rind
are able to provide approximate, fallibilist "accidental" knowledge (as possibility) whose "degree
and scope is indifferent" to the subjectivity of the existing person. See KW XII. 1 205/SV IX 170.
22 Poole, "Twentieth Century Receptions, 65. Poole contrasts the blunt readers to those who have
accepted the "deconstructive turn". See ibid., 58-68.1 actually find C. Stephen Evans's analysis of
the topology of Kierkegaardian literature in Passionate Reason, 2-5, more helpful (although not
more comprehensive) than Poole's. Evans argues that there are three types of Kierkegaard literature:
(1) those who read Kierkegaard as a straight philosopher and therefore draw on Kierkegaard's
literature as a whole, disregarding the nuances of the pseudonyms; (2) those who take "the literary
approach" and see Kierkegaard as a proto-deconstructionist whose literary work fundamentally
subverts its apparent content; and (3) those who combine the first two approaches and, on one
hand, take the pseudonyms and the literary structure of Kierkegaard's works seriously while, on the
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dialectical structure of the Kierkegaardian text. . . invisible".23 He opts instead for a
more refined approach that accepts the "deconstructive turn". Poole's
dcconstructive reading sees Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms, irony and humour,
and alternative literary forms as part of his commitment to a view of language and
authorship that is proto-deconstructionist and deliberately subverts the "objective",
philosophical content of his own texts.24
The purpose here is not to argue conclusively for one approach or for the
poverty of all other methods of reading Kierkegaard. (For instance, there is much of
value in the "deconstructive reading" of Kierkegaard.) However, to distinguish the
manner in which Kierkegaard is interpreted here from the way Poole does, there are
three points that generally indicate why this stance towards the Kierkegaardian
authorship is adopted, and a thorough-going deconstructive interpretation and
methodology resisted.
To begin with, C. Stephen Evans is correct to say that Kierkegaard's rejection of
the Enlightenment (Hegelian) idea of pure objectivity and an ahistorical self that
knows itself transparently does not mean that the concomitant construal of a situated
subjectivity entails a complete jettisoning of (objective) truth.23 Indeed, it is the task
of this project to secure the idea that for Kierkegaard subjectivity is instead a
medium which may grant us access to truth, and that without appropriate subjectivity
truth may not be obtained by finite, human knowers.
Second, Evans is also correct to say that reading Kierkegaard's pseudonyms as
if they had genuine philosophical content, organized around a unifying theme (as
Kierkegaard indicates in several places he understood his authorship),26 provides a
other hand, do not find this hinders but rather promotes the texts' philosophical gravity. This third
option is the type of approach taken in the present study.
23 Poole, "Twentieth Century Receptions", 62.
24 Poole comments that, "The [Kierkegaardian] texts demonstrate to a nicety the Lacanian
perception that all we are ever offered in a text is an endless succession of signifiers". See Roger
Poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia
Press, 1993), 6.
25 Evans, Passionate Reason, 3.
26 In "The Eyes of Argus", Joakim Garff argues that Kierkegaard understood his authorship
variously and notes that Kierkegaard's miscellaneous comments on how he read his own literature
exhibits this tension.
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powerful and illuminating way of interpreting him that accounts for the content of
his authorship in the most comprehensive manner.27 This does not imbue
Kierkegaard with unwarranted authority "qua author" beyond his professed
authorial rights, or make him out to have direct and pristine access to the contents of
his consciousness. It does however, take his opinion "qua human" seriously as a
valid opinion regarding the texts. Ultimately, reading Kierkegaard in this manner is
the best way to be fair to his wish to distance his own voice from the pseudonyms
voices in order that they may speak for themselves, with their own contributions to
the central, organisational point in the discourse—namely, how one stands
(individually) in relationship to Christianity.
Furthermore, as Anthony Rudd poignantly observes, if the deconstructive
reading is correct, then Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship may be regarded
as "representing a collossal failure to communicate on Kierkegaard's part", given
the fact that, "For a century and a half no one understood what their true meaning
was, until now, at last, 'a Professor' has arrived who is clever enough to see what
Kierkegaard was really getting at".28 The argument implied by this is that those of
the deconstructive bent are actually guilty of the same cognitive sin they find
calumnious in the "blunt readers"—both of making the significance and meaning
of the pseudonyms dependent upon one's success in finding Kierkegaard's own
voice in the pseudonyms (or in the attempt to be "true" to Kierkegaard's
intentions), and then of thinking that one has actually discovered Kierkegaard's
voice. For example, Poole argues that, "The efforts of the 'blunt reader' are
ultimately doomed to failure, though, because the direction of attention is 180
degrees in the wrong direction. Kierkegaard's text does not offer itself to be the
object of the question 'What does it mean?' It instead offers itself as the proponent
27 Ibid., 4-5. Evans, in fact, goes so far as to assert that, "Whether Kierkegaard intended it or not,
the unity is there in the text, in the sense that an honest reading of the authorship beginning with
Either/Or and continuing through the later explicitly Christian writings can discern a consistent
[religious] telos" (p. 5).
28 Anthony J. Rudd, "'Believing All Things': Kierkegaard on Knowledge, Doubt, and Love", in
International Kierkegaard Commentary, Volume 16: Works ofLove, ed. Robert L. Perkins
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of the question 'What do you think?"'.29 In this assertion Poole implies three
things:
1. Kierkegaard's voice or intention is something that has both the
possibility of being determinate and has significance for how we read
him.
2. The voice Poole hears in the text, if not the true voice of Kierkegaard
(i.e., Kierkegaard's"real" intentions), has at least a ring truer to
Kierkegaard's voice than those who read Kierkegaard bluntly.
3. The only freedom of speech available to the pseudonyms is freedom
from speaking, as opposed to freedom to speak
Number 1 is precisely the charge Poole levies against the "blunt reading". Poole is
claiming to have discerned an intention in Kiekegaard that is not being
acknowledged by the blunt readers. This sounds suspiciously like Poole has found
some content in the pseudonyms for himself. Number 2 is a position that has self-
referential problems relative to other components in Poole's deconstructive position.
With 2, Poole apparently gives up the thesis he praises Kierkegaard for (putatively)
holding; the "Lacanian perception that all we are offered in a text is an endless
succession of signifiers".30 Whatever else this last statement means, it appears to
support the deconstructive position that the author is "dead", and thusly all we ever
"hear" in a text is our own voice. This, again, is not something Poole may claim
over the blunt readers. He seems merely to be saying that he does a better job at
blunt reading than most. Poole also is very concerned that the more blunt of us not
close off the texts of Kierkegaard and foist our interpretations onto the text. Number
3, however, is a position that itself does not seem to be overly imbued with liberality
towards the pseudonymous voices and closes them off from ever being able to
speak.
(Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1999), 129n5. Note that Rudd's comments are in specific
reference to the Climacus pseudonym, not the whole pseudonymous authorship.
29 Poole, "Twentieth Century Receptions", 61-62 (my italics)
30 Poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication , 6.
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Finally, I find the deconstuctive reading is too "thin". It attenuates the
Kierkegaardian texts, both "aesthetic" and "religious", to their aesthetical
component "qua author", and neglects any ethical and religious dimensions that his
texts may have for their readers "qua human". This results in a picture of the
literature that occludes the inherent and intended31 multi-dimensional character of
the Kierkegaardian texts, and thus disregards their ability to address the reader
across the existence-spheres s/he inhabits. It is worth noting that Kierkegaard argues
in his university thesis that irony can be a sickness as well as a healthiness.32 And
later Johannes Climacus suggests that the master of irony refuses to be trapped in
any relativities, but ironically comprehends all of life's relativities—including the
irony that irony itself is not an end, but a means to an end.33 In the final analysis, the
deconstructionist reading is afflicted with an ironical malaise that has not
comprehended all of life's relativities. Instead of using irony as a disposable,
contingent strategy (i.e., as itself a relativity) to dislodge untruth34 so that this use of
irony may in turn create the existential space for ethico-religious commitment, the
deconstructionist fixates on irony as an end in itself—and is thereby trapped in
life's relativity. Thus, I follow Paul Holmer and read the polynimity of
Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, on the one hand, to say a plurality, but on the other, to
show a unity.35 Having said this however, we must heed Anthony Rudd's caution to
treat the pseudonyms carefully, respecting their individual personalities and
perspectives, as it is "far from obvious that Kierkegaard was doing just the same
thing with, for instance, Johannes the Seducer, Nicholas Notabene, Vigilius
Haufniensis, and Anti-Climacus".36
31 "Intended" is used here because it is taken to be uncontroversial that whatever else is going on in
the Kierkegaardian texts: (a) the use of pseudonyms are at least attempts at indirect
communication—that is, attempts (at least) to engage uniquely the reader, and (b) his veronymous
upbuilding discourses are, as quasi-sermons and biblical exegesis, obviously religious in nature.
32 KW II 77JSV I 128.
33 KW XII. 1 502/SV X 179-80.
34 Sylvia Walsh, "Kierkegaard and Postmodernity", International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 29 (1991): 121.
35 Paul L. Holmer, "Post-Kierkegaard: Remarks About Being a Person", 11.
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The Project
Kierkegaard's emphasis on subjectivity is levied by him as "the rock against
which metaphysics founders", including the modem epistemological project with its
attempt to establish the presuppositionless beginning on the metaphysical
foundations of a sel-transparent epistemological subject. The point of departure for
this study of Kierkegaard's relevance for postmodemity and the theory of
knowledge is Johannes Climacus's intriguing statement in the Postscript, "There is
a How that determines the What".37 Kierkegaard later remarks that, "In all the
usual talk that Johannes Climacus is mere subjectivity etc., it has been completely
overlooked that he later points out. . . that when the How is scrupulously rendered
the What is also given"?* This, he continues, demonstrates that there is a
normativity inherent in the subjectivity principle for, "Right here, at its very
maximum, inwardness is shown to be objectivity".39 With his doctrine of "truth is
subjectivity", Climacus brings the philosophical problems surrounding the human
self/subject, belief, and language together in such a way that epistemological,
metaphysical, and ontological issues are inextricably interwoven. Thus it is that
Climacus's grammar of the post-Enlightenment subject becomes a grammar of
belief.
The primary challenge to our project is that of sorting the epistemological issues
out from Kierkegaard's literature. The objective is to expound Climacus's
subjectivtiy principle so that it provides a way to read the epistemolgical discussions
taking place throughout the various strands of the Kierkegaardian corpus. It has
already been noted that, on the reading taken here, Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms
are fundamentally interested in theological issues—namely, how one becomes a
Christian in Christendom. This, however, does not prohibit the Kierkegaardian
authorship from having other issues in mind, and on examination it is apparent that
epistemological issues are central to this basal theological concern. Therefore, while
36 Rudd, '"Believing All Things'", 129.
37 KW XII. 1 610-22, 613n-614/5V X 272-281, 274n-275.
38 JP IV 4550/Pap. X2 A 299.
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there is no explicit (de jure) development of an epistemic theory, Kierkegaard and
his pseudonyms both inform us about epistemological issues and in fact operate (de
facto) with an underlying theory about the nature and regulation of belief and how to
appropriately broach these questions—bits and pieces of which surface from time to
time in the literature.
The nature of our project is, then, primarily conceptual and not historical, and we
do not make any pretentions to have commandeered the authorial intentions of
Kierkegaard so as to provide (the substantive) "Kierkegaard's Theory of
Knowledge". This is to say that our project is more of a "Kierkegaardian" project
than straight-forwardly an exegesis of Kierkegaard's thought. We situate this task
substantially in the Kierkegaardian texts "authored" by (and about) Johannes
Climacus, in whose writings we have the formulation of the subjectivity principle.
The goal in this project is to render the Climacean subjectivity principle coherent as a
meta-epistemological principle, showing how it is augmented by, and at work in, the
various strata of the Kierkegaardian literature. Although historical and exegetical
accuracy is vitally important for this task, we aim to draw out the epistemological
dimensions of the Kierkegaardian subjectivity principle and reveal his "hidden"
meta-epistemology within his literary corpus. Because an epistemic theory is never
overtly developed in his authorship, in some instances elucidating it will entail that
these issues are taken beyond Kierkegaard's explicit discussions and will involve
our rendering them in the most plausible manner.
As noted above, our primary objective in this dissertation is the elucidation of the
epistemological dimensions of Climacus's subjectivity principle. Our aim is to
provide an account of the normative resources of the subjectivity principle and a
general outline of the basic characteristics of such an epistemology. We will not
deliver a fully developed and substantive epistemology. "Truth is subjectivity" is a
meta-epistemological statement that orients or situates a more substantive epistemic
theory. The focus, therefore, is on developing the major points of the central
39 JP IV 4550/Pap. X2 A 299.
14
argument in order to recommend and justify this Kierkegaardian approach to
epistemological issues. This entails that we forego detailed analyses of minor
arguments regarding epistemological minutiae, important and relevant as they be for
other purposes. These arguments do exist and such an account is possible, but they
must be referred to other projects as they do not strictly fall within the purview of
our present concerns.
Lastly, although this Kierkegaardian approach to epistemic issues is situated
within an ontology of human subjectivity, we will not be developing a complete
philosophical anthropology, nor will we conduct a full excursion into an ontology of
the human self in all its multifarious expressions and dimensions. We will instead
be concerned with these issues only in so far as they relate to the subject-of-belief,
or the epistemological subject (i.e., the subject that has beliefs), as a critique of the
Modem, Cartesian cogito which Kierkegaard saw as the understruction of all
Modem epistemology.
Part One analyses the relationship of subjectivity and truth in Kierkegaard's
philosophy. The following chapter begins this task by establishing a firm
understanding of the philosophical backdrop to Kierkegaard's concept of
subjectivity and his critique of reason. Chapter Two also introduces the
epistemological significance of Kierkegaard's category of the paradox as a
response to the implicit notion of the epistemological subject that Kant and Hegel
inherit from Descartes. Chapter Three details Kierkegaard's rejection of
metaphysics. Kierkegaard's understanding of the role of philosophy is similar to
Wittgenstein's view that philosophy is a grammatical enterprise. Chapter Four
focuses on Kierkegaard's epistemological shift away from understanding truth
objectively, to his thesis that "truth is subjectivity". This is treated by an
examination of Climacus's account of truth in Philosophical Fragments. The
grounds of epistemology are shown to be ultimately theological, as the truth of
subjectivity is that subjectivity is untruth.
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Part Two turns to the ontological ground of belief established by Kierkegaard's
subjectivity principle. Chapter Five therefore examines one aspect of Kierkegaard's
grammar of subjectivity. This grammar focuses on the ontological establishment of a
situated human self in terms of thin and deep subjectivity. In Chapter Six we have
the second half of Kierkegaard's grammar of subjectivity in terms of the self's
relation to time, others, and itself. In this stage, Kierkegaard's grammar of
subjectivity is developed as a working out of the inner logic of Salighed (eternal
blessedness) as the central passion of a deep subjectivity. The end or goal of
Salighed is self-transparency. Chapter Seven outlines, then, Kierkegaard's grammar
of belief, and includes a discussion of Kierkegaard's radical and theological,
subjective orientation to epistemological issues. Kierkegaard's concept of belief is
essential to his account of epistemological and ontological transitions. It is argued
that Kierkegaard's grammar of subjectivity is in fact a grammar of belief as well, for
they each have Salighed as their telos. Kierkegaard's subjectivity is thus a meta-
epistemological principle that takes a doxastic practice approach to epistemology and
transforms the epistemological enterprise from a science of belief to an ethics of
belief.
The conclusion will review the manner in which Kierkegaard's subjectivity has
been shown to be epistemological. It will then make draw out some of the
implications of the meta-epistemology of the subjectivity principle for a substantive
epistemology, and how knowledge could further be analysed.
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PART ONE
SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH IN KIERKEGAARD'S PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER TWO
KIERKEGAARD'S CRITIQUE OF REASON
Modern philosophy, being abstract, is floating in metaphysical indeterminateness. Instead of
explaining this about itself and then directing people (individual persons) to the ethical, the
religious, the existential, philosophy has given the appearance [Skin] that people are able to
speculate themselves out of their own skin [Skind], as they so very prosaically say, into pure
appearance [Skin],
Anti-Climacus, Practice in Christianity
Kierkegaard develops the "subjectivity principle", a term he uses in his journals,1
primarily through the mouthpiece of his pseudonym Johannes Climacus in the two
works, Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript to
Philosophical Fragments. In Chapter One we noted that this principle can be simply
paraphrased from Postscript as, "Truth is subjectivity", or more pragmatically, "The
How determines the What".2 Climacus defines this more elegantly as, "an objective
uncertainty, held fast through an appropriation with the most passionate inwardness".3
The pseudonymous declaration of Kierkegaard that "Truth is subjectivity" postulates
an interesting, if cryptic, philosophical principle; one that appears to be aimed directly at
the issues of epistemology and belief.4 This chapter looks at the philosophical context
in which the Kierkegaardian pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, formulates his subjectivity
principle and examines it in light of its orientation to modem epistemology.
It is characteristic of modem epistemology (at least since Descartes) that epistemic
justification is conceived as requiring a metaphysical guarantee of infallibility. The term
"metaphysical-epistemological" will be used throughout this thesis to refer to a species
of inquiry that adopts a robust confidence in the ability of human reason to inquire into
the nature of "reality" on its own terms and achieve veridical answers. The chief
characteristic of the metaphysical-epistemological inquiry of modernity is its
1 Kierkegaard's emphasis on subjectivity properly regarded as a formal principle of his thought as
Kierkegaard himself refers to it as such. See JP IV 4550/Pap. X2 A 299.
2 KW XII. 1 610-22, 613n-614/SV X 272-281, 274n-275.
3 KW XII. 1 203/SV IX 169.
4 See KW XII. 1 203/SV IX 169. This and other related ideas of Kierkegaard have fuelled many diverse
intellectual trends in the twentieth century from the putative existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin
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programmatic search to establish absolute, infallible rational foundations for human
knowledge from within human noetic resources, absent any external aid. It will become
clear in this and the proceeding chapters (especially Chapter Three) that Kierkegaard's
challenge to the metaphysical-epistemological project of modernity is not a complete
jettisoning of either metaphysics or epistemology. The term "metaphysical" here
denotes a particular sort of intellectual inquiry—the kind which lays claim to uncover
the hidden substance of things. This does not, however, imply that Kierkegaard
ultimately denies all metaphysical "presence". We will find that Kierkegaard's concern
is to rescript the map of belief by returning to "Kant's deviation" from modernity,
which placed limits on the scope of reason. What primarily interests Kierkegaard is
existence—human existence.
Kant, Hegel, and Descartes: Kierkegaard andModern Philosophy
Kierkegaard was one of the earliest critics of modernity (predating Nietzsche by a
handful of years) and its attempt to establish indubitable foundations for human
knowledge from within the resources of human noetic capabilities. Kierkegaard's
importance lies in his ascertaining that the root of the problem with modernity lay in its
(re)conceptualisation of the human subject as a purely rational, self-relating subject who
possesses radical autonomy. The modem notion of human subjectivity that Kierkegaard
rejects is the one advanced in Rene Descartes's formula, cogito ergo sum [I think
therefore I am], as a self-transparent knowing subject, able to hold the objects of its
consciousness, including itself, before itself with diaphanous clarity. Despite his
dissension from Cartesian philosophy, Kierkegaard remained fundamentally interested
in the issues of modernity—what concerned him was the wrongheaded approach to
these issues taken by modernity, an approach he saw embodied in the speculative
metaphysical System of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). It possible then,
and instructive, to view Kierkegaard's project as a reconfiguration or a rescripting of the
Heidegger, and Karl Jaspers, to the theologies of Karl Bath and Paul Tillich, to the "postmodern"
thought of Theodor Adorno.
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issues ofmodernity, rather than a complete forsaking of them as some would have it. In
this sense Kierkegaard is more properly post-Enlightenment than he is postmodern.
Immanuel Kant and Georg W. F. Hegel are only two of the thinkers who
contributed significantly to Kierkegaard's intellectual legacy. There are a variety of
persons to whom Kierkegaard's thought owes a debt, including Friedrich W. J.
Schelling, Gotthold E. Lessing, Johann G. Hamaan, Johann G. Fichte, Nikolai F. S.
Grundtvig, Hans L. Martensen, Fredirick C. Sibbem, and Martin Luther, to name only a
few. However, Kant and Hegel are treated here as primary influences in Kierkegaard's
intellectual development because they are deemed to be seminal to the whole direction of
Kierkegaard's thought and are basic and fundamental to Kierkegaard's philosophical
undertaking. Kierkegaard himself claims that Kant and Hegel are the pinnacle of
modem philosophy—especially Hegel. In fact, all of modem philosophy bears (for
Kierkegaard) the "birthmark" of Rene Descartes's philosophy.5 In other words, Hegel,
for Kierkegaard, presents us with the ultimate logical extension of Cartesian
philosophical method and assumptions. Regardless of the resources gleaned from other
thinkers, it is the legacy inherited from Kant and Hegel with which Kierkegaard wrestles
throughout his philosophical life (while it is more obviously Luther with whom he
contends in his theology). As such, Hegel and Kant are of particular importance for the
aspect of Kierkegaard's thought under scrutiny here.
It is generally agreed that the driving force behind Kierkegaard's literary effort was
a polemical response to the speculative philosophy of Hegel.6 While we must heed
Merold Westphal's warning that "Kierkegaard is never simply anti-Hegelian",7 it is
important to frame Kierkegaard's criticisms of modem epistemology, particularly those
found in Johannes Chmacus's Fragments and Postscript, against the backdrop of
5 JPlll 2338/Pap. IV C 11.
6 This fact is so widely attested—with varying opinions on the degree and significance—that one need
only choose at random a piece on Kierkegaard to find this claim in some form, especially in the various
biographies written on him. For three good treatments of Kierkegaard's philosophical relationship with
Hegel, see Merold Westphal, "Kierkegaard and Hegel", in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard ,
eds. Alastair Hannay and George Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 101-124;
Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); and
Steven M. Emmanuel, Kierkegaard and the Concept ofRevelation , 24-34.
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Kierkegaard's response to Hegel's speculative philosophy and Hegel's Danish
exegetes.8 Kierkegaard's severest criticisms of Hegel (et at.) were directed against what
Kierkegaard regarded to be the apotheosis of Reason in Hegel's "System" inherent in
the claim that philosophy has an absolute and presuppositionless beginning.9
Hegel is concerned in his philosophical project to overcome the sort of dualism
modem philosophy inherited from that posited an unbridgeable gulf between the subject
of thought (who thinks) and the external world of perceived objects. He therefore
searches for a way to unite thinking and being so that the strict dichotomy between them
is overcome and human reason becomes embodied reason.10 Hegel argues that,
the beginning [of the science of Logic] must be an absolute, or what is synonymous here, an
abstract beginning; and so it may not presuppose anything, must not be mediated by anything
nor have a ground; rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire science. Consequently, it must
be purely and simply and immediacy , or rather merely immediacy itself. . . . The beginning
therefore is pure being."
For Hegel, human reason, or "logic", is the self-mediation of being. Reality is a
manifold evulgation of the Absolute Idea (or Spirit) and as such is constituted by
concepts.12 Hegel uses "thought" in a broad way to refer to a self-unifying or self-
determining process whereby one thing distinguishes itself from another as the result of
the development of its own internal telos (versus an external manipulation).13 The idea is
that reality and thought are embedded in a shared underlying logical structure14 such
7 Westphal, "Kierkegaard and Hegel", 101.
8 Kierkegaard's understanding of Hegelian philosophy shaped his thinking about epistemology.
Whether Kierkegaard actually read Hegel "correctly" is superfluous. The discussion here concerns what
Kierkegaard understood Hegel to be saying, since it is this to which Kierkegaard responds.
9 For Kierkegaard's comments on this feature of Hegelian philosophy, see KW XII.1 111-113/SV IX
94-96, and passim.
10 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 16-23.
11 His emphasis; see Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press,
1969), 70, 73.
12 Hegel, in his Hegel's Logic. Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. W.
Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), states that thought "is the constitutive substance of external
things" (§24Z), and that "a living being is a syllogism" (§217).
13 Frank B. Farrell, Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernism—The Recovery of the World
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 16-17.
14 Hegel calls this "the Notion [Begriff—concept]", and it bares comparison to Pythagoras's concept of
numbers. See, for example, Aristotle's comment, in Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Treddenick, in Greek
Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle, Second Edition, ed.Reginald E. Allen (New York: The Free Press,
1985) 1090a 20: "The Pythagoreans, because they saw many attributes of numbers belonging to
sensible bodies, supposed real things to be numbers—not separable numbers, however, but numbers of
which real things consist". Hegel himself notes the affinity of his "Notion" with the Pythagorean
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that logical principles are "immanent" in living things which, accordingly, are able to be
prehended unaided by human Reason.15 Reality is comprised not only of a hierarchy of
forms of life, but modes of thought as well, so that human rationality is developed
rationality.16 In the end, thought and Being are substantially homologous. Thus, a
carefully thinking (logical) person, with a fully-developed rationality, has direct and
unmediated access to reality as it really is and in the act of thinking is able fully to
ideate what is actual as it is in itself (given that one possesses the adequate mental
faculties). Spirit is absolute Reality/Truth and consequently truth is not found in the
variegated components of one's experience (or thoughts); instead one must think the
whole of reality to have truth. What is often contradictory at one level eventually will be
resolved as one comes to a more clear and comprehensive understanding. Thus,
Aristotle's law of noncontradiction17 is cancelled or annulled in Hegel's celebrated
theory of number in Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Volume I, trans. E.S. Haldane and
Frances H. Simson (New York: The Humanities Press, 1974), p. 210, and states that, "the
Pythagoreans did not accept numbers in this indifferent way [i.e., as the static differentiation and
enumeration of individual units], but as Notion". Hegel elaborates further: "In the Pythagorean system
numbers seem ... to be at once the thought-determination of unity, of opposition and of the unity of
these two moments. In part, the Pythagoreans from the very first gave forth universal ideal
determinations of numbers as principles, and recognized ... as the absolute principles of things, not so
much immediate numbers in their arithmetic differences, as the principles of number, i.e. their rational
differences. . . . These are not differences of one thing from another, but universal and essential
differences within themselves". Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, pp. 211-12. Hegel's
fundamental criticism of the Pythagoreans in this passage is that they were not content with these
"first determinations of unity" and attempted to go beyond them to provide universal, concrete
determinations for empirical objects. These attempts, Hegel says, result in a static and shallow
dogmatism that is unable to account for the dynamic and manifold unfolding of being. See Lectures on
the History of Philosophy, p. 212.
15 In Hegel's Science of Logic, p. 766, Hegel says, "Since the Notion is immanent in it, the
purposiveness of the living being is to be grasped as inner; the Notion is in it as determinative Notion,
distinct from its externality, and in its distinguishing, pervading the externality and remaining identical
with itself'. In Subjectivity, Realism, and Postmodernism, p. 17, Frank Farrell comments that for
Hegel, "Just as the middle term links universal and particular terms in the well-formed relations of
certain syllogisms, so a biological entity is a self-unifying whole that joins in a successful 'mediation'
a universal character and particular differences or determinations. Because living things embody, so he
believes, those patterns of logical activity, Hegel feels free to say that they are 'thoughts' or
'syllogisms.'" It is important to note (as does Farrell) that this reading of Hegel's idealism makes him
amenable some versions of metaphysical realism which see reality as articulated into units and sorts;
and it certainly distances him from Berkleyan idealism, which views reality as substantively dependent
upon the mental activity of particular thinkers. It is also important to note in what follows that
Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel does not depend upon a reading of Hegel as anti-realist.
16 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, 20.
17 Aristotle's law of noncontradiction was one of the fundamental "laws" of logic, hitherto until Hegel.
It generally expressed, "A is not non-A". Or more colloquially put, a thing cannot be both what is and
what is not in the same way, time, and space.
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Aufltebung.n For Hegel's "Reason", all propositions are ultimately reconciled to each
other.
Hegel inherited the mantle of transcendental German idealist philosophy from Kant
after the latter performed his dramatic reversal in philosophical rationalism, generated by
his transcendental scepticism.19 Inspired by the more radical scepticism of David Hume,
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason had effectuated a "Copernican Revolution" by
proposing a new hypothesis from which to launch metaphysical-epistemological
inquiry. Rather than conceive of perception on the former "geocentric" model, in which
our minds conform to the objects of the universe in the act of cognition (analogous to
viewing the sun revolving around the earth), Kant argued there was more explanatory
power if perception is understood in a "heliocentric" manner, where perceptual objects
conform to our capacities to know them. Thus Kant limited the sphere to which
theoretical reason (the instrument for procuring knowledge) has access to, arguing that
the noumenal ding an sich is something theoretical reason cannot access—one only
postulates it via practical reason as the basis for free moral action. A fortiori this entails
a kind of scepticism as to the metaphysical nature or essence of the objects we perceive.
For if our minds construct or organise sense-data into comprehensible patterns as Kant
would have it, one has no epistemological guarantee that this is according to the nature
of the object as it is separate from our perceiving it.
18 Hegel and Kierkegaard both make use of this German concept of Aufhebung which does not have a
strict English equivalent. It is variously translated as "sublate" or "annul" and sometimes "mediate".
Merold Westphal very succinctly summarises this principle of Aufhebung : "X is aufgehoben in Y
when X is recontextualised, so that instead of standing by itself, it belongs to Y, a wider frame of
reference of which it is not the first principle". See Merold Westphal, Becoming A Self: A Reading of
Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press,
1996), 25. Westphal elaborates, "When X is aufgehoben, or teleologically suspended in Y, the
immediate, self-sufficient form of X is cancelled, and whatever belongs to that mode of its being is
relativised as something insufficient by itself. But this has positive significance, for the claim that Y
is the truth of, telos of, X, and that in this process X realises itself, or at least moves to a higher
normative development"; Westphal, Becoming A Self\ 146. Kierkegaard parodies the Hegelian usage of
this term in KW XII. 1 222-23/SV IX 184, but very subtly employs his own version of the
Aufhebung, standing Hegel on his head. This is particularly apparent in Kierkegaard's understanding of
the leap, or qualitative transition, to faith.
19 Once again, my concern here is not an exposition on Kant, but rather how Kierkegaard understood
him. Ronald Green has argued (too strongly) that Kierkegaard is fundamentally Kantian throughout his
authorship and that this is something Kierkegaard was either incapable of discerning or at pains to
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Hegel believes that the "severest defect" of Kant's philosophy is his "subjective
idealism" described above.20 Kant, Hegel thinks, has forever and indissolubly isolated
our thoughLs of reality from what reality actually is. The "subjective" part of Hegel's
description of Kant's philosophy is meant by Hegel to refer to the fact that according to
Kant the propositional attitudes and dispositional mental states of human subjects in any
description of or experience with "objects" in the "world" are dependent upon
qualities unique to the subjects who have these propositional attitudes and dispositional
mental states. The "idealist" part of Hegel's label for Kant's philosophy refers to
Kant's assertion that the possibility of having an experience of the "external world" is
dependent upon particular forms of intuition and an a priori categorical framework that
exists in our minds. Hegel's problem with Kant's theoretical, "critical" philosophy, is
that it is not critical enough.21 The trouble with Kant's subjective idealism, for Hegel, is
that the former assumes that having an understanding of a concept is to operate with
categories of intuition or judgment. In Hegel's view, a genuinely critical philosophy will
be one that does not take anything for granted—even about thought and its own
categories—except for the rather mundane assumption that there is such a thing as
thought.22 Thus Hegel quests for the absolute starting point for thinking—within
thought itself.
disguise. See Green's, Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1992).
20 Stephen Priest, "Subjectivity and Objectivity in Kant", in Hegel's Critique of Kant, ed. Stephen
Priest (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 109. Priest argues (convincingly) that Hegel is wrong to call
Kant a subjective idealist because this depends upon a false reading of Kant's phenomenal/noumenal
split, in which these are taken to represent two ontologically distinct realms of being. Priest claims
instead that Kant's position is a "neutral monism" in which phenomena and noumena are "two ways
of specifying the same thing"; (ibid., 110). This reading is not without its own problems, however,
and one must wonder with Alvin Plantinga how Kant could think of his philosophy as a constituting a
"Copernican Revolution" if this is what he meant by phenomena and noumena. See Plantinga,
Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13. Whether or not Priest's neutral
monist reading is correct, it certainly is the most charitable reading of Kant and renders the phenomena-
noumena distinction most intelligible.




In the Postscript Kierkegaard has Climacus read Hegel back to Kant and finds
Hegel's "method" of answering Kant's scepticism flawed.23 Climacus argues that,
the dubiousness of 'the method' [of Hegel] is already apparent in his relation to Kant. A
scepticism that confiscates thinking itself [like Kant's] cannot be halted by being thought
through, because this must indeed be done by thinking, which is on the side of the mutineer. It
must be broken off. To reply to Kant within the fantastical Schattenspiel [shadow play] of pure
thinking is precisely not to reply to him—the an sich that cannot be thought is existing, with
which thinking has nothing at all to do.24
On Climacus's reading, Hegel attempted to reconcile the tension in Kant between the
noumenal and phenomenal realms, between how things appear and how they really are,
by "mediating" being in an identification of the "real" (that which is or has being)
with the rational (autonomous human Reason). Held up to Kant, Climacus finds Hegel
to be "fantastical" and to have completely begged the question. That which Hegel
assumes (the identity of thought and being)25 from the outset is precisely what has been
problematised. Hegel's critical philosophy is itself culpably uncritical.
In his Journals and Papers Kierkegaard reminds us of Kant's "well-known
(honest) 100 dollars",26 which Kierkegaard understood as an excellent example of "the
famous Kantian distinction between what is thought and the actuality [of it]".27
Climacus approvingly calls this "Kant's deviation" from a wrong turn in modern
philosophy and interprets him as bringing Kierkegaard's own notion of actuality (which
he defined in Kantian terms as "a self-with-holding an sich") into relationship with
23 It is not unscrupulous of Kierkegaard to critique Hegel in light of his relationship to Kant as it is
clear that Hegel himself formulates his philosophy against a Kantian backdrop. Houlgate explains in,
"General Introduction", 7, 10: "Hegel comes to understand his thought as a radicalization of Kant's
theoretical, rather than practical, philosophy - in particular, as a radicalization of Kant's theoretical
critique of metaphysics. ... he understands the historical source of his mature thought to he in Kant's
Critique ofPure Reason (1781), from which paths lead either to the Phenomenology or directly to the
Science of Logic. There is much in Kant's critical philosophy with which Hegel does not agree. But
Hegel acknowledges that the critical philosophy involves 'the correct insight that the forms of thinking
themselves' - the categories - 'must be made the object of cognition' [quoted from Hegel's
Encyclopedia ofLogic]" (Houlgates's italics).
24 KW XII. 1 328/SVX 32.
25 KW XII. 1 328/SVX 32.
26 Kant points out how, on the one hand, the concept of "a hundred real thalers" and one's actually
having them in one's pocket involve (conceptually) exactly the same amount of money and therefore in
this sense the two states are identical. But on the other hand, Kant goes on to note, "My financial
situation is, however, affected very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of
them". See Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason , trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London:
MacMillan, 1950), 505.
27 JP III 3558/Pap. X1 A 666.
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thinking (possibility) by "referring actuality to the ethical".28 He tells us that since
philosophy—via Hegel—has abandoned this "honest way" of Kant's. It has become
"fantastic".29 The knowledge of Kant's noumcna (Kierkegaard's actuality) that
Hegelian "pure thought" achieves is a chimera. Against Hegelian objectivity, the "pure
I-I" that erases the subjectivity or in-itself-ness of the human thinker, Kierkegaard
raises his principle of subjectivity and returns actuality to its rightful ethical domain.
Despite this agreement with Kant, we must take care not to collapse completely the
Kierkegaardian corrective back into Kant's rationalist philosophy.30 Kant had proposed
his own answer to his brand of scepticism by disarticulating theoretical reason from
practical reason, asserting the primacy of the latter.31 Kierkegaard rejects the contention
that any form of reason could positively grasp actuality and saw this as a confusion in
Kant. John Heywood Thomas notes that, "[Kierkegaard's] practical interest meant that
he refused to follow Kant in the latter's strict separation of pure and practical
reason".32 Kierkegaard distinguishes himself further from Kant's practical postulation
of the an sich as a "nonknowledge" (Kierkegaard's term), by arguing that faith grasps
actuality beyond knowledge.33 The problem with Kant's schematic is that ultimately it
remains cast in rationalist and metaphysical terms, and thereby persists in its complete
dependence upon a Cartesian notion of the human subject (detailed below). Truth must
be immanent in the human subject and through reason the selfmust have itself purely as
its own object—as a metaphysical guarantee for its justifications—or one loses one's
28 KW XII. 1 328/SV X 32. Why this is high praise from Kierkegaard will become obvious later in this
chapter when we discuss his concepts of possibility and the ethical, where it is proposed that
Kierkegaard privileges the ethical over the cpistcmological. However, he is not to be identified with
Kant too closely, even in his provisional endorsement of the category of the an sich. Cf. JP II
2235/Pap. X5 A 132.
29 JP III 3558/Pap. X' A 666; cf. KW II 144/SV I 180-81.
30 This is Ronald Green's error in Kierkegaard and Kant.
31 Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1956), 124-26.
32 See "Kierkegaard's Alternative Metaphysical Theology", in History ofEuropean Ideas 12 (1990), 33-
63. For as similar assessment from a radically different reading of Kierkegaard, see also Peter Fenves,
"Chatter": Language and History in Kierkegaard, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 150-51.
33 JP II 2252/Pap. II C 48. Kierkegaard's position on this is discussed in much more detail later in this
chapter.
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autonomy as a rational agent.34 Kant remains entrenched in the quest to circumscribe
and legitimate all things under Reason, and thus Kant's epistemology continues to be
one in which the only legitimate candidate for belief (or action) is one that is securely
anchored in the infallible foundations human reason (either theoretical or practical).35
These attempts, of both Kant and Hegel, to prescribe the role and limit of reason in
regulating our beliefs, form the background for Kierkegaard's criticism of epistemology
and account of belief. Following in the tradition of Rene Descartes, the Hegelian-
Enlightenment36 emphasis is on Epistemology as absolute knowledge. This is a very
strong conception of Epistemology, which might be characterised with a capital 'E', the
tradition inherited from Plato and Descartes (et al.), where belief must be certain and
indubitable if it is genuinely to be knowledge, and the goal of believing is infallibility.37
Kierkegaard categorically rejects this view of knowledge and the tasks of epistemology.
Hegel's epistemological perspective emerges from its complicity with modem,
Enlightenment philosophy. As noted earlier, behind this perspective looms Rene
34 Kant does not see this as his own position. Kant, in fact, argues that one, strictly speaking, does not
"know" one's own existence, as it is noumena. One simply is oneself. This may be the case, for Kant,
and still the above point stands. Kant must assume that through reason one can discern the contents of
one's consciousness (which are phenomena) , and do that veridically, or Kant cannot have his
philosophy. Human reason must be able to use its categories to understand that it understands, and this
must be the truth of the matter, or there can be no transcendental deductions made. If it is the case that
reason does not do this for Kant, the premises from which one would deduce anything would be less
than necessary, and that would entail that one's conclusions were also less than necessary—something
Kant's critical philosophy cannot abide. It is this priority of absolute self-relatedness that is the
Cartesian element in Kant.
35 At this point Kant's split of reason into two spheres becomes dubious, as it is not at all clear how
reason is qualitatively different (as opposed to functionally different) when it has as its content
empirical phenomena, on the one hand, or moral action on the other. Despite Kant's protestations to
have "found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room forfaith", in Kant, Critique of Pure
Reason, 29 (his italics), he nevertheless continues to subjugate all spheres of human life to Reason and
cannot bring himself to deny reason as the final court of appeal in human affairs. This is because of his
Cartesian notion of the autonomous subject.
36 "Hegelian-Enlightenment" is used to refer to the coincidence of the aims and goals of Hegel's system
of philosophy as typifying the overarching aims and goals of the general approach to philosophical
problems taken in the Enlightenment. This terms refers then, not to the particularities of Hegel's
philosophy per se, nor comprehensively to all of Enlightenment philosophy. It is meant to denote that
which Hegel shares with his fellow Enlightened philosophers and what they share with him, thereby
uniting in one term the discordant and conflicting array of philosophical movements and systems which
historically characterised modem philosophy.
37 See Plato's "Meno", in Classics of Western Philosophy , ed. Steven M. Cahn (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1977), 4-27, where Plato defines knowledge as a true belief that is
rationally justified. See also Rene Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy", in Classics of
Western Philosophy, ed. Steven M. Cahn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977), 331.
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Descartes. There are two serious features of the Cartesian turn in philosophy that
Kierkegaard opposes. The first issue concerns Descartes's radical departure from
ancient and scholastic philosophy and its methodological veneration of tradition and
authority. Philosophy for the scholastics, as with the ancients, began with wonder and
took place within a community in which there was endorsed a set of virtues (intellectual
and moral) that constituted the context for legitimate philosophical exploration. Instead,
the Cartesian philosophical method eschews tradition and external authority and
employs doubt to strip our philosophical cogitations down to "indubitable" First
Principles.38 The individual has the right—indeed, the responsibility—to determine for
oneself, through the exercise of rational introspection and without reference to external
authority, the truth, and this because the individual (not religious and cultural
institutions) possesses "Reason". We may call this view of human reason autonomy 1.
Reason, for humans with autonomy 1, is both self-grounding and absolute in its scope
and this provides the basis for Descartes's method.
The second major issue that Kierkegaard has with Cartesian philosophy, and
imputes to modem philosophy, is a peculiar notion of human subjectivity that follows
from Descartes's assumptions about the supremacy of human reason. It is in fact this
conception of the human subject, in the end, that drives Descartes's philosophical
method—although Descartes does not present this in a so obviously circular manner.
The indubitable ground that Descartes putatively establishes for his beliefs is reflected
in his famous axiom: cogito ergo sum [I think therefore I am], Descartes must find a
means of securing an epistemic stronghold that is immune from his unrelenting
doubt—and that place, he believes, is the clarity and distinctness of his self-
apprehension in the act of thinking. This rational self-possession we will call autonomy
2.
38 See Descartes, "Meditations of First Philosophy", 303-346. Compare Kierkegaard's comments in a
sketch fox Johannes Climacus: "[modern] philosophy begins with doubt, one must doubt to
philosophize; in that case philosophy presumably must begin with something else (just as when it
began with wonder, it began with explaining the wonderful—here with/a/f/z). Modem philosophy
begins with doubt". See KW VII 240/Pap. IV B 5:4.
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Descartes finds that it is the clarity and distinctness with which he is presented with
his own self in the act of thinking that leads him to believe that he is not (and could not
possibly be) deceived in this thought—as he had been deceived by his senses.39
Descartes concludes that, "there is nothing easier for me to know than my mind".40
The reason for this is that the mind and the self are of the same mental substance, while
bodies are of a separate material substance. Stephen Priest notes that Descartes reasons
from the fact that he may doubt he has a body, but not that he has a mind, to the
conclusion that he must therefore be a mind and not a body.41 Priest recalls a parallel
passage in Descartes's Discourse on Method:
Examining attentively what I was, and seeing that I could pretend that I had no body and that
there was no world or place that I was in, but that I could not for all that pretend that I did not
exist, and that on the contrary, from the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other
things, it followed very evidently and very certainly that I existed: while on the other hand, if I
had only ceased to think, although the rest of what I had ever imagined had been true, I would
have had reason to believe that I existed; I thereby concluded that I was a substance of which
the whole essence or nature consists in thinking, and which, in order to exist, needs no place
and depends upon no material thing; so that this I, that is to say the mind, by which I am
what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, and even that it is easier to know that the body,
and moreover, that even if the body were not, it would not cease to be all that it is.42
Note that Descartes's method (of doubt), his view of human reason (as absolute), and
his metaphysical dualism are nested. These beliefs, in other words, are all logically
related to each other and come as a unit. Descartes's methodological doubt depends
upon the sufficiency of reason (autonomy 1) to halt doubt through the rational self-
apprehension (autonomy 2) of the cogito. That is, Descartes's methodological doubt
logically entails a radically autonomous subject—one that is autonomous in both senses
of autonomy 1 and autonomy 2. If such a subject is not secured, there is no point in
using doubt as a method for stripping away falsehood. Doubt would lose its perspicuity
without the radical autonomy of Descartes's subject. Likewise, metaphysical dualism is
required for Descartes's reason to have complete access to the self of the cogito. The
epistemological purity of the human subject is made possible by its being one with
thought: "I thereby concluded that I was a substance of which the whole essence or
39 See Descartes, "Meditations" (especially Meditations I and II), 309-318.
40 Ibid., 318.
41 Priest, Theories of the Mind (London: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), 20.
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nature consists in thinking", claims Descartes above. Gordon Michalson's description
of the logic of Descartes's position is worth quoting:
It is this Cartesian priority of self-relatedness to other-relatedness that sets the terms for our
modern notions of autonomy .. . For on the terms of the reflexive Cartesian scheme there can
be no autonomy when some "other" (understood now as anything distinct from my own
subjectivity) relates to the self in a way that is prior to or disruptive of the self's natural
relationship to itself. The very possibility of autonomy lies in just this self-relatedness,
defined in terms of the capacity to be conscious that one is conscious. Nothing can justifiably
disrupt, override, or undermine this reflexivity, for it is the reflexivity itself that is
foundational, just as the certainty that he is thinking is foundational for Descartes in the
elaboration of subsequent knowledge-claims.43
The point is that the Cartesian notion of radical and absolute self-autonomy (autonomy
1 and autonomy 2) of the human agent requires an epistemological and metaphysical
construct (the self of the cogito) in which it is guaranteed that the self has itself qua its
particular self in the act of rational reflection. As Michalson noted above, this is in fact
what shapes all modern notions of the autonomous rational agent, and without some
version of this cogito (at least implied), the notion of complete rational autonomy
perishes. Autonomy 1 requires autonomy 2 in order to secure it.
Kierkegaard's response to the Cartesian cogito and its notion of human subjectivity
is the focus of the rest of this chapter. For this reason we will move past his criticism of
the cogito and immediately turn to Kierkegaard's reaction to Descartes's philosophical
method.
The commitments enmeshed in the "new" Cartesian philosophical methodology
lead all of modem philosophy, in Kierkegaard's view, to participate in a common set of
errors, all of which have Descartes as their progenitor. The basic error that Kierkegaard
finds in the Cartesian method is its erroneous assumption that human reason is
sufficient to establish the truth within in its own resources. Because of this assumption,
Descartes (et al.) also assume that human reason is the final arbiter for all of human
belief and practice. This, of course, immediately raises a problem. If reason is to
perform in such a spectacular role, it must also have a metaphysical guarantee that what
42 Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, trans. F.E. Sutcliffe (London: Harmondsworth, 1974), 54.
43 Gordon Michalson, Jr., Kant and the Problem ofGod (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 9-10.
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it thinks really is. Anti-Climacus expresses this concern by affirming Climacus's
conclusion:
[I]n modern philosophy there is a confused discussion of doubt where the discussion should
have been about despair. Therefore one has been unable to control or govern doubt either in
scholarship or in life. "Despair," however, promptly points in the right direction by placing
the relation under the rubric of personality (the single individual) and the ethical. . . .Modem
philosophy, being abstract, is floating in metaphysical indeterminateness. Instead of
explaining this about itself and then directing people to the ethical, the religious, the
existential, philosophy has given the appearance [Skin] that people are able to speculate
themselves out of their own skin [Skind], as they so very prosaically say, into pure
appearance [Skin].44
Kierkegaard45 is claiming, here, that modem philosophy had not yet been able to shake
Cartesian assumptions about rational self-relatedness—not even in the critical
philosophies of Hegel and Kant. So, in Kierkegaard's mind, sufficient to be
"Cartesian" is the methodological assumption that philosophy must proceed through
doubt, for this carries with it the basic assumptions nested along with Descartes's
deployment of doubt. Kierkegaard is recognising the logic of Descartes's cogito as
explicated above by Michaelson. In Kierkegaard's view, doubt cannot penetrate the
depths of the human subject and discern the truth with respect to it because the human
person is more than just a ratio machina [mechanical reason],
Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel may be re-stated, then, as the charge that Hegel has
not overcome the Cartesian split between mind and body. Hegel's attempt to preserve an
embodied subject fails. Although Hegel is the primary target of Kierkegaard's attack, it
is really Descartes with whom Kierkegaard quarrels. Kierkegaard maintains a healthy
respect for Hegel and incorporates much of Hegel's dialectic in his own thought.
However, Kierkegaard understands the Cartesian project to have reached its zenith in the
Hegelian System, and to have been pushed to its ultimate and logical conclusion. Thus,
for Kierkegaard the basic error of both Hegel and Kant is that they continue the
Cartesian project with Cartesian tools. Kant and Hegel and the rest of modem
44 KW XX 81n/Sk XVI 75n-76.
45 Although Practice in Christianity is published under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, Kierekgaard
attached the pseudonym to the book only moments before publication. The Hongs's note that the
above quoted footnote also refers to "the works of some of the pseudonymous authors", one of which,
based on the content, must be Anti-Climacus himself. Thus they conclude that, "The reference is no
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philosophy (although Kant less than Hegel) follow Descartes' conception of the task of
philosophy as that of establishing irrefutable epistemic foundations for human
knowledge by proceeding from the assumption, "De omnibus dubitandum est
[Everything must be doubted]".46 As we have already seen, this "wrong turn in
philosophy" is deeply connected to Descartes' ontological reduction of the human
subject to the cogito\ the metaphysical guarantee Descartes deduces as the requirement
for infallible human knowledge. This subject is the possessor of itself; the objectively
certain subject that understands itself with clarity and distinctness.47 Hegel may, as
Charles Taylor argues, reject Descartes's disembodied subject by arguing that Geist is
always embodied spirit, so that there is no hiatus between life and consciousness.48 But
Kierkegaard's criticism is that Hegel's method fails to takes the embodiment of the
thinker seriously and operates de facto as if the opposite were true—as if all of reality is
present in thought.
There are four features of the Hegelian-Enlightenment project that serve as a foil for
Kierkegaard's analysis of belief and its concomitant normativity. First, the Hegelian
doubt an unchanged remnant of Kierkegaard's idea of direct authorship before his decision to use a
pseudonym"; KW 385 nl9.
46 See Kierkegaard's polemic against modern philosophy in this regard in his unpublished (in his
lifetime), Johannes Climacus, Or, De Omnibus Dubitandum Est. A Narrative; KW VII 113-172/Pap.
IV B 1. Kierkegaard is surely correct in attributing this view to Hegel, who states in, Hegel's Lectures
on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3, trans. E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (New York:
Humanities Press, 1955), p. 224: "Descartes expresses the fact that we must begin from thought as
such alone, by saying that we must doubt everything (De omnibus dubitandum est)\ and that is the
absolute beginning. He thus makes the abolition of all determinations the first condition of
philosophy". Kierkegaard does not limit this critique to just Kant and Hegel, but extends it to all of
modem philosophy. For example, he begins Johannes Climacus with the following epigraph from
Benedict Spinoza's De intellectus emedatione Tratatus[On the Improvement of the Understanding],
Opera philosophica omnia, ed. August Gfoerer (Stuttgart: 1830), p. 511: "Loquor de vera dubitatione in
mente, et non de ea, quam passim videmus contingere, ubi scilicet verbis, quamvis animus non dubitet,
dicit quis se dubitare: non est enim Methodi hoc emendare, sed potius pertinet ad inquisitionem
pertinacice et ejus emedationem [I speak of real doubt existing in the mind, not of such doubt as we see
exemplified when a man says that he doubts, though his mind does not really hesitate. The cure of the
latter does not fall within the province of the Method, it belongs rather to inquiries concerning
obstinacy and its cure]" KW VII 115/Pap. IV B 1 103. For examples of this interpretation of modem
philosophy in Kierkegaard, see also, KW I 114/Pap. II B 16 296; KW I 117-18/Pap. II B 16 298-99;
KW II 342/SV I 208; KW III 462-3/SV II 150; KW VI 5-6/SV V 8; KW XII. 1 317-18/5V X 22-3;
KW XII. 1 195/SVIX 162-3; KW XIV 93/SV XV 145; KW XIV 119-20/SV XV 168-9. For another
contemporary reading of Kant and Hegel as carrying the Cartesian torch in philosophy, see Gordon
Michalson, Kant and the Problem ofGod, 6-14.
47 See Descartes, "Meditations of First Philosophy", passim, where he searches for a method of
transcending his subjectivity.
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project harbours a metaphysical assumption, namely, that thought is (structurally)
identical to being—or to use Kierkegaard's terminology, that possibility is
actuality—and thought is therefore able to "mediate" being. This is the cardinal issue
Kierkegaard takes up with Hegel, and the metaphysical-epistemological project in
general. From this point of departure, the rest of Hegel's System goes awry. From this
metaphysical assumption follows the second feature. Methodologically, it is assumed
that there is a presuppositionless beginning that can be arrived at by "pure thought";
i.e., a beginning at the beginning (or end). The way to proceed, then, in an inquiry is
"objectively" by employing abstract Reason. A third facet of Hegel's infallibilist
metaphysical-epistemology is that it contains an implicit ontology. It is presupposed that
humans are such that they have the self-transparency required to attain to and recognise
the achievement of total harmony between subject and object. And lastly, Hegel's
metaphysics includes the epistemological assumption that human cognition and reason
have unimpeded access to reality in its fullest and deepest expressions. These four
features of Hegelian-Enlightenment Epistemology constitute the constrictive framework
which Kierkegaard intends Climacus's subjectivity principle to correct.
The Category ofParadox
Through Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard introduces his principle of subjectivity as
an epistemological thesis to resolve the residual tensions he sees in Kant's and Hegel's
idealisms. Kant and Hegel have not yet accounted for being in time, as embodied being,
and thus have not accounted for knowing in time either. Kierkegaard chisels out a space
in the conversation for his notion of subjectivity by advancing his category of paradox.
The category of the paradox emerges from the juxtaposition of thought and existence
which occurs as the fundamental "duplexity" of human life.49 The insistence upon this
48 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, 18.
49 In his Journals and Papers it is reiterated that the category of the paradox is required as a
philosophical category to account for the phenomenon of cognition. Kierkegaard saw Kant's solution
as a self-referentially incoherent ad hoc concession but argues that, "the paradox is not a concession but
a category, an ontological qualification which expresses the relationship between an existing cognitive
spirit and the eternal truth"; JP III 3089/Pap. VIII1 All.
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as an elemental feature of human existence marks the beginning of Kierkegaard's
polemic against the Hegelian metaphysical System and its chimeric response to the
Kantian dilemma.30
Kierkegaard recognised that the problems of epistemology have a dual aspect in a
way that Hegel and the rest ofmodem philosophy never realised.51 The first problem in
this duality regards the nature of the object and the potential problem its ontological
status brings to its relationship to the knower, a recognition that modem philosophy did
in fact realise. The task here is to find a way of reconciling the object of perception with
the perceiver. Hegel did this, as we saw, by collapsing the being of the object into
Reason in which the perceiver participates.
With the second epistemological issue Kierkegaard goes beyond Hegel et al. to
further problematise the perceiver in the act of cognition.52 Climacus characterises
human life as a situated "duplexity",53 or a juxtaposition of contraries (such as finitude
and infinitude, temporality and eternity, and soul/psyche and body) which produce a
kind of duality, which in turn generates the category of paradox.54 The only way for
Hegel to have the absolute knowledge of Kant's an sich was to freeze them both sub
50 Be reminded that Kierkegaard's rejection of Hegel is not inspired by an anti-realist interpretation of
Hegel's metaphysics. What elicits Kierkegaard's disapprobation is Hegel's notion that thought mediates
being and that the entire structure of reality is the process of thought becoming other than itself in
order to unfold its own character (see Hegel's Encyclopedia of Logic, §153-4). Kierkegaard's main
contention is that even if Hegel is correct in this schema (which Kierkegaard doubts very much), and he
is able to finish his program, all he will have achieved is an explanation of how to think about
being—not how to he being.
51 Again, as noted earlier, Kierkegaard does recognise Kant's "deviation" from modem philosophy with
the category of the an sich—that is invisible to theoretical reason. However, this is not sufficient, for
Kierkegaard, to shake off Cartesianism. Kierkegaard's critique of Kant, then, is that the former did not
fully realise all that the an sich means for philosophy.
52 David R. Law makes a similar distinction regarding Kierkegaard's understanding of epistemology in
Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 73. He identifies what he calls
two forms of scepticism in Kierkegaard: (1) "anthropological scepticism", which corresponds to my
above second problem; and (2) "ontological scepticism", which corresponds to my first problem. I do
not like his use of the term "scepticism" in relation to Kierkegaard's position here because it could
suggest that Kierkegaard assumed the position of epistemological scepticism. Kierkegaard is surely
sceptical about certain epistemological claims, but he is not an epistemological sceptic.
53 See Climacus's statement, "Something that is dialectical with respect to time has an intrinsic
duplexity, so that after having been present it can endure as a past"; KW VII19/SV VI 72.
54 This should not be construed as the metaphysical doctrine of substance dualism.
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specie aeterni55 in "pure thought", thereby isolating them from the flux of time. As
Hermann Diem notes, it is at this critical point of Hegel's "facile acceptance of and
assumption of the Platonic idea [however differently conceived] of an immediate unity
between thought and being",56 that Kierkegaard concludes Hegel must be refuted and
in response launches his category of the paradox.
55 Walter Lowrie notes in his translation of Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 560, that the Danish editors claim this phrase in
Climacus is borrowed from Spinoza, and doubtless it is, but Lowrie goes on to note that Spinoza's
word is aeternitatis. However, because Kierkegaard was a good Latinist and this form is acceptable
Lowrie (and the Hongs as well) does alter it in his translation.
56 Herman Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, trans. Harold Knight (Edinburgh: Oliver and
Boyd, 1959), 16.
35
Paradox and "the moment"
Kierkegaard brings the act of cognition into time and spoils Hegel's cozy equation.
As Kierkegaard would have it, human life is fundamentally paradoxical because of its
temporal nature.57 Vigilius Haufniensis declares that, "Man ... is a synthesis of psyche
and body, but he is also a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal" ™ Humans
"exist" in time-space extension while at the same time possessing the ability to abstract
from this temporal flux by "eternal" abstraction.59 For human cognition to be genuine
cognition it must resolve this temporal-eternal tension. The horns of this dilemma
consist of either an exclusive emphasis on human cognition in time, with the result that
all is flux (the existential horn); or one's sole emphasis is on the immovable, fixed
nature of logic and thought (the conceptual horn). Either option leaves us with an
account of cognition that fails to account for genuinely human existence.
To demarcate its uniquely human application, Kierkegaard develops an idiocratic
and technical usage of the term existence. As a general concept, existence denotes a
temporal unfolding and a becoming in time, inherently comprised of motion. To exist,
for Kierkegaard, is to be actual and to have come into being. He purposefully aligns
himselfwith the Platonic and Aristotelian approach to and conceptualisation of existence
57 See JP I 17, 1057/Pap. I A 137, X2 A 328; JP III 3089, 31\6/Pap. VIII1 All; KW VII 13, 41n-
42/SV VI 17,41; KW Xll.l 189-92, 197-99, 311-12/SVIX 157-60, 163-65, X 18-19; KW VIII 155-
60/SV VI 234-37.
58 KW VIII 85/SV VI 173; his emphasis. In saying that humans are "eternal" it must not be thought
that Kierkegaard is begging a Christian anthropology, ontology, or eschatology. The pseudonym
through whom Kierkegaard makes this statement is Vigilius Haufniensis, and we have no reason to
believe that he is a Christian. But more importantly, for Kierkegaard, the term eternal denotes
something that is not subject to temporal becoming, like thought, not an eternal bliss which is
inhabited by God alone. See the quote from KW XII. 1 308-09/SV X 15 in text below. Climacus,
another of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, certainly uses the term eternal in reference to God, but does not
do so exclusively. C. Stephen Evans identifies four uses of "eternal" in Climacus's writings: (1)
abstract possibilities, (2) moral obligations (3) God, and (4) humans' future life; Kierkegaard's
Fragments and Postscript (Atlantic Highlands, NI: Humanities Press, 1983), 59-64. I think it is
possible to see a fifth way in which Kierkegaard uses "eternal" and that is to denote a fixed,
immovable, numerically self-identical unity. The bottom line for Kierkegaard's concept of eternity is
that it is diametrically opposite from temporality. The sphere of temporality is characterised by
fluctuating motility, the present tense, concrete actualities, humanity, and a kind of evanescent
immediateness. Whereas eternity is the realm of abstract possibilities, the Wholly Other, infinite
obligation, unified truth, logical coherence, and fully realised purposefulness. It is this antipodal sense
of eternity in relation to temporality that Kierkegaard is drawing out in the above quotation, the human
possession of which is related to the nature of human consciousness.
59KWXII. 1 311-12/SVX 18-19.
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against modern philosophy's way.60 There are two Danish terms translated into English
as "existence". Kierkegaard uses them both to draw important distinctions. Existere
means to exist as a striving person, and in this sense is something pertaining only to
human persons. The other expression, vcere til, is a corollary of the German term
Dasein, and means to have come into being in time and space—that is, to be there, or to
have come to be there. Humans existence shares with the rest of the natural world the
"uncertainty" of having come into being in spatio-temporal existence as voere til, but
humans alone have their own existence, in the sense of existere, as a task.61
The peculiar feature of human existence is the amalgamation of vcere til, with
thinking. Thought, in the Kierkegaardian literature, is eternal, unmoving, and thus at
odds with human existing (existere). Regarding this distinction between thought and
existence, we read in Postscript,
To think existence sub specie aeterni and in abstraction is essentially to annul it, and the merit
of it resembles the much-heralded merit of cancelling the principle of contradiction. Existence
without motion is unthinkable, and motion is unthinkable sub specie aeterni. To omit motion
is not exactly a masterstroke and to introduce it into logic, and along with it time and space, is
only a new confusion. But since all thinking is eternal, the difficulty is for the existing person.
Existence, like motion, is a very difficult matter to handle. If I think it, I cancel it, and then I do
not think it. It would seem correct to say that there is something that cannot be
thought—namely, existing.62
Human existence is distinct from brute existence in that it may be participated in by the
object (person) as it moves through time and space. Kierkegaard is concerned with the
same philosophical enigma that captivated the ancient Greek philosophers. How does a
thing become something else? How is a transition made from possibility to actuality?
How is a becoming in time possible, and furthermore, how is such a becoming thought?
Kierkegaard adds to these questions the problem of what I am qua conscious human
being to do with my humanity. How is that I, as a creature of kinesis (movement), have
any warrants for these decisions about my actions? In other words, how do I bring
60 JP II 1097/Pap. II A 290.
61 See Kierkegaard's discussion of proving the existence [Tilvcerelse ] of something in time-space; PF,
39ff. Kierkegaard predicates the same type of existence to these three classes of entities. Howard and
Edna Hong make the distinction this way: "'Existence', 'exist', and 'to exist' pertain to temporal and
spatial being or actuality. All existence is being, but not all being is existence or actuality"; KW VII
297-8n.6.
62 KW XII. 1 308-09/SVX 15; his italics.
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together my self-as-thinking (thoughts), and my self-as-acting/doing/being (existence),
and what is the nature of this relationship?
What is needed to halt this temporal flux for the human knower is a "decisive" and
"eternal" moment in time, in which "the learner has most fully put on the condition [of
knowing the truth] and then, by so doing, has become immersed in the truth".63 In the
Concept ofAnxiety, Haufniensis pits Plato's attempt to account for this "transition"
and movement with his doctrine of recollecting (anamnesis) back to the moment in
eternity-past,64 against Aristotle's account of kinesis.65 The conclusion is that, "The
term 'transition' is and remains a clever turn in logic [i.e., pure thought]. Transition
belongs in the sphere of historical freedom,66 for transition is a state and it is actual".67
He privileges Aristotle's kinesis account of the transition from possibility to actuality as
the historical movement of the individual because, when conceived of sub specie aeterni,
as with Platonic Recollection (cf. Hegel), the moment is abstracted away and simply
ignored, the question having been begged.68 The problem with the Socratic/Platonic
(Hegelian) ideal of Recollection is that "the moment in time", in which the
learner/knower exists, has no decisive significance. One finds that, "The temporal point
of departure is a nothing, because in the same moment I discover I have known the truth
from eternity without knowing it, in the same instant that moment is hidden in the eternal
. . . there is no Here and no There but only an ubique et nusquam [everywhere and
63 KW VII 1 &/SV VI 22.
64 The term "eternity-past", while literally nonsensical, is used to indicate that for Plato and Aristotle
(at least in Kierkegaard's mind) eternity was something "behind" us (at least logically), so that truth is
recollected.
65 KW VIII 82-84/5V VI 170-73
66 History, for Kierkegaard, pertains to existing human individuals (actuality), not abstract concepts.
67 KW VIII 82/SV VI 170; his emphasis.
68 Haufniensis writes that in Platonic Recollection, "the moment appears to be this strange entity . . .
that lies between motion and rest without occupying any time, and into this and out from this that
which is in motion, and that which is at rest changes into motion. Thus, the moment becomes a
category for transition (pexaPo^ri), for Plato shows in the same way that the moment is related to the
transition of the one to the many, of the many to the one, of likeness to unlikeness, etc., and that it is
the moment in which there is neither 'ev [one] nor jtoAAa [many], neither a being determined nor a
being combined. . . Plato deserves credit for having clarified the difficulty; yet the moment remains a
silent atomistic abstraction, which, however, is not explained by ignoring it"; KW VIII 83n-84/SV VI
172n-73. Refer to our prior discussion of Hegel's question begging response to Kant.
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nowhere]".69 From the vantage point of eternity-past, there can be no genuine coming
into being, no genuine cognition, and human existence itself is confiscated. John D.
Caputo observes that, "by opposing the Greek denial of motion implicit in Recollection
. . . to the movement (kinesis) of 'existence', Kierkegaard takes his stand with
Aristotle's defence of motion against all Eleatic tendencies".70
Climacus develops the logic of the categories of possibility and necessity in some
detail in Fragments in relation to the transition that occurs in the kind of change
involved in "coming into existence".71 There Climacus is very careful to delineate the
category of necessity as applying to a completely separate conceptual sphere from that
of possibility. Necessity is, for Climacus (and Kierkegaard), a logical category which
excludes freedom; the necessary cannot not-be, for it must be and cannot become—that
is, it is eternal.72 Therefore Climacus concludes:
1. Whatever comes into existence cannot be a necessary being, for there was a
time when it was not and it is therefore possible that it not-be (i.e., it is
contingent).
2. Whatever comes into existence does so by a free act, or "transition", for if it
does not come about through freedom, then it is necessary (and not
contingent).
3. Actual things, as things that have come to be in time, exist as possibility (i.e.,
nonbeing) prior to being actualised.
4. Nothing that exists (er til) as actual, exists necessarily, for it has come into
being (become).
Climacus thus takes issue with Aristotle's claim that, since whatever is necessary is also
possible (since it cannot be impossible)73, there must be two kinds of possibility: (1) the
possibility of contingent thing, which when actualised necessarily exists; and (2) mere
69 KW VII 13/SV VI 17; see also KW VII 51-2/ SV VI 50.
70 Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project, (Bloomington,
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1987), 13.
71 See Kierkegaard, KW VII 72-88/SV VI 67-VI 80.
72 Kierkegaard, KW VII 74-5/SV VI 69.
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possibility of that which is contingent and has not been actualised. Climacus sees this as
a confusion in Aristotle stemming from the misapplication (and self-contradictory) of
the concept of possibility in relation to necessity.
So how are "possibles" (as non-necessary things) captured cognitively so that
truths about them are known in time? Kierkegaard's answer is that there must be a
genuine moment in which the individual and the truth are connected in the act of
cognition. The Kierkegaardian moment incorporates the intuitive notion of the present
(as in past, present, future), but Kierkegaard sees this intuition as an abstraction from
"real" time. As such, the intuitive notion "is not a concept of time, except as precisely
something infinitely countless, which again is the infinitely vanishing".74 The moment
is a tenacious embrace of the present. This category of the moment is essential for any
coming into existence, or any knowledge of it, for it is the medium in which we exist and
is the unity of actuality (as temporal) and possibility (as eternal).73 In the moment, that
which is possible is made actual. If a thing is to become it must move from a state of
possibility to actuality, it must go through a transition. And if this flux is to be
prehended, it must be halted in a cognising act. This collision of the individual with the
eternal, the act of bringing thought into relation with temporal existence in the moment
of cognition, is the paradox "in its most abbreviated form".76 This paradox is an
essential philosophical category that expresses the ontological nature of the relationship
between the existing spirit and the eternal truth.77
Paradox and Reason
Existence belongs to the category of paradox and lays beyond thought as
"something which cannot be thought".78 Yet human reason is preoccupied with
existence, as it is from within existence that reason operates and it receives from
73 Aristotle, On Interpretation, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Students Oxford Aristotle, Volume I, Logic
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942), 21b-23a.
74 KW VIII 86/SV VI 174; see also KW VIII 88/SV VI 176.
75 KW VII 51/5V VI 49-50.
76 KW VII 51/5V VI 49-50. Cf. KW VIII 89-90/5V VI 169-70.
77 VP III 30891Pap. VIII1 A 11.
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existence its content. The preoccupation of reason with existence as the necessary
context for its operation is what Climacus calls the "passion of thought", and this
passion "is always to will its own downfall".79 This "paradox of thought" (that it wills
its own downfall) in its ultimate expression is "to want to discover something that
thought cannot think",80 namely existence itself. Human reason is situated in the
temporal becoming of human existence and finitude.81 It is given to the understanding
to explain and "know" this existence but its tools are logic and conceptual abstractions.
Logical claims and abstract concepts, as possibilities, are substantively different from
existence, as actuality. For the human subject, the act of cognition is that in which the
actual-as-lived is cognitively grasped, when what is has been translated into conceptual
existence. Concepts express "universals"82 and this translation process is always
"approximating" reality (insofar as concepts are not numerically identical with that
reality) by making what is actual (existence) into what is a possibility or a possible way
of being.83
The paradox of reason then, is this "unknown" realm of 'existing' which lays
outside of reasons purview as its "frontier that is continually arrived at".84 Strictly
speaking it is not known because like Kant, Kierkegaard is referring knowledge (insofar
as it is defined in the Enlightenment infallibilist sense) to the orbit of rational human
78 KW XII. 1 308-09/SLX 15.
79 KW VII 37/SV VI 37.
80 KW VII 37/SV VI 37.
81 Cf. KW VII 37, 45/SV VI 37, 44-5; and KW XII.2 99/Pap. X2 A 354.
82 The term universal is in quotes because it is used to signify that which is commonly picked out by
the term universal. However, it is not meant to predicate the existence of transcendent and enduring
metaphysical properties as the term universal is used in a substance dualist (or classical) metaphysics.
This use of "universal" simply designates that concept of sameness or constancy in things which we
acquiie through life-experience and employ as a means of constructing a wider, more comprehensive
system of reference. In this sense it bears comparison with Merleau Ponty's notion of a "lateral
universal". See Merleau Ponty, "From Mauss to Claude Levi-Strauss, " in Signs, trans. R. C.
McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 120. See also Calvin O. Schrag's
discussion in The Resources of Rationality: A Response to the Postmodern Challenge (Bloomington,
IN: University of Indiana Press, 1992), 170-71.
83 See KW XII. 1 328-29, 331-32/SV X 31-3, 35-6. See also Paul L. Holmer, "On Understanding
Kierkegaard", in A Kierkegaard Critique , eds. Howard A Johnson and Niels Thulstrup (Chicago: Henry
Renery Company, 9172), 44-47; C. Stephen Evans, "Realism and Antirealism in Kierkegaard's
Concluding Unscientific Postscript", in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, 163-4. The nature
of concepts will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
84 KW VII 44/SV VI 44.
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inquiry. Reason runs up against its own boundaries as it tries to realise itself. This is the
above sense in which Climacus means that reason wills its own downfall. Situated
within a human person in the process of temporally existing, reason can go no further
towards existence than recognising that it is incapable of grasping that which possesses
it—a thinking, existing subject. Reason stands incapable of solving its own inherent
problem—the metaphysical question of the unity of existence, but it keenly discerns this
limit in itself. In this "self-ironizing of the understanding",85 reason cannot
actualise—cannot move from possibility to actuality—its own passion (a trait of
subjectivity). This "paradoxical passion" of the understanding constantly collides with
the unknown thing outside itself—the god,86 which is the ground of reason and the
basis by which reason is cognisant of nature, "by infusing nature with the idea of
fitness and purposiveness".87 Reason, whose function it is to find and give reasons,
inquires into its own foundations and finds that it cannot think outside of itself. The
paradox is that which is designated as that region beyond reason's ken, and the
acceptance of any existential proposition88 by a person is a general instance of the
paradox.
Subjectivity and Belief
In the aporia89 of reason encountered above, we found reason incapable of
establishing its own metaphysical grounding as it founders on the rock of subjectivity
85 KW VII 44, 45ISV VI 44, 45.
86 Again, Kierkegaard may seem to be begging a Christian stance, but Climacus's (the pseudonym by
whom Kierkegaard makes this point) claim not to be a Christian must be taken seriously. This being
the case, it is best to understand Climacus's "god" simply as a reference to the unknown thing, beyond
reason, that is the power by which reason operates. Thus, Kierkegaard is simply pointing to the
fallibility of reason and the fact that reason does not and cannot inherently ground itself. The "god" is
the designation Climacus gives to whatever it may be that does this.
87 KW VII 44-5/ST VI 44-5.
88 "Existential proposition" is used, here, to refer to any proposition that asserts of the actual existence
of the predicate of the sentence. For example, "I see a tree". In this proposition the existence of the tree
is asserted as actual. This is to be contrasted with the parallel (and incorrigible) perceptual proposition,
"I seem to be seeing a tree", which does not assert the existence of the tree, only a perceptual event that
is taken to be of a tree.
89 The term "aporia", the Greek term meaning "puzzle", has taken on added philosophical significance
with its recent and liberal use in continental philosophy to denote a site of "deconstruction" in a theory.
An aporia in this sense is an instance in which a theory undermines itself by self-referential tensions
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(existence). As Haufniensis puts it, "In actuality, the whole interest of subjectivity steps
forth, and now metaphysics runs aground".90 Reason does not exercise infallible and
hegemonic rule over belief in some pseudo-sense of objectivity. Now subjective factors
are important, as they are equally constitutive of the human person. Kierkegaard writes,
"Human reason has boundaries . . . But people have a rattle-brained, conceited notion
about human reason, especially in our age, when one never thinks of a thinker, but
thinks of pure reason and the like".91 Karstein Hopland observes that, for Kierkegaard,
"The finitude of reason implies that reflection must always share its place with will and
feeling as necessary instances of self knowledge".92 With the category of paradox,
Hegel's metaphysical-epistemological assumption and its attending rationalistic method
have been countered. There is a space for a non-rational sphere beyond the aegis of
autonomous Reason.
The Subject of Belief
We turn next to the ontological constitution of the human (knowing) self prescripted
in Hegelian-Enlightenment epistemology. Not only does Kierkegaard find the
metaphysical presuppositionless starting point hopeless in view of the category of
paradox as seen above, but he also erodes its ontological and theoretical status as well.
Throughout his literature Kierkegaard criticises the "Cartesian method" of "beginning
with doubt",93 which had become the by-word of modem philosophy. But it is in
Climacus's Postscript that he directly attack's Descartes' formula: cogito ergo sum [I
think therefore I am]. This innovation of Descartes' provided modem philosophy with
that cannot be resolved within the conceptual paradigm employed, thereby producing a situation of
instability and indeterminacy. Kierkegaard's following arguments ultimately are designed to
demonstrate how reason and epistemology can never account for itself in absolute terms, hence my use
of the term.
90 KW VIII 18n/SV VI 116n-17.
91 JP I 7/Pap. X2 A 354.
92 "Passion (Lidenskab)", in Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana vol. 16, ed. Niels Thulstrup and Mikulova
Thulstrup (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzls Forlag, 1988), 70-1.
93 As previously noted, Kierkegaard, in fact, dedicates an entire book to this issue, albeit a book he
never submitted for publication. See his Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est
[everything must be doubted] which chronicles the unsuccessful attempt by a fictive young philosopher
to begin his philosophising by doubting everything; KW VII \21-\12/Pap. IV B 1:112-IV B 1:150.
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the absolute theoretical foundation necessary for indubitable belief. Descartes and
subsequent modern philosophy took the thinking, knowing subject's transparent self-
presence as the paradigm of well-founded belief and the given from which we construct
knowledge. We have already argued that some form of this self-translucent subject
remains a necessary postulate for all modem foundationalist epistemology (in so far as
it is infallibilist) and depends upon a radically autonomous, self-relating rational subject.
Hegel's metaphysical System is not an exception.
Climacus begins his critique of Descartes' indubitable epistemic starting point by
arguing that humans cannot have knowledge of actuality as actuality. Rather, in the act
of cognition we "know" actuality by transforming it into possibility (concepts) so that
it may be thought. This always includes the chance that something is lost in the
translation, and therefore our best efforts at ferreting out the truth is always and only an
"approximation". Climacus goes on to say our knowledge of our own existence is an
exception to this, for we know what existing is, not by translating it into concepts, but by
actually being it, i.e. existing,94 Because of this unique relationship to our own actuality,
Kierkegaard argues that we have more than knowledge of it—because knowledge qua
human knowledge is always of ideality as possibility (i.e., it is conceptual), it always
"dissolves an historical actuality into a possibility", and this involves translation.95 The
unobtainable "knowledge" referred to here is the infallible knowledge of the classical
foundationalist. Kierkegaard is saying that if this is how knowledge is defined then we
do not have knowledge of these sorts of things. Climacus goes on later in Postscript96
to drop the qualifier "more than knowledge" and refers to the thinker's actuality as the
only thing he knows without turning it into a possibility. This signifies Kierkegaard's
ambiguous relationship to epislemology, because of his rejection of Enlightenment
epistemology, and shows that while he is rejecting the infallibilist epistemology of his
94 KW XII. 1 316/SV X 21. This is not to say that we cannot think conceptually about our own
existence, only that there is another mode of presentation available in our self-presentation. This
commits him, in my view, to an alternative to the conceptual theories of perception, of which Kant
may be said to be the father, that claim that there can be no nonconceptual component to our awareness
of objects.
95 KW XII. 1 316/SVX 21.
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day, there was a sense in which he was willing to maintain a preferential distinction
between certain kinds of beliefs.97 It is this fact which makes the Cartesian cogito a
contradiction:
If the I in cogito is understood to be an individual human being, then the statement demonstrates
nothing: I am thinking ergo I am, but if I am thinking, no wonder, then, that I am; after all, it
has already been said, and the first consequently says more than the last. . . . here it is not a
matter of my / or your / but of the pure / . But surely this pure I can have no other existence
than thought-existence. . . .the statement then is a tautology. ... To conclude existence from
thinking is, then, a contradiction, because thinking does just the opposite and takes existence
away from the actual and thinks it by annulling it, by transposing it into possibility.98
Here we have an application of category of paradox. Existence is that which cannot be
thought; it is the "absurd" and the paradoxical. To think in such a manner as when
performing the cogito is to abstract from one's existence. The attempt to prove existence
by moving away from it is contradictory and circular, and ultimately involves a category
error.99 Kierkegaard takes the epistemological issue of doubt versus certainty in
Descartes' formula, and makes it an ontological-ethical issue of possibility versus
actuality. Climacus continues:
That what I am thinking is, in the sense of thinking does not, of course, need demonstration. . .
since it is demonstrated [i.e., it is a tautology]. But as soon as I begin to want to make my
thinking teleological in relation to something else, interest enters the game. As soon as it is
there, the ethical is present and exempts me from further trouble with demonstrating my
existence, and since it obliges me to exist, it prevents me from making an ethically deceptive
and metaphysically unclear flourish of a conclusion.100
Climacus's innovation on Descartes's equation is to adduce that he was deriving the
wrong conclusion from the experience of being a thinking being. We are not given to
ourselves as an epistemological subject, a "pure I-I", a mathematical point in the
96 KW XII. 1 320-21/5V X 25-6.
97 C. Stephen Evans in, "Realism and Antirealism in Kierkegaard", 164-5, interprets Cliamcus's claim
that we have more than knowledge of our own existence as meaning that the individual's own
existential reality can be thought and known. Evans finds this to be, "remarkably like Kant's own
perspective, which limits theoretical reason to knowledge of the phenomenal world so as to allow room
for the perspective of the rational agent, who has rational faith in his own existence as a free being and
grounds his belief in God and immortality on this practical faith". Kierkegaard's faith is not quite so
Kantian and rationalist as Evans would have it. Kierkegaard's cognitive subject is primarily an ethical,
not rational, agent, but Evans' insight that the individual's own actuality can be thought and known is
correct.
98 KW XII. 1 317/ST X 22; his emphasis.
99 KW XII. 1 317ASV X 22. See also Kierkegaard's comments: "From the logical point of view, the
Cartesian formulation: I think, therefore I am [er]—is a play on words, because the 'I am' logically
signifies nothing other than 'I am thinking' or 'I think'". JP I 1033/Pap. V A 30.
100 KW XII. 1 317/SV X 22; his emphasis.
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subject-object structure of representational knowledge and abstract thought.101 The
abstracted subject of pure thought (Hegel and Descartes) is a "fictive objective
subject", a "phantom" of speculative thought, employed to prematurely stop doubt.102
This fiction of speculation is theoretically possible (for a being such as God perhaps),
but is not existentially viable for temporal (human) creatures, argues Kierkegaard, for as
soon as I make the claim that this subject exists, has come into being in time as actuality,
it is no longer tenable. There is an inherent teleology in human thought such that, as
situated in temporal existence, all of our thinking is characterised by intentionality. That
is, as they pertain to existence, our thoughts are always thoughts of, and there is always
a temporal object of our thoughts as soon as they have any existential significance. This
is where Descartes (et al.) runs amuck. As soon as one brings one's thinking into
relationship with one's own existence, "the whole interest of subjectivity steps
forward" and one is no longer referring to thought, but that to which thought has no
direct access—actuality. The attempt of reason to establish itself comes to ruin. Reason
merely prescribes its own limits.
However, Kierkegaard does not find Descartes' formula completely bankrupt, only
misunderstood. Kierkegaard in fact uses the Cartesian "cogito ergo sum" heuristically
to deconstruct Descartes's rational autonomous subject and assert in its place an ethical
subject. Climacus ironically declares that, "the abstraction [of Descartes' cogito]
nevertheless does indeed become a strange demonstration of his existence", because the
individual's agency is assumed in the formula as actual.103 The Archimedean point on
which all turns is still the self, but Climacus replaces Descartes' epistemological self
with an ethically responsible agent. We may attempt to abstract an epistemological,
rationally self-related self ad infinitum, but when 1 am engaged as an existing subject
with existing, I am continuously presented with myself as an ethical agent, which
101 Westphal, Becoming A Self, 138.
mKWX\\.\ 81/SV IX 69. KW XII. 1 117, 189-93,197-98, 219, 305-08, 361-62/SV IX 100, 157-61,
163-64, 181, X 12-15, 59-60; JP III 2338/Pap. IV C 11; JP I llA/Pap. IV A 72; KW II 273ff./SV I
285ff. Merold Westphal discusses this point in, "Kierkegaard and Hegel", 116.
103 KW XII. 1 316-17/SV X 21-22.
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"exempts me from further trouble with demonstrating my existence, since it obliges me
to exist".104 Herman Diem describes this dialectic of self:
As soon as the reflecting subject performs this act of self-awareness, it automatically
differentiates itself from its empirical reality as an object. [In doing this] it measures the
empirical subject against a conceptual ideal subject. By this act, the ego becomes conscious of
itselfas an existing ego. It does not remain the empirical ego; the position is rather that as the
ego which is interested in its own existence as a mediator between the two.105
Implicit in this analysis is a distinction between a kind of Socratic "self-knowledge" of
subjectivity and objectively acquired pieces of information. Kierkegaard makes this
explicit in Postscript where Climacus identifies "the truth that is essentially related to
the existing person by pertaining essentially to what it means to exist" as "the eternal,
essential truth", while all other "knowledge" is merely "accidental", and "its degree
and scope is different".106 This accidental, "objective" truth is seen by Kierkegaard as
comprising a set of possibilities and thus the nature and contours of these are
significantly dependent upon their essential, passionate and subjective relating of them
to one's self in inwardness. As Climacus states, "from the ethical point of view,
actuality is superior to possibility".107
The nascent, "trans-representational self"108 given to us in our existing is a pre-
reflective "presence" to self, but lacks the total transparency of the Enlightenment
cogito. What I am certain of is myself as an ethically responsible agent. This is not an
objective (Cartesian) certainty that provides an absolute foundation for indubitable
beliefs and one does not arrive at it by "doubting everything". Instead, this is a
subjective certainty that provides enough normativity for a fallibilist account of belief
formation. For example, on this basis one now believes (and not doubt) the proposition,
"I exist", due to the passion, or disposition, coactive in existing itself. This belief is not
infallible, but ethically generated as a given.
Kierkegaard's subjective certainty is analogous, as an ethical passion, to the sort of
certainty that one experiences when one feels obligated to perform some act of human
104 See KW XII. 1 317'/SV X 22 quoted in text above.
105 Herman Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic ofExistence, 21; my emphasis.
106 KW XII. 1 205/SV IX 170, my emphases. See also KW XII. 1 197-98/SV IX 164.
107 KW XII. 1 320/SVX 24.
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kindness and the such. Furthermore, subjective certainty is as dependent upon qualities
directly under the conscious control of the individual as the feeling one has being full
after a large meal. In the first instance, when I feel obliged, say, to help an old lady
across the street, there is nothing in this "certainty" that lays claim to universality or
infallibility. Yet it is a conviction I cannot avoid either. In the latter case, I cannot
legislate at whim the sensation that I have had enough to eat. And yet the experience of
being full after a meal is one that I cannot display to another person and is in some
sense dependent upon states that are uniquely mine. I can neither ignore it nor deem it
epistemically capricious. Try as I might, I feel full only when in certain circumstances.
Kierkegaard's ethical or "interested" ego differs from Husserl's solitary, intra-
subjective and pre-linguistic transcendental ego that grasps the absolute and immobile
geometric ideality of truth.109 The ethical subject is certainly copresent with every
thought, but is not the noematic correlate of every noetic act. As Merold Westphal
astutely observes, it is much more like Sartre's prereflective cogito which in reflection
has its own self as its object, but most often has a "non-reflective, "non-positional",
and "non-thetic" consciousness of itself accompanying its intentional awareness of
objects apart from itself.110
This ethical subject is not a ready-made "ghost in the machine". It is the task of a
lifetime to bring this / out in relation to the ethical requirements and all its various
meanings. Thus, there is an irony at the very core of human beings which plays a vital
role in the way we conduct ourselves cognitively. It is now given to us to make this pre¬
reflective (and subconscious) self our explicit self-awareness. We are situated such that
we have enough of a self to undertake the ethical tasks of becoming a self in fear and
trembling, but not enough of a self to think that we have completed those tasks.
Descartes's radically autonomous subject who grounds all knowledge in its self-
apprehension is replaced by an ethically autonomous subject responsible for its own
108 This is Merold Westphal's term, Becoming A Self, 142n.l4.
109 See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorian Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960). See
Merold Westphal's brief discussion in Becoming A Self, 110.
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actions. Anti-Climacus summarises the development of this theme in the other
pseudonyms in Practice in Christianity.
In the wuiks of some pseudonymous writers it has been pointed out that in modem
philosophy there is a confused discussion of doubt where the discussion should have been
about despair. Therefore one has been unable to control or govern doubt either in scholarship
or in life, "Despair," however, points in the right direction by placing the relation under the
rubric of personality (the single individual) and the ethical.111 As a result of this change, doubt
can no longer be the procedural mechanism that brings one ultimately to self-knowledge and
the absolute foundations of truth. Instead one achieves oneself and the ground for veridical
belief through despair—an existential category.112
Faith and Belief
The self that I have as my responsibility is not an objective something, but is my
subjective "me" that is given (only) to me to possess as the organisational point for my
existence. Quite literally this self constructs my world—not the objective world that I
experience, but it constitutes the subjective world of my experience, i.e. the world as I
experience it. The view of "objective reality" from inside this world cannot rightly be
said to be one that is either obtained by or regulated by the exercise of reason alone. In
an early journal entry of September 10, 1836, Kierkegaard records J. G. Hamann's
comments on the last paragraph of David Hume's "Of Miracles", in An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, where regarding belief in Christianity, Hume
states, "Mere reason is not sufficient to convince us of its veracity: and whoever is
moved by Faith to assent to it . . . subverts all the principles of his understanding".113
Hamann's response, "Well, that's just the way it is", is noted with approbation by
Kierkegaard for recognising that Hume simply demonstrates "the complete
110 Westphal, ibid. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on
Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London: Washington Square Press, 1956), 9-17.
111 KWXX 81n/SVXVI 85n.
112 Judge William thusly urges A (the esthete) to despair: "Choose despair, then, because despair itself
is a choice, because one can doubt [tvivle] without choosing it, but one cannot despair [fortvivle]
without choosing it. . . . Doubt is thought's despair; despair is personality's doubt. That is why I cling
so firmly to the defining characteristic 'to choose' . . . Doubt is the inner movement in thought itself,
and in my doubt I conduct myself as impersonally as possible. I assume that thought, when doubt is
carried through, finds the absolute and rests therein . . . Despair is precisely a much deeper and more
complete expression; its movement is much more encompassing than that of doubt. Despair is an
expression of the total personality, doubt only of thought"; KW IV 211-12/SV III 195-97. See also
KW XII. 1 254-55/ST IX 212.
113 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in Classics of Western Philosophy,
ed. Steven M. Cahn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977), 681.
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misunderstanding of a Christian and a non-Christian". Instead of destroying faith,
Kierkegaard understands Hume to have made room for it.114 Hume's error is to
conceive belief as a purely mental entity that can only be governed legitimately by
reason alone. The Climacean subjectivity principle combines with the category of the
paradox to alter the whole conception of the nature of belief. It is only in subjectivity
that the paradox is reached, for existence—the context of paradox, is the environment
for the concretion of the human subject. "Subjectivity is the truth",115 thusly means that
truth for an existing person will involve this something more that is beyond mere reason.
The word "faith" is the ordinary linguistic designation for this going beyond of reason.
After spending the better part of three chapters spelling out the paradoxical nature of
human reason in Fragments, at the end of Chapter Three, Climacus refers to "that
happy passion"116 of reason that, in subjectivity, goes beyond reason to attain the
paradox. In Chapter Four we read that the name of this passion in which "the learner
comes to an understanding with paradox" is faith, which is a bringing together of the
learner with existence in the moment.117 Later in Postscript, faith is declared by
Climacus to be coterminous with the subjectivity that is truth. We read that, "the
definition of truth stated above is a paraphrasing of faith. Without risk, no faith. Faith is
the contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and objective
uncertainty".118 Faith or, as we shall presently see, belief, is a passion that drives us
beyond reason to the paradox. This going beyond of reason is the "contradiction"
which makes faith an objectively risky thing. It is something that reason has not
stamped with its guarantee and therefore cannot be objectively certain—it is shrouded in
subjectivity and penetrated only by subjectivity. As Kierkegaard remarks, "when
lefieclion is completely exhausted, then faith takes over".119
U4JP II 1539,1540/fap. I A 100, 237.
115 KW XII. 1 203/W IX 169.
116 KW VII 54ISV VI 51.
117 KW VII 59ISV VI 55.
118 KW XII. 1 204/WIX 170.
n9 JP I 49/Pap. V A 28.
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Kierkegaard's most extensive treatment of the nature of belief and faith comes in the
"Interlude" of Fragments where Climacus discusses the possibility and nature of
historical knowledge and its relationship to faith. The Danish term Climacus uses for
faith is Tro. When translated into in English, Tro generally denotes faith in the religious
sense, but in Danish Tro also includes the more synoptic meaning of the English word
belief, as in about some fact regarding the furniture of the universe. This term is used to
refer to both religious belief and the everyday kinds of beliefs we have about the "real"
world, and Climacus carefully distinguishes these two uses for us in the text of
Fragments}20
Kierkegaard calls tro-as-belief "faith sensu laxiori", or faith in the ordinary sense.
As Law notes, this is a "purely epistemological category",121 and denotes those beliefs
concerning objects of historical becoming. It refers to our cognition of the various
matters of fact pertaining to the world. On the other hand, Kierkegaard designates Tro
in the religious sense as "faith sensu eminentiori or "sensu strictissimo"—faith in the
eminent or strict sense. We must not assume that because Kierkegaard is couching his
discussion in a religious framework that he is giving us an account of only religious
belief. While it is true that he is giving us an account of religious belief, an account of
Christian belief to be exact, he is also at the same time giving us an account of doxastic
practice in general. Evans notes that Kierkegaard's use of "faith in the eminent sense
presupposes or includes ordinary faith [as common belief] as a component. . . . this
implies that everything Climacus says about ordinary faith must be true of eminent faith
120 KW VII 87-88/5V VI 79-80.
121 Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, 89. For Law's discussion of the senses of Tro see
Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, 86-69. Law's analysis of the nature of belief is flawed on two
critical points: (1) his contention that for Kierkegaard the uncertainty of 7Vo-as-belief is the
"foundation for the establishment of knowledge" (p. 87) is mistaken, if by knowledge Law includes a
fallibilist account as well. Kierkegaard adheres to a fallibilism with ethical foundations for felicitous
doxastic practice. And, (2) Law is wrong to claim that the way in which inherent epistemic uncertainty
is overcome, for Kierkegaard, is by the individual directly "willing to believe that a particular event has
happened or that a perceived object is that which it appears to be" (ibid.). This depends upon a reading
of Kierkegaard as a direct volitionalist, a position that will be argued against in Chapter Seven. Cf.
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, editorial note 43, JP II 311; and Evans, "Realism and Antirealism
in Kierkegaard", 171.
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as well, a point some commentators have missed" (and vice versa, we might add).122 In
other words, when Climacus describes the structure of ordinary, epistemological belief,
he is at the same time making intelligible for us the undcrstructurc of faith. It so
happens that Kierkegaard thinks that there can be no adequate non-Christian account of
epistemology, metaphysics, or belief. What we find is that, for Kierkegaard, religious
beliefs have an epistemic parallel with other kinds of belief. What emerges from this
portrait, as we shall see throughout the remaining chapters, is that Kierkegaard's meta-
epistemology is a distinctly Christian account of belief, and that subjectivity and belief
cannot be treated separately. Who and what we are (and choose to be) is inextricably
woven together with what we believe, and we cannot disentangle doxastic evaluations or
propositions from the ethical valuations of persons.
Conclusion to Chapter Two
We have seen that Kierkegaard introduces the "subjectivity principle" through the
mouthpiece of his pseudonym Johannes Climacus, in the two works, Philosophical
Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. This
principle can be simply paraphrased from Postscript as, "Truth is subjectivity", or
differently, "The How determines the What".123 Climacus further clarifies this as, "an
objective uncertainty held fast through passionate appropriation".124 What is more,
Climacus tells us that this is "a paraphrasing of faith".125
This chapter set out to articulate the philosophical context in which Kierkegaard
formulates this subjectivity principle. We noted the Kantian and Hegelian influence on
Kierkegaard's philosophical understanding and concluded that Kierkegaard advances
the Climacean subjectivity principle as a corrective to the Hegelian-Enlightenment desire
to construct an epistemological System of absolute and infallible human knowledge
from within the resources of human reason. Kierkegaard finds Kant more "honest"
122 C. Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason, 120.
m KWXWA 610-22, 613n-14/SVX 272-81, 273-75.
124 KW XII. 1 203/5V IX 169.
125 KW XII. 1 204/SV IX 170.
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than Hegel because of, on the one hand, Kant's acknowledgement of and insistence
upon the limits of human reason, and on the on the other hand, Kant's placing of
existence, as the realm of the ethical subject, outside the sphere of reason. The trouble
Kierkegaard has with both Kant and Hegel (and the rest of modem philosophy) lies in
their continuation of Descartes' vision of philosophy and their collaboration in his
project of circumscribing everything within human reason. This objectifying process
requires a metaphysical guarantee that comes in the form of the Cartesian cogito ergo
sum, as the transcendental, atemporal, and presuppositionless starting point for
philosophy. Descartes's notion of a radically autonomous subject depends upon the
pure, rational self-relation of that subject. This, in turn, can only be guaranteed if that
subject is as it thinks. If one is to have absolute knowledge, one's cognitions must be
insulated from the corruption of temporal flux, and must occur sub specie aeterni—that
is, they must be complete and of the whole, no missing parts or imperfections. Hegel
accomplishes this by reducing being to thinking, so that what is rational is real, and vice
versa.
In response to this, Kierkegaard has Climacus emphasise the disparity between
thinking, which he tells us belongs to the category of possibility, and being, which
belongs to the category of actuality. Climacus, we saw, argues that actuality cannot be
thought (by humans) because that which is actual (for humans) is within time-
space—the temporal flux—and humans, as actual, are also temporally bound. This
places actuality under the category of paradox for reason, because it lies beyond reason
as its object of intention and as that on which reason has no positive grasp. The thrust of
this for Climacus is that human reason is a function of, and thus bounded by, human
subjectivity (as actuality). Far from being that which must be overcome (Descartes and
Hegel), human subjectivity is presented by Climacus as precisely that which must be
presupposed in human knowledge and is the vehicle of human reason. Climacus thus
takes the Cartesian cogito and turns it in on itself, so that it merely points to the
limitations of reason. The self is certainly present in the cogito, not as rational,
objectively certain postulate, but as ethically required. The certainty that results from this
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inversion of Descartes' formula is the sort of subjective certainty attending the
convictions we may have regarding those things we perceive as our obligations—the
kind of certainty usually associated with belief (as a subjective state). This chapter
concluded by noting that Kierkegaard is, throughout his Climacean account, explicitly
linking this epistemological discussion of belief (as Tro sensu laxiori), with the
religious concept of faith (as Tro sensu strictissimo).
Now, throughout the rest of this dissertation, our task is to show how the
subjectivity principle displaces the metaphysical-epistemological approach of modernity.
In Chapter Three we will focus on Kierkegaard's post-metaphysical philosophical
method and how his emphasis on subjectivity challenges the metaphysical approach to
philosophy taken by modernity.
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CHAPTER THREE
PHILOSOPHY IN THE SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD
What our age needs most to illuminate the relationship between logic and ontology is an
examination of the concepts: possibility, actuality, and necessity.
Spren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
Philosophy is life's dry-nurse, who can take care of us—but not suckle us.
Spren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
When detached from life, philosophy is a panacea: a search for "the sunny places of
thought".
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy Since Hegel
In the previous chapter we argued that Kierkegaard is consciously attempting to
emend the metaphysical-epistemological approach to belief taken by his modern
predecessors and contemporaries. Kierkegaard find this approach to be rooted in
Descartes's notion of the radical autonomy of the human subject. One of the most
telling portrayals of the hubris of the modern philosophical project found its
expression in the philosophical System of Hegel. Kierkegaard's problem with the
Hegelian-Enlightenment approach is the assumption that metaphysics could answer
the deepest questions of human existence. The exclusive emphasis on the rational
and objective dimensions of belief, and human persons, annuls the subject qua
human subject. Kierkegaard replaces the thinking, rational Cartesian subject with an
acting, ethical subject, as the centre of belief. In this chapter we turn to examine how
Kierkegaard's new conception of subjectivity relates to his understanding of
philosophy and how it affects his approach to philosophical questions.
Grammar or Metaphysics?
Perhaps the most significant and radical feature of Kierkegaard's thought is his
complete abandonment of the Enlightened notion of "scientific" method, and the
metaphysical mode of inquiry characteristic of modem philosophy, whether that be
inquiring into the nature of things (metaphysics) or knowledge (epistemology).
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Kierkegaard's refusal to accept the fundamental assumptions of the metaphysical-
epistemological project lead him to cast about for new ways of moving the
discussion of philosophical and theological issues forward. In a passage from
Journals and Papers we read,
First of all comes life; then later or sooner (but afterwards) comes theory—not the reverse.
First theory, then life. First art, the work of art, then the theory—and so it is in all things.
. . .That is why it is easiest to write a grammar of a dead language—because it has ended.
The anatomist must have a dead body because even if he in other respects could use a living
body, it changes at every moment, is in flusse [in a state of fluctuation]. The guarantee that
a theory can be produced is always that the object is in the sphere of being [vceren ] or
having been, not in becoming [vorden ]. It seems as if one has even more in theory than in
life. In a certain sense that is the case. In the theory one has the whole thing in every detail
and simultaneously; whereas life, poor life, is successive. But then again the theory does
not have life. That is the deception which ultimately makes every theory prey to the empty
conceit that it is able to fashion life on a scale not known even by the life which precedes
it.1
Kierkegaard employs two very instructive and closely related metaphors to
characterise the way he thought the problems of philosophy should be approached
and how we should look at the activity of philosophising itself. In what seems to be
an anticipation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's "philosophy as grammar", Kierkegaard
draws the parallel between the act of theorising (philosophy) and the kind of activity
performed by a grammarian or an anatomist. Elsewhere in his Journals and Papers
Kierkegaard comments that, "Science, theory, always comes afterwards [in this case,
after Christianity], . . .The grammar of a living language can never really be made
into a science; this can be done only with a dead language, for the immediate being
of the living language makes the science difficult".2 The two disciplines (i.e.,
philosophy and grammar) share a common method and it is clear that Kierkegaard is
endorsing a kind of methodological naturalism that is descriptive in nature and
shuns deontological notions of normativity with respect to belief; that is, he rejects
the idea that there are certain a priori rational duties that inhere in our investigations
which produce and regulate the formation of belief.3
XJP III 3716/Pap. X4 A 528.
2JP IV 3867/Pap. XI1 A 557
3 While the question of what counts as a true naturalism is a difficult one, here naturalism is taken
to be about a method of determining normative standards. See Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper
Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 45-6. There are different conceptions of
naturalism, operating across a spectrum of more to less extreme versions. Kierkegaard is not being
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The later Wittgenstein also speaks of philosophy as grammar—a concept linked
to what he called "language-games" and "forms of life". Wittgenstein introduces
the term language-game to refer to "the whole process of using words" in a specific
community, or "the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is
woven".4 These language-games are patterns of processing and referring to reality
which share a family resemblance and are the product of specific ways of being and
acting in the world.5 These ways of being in the world are also called forms of life.
Fergus Kerr notes that for Wittgenstein, these forms of life are "equated with the
kind of activity that customarily includes some speaking", but on the whole,
"Wittgenstein is evidently concerned with very elementary patterns of social
interaction . . . the kinds of activities out of which human life is formed, no matter
what language is spoken or what the social structure is".6 The example given by
Kerr is that of the collage of gestures, words, activities, etc., involved in comforting a
man in pain. Wittgenstein elaborates,
Instead of the unsayable specific, the indefinable: the fact that we act in such-and-such ways,
e.g. punish certain actions, establish the state of affairs thus and so, give orders, render
accounts, describe colours, take an interest in others' feelings. What has to be accepted, the
given—it might be said—are the facts of life.7
Elsewhere he insists that, "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we
ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'", and that, "we are to look
on the language-game as the primary thing".8 This turning of our philosophical
investigations to the language which is expressed through and out of our forms of
saddled with a radical form of naturalism such as W.v.O. Quine's, that eschews normativity
altogether. See Quine, "Epistemology Naturalised", in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 69ff.
4
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans, by G.E.M. Anscombe (London: Basil
Blackwell, 1967), 7.
5 Wittegenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 23. Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations,
19; Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, eds. by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans, by
G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967) 173.
6 Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, Second Edition (London: Society for Promoting
Christian Knowledge, 1997), 30.
7
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1, eds. by G.E.M.
Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans, by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980),
630. Fergus Kerr quotes the above section (ibid., 64) and notes that, "this passage is decisive for
Wittgenstein's forms of life. The focus is clearly on the endless multiplicity of smallscale and
ubiquitous social practices such as punishing, noting, commanding, telling, etc. The 'given' in
other words, is no longer atomic elements of being".
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life amounts to writing a grammar. By paying attention to the concepts expressed
through language, philosophy as grammar seeks to uncover the rules of the "game"
of which they are a part. This analogously provides a description and explanation of
the game and exposes its "sense".9 In reference to the concept of grammar in
Wittgenstein, Robert C. Roberts remarks that the job of the grammarian is, "not to
invent the rules . . . her ingenuity is to discover regularities already there in the
practices of the [particular] human tradition . . . and to find neat ways of formulating
these regularities".10 The kind of grammar being written in a philosophical grammar
does not look at individual words and the lexical-syntactical rules that govern their
function, but is a "depth grammar". Such a grammar directs its focus to the
concepts the words signify, and formulates the "rules" governing their use by
examining how they operate in our lives and by dialectically clarifying their
appropriate application across a range of thought. These "rules" acquire their depth
as a grammar (versus the mere "surface grammar" that governs the lexical and
syntactical deployment of language) because they are the rules of a community's
conceptual and linguistic engagement with "reality". A philosophical grammar of
concepts is elicited from the "facts of nature" within the forms of life specific to a
language game.11
But how is Kierkegaard like Wittgenstein, apart from some trivial mention of
grammar? There are two reasons. First, Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein similarly
understand human reason to be limited to conceptual essences. And secondly,
Kierkegaard understands the nature and task of philosophical thinking in roughly
the same manner as Wittgenstein. Thus Kierkegaard, like Wittgenstein, employs a
8 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 654-6; first italics mine.
9 See Wittgenstein's comment, "Grammar describes the use of words in the language. So it has the
same relation to the languages the description of the game, the rules of the game, have to the
game". Philosophical Grammar , ed. by R. Rhees, trans, by A. Kenny (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974),
60.
10 Robert C. Roberts, "Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and a Method of 'Virtue Ethics'", in Kierkegaard
in Post!Modernity , eds. Martin J. Matustlk and Merold Westphal (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, 1995), 144-5. Robert C. Roberts draws a parallel between Kierkegaard and
Wittgenstein and argues that Kierkegaard is a moral grammarian. Kierkegaard is more than just a
moral grammarian; his grammar extends to the formation and regulation of beliefs as well.
11 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 230.
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philosophical method, or manner of approaching philosophical problems, that takes
the form of a conceptual grammar and functions as a kind of therapy to remove
confusion and reveal inconsistencies in one's thoughts.
One may divide the methodology of a philosophical grammar into two basic
stages. The first stage is a phenomenology. "First of all comes life; then later or
sooner (but afterwards) comes theory—not the reverse", reminds Kierkegaard. Here
Kierkegaard uses phenomenology in the broad sense of inquiring into the contents
of conscious experience. For Kierkegaard (as well as Wittgenstein), there is no other
place for philosophy to begin than from the present conscious involvement in the
world. This, of course, takes place (especially for Wittgenstein) within a social
context, and not in isolation from others. Consciousness is comprised of concepts
and the concepts we use shape the way the world appears to us. We must use
concepts and so a taking stock of our present conscious involvements in the world is
the place from which we begin our theorising. Both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard
understand our present corporal embodiments and our conceptualisations to be
corresponding parts of our cognitive life. In this sense a "phenomenology" is a
taking stock of our present cognitive position in the world. The second stage
involves a logical analysis of the concepts we glean in the first stage. The later stage
is an attempt to draw out the logic of concepts we use in order to clarify our world
picture and remove conceptual inconsistencies.
A Grammar ofConcepts
Let us begin with the first point of similarity between Wittgenstein and
Kierkegaard. To understand how Kieikegaard's and Wittgenstein's views are
similar regarding the nature of human reason, the category of paradox, discussed in
Chapter Two, is essential. Wittgenstein's shift to philosophy as grammar was
prompted by his view of the limits and situatedness of human reason. Kierkegaard's
shift to grammatical analysis is similarly funded by his category of paradox.
Kierkegaard returns to his principal distinction between actuality, as referring to the
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existing-ness of a thing, and possibility, as referring to the concept of a thing. The
dominant concern of Kierkegaard's is that Hegel's idealism, and by extension all
purely metaphysical inquiry, collapses existence into thought, and treats actuality as
possibility. Kierkegaard reminds all those of a metaphysical persuasion that as
existing persons they are finite and temporally situated and characterised by flux.
There is no abstract point of pure self-presence, no presuppositionless beginning
point, from which to begin philosophy's task of sorting through existence, and such
a place is not humanly attainable. In Postscript Climacus argues that an existential
system is impossible (except for God).12 "All philosophising is a reflection of what
is already given in consciousness", Kierkegaard affirms.13 Human theorising must
start where it is, with what is given conceptually to it in human existence—as the
juxtaposition of the temporal and eternal, existence and thought.
The result of this duplex situation is a gap between our experience and ideas.
Mental representations of, and referring expressions to, the actual world, the existing
world, are always incomplete replicas and of such a nature that they can never fully
present actuality qua actuality to human consciousness. In Fragments Climacus
states,
Immediate sensation and immediate cognition cannot deceive. This alone indicates that the
historical cannot become the object of sense perception or of immediate cognition, because
the historical has in itself that very illusiveness of coming into existence.14
That which is historical is concerned with the existential concretion of the existing
human subject and Kierkegaard often uses the term as synonymous with actuality;
the historical is the possible that has come into existence as actual. In the above
passage Climacus simply means that in its immediacy the perceptual presentations
of experience prior15 to judgements are simply that. Perceptual presentations are
sense reports devoid of propositional content—they just are. This is what
12 KW XII. 1 109-125/SVIX 93-106.
13 JP II 2274/Pap. Ill A 5; my italics.
14 KW VII 81AT VI 73-4.
15 The term "prior" here does not denote temporal priority, but rather logical priority. Many would
dispute the claim that the two poles of human experience, perceptual "giveness" or "appearing" and
conceptual judgements, can be separated in any other way than in abstraction and it is not claimed
here that there is a temporal gap between them.
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Kierkegaard refers to as immediacy.16 For Kierkegaard immediacy refers to actual
states of things—"the immediate is reality [Realiteten]"11—and when used of
human perception signifies the state a person is in when being appeared to in a
human perceptual mode (traditionally delineated as: visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory,
and gustatory). When one is in the state of being appeared to we may call these
perceptual states. In a state of immediacy one does not reflect upon the contents of
one's consciousness but directly acts one's perceptual states (and perhaps other
mental states as well).
Howard and Edna Hong make this same point in their editorial comments in
Fragments,18 and in an editorial note in Training in Christianity, Walter Lowrie
similarly explains that for Kierkegaard the terms "immediate" and "immediacy"
are philosophical terms used to denote "the direct apprehension of the senses".19
Note that Kierkegaard's category of immediacy is interpreted here as a pre-
conceptual mode of perceptual consciousness and therefore he is understood to be
operating with a notion of perception that, contrary to sense-data and adverbial
theories, sees the relation between the reports of one's senses regarding an object
and the way it "appears" to one's (pre)consciousness as irreducible. In Johannes
Climacus, or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, Kierkegaard states that, "If
consciousness can remain in immediacy, then the question of truth is cancelled".20
C. Stephen Evans takes Climacus's statement in Fragments regarding
immediate sensation (quoted in the text above) to mean that Kierkegaard is "in
agreement with both classical foundationalism and classical scepticism, that there is a
category of necessary truths".21 Classical foundationalism takes there to be a
category of truths about (at least) our perceptual states. Truths like, "I seem to be
seeing a tree right now". These truths are understood to be infallible.
16 KW VII 167-68/Pap. IV B 1:146.
17 JP III 2320/Pap. IV B 14:6.
18 KW VII 31 In.41.
19 S0ren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1941), 124n.2.
20 KW VII 167/Pap. IV B 1 146; my italics.
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There are three problems with reading the account of perception in Fragments as
expressing agreement with classical foundationalism.22 First, Evans ignores that, for
Kierkegaard, there is a gap between experience and ideas. Thus, if there are
necessary truths for Kierkegaard, they must be mathematical or logical truths, and
could not be those gained through sense experience. Second, by hypostatising the
objects of cognition Evans's position does not account for Kierkegaard's linking
the concept of the historical to the existing person. Consciousness for Kierkegaard
is always a situated, historical consciousness that is limited by accidental features of
its historical subject. And the objects of cognition, as actuality, are in the flux of
time. Last, Evans ignores Climacus's statement in Johannes Climacus that, "In
immediacy there is no relation, for as soon as there is relation, immediacy is
cancelled. Immediately, therefore, everything is true".23 Kierkegaard is not saying
that every experiential proposition (e.g., "I see a tree in the quad") is true—he in
fact goes on in the same sentence to say the opposite—but he is pointing to the
nature of consciousness in relation to cognition, perception, judgements, and
immediacy. Immediacy signifies the pre-conceptual mode of perceptual experience.
Consciousness (as full-consciousness), by its very nature, annuls immediacy by
becoming aware of its cognition. In this awareness judgements are formed and the
act of cognition receives propositional content. In A Realist Conception of Truth
William Alston explains the logic of the position we are attributing to Kierkegaard:
To recognize a cardinal is to form a belief that it is a cardinal, and, like all beliefs, this
involves using concepts. But this does not show that to be visually aware of a cardinal
one must employ that concept. Indeed, it is obvious that one need not employ the concept
of a cardinal in order to see a cardinal. I can see a cardinal (i.e., it can be a that what I see
is a cardinal) even though I do not recognize it as such, and even though I totally lack any
such concept. . . . the mere visual cardinal cannot be mistaken; it is not the sort of thing
that can be correct or incorrect. It is the beliefor judgment that what I see is a robin that
is susceptible to mistake?*
21 C. Stephen Evans, "Does Kierkegaard Think that Beliefs Can be Directly Willed?" International
Journal for Philosophy ofReligion 26: (1989)176.
22 Popkins also makes this same mistake Evans does when he says that for Kierkegaard
propositions reporting immediate sensations "are indubitable but not a priori". Popkins, "Hume
and Kierkegaard", 277.
23 KW VII \61/Pap. IV B 1 146; his italics.
24 Alston, A Realist Conception of Truth, 91.
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When he insists that in immediacy sensation and cognition "cannot deceive",
Climacus is emphasising that the state of immediacy is a pre-linguistic and pre-
conceptual state and therefore the categories of truth and falsity do not apply. The
question of being deceived cannot arise. For example, one does not refer to a
thermometer that is inaccurate in its reading as being deceived, but broken. The
thermometer cannot be in a state of being self-deceived by its faulty information
because it has no awareness of its perceptual states or their objects, and therefore has
no propositional states regarding its perceptual states (or their objects). There is a
sense in which it is perfectly right to say that the thermometer has a kind of
"consciousness" of its environment in so far as it responds to and reflects any
adjustments in the temperature. However, the thermometer, in its analogous state of
"immediacy", is not forming any prepositional content regarding the temperature
(i.e., it does not have full-consciousness of it) and therefore cannot itself be
deceived. True, it may deceive others, but only those who are no longer in a state of
immediacy, but are aware of perceiving the reading as what it is (falsely)
presenting—and therefore have propositional awareness as part of their cognition of
the thermometer in the form, "The thermometer indicates that the temperature is 0".
Or, to be more precise, those who read the thermometer are in the state: S is self¬
consciously aware that X is 0. In the same passage Kierkegaard notes that it is
precisely this fact which makes the propositions we believe through perception
objectively "dubious". The objects of perception come to our awareness and are
therefore no longer objective certainties: "It is just as if reflection removed the
[object of perception] from [our] senses".25 Kierkegaard's category of the paradox
surfaces again.
Kierkegaard's position on the nature of cognition, concepts and perceptual
consciousness may roughly be abbreviated and summarised as follows. There are
different modes or aspects of consciousness. These range from pre-conceptual
modes, in which X is presented as 0 to some subject S but S is not self-consciously
25 KW VII 81 /SV VI 74
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aware of perceiving X as 0, to a thoroughly conceptual full-consciousness—i.e., a
self-conscious act of subject S taking her perceptual experience of X as 0 to be that
of X as 0. The term, full-consciousness is used for Kierkegaard's concept of
consciousness because the Danish term for consciousness, Bevisted, is a direct
corrolary of the German word for consciousness, Bewusstein. The dictionary
Kierkegaard used, The Dansk Ordborg of Christian Molbech, defines Bevisted as:
"The characeristic of being aware of one's own existence".26 Both the German and
the Danish words have a self-reflexive character that refers back to the conscious
subject. Thus, the ordinary German and Danish words for consciousness carry with
them the idea of being fully aware, which is not necessarily implied in the English
word consciousness. For Kierkegaard, then, the ordinary usage of the term
consciousness would denote a kind of self-awareness we will call full-
consciousness, in order to distinguish it from a perceptual presentation to
consciousness.
In Johannes Climacus Kierkegaard describes consciousness as a "duplexity"
of "reality" and "ideality". He further defines these terms saying that, on the one
hand, "Immediacy is reality", and on the other hand, "language is ideality".27
Reality, then, is unmediated (it is), and ideality is mediated by language. Kierkegaard
describes consciousness as the mental state of a human person in which immediacy
and language are brought alongside, but not absorbed into, each other.
Consciousness qua full-consciousness, then, has two elements or poles: (1) a pre-
conceptual element of direct perceptual presentation (immediacy); and (2) a
conceptual, linguistic element (ideality). For this reason, Kierkegaard is able to
question whether consciousness can remain in immediacy, which would entail that a
kind of perceptual immediacy inheres in consciousness. And yet he also criticises
Hegel's use of the terms sinnliches Bewusstein [sense-consciousness], and
wahrnehmendes Bewusstein [perceiving-consciousness], arguing that these should
26 John W. Elrod, "The Self in Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms", International Journal for Philosophy
ofReligion 4 (Winter 1973), 230.
27 KW VII 168/Pap. IV B 1 147.
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instead be rendered "sense-perception" and "experience".28 In this comment
Kierkegaard clearly wants to distinguish, in any act of sense-preception, the event of
perceiving that takes place in the perceiver—what we could call the perceptual
presentation or "immediacy", from the perceiver's awareness (consciousness) of
the event of perception—the experience. Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel's use of
Bewusstein in this context concerns the fact that in the concept of "consciousness
[Bevisted] there is more [than just perceptual immediacy]".29 Therefore Kierkegaard
charges Hegel with misusing the concept Bewusstein by using it to designate the
event of perceiving as an act of consciousness. Thus, we may conclude that Bevisted,
for Kierkegaard, denotes /^//-consciousness, and is more than just simply Hegelian
sinnliches Bewusstein, or perceptual immediacy. Kierkegaard understands there to
be a pre-conceptual mode of human consciousness. Thus we may speak of a pre-
linguistic element of perception—of which one necessarily can have no full-
consciousness, for that entails a linguistic framework—in Kierkegaard's thought.
Taken as a whole, there is no pre-linguistic full-consciousness (as Bevisted) of
perceptual experience because full-consciousness includes awareness—and that
negates immediacy. On Keirkegaard's view, the pre-linguistic pole of perception
(perceptual immediacy) is ontologically different and logically separable from my
being aware of experiencing the event in question as that event, even though it occurs
simultaneously—perhaps necessarily—with it.
There are two intuitions preserved in this analysis. The first is that that events
happen to things, whether conscious or unconscious, and as such inanimate, non-
sentient objects have "experiences". In other words, events, or the exchanging of
"properties", may involve either persons or objects. For example, a stone may be
hurled through a car window, or (God forbid) a human person may be hurled
through a car window. Both the stone and the person have had an "experience" of
the same sort, in the sense that each experienced a relevantly similar exchange of
properties. The difference is that the person may be aware of this experience,
2tKW\II 167, 169n/Pap. IV B 1 146, 148.
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whereas the stone may not. As soon as one becomes fully conscious of having had
an experience, there necessarily is a linguistic-conceptual component present. The
second intuition preserved in this analysis is that there is something about our
actually perceiving objects that is very different from our merely thinking about
them, even though in each instance (sense perception and thoughts about the objects
of sense perception) we may employ exactly all the same concepts?0 This means
that perception can never be collapsed into conception.
The poverty of mental representation is further vented in Kierkegaard's
distinction between "factual being" and "ideal being".31 Any attempt to
propositionally or conceptually demonstrate actual existence must fail by definition.
What is demonstrated in such attempts is "ideal being". Factual being refers to that
which exists (vcere til ) as actual and there are no degrees of this type of being:
"With regard to factual being, to speak ofmore or less being is meaningless. A fly,
when it is, has just as much being as the god".32 When we attempt to prove that " X
exists" by arguing from the proposition, "Y exists", what we succeed in showing is
the rather banal conclusion that either X and Y are tautologous, or that Y includes the
concept X.33 This yields the ideal being of X, "But as soon as I speak ideally about
being, I am no longer speaking about being but about essence". 34 Ideal being, or
essence, can be explored for coherence and to see what logical relations it involves,
but essence is conceptual and not in a necessary relationship with factual being qua
29 KW VII 167, 169n/Pap. IV B 1 146, 148.
30 William Alston has elaborated on this view, calling it the Theory of Appearing in his
unpublished paper, "Back to the Theory of Appealing". He also briefly discusses this in his books,
A Realist Conception of Truth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), and Perceiving God:
The Epistemology ofReligious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
31 KW VII 40n-41/SV VI 41.
32 KW VII 40n. /SV VI 41. Kierkegaard is very careful here to avoid Anselm's error of identifying
existence as a property of a thing, which Kant so cogently rebutted. In Journals and Papers he
writes, "Kant is right in saying, 'Existence brings no new predicate to a concept.' Obviously Kant
honestly thinks of existence as not being absorbed into the concept, empirical existence . . .
Nothing is added to a concept whether it has existence or not; it is a matter of indifference; it indeed
has existence, i.e., concept-existence, ideal existence"; JPI 1057/Pap. X2 A 328.
33 Popkin, "Hume and Kierkegaard", 276.
,4KW VII 42n,/SV VI 42; his emphasis.
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actuality.35 In a way that resonates with some of the current postmodernist criticisms
of the "metaphysics of presence",36 Kierkegaard argues that what concepts signify
are never wholly and simply present in experience.
The failure of concepts to represent existence as it actually is (as it is in the
process of being what it is) leads to a necessary distinction between facts and
judgements.37 Kierkegaard notes that the totalising impulse in human reason, the
impulse to contain reality and present it as a coherent unity to the human subject, and
therefore the ideas or judgements we form on the basis of experience, are in a
reciprocal relationship of informing and being formed by a larger set of beliefs. This
larger set of beliefs, belonging to the realm of ideal being mentioned above, must be
categorised and sorted into "facts". In The Concept ofAnxiety Haufniensis says,
To be able to use one's category is a conditio sine qua non [indispensable condition] of
observation if in a deeper sense it is to have any significance. When the phenomenon is
present to a certain degree, most people become aware of it but are unable to explain it
because they lack the category [in this case, the "demonic"], and if they had it, they would
have a key that opens up whatever trace of the phenomenon there is, for the phenomena
within the category obey it as the spirits obey the ring.38
Here Kierkegaard clearly identifies that our making judgements is part and parcel of
our practice of forming beliefs in the process of experiencing reality. He identifies
that there is a third "something" inserted in the gap our experience of reality and
the ideas that we form in respect to them; namely, reflection. In his journal
Kierkegaard writes that, "As soon as I frame a law from experience, I insert
35 Kierkegaard also asserts the gap between idea and experience in KW XII. 1 109-125/SV IX 93-
106, where he argues that a logical system is possible but an existential one is not; the distinction
is also made in KW XII. 1 149-50/SV IX 123-24. As Paul Tillich notes, Kierkegaard's distinction
between essence (as possible being) and existence (as actual, factual being) is really an extension of
the scholastic distinction between essentia and existentia, in which "'essence' signifies the What,
the xt ecttiv or quid est of a thing; 'existence' signifies the That, the oxi eaxtv or quod est.
Essentia thus designates [in scholasticism] what a thing is known to be, the non-temporal object
of knowledge in a temporal and changing thing, the oucua of that thing which makes it possible.
But whether a thing is real or not is not implied in its essence: we do not know whether there is
such a thing by knowing its 'essence' alone. This must be decided by an existential proposition".
In Paul Tillich, Theology ofCulture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 80-81; see also 85.
36 Westphal uses this term of Kierkegaard and makes this point in Becoming A Self (West
LaFayette, Indianna: 1996), 107.
37 David Law makes this point as the basis of his discussion of what he terms Kierkegaard's
"anthropological scepticism, " in David R. Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian (Oxford:
ClarendonPress, 1993), 73-74. The following discussion closely parallels his and it has already
noted how his reading of Kierkegaard's epistemology differs from ours.
38 KW VII Xlln/SV VI 209.
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something more into it than there is in experience".39 He makes a similar point
another place when he writes, "It depends then, not only on what a man sees, but
what a man sees depends on how he sees it".40 Law comments that, "in using our
reflection to organise our sense data, we are imposing an alien framework upon
them, a framework which is not contained in or posited by the sense data but is
provided by the knower".41 For Kierkegaard then, cognition of one's perceptual
environment involves: (1) the perceptual experience (immediacy); (2) reflection on
or judgements about the experience which places it into a larger framework of ideas
or concepts; and (3) the beliefs we take away from the experience and hold in our
conscious awareness as we existentially orient ourselves to these
judgements/reflections in such a way that they are able to be expressed by our
propositional attitudes,42 Thus, there is, for Kierkegaard, an important difference
between the mental states of a human subject in a perceptual event, and the
propositional attitudes used to describe the event.
Two important points need to be emphasised. First, Kierkegaard's basic position
is that the facts we countenance about the material universe are features of our
consciousness, which in turn is constituted by concepts. Facts are not simply given
to us ready-made, nor are they part of the accoutrements of universe which, perhaps
in a Lockean sense, actively impress themselves on our passive awareness. Facts
only come to our awareness as propositional features of the "real world" when we
impose a conceptual framework on what is perceptually given to us in experience.
This is important because it leads us to the second point, which involves the
nature of concepts. Concepts themselves are, for Kierkegaard, "ideality",43 and
express the conceptual essences of things as possibilities for reflection. Their
39JP I 1012/Pap. IV C 75.
40 S0ren Kierkegaard, Edifying Discourses, translated by D.F. and L.M. Swensen (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1943), 67.
41 Lew, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, 74. "Sense data" is Law's term. I have already noted
my objection to an attempt to ascribe a sense-data theory of perception to Kierkegaard above.
42 For now, we will define propositional attitudes as the mental states of person expressed in
propositional form, but this definition will be improved upon in Chapter Seven. There will also be
in Chapter Seven a further discussion ofmental states and their relationship to beliefs.
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ontological and representational tie to empirical reality is not necessary
(logically)—although they are inherently intentional entities rooted in empirical
reality. Concepts are simply the basic units of thought and express "universals"
and as such are governed by the laws of logic. These "universals" do not exist as
hidden metaphysical entities but exist (as 'thought-existence') in their concretions,
their being used and functioning in our lives.44 Thus it does not matter if a concept
has a particular instantiation as long as it already has a way of being used.46 In this
way, a concept is that feature of our mental life (as a non-Cartesian way to our
thoughts, feelings, attitudes, emotions, references, etc.) whereby it is organised into a
realised capacity. Using these mental capacities (i.e., concepts), human persons are
able then to use to create a "meaning-complex",46 expressible through language as
the means by which humans judge, evaluate, compare, distinguish, and perform all
sorts of other "mental" tasks. While having concepts of a specific type will entail a
vocabulary commensurate with them, the possession of these concepts is not
reducible to the having of this new vocabulary. Rather, possessing a concept
facilitates a new way of speaking, acting, judging, "seeing", etc.47 This naturalistic
explanation of concepts is what oddly enough connects them to actuality—they are a
product of our existing and find their actuality derivatively in ours. Concepts are the
form in which reality (actuality) gives itself to be transposed into human thought
43 JP I 1051/Pap. X2 A 328. In this journal entry Kierkegaard also refers to the "eternity of
'concepts'"; Ibid.
44 Kierkegaard writes, "Abstract concepts are invisible like a straight line—visible only in their
concretions"; JP I 2/Pap. II A 496.
45 This effectively responds to the dilemma (often posed by ardent substance dualists) of the status
of alleged universal properties like colours (e.g., red) were all the particular instances removed,
erased, from the world. Does the colour then go out of existence? A Kterkegaardian may respond
yes and no. It does have concept existence still; i.e., we can still use the expression "ted"
meaningfully—which is the intuition the substance dualist wants to preserve. "Red" continues to
have a way of being used and therefore still retains its concept or thought-existence. "Red" does
not, however have any actual existence. See JP I 1057/Pap. X X2 328. Cf. JP II 1590/Pap. II A
37.
46Paul L. Holmer, The Grammar ofFaith (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 120, 140-42.
47 In The Book On Adler, Kierkegaard argues that concepts occasion and qualify our ways of being
in the world, saying, "emotion that is Christian is controlled by conceptual definitions, and when
deep emotion is transformed into or expressed in words in order to be communicated, this
transformation must continually take place within the conceptual definitions"; KW XXIV 1 \ 3/Pap.
VII2 B 235:200.
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(possibility).48 Kierkegaard writes that, "[t]o conceptualize is to dissolve actuality
into possibility", but that "[i]t is not as if 'actuality' were void of concepts, not at
all; no, the concept which is found by conceptually dissolving into possibility is also
in actuality, but there is still something more—that it is actuality".49 This grounding
of concepts in a metaphysically given reality that exists idependently of any
perceiver's mind is what separates Kierkegaard from metaphysical idealism and
from epistemolgoical idealism/subjectivism. In Journal and Papers Kierkegaard
states: "There is a kind of reflection in which the object is lost completely, and then
one behaves like the raven when it lost its object (the piece of cheese) because of its
eloquence. In this respect it is a picture of idealism, which when everything was lost
had only itself left".50 Not only is Kierkegaard saying that he understands reality to
be mind-independent, but, contra the epistemological idealisms of Kant and Hegel,
he also refuses to absorb the referent of our concepts into the features of our mental
activity.
Because of the inter-dependent relationship of our conscious experience of
actuality and the essence of concepts, Kierkegaard finds it to be an incorrigible
feature of human existence that we form concepts as a product of our being in the
world and consciously existing in it. Humans possess dispositions51 that, as
expressions of human subjectivity,52 are the "determinant of immediacy".53 That is,
human mental dispositions shape the way we experience reality. Kierkegaard is not
making the metaphysical claim that humans are hard-wired in a certain manner to
produce specific kinds of beliefs whenever they are appeared to in particular ways.
Instead it is postulated that, as an inherent feature of human doxastic phenomena,
48/PI 1059/ Pap. X2 A 414.
49 JPI 1059/ Pap. X2 A 414; his italics.
50 JP III, 3251/Pap. II A 198.
51 For example, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Climacus refers to a specific organ which produces
historical beliefs, KW VII 81/5V VI 74; and the pseudonymous Vigilius also refers to faith as "the
organ for issues of dogma"; KW VIII 1 Sn/SV VI 116. These references demonstrate that
Kierkegaard saw beliefs as the product of natural dispositions which arise from our being in the
world.
52 Kierkegaard states that, "disposition is the unity of feeling and self-consciousness"; KW VIE
148-49/SV VI 228.
53 KW VIII 148-49/5V VI 228.
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beliefs are formed when a subject is presented with objects—that this is must be due
to a pre-reflective, non-inferential disposition which lays outside the purview of
prescriptive reason.
Speculation operates in the "indicative mood", and speculation as to the
metaphysical nature of our mental dispositions is something Kierkegaard eschews.
Kierkegaard instead embarks on a grammatical inquiry that is self-consciously in the
"subjunctive mood"—that is, without making any claims to metaphysical ultimacy.
Kierkegaard writes,
The grammar of the indicative and the subjunctive contains basically the most aesthetic
concepts . . . and of the hackneyed proposition cogito ergo sum holds true: it is the
subjunctive's life principle (therefore one could represent the whole of modem philosophy
in a theory about the indicative and the subjunctive; it is indeed purely subjunctive).54
The trouble for modem philosophy is that they unwittingly speak in the subjunctive
mood but use an indicative syntax. Kierkegaard regards this a great confusion.
Mental dispositions, while not identical to the "categories" referred to above in the
quote from Anxiety, are obviously quite closely linked to and perhaps partially
comprised of them as constitutive features of full-consciousness—which is
linguistic and conceptually constructed. For conscious persons in the world,
concepts are an inescapable and indispensable feature of existence. Concepts allow
us to have beliefs in such a way that we can linguistically express our beliefs, and
they furthermore expedite our distinct dispositions, virtues, emotions, and
passions.55 Thus, faith or belief is really the expression of these dispositions as they
are ratified by the implementation of concepts. Therefore, as a disposition to belief,
Kierkegaard speaks with perfect coherence of, "The a priori character of faith" that
"can be interpreted in part from the side of the knower since that which heaven has
overcome is every doubt",56 and "the a priori in faith which hovers over all the a
posteriori of works".57
54 JP III, 2313/Pap. II A 159. For more on this distinction, see also JP III 2309/Pap. II A 155; JP
III 2310/Pap. II A 156; JP III 2314/Pap. II A 160; JP III 2315/Pap. II A 161; JP III 2199/Pap. I A
300.
55 Paul Holmer, The Grammar ofFaith, 145.
56 JP II 1099/Pap. Ill A 36 (his emphasis).
57 JP III \091/Pap. II A 190; his emphasis).
71
So then, for Kierkegaard, while the sphere of actual existence (corresponding to
Kant's noumenal world of the an sich) is real enough, it is only "known", or
consciously reflected upon, through the concepts we employ. It now begins to be
more clear why Kierkegaard applies the metaphor of grammar to theory or
philosophy and we are now in a better position to see how it is that Kierkegaard is
naturalising philosophy in a manner similar to Wittgenstein. In light of the above
analysis of concepts and their pre-eminence, Kierkegaard speaks of his task as being
that of rescuing concepts and clarifying them.38
Kierkegaard explains his situation thus:
When it so happens that generation after generation everyone takes over the concepts
[s/]he got from the previous generation—and devotes [her]/his days and [her/]his ideas and
[her/]his time to enjoying this life, works for finite goals, etc.—it all too easily happens
that the concepts are gradually distorted, become entirely different, come to be like
counterfeit money. . . . Yet no one wants the business of auditing the concepts. . . .
Nevertheless auditing is needed, and more and more with each decade.59
Kierkegaard saw himself as an "auditor"; as one fighting a battle to clarify concepts
and save terminology from becoming (in his words) "muddled", and "confusing",
and "twaddle",60 as they had become in the Hegelian attempt to subsume all the
academic disciplines under the hospices of metaphysical logic.61 Anthony Rudd
reasons that Kierkegaard's use of the pseudonyms was precipitated by the fact that,
"Conceptual clarification was essential for those intellectuals who had been
bewitched by Hegelian or other muddled thinking: they needed to clear their minds
5SKW XII. 1 206nJSV IX 171; OAR, 254. Cf. KW VIII 14; KW XXIV 89WU, 114, 173, 321/Pap.
VIII2 B &: 11 32, VII2 B 235:202; VIII2 B 9:16 51; X1 A 94:72. OAR, 251-3, 255, 262; JP ffl
2989/Pap. XI2 A 92.
59 JP VI 69211Pap. XI2 A 36.
60 See for example Climacus's statement in Postscript, ". . . in our day terminology and the like
are so muddled that it is almost impossible to safeguard against confusion"; KW XII. 1 206n/5V IX
171.
61 Niels Thulstrup argues this in, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1980), 351-55. See also Lee Barrett's excellent essay on Kierkegaard's doctrine of original
sin, "Kierkegaard's 'Anxiety' and the Augustinian Doctrine of Original Sin", in International
Kierkegaard Commentary, Volume 8: The Concept of Anxiety, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon,
Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1985), 39-41.
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before they could come to understand ethics and religion as the existential
challenges they are".62
Kierkegaard makes a clear argument for a "grammatical" method in the
introduction of The Concept of Anxiety,63 The pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis
notes that each discipline of inquiry, whether it be science, or poetry, or dogmatics
(theology), has its own mode of inquiry, entailing different passions and
interpretative concepts—an idea closely resembling "language-games". He later
declares that, "Every concept must be dealt with by the science to which it
belongs".64 Throughout Anxiety, Vigilius persistently counsels of the dangerous
effects of conflating logical concepts such as "immediacy" and "the negative",
with their related theological ones of "faith" and "evil".65 Legitimate conceptual
inquiry demands sufficient attentiveness to the intrinsic "modulation" appropriate
to each form of inquiry which involves a recognition of the game being played and
its intrinsic mood. This prevents, on one hand, our confusing the results of a certain
kind of inquiry for something it cannot represent (as in the case of Hegel's
metaphysical approach Christianity); and on the other hand, that we do not jumble
our nomenclature, calling an activity by one name when, by virtue of the manner in
which it is undertaken, it is necessarily something else.66 Each mode of inquiry (or
language game) has its own proper "mood". Even "science, just as much as poetry
and art, presupposes a mood in the creator (or author) as well as in the observer (or
reader), and that an error in the modulation is just as disturbing as an error in the
development of thought".67 The meaning of a particular concept is thus a matter of
attunement to the passional context of the language game in which it is used, and
62 Anthony J. Rudd, '"Believing All Things': Kierkegaard on Knowledge, Doubt, and Love", in
International Keirkegaard Commentary: Volume 16: Works ofLove, ed. Robert L. Perkins
(Macon, GA: Mecer University Press, 1999), 131.
63 KW VIII 9-13/SV VI 109-12.
64 KW VIII 35/SV VI 130.
65 Barrett, "Kierkegaard's Anxiety and the Augustinian Doctrine of Original Sin", 39.
66 Cf. Wittgenstein's comments: "Our mistake is to look for an explanation . . . where we ought
to have said: this language-game is being played", Philosophical Investigations, 654-6, his
emphasis; and also, "Tell me 'how' you seek and I will tell you 'what' you are seeking";
Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1974), 370.
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understanding a concept requires (and simply amounts to) employing it with the
appropriate pathos. As Gouwens observes, Kierkegaard is pointedly criticising "the
tendency of speculative philosophy and theology [i.e. the Hegelian metaphysical-
epistemological approach] to obscure linguistically the distinctions between fields of
study by interpreting particular concepts into such an all-embracing meta-logical or
speculative field".68
There are two significant parallels, then, between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein
pertaining to the naturalisation of belief.69 The first is the blatant rejection of the
hegemony of the metaphysical-epistemological approach to philosophy by both of
them, on the basis that it is a category error for human reason to inquire into the in-
itself-nature of things. We are already familiar with Kierkegaard's category of the
paradox. With this category in place, Kierkegaard asserts two things. He accepts
idea that human cognition does not have available to it the pristine vantage point of
an atemporal, ahistorical and presuppositionless beginning, but remains sullied in the
mire of temporal finitude. He also believes that reason is limited and cannot
penetrate to the sphere of existence as actuality. Whatever validity a "scientific" or
speculative metaphysics may have, it cannot reveal the mysteries of existence.
Wittgenstein was also concerned to remove philosophical inquiry from the
patronage of a speculative or psseudo-scientific metaphysical bias. He likewise
presents metaphysics "as a confusion between two language-games—just the sort
of confusion that results in nonsense or absurdity".70 In remarkably Kierkegaardian
style, Wittgenstein remarks that, "The essential thing about metaphysics [is] that the
67 KW VIII 1An/SV VI 113n.
68 David J. Gouwens, Kierkegaard us Religious Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 62.
69 There is a growing amount of studies in the literature comparing Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard.
The contrast lends itself easily because of the high praise that Wittgenstein had for Kierkegaard.
See Charles L. Creegan, Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality, and Philosophical
Method, (London: Routledge, 1989), for a good, full length introduction, as well as a book of
essays, Grammar of the Heart: Thinking with Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. New Essays in Moral
Philosophy and Theology, ed. Richard H. Bell (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988). For partial
treatments see Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, passinv, and Norman L. Malcolm,
Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?, passim.
70 Newton Garver, "Philosophy as Grammar", in The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, eds.
Hans Sluga and David G. Stern, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 158.
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difference between a factual and conceptual investigation is not clear to it. A
metaphysical question is always in appearance a factual one, although the problem is
a conceptual one";71 and elsewhere writes: "A main source of our failure to
understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. Our
grammar is lacking that sort of perspicuity".72
The way to solve philosophical problems, then, is in a grammar of
concepts—where concepts are ideal expressions of the essences of actual
objects—which clarifies and brings out the conditions under which these concepts
are properly employed (in reference to their function in ordinary forms of life). This
is the second parallel between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Both see philosophy's
task as the grammatical elucidation of concepts because the only cognitive access
(philosophy's realm of inquiry) we have to reality is its conceptual essences.
Wittgenstein's above comment about the essence of metaphysical questions
recalls Kierkegaard's distinction between factual and ideal being. In the development
of that point, Kierkegaard says that, "as soon as I speak ideally about being, I am
no longer speaking about being but about essence".73 In response he takes leave of
the resources of metaphysics to inquire into existence and defaults to a naturalistic,
grammatical approach—one that begins to reason from the situation in which we are
found and seeks to clarify those concepts already in place. In Philosophical
Investigations, Wittgenstein too shifts from metaphysics to a naturalistic ontology.
He tells us that, "Essence is expressed by grammar",74 and that, "Grammar [not
metaphysics] tells us what kind of object anything is".75 Admittedly, Kierkegaard is
not employing his linguistic analysis and conceptual grammar with the same level
and kind of self-awarenes that Wittgenstein is. Kierkegaard is neither as focussed
nor dedicated to pure logical analysis as Wittgenstein. There remains significant and
important differences between the two—not the least of which is their very different
71 Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, 949.
72 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 122; his emphasis.
73 KW VII 42n/Sy VI 41.
74 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation, 370.
75 ibid., 373.
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religious commitments. Nevertheless, the two thinkers have a continuing and deep
agreement about the nature of, and approach to philosophical problems—one that
eschews a modernist, metaphysical approach, that is predicated upon a radically
autonomous (Cartesian) subject, but also resists a solipsistic nihilism.
Subjectivity and the Limits ofPhilosophy
There is also a second point of similarity we noted between Wittgenstein and
Kierkegaard regarding the nature of the philosophical task. For Kierkegaard, as for
Wittgenstein, the situation of human reason, the situatedness of all human thinking,
is in language. In the Journals and Papers Kierkegaard argues that language is the
medium in which all human thinking is done (including Hegel, et al.), and yet is " a
medium that [speculative philosophy] did not choose".76 Kierkegaard's
philosophical opponent is Hegel—or more properly said, the Hegelian System—and
a major weakness Kierkegaard finds in Hegel's philosophy is Hegel's attempt to
construct a metaphysical system in terms of a pure, metaphysical language. The
attempt at a metaphysical system, the attempt to construct a language that expresses
reality as it really is (in distinction to how we normally speak about it), ignores the
fact that there is no point human speculation can reach that is outside of an already
given language. A speculative metaphysics also carries the implicit assumption that
ordinary language somehow is not appropriate.
This sort of oversight leads to all kinds of errors, Kierkegaard thinks. He
explains that, "There is much talk nowadays about flesh and blood being man's
enemy, but I am more inclined to look upon language".77 Kierkegaard further
remarks that when one fails to recognize that language is the natural, historical,
"given" in which all human thinking takes place, and then attempts (like Hegel) to
replace ordinary language with an artificial language, "it usually ends in silence [i.e.,
solipsim], or in the personal isolation of jargonish nonsense".78 Elsewhere
76/Fill 3281/Pap. Ill A 11.
77 JP III 2334/Pap. XI2 A 128.
78 JPIII 3281/Pap. Ill A 11.
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Kierkegaard states that it is, "no doubt simply because all instruction takes place
directly through language [that humanity] is so easily led astray. . . . how easily a
person is led into the conceit that he really knows something for which he has the
word. It is the concrete intuition which is so easily lost here".79
These statements of Kierkegaard lead Hermann Cloeren to argue that, along with
Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard believes "on the one hand the view that errors and
pseudo-problems in philosophy occur due to philosophers being misled, being
seduced, being charmed by language, [and] on the other hand that such pseudo-
problems are due to the active misuse of language by philosophers".80 As a kind of
therapy for this metaphysical malaise, Kierkegaard sets Climacus to the task of
performing linguistic analysis on Hegel. Climacus indicates this anti-systemic
methodology by naming his first work Philosophiske Smuler or Philosophical
Fragments—or Philosophical Scraps, as Walter Lowrie translated it. This method is
not just limited to the pseudonym Johannes Climacus but includes all of
Kierkegaard's works. This is especially the case in his works Concept of Irony
[Begrebet Ironi] and Concept ofAnxiety[Begrebet Angest], in which the basic mode
of analysis is to examine the logic of specific concepts and how they function,
without any explicit attempt to formulate a grand system of philosophy. This
extends even to Kierkegaard's more theological discourse.81 Climacus actually
describes the absent mindedness of speculative philosophy (Hegel) as an objective
lunacy,82 and prescribes the kind of cure he has in mind: "Presumably ... it takes a
devil of a fellow in speculative thought to free himself from Hegelianism. Far from
79/Fill 2324/Pap. X2 A 235.
80 Hermann Cloeren, "The Linguistic Turn in Kierkegaard's Attack On Ilegel" International Studies
in Philosophy 17/3 (1986): 2. Cloeren's article is very good and my argument in this paragraph is
drawn cheifly from him.
81 A good example of this occurs in, Practice in Christianity. Anti-Climacus place the heading on
Part 2: '"Blessed is He Who Is Not Offended At Me': A Biblical Exposition and Christian
Definition [of Concepts], By Anti-Climacus"; KW XX 71-144/5V 16 77-142. The Hongs's
translation of the title of this section is not as accurate as Lowrie's, who includes the words "of
Concepts" which is placed in brackets above. The Danish word used in this instance is
Begrebsbestemmelse which is a compounding of the two words Begrebet or "concept", and
bestemmelse which means "to make definite". It seems quite clear that Anti-Climacus is meaning
to indicate something like a grammar of concepts, in which the concept indicated is "made
definite".
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it; only sound common sense is needed, a pithy sense of the comic, a little Greek
ataraxia [inner peace]".83 However, for Kierkegaard linguistic analysis is, as we
shall see below, at least, only one of the necessary elements in Climacus's
prescribed therapy to Hegelian thought. The other, more important ingredient, is
becoming subjective.84
In the Postscript Climacus sets about revealing the "chimeric" and
"fantastical" achievements of Hegel by simply examining his language to see if it
makes sense, and if Hegel has correctly employed ordinary language concepts.85
Climacus writes that in both Postscript and Fragments he is struggling against the
fact that (and we can assume he sees this is as a result of the Hegelian influence) "in
our day terminologies and the like are so muddled that it is almost impossible to
safeguard oneself against confusion".86 As Cloeren notes, Climacus frequently
combines linguistic analysis with an ironical humour to demonstrate that Hegel's
claim to absolute knowledge and systematic completeness is meaningless and even
laughable.87 The goal of for Climacus is to reveal the ironic conflict between
Hegel's claim to possess the System, the metaphysical explanation of the world-
historical process, and its state of incompletion—"if the system is not finished, there
is not any system".88 The results of Climacus's linguistic analyses reveal,
Kierkegaard thinks, that Hegel's vantageless metaphysical language ignored the
relative nature of linguistic expressions and thus "became fantastical".89 Hegel has
crossed the boundaries of philosophical sense and utters sheer nonsense.
82 KW XII. 1 194-5/SV IX 162.
83 ATty XII. 1 33n/SV IX 32n.
84 See KW XII. 1 129-188/SVIX 107-157.
85 We could point to our previous discussions of Climacus for examples of this kind of
analysis—e.g., his critique of Aristotle's views on possibility. For another example, see
Climacus's critique of Hegel's views on the logical principle of contradiction, KW VII 108-09/5V
VI 97; KW XI. 1 304-06/SVX 12-13.
SbKW XII. 1 206/SV IX 171.
87 Cloeren, "Linguistic Turn", 4.
88 KW XII. 1 101/SV IX 92. For Climacus's statements regarding the incompleteness of Hegelian
system see XIV XII. 1 13, 86-109, 118-124, 145/SVIX 15, 91-94, 101-05, 120.
89 Ibid. Here Climacus also states regarding Hegel's metaphysical language that, "In the situation
of dialogue, the whole fantasticality involving pure thinking will make a poor showing". See also
Cloeren, "Linguistic Turn", 6.
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In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein proposes a view of language
and philosophy that agrees in many details with the above Kierkegaardian
perspective. Wittgenstein made a variety of remarks along these lines. He tells us,
for example, that, "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence
by language"; he also states that, "language is itself the vehicle of thought", and
that "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an
illness".90 Wittgenstein clearly saw language, as did Kierkegaard, as something for
which metaphysics cannot account. For Wittgenstein, the activity of philosophy is a
contingent enterprise consisting of the explication of concepts we are already familar
with, and use every day, so that what is being overlooked is made plain. On this
account, in their philosophising both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein are attempting to
"lead words back from their metaphysical use to their correct use in language".91
Both these thinkers, then, saw philosophy as limited by its nature to a conceptual
grammar, which must be engaged in when metaphysical confusion abounds and
concepts are being misapplied.
Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein similarly prescribe the limits of philosophical
thinking within the conceptual sphere and think that human thought and language
can never get beyond itself to speak of things as they really are (being qua being).
Wittgenstein argues that "the cardinal problem of philosophy" is the question of
the nature and limits of language, that there are things that "cannot be said by
propositions, but only shown" ,92 Jamie Ferreira draws attention to the similairites
between Wittgenstein's contention that, "the sense of the world must", because of
the limits of philosophy and language (i.e., human thought), "lie outside the
world",93 with Kierkegaard's category of paradox (the absurd), which he describes
90 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 109; 329; 255.
91 Ibid., 116.
92 Wittgenstein, Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore, eds. G.H. von Wright and B.F.
McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 71; my emphasis. See also David G. Stem, Wittgenstein
on Mincl and Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 69-70.
93 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness,
(London: Routledge, 1974), 6.41.
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as a "point outside the world".94 This does not mean that either of Kierkegaard and
Wittgenstein believe that there are things that cannot be talked about—the point
instead is that speaking about certain things cannot explicate (or reveal, or capture)
what those things are. Both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein share the idea that
philosophy is simply a kind of therapy all of us need from time to time when our
thinking (use of concepts) becomes confused and our vision of reality is thereby
distorted—i.e., we encounter a philosophical quandry. Going beyond the limits of
language and logic in this way, the making sense by showing, "will simply be
nonsense"95—so there is a sense in which all philosophy itself is "nonsense" in
that it is attempts through propositions to show us something that cannot (strictly)
be said. Philosophy is not an end in itself, but is a tool to point beyond itself—to
that which cannot be said and cannot be circumscribed by the logical standards that
apply to propositions. So it is that on the one hand Wittgenstein says, "My
propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: whoever understands me
eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps - to
climb up beyond them"96, and on the other hand Climacus says, "A person
relinquishes the understanding in order to believe—but then he achieves a higher
understanding".97
There is a debate in the literature over whether there are two kinds of nonsense,
"plain nonsense" and cognitively meaningful nonsense or "deep nonsense", in
Wittgenstein (and a fortiori Kierkegaard). James Conant and Cora Diamond reject
the notion that there is a kind of nonsense that is cognitively meaningful and helps
us to grasp the ineffable.98 Our claim above is not that (for Kierkegaard and
Wittgenstein) there are certain ineffable propositions (as possibilities) that are then
94 JP III 2803/Pap. X2 A 519. See M. Jaimie Ferreira, "The Point Outside the World: Kierkegaard
and Wittgenstein on Nonsense, Paradox and Religion" Religious Studies 30 (1994): 29-44.
95 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, p. 3.
96 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.54.
97XWXII.l 564/SV X 234.
98 Cora Diamond, "Throwing Away the Ladder" Philosophy 63 (1988), 5-27; and James Conant,
"Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Nonsense", in Pursuits of Reason: Essays in Honor of Stanley
Cavell, eds. Ted Cohen, Paul Guyer, and Hilary Putnam, (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University
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grasped only by other "nonsensical" propositions. Rather the point is that the telos
of explanatory propositions (philosophy) is subjectivity (actuality) and that these can
at best serve to give us a better vision of actuality. So the goal of philosophy, in so
far as that involves truth, is ultimately outside itself as the re-positioning of ourselves
as subjects in the world. This is also to say that (strictly speaking) philosophy is
"nonsense" of some sort because it inherently undermines its own efforts—it uses
words to say that words are not enough. A nonsense of this sort is compatible with a
view (such as Conant's, Diamond's, and Ferreira's) that rejects the intelligibility of
the concept of deep nonsense, because what is grasped on our account is a way of
being, not some cognitively meaningful but logically nonsensical proposition. Thus,
all propositions that claim to elucidate this actuality are, as possibilities, nonsensical.
But within this sphere of possibility there still can be a distinction made regarding
kinds of nonsense. That is, not every piece of jibberish is equal to appropriately used
philosophy. It is important to note that, in at least Kierkegaard's case, the paradox or
the absurd is not that which can be dissolved into a logical contradiction: "The
absurd, the paradox, is composed in such a way that reason has no power at all to
dissolve it in nonsense and prove that it is nonsense; no, it is ... a compounded
riddle about which reason must say: I cannot solve it, it cannot be understood, but it
does not follow that it is nonsense".99
The significant thing here, is that both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein view
philosophical efforts, which intrinsically undermine themselves, as nonetheless
serving as "elucidations", and as achieving "a higher understanding". That is,
philosophical ruminations contribute to an overall vision of how things are.
Wittgenstein believed philosophy could not account for the ethical, "that centre of
Press, 1993), 195-224. See also Jaimie Ferreira's discussion of this issue in, "The Point Outside
the World", passim.
99 JP I 1/Pap. X2 A 354. Climacus also states in Postscript: "Therefore [the Christian] cannot
believe nonsense against the understanding . . . because the understanding will penetratingly
perceive that it is nonsense and hinder him from believing it, but he uses the understanding so
much that through it he becomes aware of the incomprehensible, and now, believing, he relates
himself to it against the understanding" KW XII. 1 568/SV X 235; my emphasis. Cf. KW VII 108-
09/SV VI 97; and ATT XII. 1 421 /SV X 110-11.
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the world, which we call the I, and which is the bearer of ethics".100 For
Kierkegaard, that which language and philosophy cannot encapsulate is
actuality—the sphere of paradox, which is also the realm of ethics and the self.
Haufniensis tells us in Concept ofAnxiety that in dealing with actuality, "the whole
interest of subjectivity steps forth, and now metaphysics runs aground".101 In
Chapter Two we discovered that this is precisely why Descartes's cogito is so
mistaken. In order for the self to operate as the rational foundation of epistemology
it must be a pure, rational entity. In order for Descartes's epistemological program
to succeed the self must be collapsed into thought and thereby part of the
propositional scheme. Kierkegaard rejects this picture. For Kierkegaard, as pure
actuality, subjectivity draws the limit for the world of reflection. Ethics, the ethical, is
what gives philosophy its "world" for contemplation, it is the point outside the
world and thus is not a part of the world of reflection but stands underneath it as its
• • 10?
presupposition.
Philosophy or philosophical activity, especially metaphysics, cannot become a
surrogate subjectivity. Propositions and thinking cannot reveal (or be) the self that is
actual. "The continued striving", writes Climacus, "is the expression of the existing
subjects' ethical life-view. The continued striving must therefore not be understood
metaphysically, but niether is there any individual who exists metaphysically".103 It
is almost as if Kierkegaard, and not Wittgenstein, wrote in Tractatus that, "What
i°o Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916 , trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, eds. G.H. von Wright and
G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961), 80. See Paul L. Holmer",Wittgenstein and the
Self', in Essays on Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein: On Understanding the Self, eds. Richard H. Bell
and Ronald E. Hustwit (Wooster, OH: The College of Wooster Press, 1978), 10-31, for an
excellent discussion of this theme in Wittgenstein.
101 KW VIII 18n/SV VI 116n.
102 Recall the passage quoted from Climacus in Chapter Two regarding the Cartesian cogito: "The
indifference is forgotten in the Cartesian cogito—ergo sum ... I think, ergo I think; whether I
am or its (in the sense of actuality, where I means a single existing human being and it means a
single definite something) is infinitely unimportant [for Descartes], That what I am is in the sense
of thinking does not, of course, need any demonstration, not does it need to be demonstrated by any
conclusion, since it is indeed demonstrated. But as soon as I want to make my thinking
teleological in relation to something else, interest enters the game. As soon as it is there, the
ethical is present and exempts me from further trouble with demonstrating my existence, and since
it obliges me to exist, it prevents me from making an ethically deceptive and metaphysically
unclear flourish of a conclusion" KW XII.1 318-19/.SF X 65-6; my italics, his bold.
103 AW XII. 1 \2\-22/SV IX 104.
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brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'. The
philosophical self [i.e., the Cartesian self] is the limit of the world—not part of
it".104 Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard agree that the concept "I"
has no logical or philosophical status—it is more an existential concern that escapes
the bounds of reason.
To this end Frater Taciturnus argues in Stages On Life's Way that, "The
metaphysical is abstraction, and there is no human being who exists metaphysically.
The metaphysical . . . does not exist [as such], for when it eixsts it does so in the
esthetic, in the ethical, in the religious".105 Instead, the esthetic, ethical, and religious
are cross-sections of actuality and cannot be thought; they are lived. Paul Holmer
comments that these sorts of limits on philosophy may seem to place "ethics,
transcendental matters generally, the foundations of logic, the meaning of life, and
much else of first importance into a kind of limbo . . . such that if we cannot have
these things as propositions we cannot seemingly have them at all".106 However,
Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein both assume that we do have first-hand access to
subjectivity (and all these other things), only not via propositions or thought
(philosophy). The point is (for Kierkegaard at least) that human thinking cannot
fashion for itself a metaphysical world immanent within itself, and achieve what
Calvin Schrag terms a "transcendence-within-immanence".107 When this is
attempted the whole interest of subjectivity steps forward and metaphysics runs
aground. Subjectivity is transcendent, its situation in language outstrips specualtive
thought and its being or actuality is constituted in its historical action as the Kivrjoig
or flux of its temporal existence [Tilvcerelse]—that which cannot be thought. For
Kierkegaard, Adi Shmiielli notes, "One does not see transcendent existence one
believes in it... . Transcendent existence is hidden behind every phenomenon, which
104 Witgenstein, Tractatus, 5.641.
105 KW XI 476/5P VIII 266
106 Holmer, "Wittgenstein and the Self', 12.
107 Clavin O. Schrag, The Self After Postmodernity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997),
11Off.
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is its veil".108 Therefore attempts to circumscribe it within the bounds of theoretical
reason alone constitutes a type of philosophical and spiritual illness. The
philosophical therapy Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein both recommend and perform
is designed to show us that these things are available to us all and to help get a
clearer picture of ourselves—i.e., our world. This is for Kierkegaard, of course, only
the first stage of a thorough remedy, a sort of clearing ground for proper pathos.
Climacus and Grammar?
C. Stephen Evans objects to an anti-metaphysical reading of Climacus. He
argues that Climacus's philosophical discussions in Fragments often have a
"robustly metaphysical character", which causes, "Some commentators . . . [who]
have tried to interpret Climacus as giving us bits of linguistic analysis . . . providing
us with 'grammatical reminders' about the use of our concepts ... [to be] somewhat
embarrassed".109 On the contrary, Evans finds there to be an obvious metaphysics
at work in Fragments, as in, for example, when Climacus claims: "All coming into
existence occurs through freedom, not by way of necessity. Nothing coming into
existence comes into existence by virtue of ground, but everything by a cause. Every
cause ends in a freely acting cause".110 Evans is specifically targeting H.A. Nielsen
who argues that despite the "fact-like" appearance of Climacus's statments
regarding possibility and necessity, this guise is "unfortunately obscuring"
Climacus's real objective of simply providing a grammar for our discourse about
these things.111 According to Nielsen, these deceptive "fact-like" statements need to
be "decompressed" so that their grammatical function may be clearly seen.112
In rebuttal to Nielsen, Evans argues that it is, "a mistake to think that these
points simply reflect the way we talk, as if they would no longer hold if we talked
108 Adi Shmiielli, Kierkegaard and Consciousness, trans. Naomi Handelmann (Princeton:
Orinceton University Press, 1971), 56.
109 Evans, Passionate Reason, 121.
110 KW VII 75/SV VI 69; and Evans, Passionate Reason, 122-3.
11'H.A. Nielsen, Where the Passion Is: A Reading of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments
(Tallahasse: Florida State University, 1983), 129-133; Evans, Passionate Reason, 121.
"2Evans, Passionate Reason, 121.
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some other way".113 Climacus's apparent metaphysical talk just is straight¬
forwardly that—statements that indicate how things really are. Climacus is not,
Evans contends, simply trying to talk about (in this case) possibility and necessity as
features of our language. The substance of Evans's argument is that, "Climacus is
focusing on what logicians call de re necessity, the necessity of things themselves,
rather then de dicto necessity, the necessity of propositions or statements. The nature
of things is reflected in our statements; our statements do not dictate how things
must be".114 At the end of the day, for Evans Climacus is "closer in sensibility to a
Greek or medieval philosopher here than to contemporary Wittgensteinians".115
Regardless of their relevance for Nielsen's understanding of conceptual
grammar and arguments concerning Climacus's position, Evans's remarks betray
that he has not considered all that someone (Wittgensteinian or Kierkegaardian)
might mean when they say that philosophy is grammatical. We must be careful not
to overextend the Wittgenstein-Kierkegaard connection, but the two thinkers seem to
have some deep connections. By his last comment Evans clearly means to be
addressing all Wittgensteinian readers of Kierkegaard, yet he has not apparently
considered the kind ofWittgensteinian-Kierkegaardian reading envisioned here.
To begin with, Evans does not seem to grasp the relevance of depth grammar and
how it is that forms of life function as the ground for our language and concepts.
The kind of grammatical inquiry of which Wittgenstein spoke, and with which I am
linking with Kierkegaard, is not, it will be recalled, a surface grammar that examines
only the lexical-syntactical rules governing the role and function of the linguistic
expressions which shape our discourse. This appears to be the understanding Evans
has of philosophical grammar. However, Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard (on our
reading) are concerned with depth grammar, a grammar of concepts. This sort of
grammar acquires its depth because of the rich notion of concepts it rings with it.





grammar in our sense, then, forms the rules of conceptual and linguistic engagement
with reality as they are elicited from the "facts of nature" within the forms of life
specific to some language-game. The point of saying that philosophy is grammar is
not (just) to prescribe a method, but more importantly to describe what is in fact
going on in all of our philosophical analyses.
Thus Evans's truism regarding our speech reflecting the nature of things, and
not the converse, completely misses the point. Depth grammar is concerned with
clarifying our use of the concepts (and language) given to us from our praxial
engagements with "reality". Evans correctly attributes to this position a denial that
our statements straight-forwardly reflect the nature of things. However, instead of
the belief that our statements dictate how things must be, it is more appropriate to
say that on the depth grammar view if we were engaged in different ways with
things, we would speak differently about them. The realist assumption, in so far as
that means taking there to be a mind-independent reality to which our words refer,
has already been granted—only Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard will emphasize that
there is no place outside of language we can find from which to compare our
relationship to the world expressed by our language.116 For Climacus (and
Kierkegaard), then, language, while never communicating reality qua actuality,
nevertheless contains metaphysical commitments—that we cannot (and need not)
completely rationally justifiy. Frater Tacitumus explains that, "The metaphysical, the
ontological, is [er] but does not exist [er ikke til] . . . and when it is, it is the
abstraction from, the prius [something prior] to [existence]".117 Kierkegaard
believes that our language and attending truth-claims reveal our "metaphysical
competences" because of the implicit involvement of our language with "our
common sense practices" and the general way we live.118
116 This is not naive or direct realism. See Fergus Kerr's extremely good discussion of this subject
in Wittgenstein's thought, in "Assurances of Realism", Theology After Wittgenstein, 121-141.
117 KWXl 476/5V VIII 266.
118 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "Trials of Truth: Mission, Martyrdom, and the Epistemology of the
Cross" (in press).
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Secondly, Evans also seems oblivious to the critique of reason and metaphysics
that we have described as motivating both Kierkegaard's and the Wittgensteinian
grammatical approach to philosophy. Earlier we quoted Wittgenstein saying that,
"The essential thing about metaphysics is that the difference between a factual and a
conceptual investigation is not clear to it. A metaphysical question is always in
appearance a factual one, although the problem is conceptual".119 Taken together
with his statements regarding the situatedness of reason within language,
Kierkegaard makes an almost identical point when he declares: "A remarkable
transition occurs when one begins to study the grammar of the indicative and the
subjunctive, because here for the first time one becomes conscious that everything
depends upon how something is thought, consequently how thinking in its
absoluteness supercedes an apparent reality [Realitet]".120 He also declares that, "of
the hackneyed proposition cogito ergo sum [one thing] holds true: it is the
subjunctive's life principle (therefore one could represent the whole of modem
philosophy in a theory about the indicative and the subjunctive; it is indeed purely
subjunctive)".121 In these statements Kierkegaard is pointing to a critical
forgetfulness that plagues metaphysical philosophy: it keeps thinking it has spoken
about being qua being (in the indicative mood), when in fact it has only spoken
about being qua thought, an "apparent reality" (in the subjunctive mood). Indeed,
Climacus frames his entire "thought-project" of Fragments by preceding it with
Latin term "Propositio" which means "proposal" or "hyposthesis".122 When one
reads this in conjunction with Climacus's statements in Fragments regarding
metaphysics and being noted earlier (e.g., "What is lacking here is a distinction
between factual being [being qua being] and ideal being [being qua thought] ... as
soon as I speak ideally about being, I am no longer speaking about essence"), it is
difficult to understand Climacus to be attempting what he has previously defined as
119 Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, 949.
120 JP III 2309/Pap. II A 155. This journal entry date is in 1837, seven years before Kierkegaard
wrote Fragments in 1844.
121 JP III, 2313/Pap. II A 159.
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impossible. Kierkegaard appears to be very sceptical about the ability of philosophy
to speak in the indicative, to articulate a metaphysics telling us about how things
really are.
Unfortunately Evans does not take the time to coordinate his metaphysical
reading of Climacus's discussion of possibility and necessity in Fragments with the
critique of metaphysics occuring earlier in the book. However, if we take the time to
examine Climacus's argument with Aristotle over the account of possibilty and
necessity it appears to be an example of the kind of philosophical grammar we have
attributed to Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. No doubt there are metaphysical
commitments involved in Climacus's argument, but his primary issue with Aristotle
concerns the logic of concepts (as Evans's ensuing discussion bears testimony).
Climacus wants to argue that it is a mis-application of the concept of necessity to say
(as Aristotle wanted) that what has come into existence (the historical) must exist;
that once something exists it necessarily exists. Instead, Climacus argues,
"Necessity stands all by itself. Nothing whatever comes into existence by way of
necessity, no more than necessity comes into existence or anything coming into
existence becomes the necessary. . . . The actual is no more necessary than the
possible, for the necessary is absolutely different from both. . . . Aristotle's . . .
mistake is to begin with the thesis that everything necessary is possible".123
There is nothing embarrassing for a Wittgensteinian (or a Kierkegaardian) here.
Climacus is saying that Aristotle has violated the logic of the concept of
"necessary" and that this has lead to a metaphysical confusion. When we say that
something exists necessarily, Climacus points out, logically we must mean that it
cannot «ot-exist, and therefore this thing can admit no changes in its state.124
Climacus then goes on to clarify how the concepts of necessity and possibility must
be used in relation to existence—what he calls "coming into being". In short,
Climacus argues that to speak of something as necessary is to admit that we cannot
122
Hongs's editorial note claims that the heading "Propositio" indicates the " 'if/then' form of the
entire work", KW VII 276 n.l.
123 KW VII 74-75/SV VI 69.
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also predicate of that thing that it is possible (has come into being)—that would be
contradictory ("the necessary is") and a conflation of the concept of necessity into
that of possibility. It is simple logic—the kind with which Wittgenstein's notebooks
are rife. The factual nature of the language is entirely in keeping with Climacus's
goal of telling us how speak about things that exist—"metaphysical questions are
always in appearance factual ones". Climacus is addressing the same issues as
metaphysics but he never mistakes his most poignant "metaphysical" insights to
speak of being qua being.
124 See our discussion of Climacus's logic on this point in Chapter Two.
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Conclusion to Chapter Three
Chapter Two articulated Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle against the
backdrop of its response to Hegel and the metaphysical-epistemological project of
modern philosophy. This chapter began with Kierkegaard's call for a radical shift in
how epistemological (and metaphysical) issues are approached. Kierkegaard's
insistence that, "First theory, then life", and that, "All philosophising is a reflection
on what is already given in consciousness", signifies a profound departure from the
metaphysical-epistemological approach to belief, epistemology, and subjectivity. In a
move that anticipates (but is not reducible to) Wittgenstein's linguistic analysis
Kierkegaard demonstrates that the modem (Hegelian) attempt at a "pure and
contextless theory"125 was the root source of conceptual impotence and confusion.
Kierkegaard "naturalises" our philosophical reflection and recommends a grammar
of concepts in the "subjunctive mood" rather than a metaphysical inquiry in an
illusory "indicative mood".
Chapter Three, then, marked a shift away from the language of metaphysics. For
Kierkegaard, life is constantly in Flusse, and subsequently life (or any of its
constituent parts) cannot be metaphysically picked, dried, and shrink-wrapped into
theoretically manageable bite-sized pieces. Philosophy trades in the realm concepts
or conceptual essences. Its sphere of operations is limited to the sphere of ideality
and therefore philosophies most penetrating insights cannot yield metaphysical
certainty. The appropriate way of employing philosophical thinking is thus in a
conceptual grammar that focuses on the nature of our concepts and how they are to
be consistently employed. This post-metaphysical method of analysis, as we have
seen, produces a very different picture of the nature of belief and subjectivity from
the rest of modernity. In Chapter Four, the next chapter, we turn to the subjectivity
principle itself and examine how Climacus develops his concept of subjectivity in
relation to the concept of truth.
125 Schrag, The Resources ofRationality, 58.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE TRUTH OF SUBJECTIVITY
The truth is a snare: you cannot get it without being caught yourself; you cannot get the
truth by catching it yourself but only by its catching you.
S0ren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
In Chapter Three we established that Kierkegaard approaches philosophical
questions naturalistically and grammatically and not in the a priori (Cartesian)
manner of speculative metaphysics. We argued that Kierkegaard recommends that
investigations into metaphysical matters, into what is, should be approached as a
conceptual grammar. As we saw in Chapter Two, this involves a rejection of the
Hegelian-Enlightenment project and its attempt to ground beliefs in an ahistorical,
translucently self-apprehending subject. Inspite of his naturalistic method
Kierkegaard does not want to eradicate human subjectivity from issues of doxastic
formation and regulation. Instead Kierkegaard wants to reassess human subjectivity
and affirm its essential role in human doxastic affairs—only in its proper place. This
requires that the human subject who thinks and believes must be decentered from its
rational Cartesian throne as the duly (selfjcentered ground of all (infallibly) known,
true belief.
In this context Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus comes to argue that
subjectivity is truth and fashions the subjectivity principle. In Climacus's detailed
statement of this principle in Postscript we can see the themes of human subjectivity
(subjectivity/objectivity, inwardness), anti-Cartesianism (objective uncertainty, risk),
and epistemology (truth, Tro) at work:
When subjectivity is truth, the definition of truth must also contain the expression of the
antithesis of objectivity . . . and this expression will at the same time indicate the
resilience of inwardness. Here is such a definition of truth: An objective uncertainty, held
fast through an appropriation with the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the
highest truth there is for an existing person. ... the definition of truth stated above is a
paraphrasing of faith [Tro]. Without risk, no faith. Faith is the contradiction between the
infinite passion of inwardness and objective uncertainty.1
1 KW XII. 1 203-04/SV IX 169; his emphasis.
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As noted in Chapter One, Kierkegaard indicates in his Journals and Papers that this
"subjectivity principle" is meant as an epistemologically normative principle:
In all the usual talk that Johannes Climacus is mere subjectivity, etc. [i.e., an
epistemological sceptic and relativist], it has been completely overlooked that in addition
to all his other concretions he points out in one of the last sections [of Postscript] the
remarkable thing is that there is a How with the characteristic that when scrupulously
rendered the What is also given, that this is the How of "faith". Right here, at its very
maximum, inwardness is shown to be objectivity. And this, then, is a turning of the
subjectivity-principle , which, as far as I know has never been carried through or
accomplished in this way.2
It is obvious that Kierkegaard understood Climacus to erase the Cartesian and
modem dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity that posits an
epistemological chasm between the thinking self and the objects of its thoughts.
Kierkegaard reconceives belief in such a way that it resolved epistemological
tensions.
This chapter contends that the subjectivity principle, the thesis that "truth is
subjectivity", provides us with a critical principle which serves as the normative
basis for a Kierkegaardian epistemology. In Chapter Two we also argued that
Kierkegaard's stress on subjectivity came as a response to the objectifying
metaphysical tendencies of modem philosophy, and in Chapter Three we saw how
this response involved a completely new anti-metaphysical approach to philosophy.
In Chapter Four we will show that Climacus, in a direct frontal attack on modem
epistemology, formulates his subjectivity principle in two stages and demonstrates
the poverty of the Enlightenment approach to the epistemic issue of truth. The
critique of epistemology begins in Fragments, where Climacus configures an
existential approach to epistemology while considering the fundamental issue of the
Plato's Socratic dialogues, Protagoras, Gorgias, Meno, and Euthydemus: "Can the
truth be learned?"3 The possibility of learning truth is put forward as the seminal
issue of the Climacean thought-project carried out in Fragments and entails that
epistemic issues be conceived in theological terms. In Postscript Climacus's second
move in establishing the subjectivity principle is concerned with stipulating the
2 JP IV 4550/Pap. X2 A 301; my emphasis.
^ KW VII 9ISV VI 15.
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subjectivity as the formal condition for the attainment of the existential conditio sine
qua non of epistemology addressed in Fragments as Salighed, or eternal happiness.
The result is a discussion of truth and subjectivity which outlines a normative
principle.
Truth in Fragments
Our contention is that the ironical-comical thought experiment of Fragments is
written by Johannes Climacus as Kierkegaard's attempt to parody Hegelian
epistemology and shift the orientation to epistemological issues away from the
Hegelian-Enlightenment emphasis on sheer objectivity, infallibility, systematic
completeness, etc. To be sure, Fragments is specifically interested in the truth of
Christianity and whether its truth may be known or realized in/as history; but our
point is that for Climacus this too is an epistemic issue (in addition to its theological
import). It further serves to illustrate the errors of Hegelian-Enlightenment
epistemology, as well as to illuminate the nature of doxastic regulation in general.
Evans notes that it is clear from the title Fragments that with it Kierkegaard
intends to lampoon Hegel.4 In the original Danish the title reads: Philosophiske
Smuler eller En Smuler Philosophi, and is commonly rendered in English as
Philosophical Fragments, or A Fragment ofPhilosophy. The anti-Hegelian ring to
the title emanates from the use of Smuler which pokes fun at systematic philosophy,
claiming to be only a little "bit", or a "scrap", of philosophy. The very opening
line of the Preface continues the fun at Hegel's expense when Climacus states that,
"What is offered here is only a pamphlet . . . without any claim to being a part of
the scientific-scholarly endeavor in which one acquires legitimacy".5 Hegelian satire
continues as the main theme of the Preface and Climacus concludes it by saying that,
4 C. Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments
(Bloomington: University of Indianapolis Press, 1992), 18-19.
5 KW VII 5/SV VI 9; my emphasis.
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unlike those who value objectivity as the highest philosophical virtue, every time he
gives his opinion on a philosophical quandary he stakes his entire life.6
Climacus's intention to forge an existential corrective to Enlightenment
epistemology is also evident from the outset of Fragments, and is present in the
epigraph to Fragments which asks, "Can a historical point of departure be given for
an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure be of more than
historical interest; can an eternal happiness be built on historical knowledge?"7
There are not three separate questions here; rather, these three questions weave
together to perform one interrogative. The careful phrasing of this question indicates
that in this work Kierkegaard is attempting to have his pseudonym resituate the
"world-historical" epistemological program of Hegel's "system", that claimed to
speak from the presuppositionless vantage point of absolute objectivity and thereby
account for "world-history" (including Christianity) and eternal consciousness—or
what in more Hegelian terms would be called the movement of Absolute Spirit
(■Geist). Climacus is redressing the Hegelian-Enlightenment depiction of the
individual's relation to Christianity as one that is purely cognitive and objective (a
matter of propositional knowledge). The rhetorical force of the epigraph serves to
confront the reader with what is for Climacus the essential epistemological issue:
one's individual subjectivity and its relation to the truth (Christianity). With this
epigraphic question Climacus reveals that there is one thing left out of Hegelian
systematic metaphysical-epistemology—the individual person's interests, and a
fortiori the individual person her/himself.8 Thus Climacus demonstrates early in
Fragments that he means to recommend an alternative to the epistemic issues
broached in the epigraph.
Beyond Recollection
6 KW VII 7-&/SV VI 11.
7 KW VII MSV VI 7.
8 Cf. Climacus's repeated claim in Postscript that in all his systematising Hegel has forgotten to
include himself. See, for example, KW XII. 1 109-125/SV IX 93-106.
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Climacus centers his entire thought-project ofFragments around the issue of the
possibility of learning the truth: "Can the truth be learned? With this question we
shall begin".9 It is granted by Climacus that if human existence is not temporally
structured there is neither need nor possibility of learning. The possibility of
learning arises for humans only within the flux of time and, Climacus notes, this
presents a stubborn set of difficulties. The complications of human temporal
existence (as coming-into-being, Tilblivelse) are a factor in our pedagogical
development because of the misrelation between the nature of human cognisance as
temporally situated and the truth as "eternal"—in the sense that it does not change
from one context to another. This is something that the Platonic Socrates10 realised
which led him to the central problem of Meno, between virtue ("defined as
insight")11 and knowledge. Climacus sets the difficulty this way:
Insofar as the truth is to be learned, it of course must be assumed not to
be—consequently, because it is to be learned, it is to be sought. . . . [however] a person
cannot possibly seek what he knows, and, just as impossibly, he cannot seek what he
does not know, for what he knows he cannot seek, since he knows it, and what he does
not know he cannot seek, because, after all, he does not even know what he is supposed
to seek.12
The problem is obvious. Humans need not seek for a truth if they are already in
possession of it, but it is equally difficult for humans if they do not possess this
truth. If we lack any truth (or true beliefs) regarding a certain thing x, we are without
the condition for the possibility of recognising our noetic paucity with respect to
x—it is precisely this thing (true beliefs with respect to x) we must have to know we
are without it. To understand this argument, assume that Susy possesses no true
beliefs at all about the universe—including her beliefs about the truth and falsity of
her beliefs about the universe. In this case it is impossible for Susy to discover that
9 KW VII 9/SV VI 15.
10 Climacus does not address the issue of whether the Socrates in Meno (or the other Platonic
dialogues) is the "historical" Socrates, or simply a pseudonym for Plato. He does seem to assume
that there is a unified point of view expressed by Socrates throughout Plato's dialogues and that it
is possible to discern Socrates "real" voice, but it is not his primary concern to sort this out from
Plato's personal views. The issue of whose voice is speaking in the Platonic Socrates is largely
irrelevant to our task and we will not attempt to answer this question.
11 KW VII 9/SV VI 15.
12 KW VII 9/SV VI 11.
96
she lacks these mundane truths, or even that she should investigate them, as she has
no conception of her doxastic situation with respect to the universe.
There are two parts to the corresponding dilemma Plato constructs in Meno.
First, the learner's temporal quandary must be resolved. That is, the logical difficulty
of coming to know something in time-space must be reconciled with the unchanging
(eternal) nature of truth. This is the explicit problem of Socrates in Meno: seeking
for truth implies its lack, and therefore its contingent relationship to the knower; but
possessing truth, because it is "eternal", implies its necessary existence within the
knower. What is needed to solve this part of the problem is a reconciliation of the
temporal existence of humans with human cognition of an eternal truth. But the first
predicament carries with it the second, implicit, problem as well, regarding the nature
or ontological position of the learner (i.e., humans). The implication of the first
problem is that humans are ontologically situated so that the first dilemma arises.
That is, before we can resolve the first tension we must reconcile (or assume a
position with respect to) the nature of human persons so that the tension of their
being (ontologically) in a position in which they can be without the truth is
compatible with the possibility (ontologically) of their coming to know the truth—or
admitting a change in their state of being. The epistemological quandary of Meno
speaks not only of the logical problem of time and cognition, but also the
ontological problem of human beings who inhabit time-space, yet know unchanging
(eternal) truth.
Socrates introduces the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis, or recollection, as a way
of resolving the tensions in Meno. Climacus explains: "Socrates thinks through the
difficulty by means [of the principle] that all learning and seeking arc but
recollecting. Thus the ignorant person merely needs to be reminded in order, by
himself, to call to mind what he knows. The truth was not introduced to him but was
in him".13 Ultimately the Socratic or Platonic answer, then, is to deny the reality of
13 KW VII 9/SV VI 15-16; my emphasis. Regarding the acquisition of truth, Socrates argument in
79 d - 80 b ofMeno runs as follows:
97
the perceived state of human ignorance (although it remains "real" enough for us to
have to need "teachers" like Socrates). That is, human ignorance is not an essential
ontological feature of human nature, it is an accidental feature; ignorance is more like
forgetfulness. The real problem for Socrates is that we don't realise, or
"remember", the truths we already possess. The Socratic answer to the first part of
the dilemma, then, is to circumvent the problem of the temporal cognition of eternal
truths by arguing that humans acquired these truths in a prior, eternal state of
existence. Thus, there is no need to explain how it is that we prehend eternal truths in
time because strictly speaking we do not do so. Instead, in our prehension of truths
we are actually doing so from an eternal state.
But with his answer to the temporal, logical problem Socrates has assumed a
position regarding the second dimension of the problem as well. As Climacus
keenly notes, the concept of recollection "becomes", for Socrates, "a demonstration
for the immortality of the soul—retrogressively, please note—or a demonstration of
the pre-existence of the soul".14 Socrates assumes then, that humans are
ontologically situated so that eternal truths are available to them and are, in fact,
already in their possession: the ignorant person remembers these truths "by
himself'. Socrates' postulates that humans are eternal, immortal beings and possess
within themselves, as a constituent feature of their beings, the condition for the
"S: Must he not either have at some time acquired the knowledge he now possesses, or else always
possessed it? -Yes.
S: If he always had it, he would have always known. If he acquired it, he cannot have done so in
his present life. Or has someone taught him . . . ?
M: But I know that no one has taught him.
S: Yet he has the right opinions doesn't he?
M: That seems indisputable, Socrates.
S: If he has not acquired theiu in his present life, is it not clear that he had them, and had learned
them at some other time?-it seems so.
S: Then that was the time when he was not a human being?—Yes.
S: If then, during the time he exists and is not a human being he will have true opinions which,
when stirred by questioning, become knowledge, will not his soul have learned during that time?
For it is clear that during all the time he exists, either as man or as not.—So it seems.
S: Then if the truth about reality is always in our soul, the soul would be immortal so that you
should always confidently try to seek out and recollect what you do not know at present—that is,
what you do not recollect?
M: Somehow, Socrates, what you say is right". See Plato, "Meno", in Classics of Western
Philosophy, ed. Steven M. Cahn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977), 17.
14 KW VII 10/SV VI 16.
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possibility of knowing the truth. Humans, who do in fact know some truths, can do
so because they are fashioned in accordance to the very nature of truth itself. For
Socrates humans are ontologically structured so that they are in the truth, in the
sense that humans intrinsically possess (all other things being equal) the ability to
know the truth. Plato, Socrates, and Climacus all recognise that the epistemological
issue of learning truth has an ontological dimension pertaining to the nature of the
cognising human relative to the noema of her/his cognition.15
Climacus acknowledges the merits of Socrates' position but quickly moves on
to discuss why recollection will not do as an answer to the question, "Can the truth
be learned?" Climacus notes that "the profundity of Socratic thinking" is his
"thoroughgoing humanity" that treats all persons, regardless of position or intellect,
equally as worthy of his attention and maieutic art.16 Climacus, however,
immediately tempers his praise, arguing that,
even though this enthusiasm is beautiful [i.e., the Socratic desire to be a maieuticist—an
occasion for recollection], even though I wish for myself and for everyone this
euxcrcaqpopia 615 rcaSoc; [disposition to passion] . . . this enthusiasm ... is still but
an illusion, indeed, a muddiness ofmind in which earthly distinction ferments . . . Neither
can the fact that the teaching of Socrates or of Prodicus was this or that can have anything
but historical interest for me, because the truth in which I rest was in me and emerged
from me. . . . My relationship to Socrates and Prodicus cannot concern me with regard to
my eternal happiness, because this is given to me retrogressively in the possession of the
truth that I had from the beginning without knowing it. . . . The temporal point of
departure is a nothing, because in the same moment I discover that I have known the truth
from eternity without knowing it, in the same instant that moment is hidden in the
eternal, assimilated into to it in such a way that I, so to speak, still cannot find it because
there is no Here and no There, but only an ubique et nusquam [everywhere and nowhere].17
In this passage Climacus summarises his reasons for dismissing the Socratic
option of recollection. The bottom line is that the Socratic alternative cannot answer
the question, "Can the truth be learned?" in the form Climacus has phrased it.
Climacus has given the question of Plato's Meno a further existential, religious twist
so that it cannot become simply a matter of objective disinterest to the individual
15 In other words, Socrates, Plato, and Climacus recognise the truth of Alvin Plantinga's
observation that, "the nose of the ontological camel pokes into the epistemological tent; for what
you take to be . .. [directly accessible to human cognition] will depend, in part, upon what sort of
creatures you think humans are". Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford; Oxford
University Press, 1993), 183n.9.
16 A-VU VII \2/SV VI 16-17.
17 KW VII 12/SV VI 17.
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questioner, as the Socratic question had become for Plato, and Cartesian philosophy
with its modern progeny. Climacus's version logically extends the question so that
its fundamental concern with the individual's ontological state, one's Salighed, is
kept in the forefront.
Our reading is at odds with C. Stephen Evans's claim that Climacus is not really
concerned with demonstrating the truth of his position, or with trying to demonstrate
why his position is superior to that of Socrates.18 Climacus is simply interested in
constructing an alternative to the Socratic position. Evans seems to believe that
Climacus is a little more cavalier in his dismissal of the Socratic view than our
portrait of him allows. Evans is surely correct that Climacus spends little time
elaborating on his reasons for moving beyond Socrates. And once he does state his
reason for rejecting the Socratic position it is true that Climacus repeatedly takes it
for granted that the need to move beyond Socrates is self-evident, and justifies his
innovations on or criticisms of a given view simply on the basis of it being either
beyond the Socratic or merely Socratic. However, this is only because Climacus
believes that the necessary self-interest, Salighed, that inheres in the question, "Can
truth be learned", has not been accounted for properly by remaining with Socrates.
Furthermore, Climacus has an interest in the truth in the form of Salighed. For
Climacus to argue that his concept of eternal blessedness does and cannot obtain on
a particular view is for him to argue that that view is not true, and vice versa.
Both the Platonic and the Climacean form of the question link one's being able
to learn the truth with one's ability to be in the truth. Socrates perceives the crux of
the issue of learning the truth to be whether humans possess the condition to know
truth; that is, whether existing humans are ontologically conditioned so as to
capacitate and prehend eternal truth. In order to facilitate this demand Socrates posits
18 Evans states: "[Climacus] sets himself the philosophical task of trying to construct an
alternative to the Socratic view. ... He does not (with a few notable exceptions . . .) concern
himself with the truth of this alternative, but merely attempts to see if there is any such
alternative [his] underlying procedure is simply to ask, 'Is this view genuinely different from
the Socratic view?' Thus, Climacus will often reject a possibility by arguing that accepting such a
view would 'return us to Socrates,' and just as frequently, he will add a wrinkle to his 'thought-
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that there is no new knowledge being acquired in a given instance of "learning",
and that there is no qualitative change in the learner taking place. The putative
"acquisition" of knowledge is merely a matter of recollecting truths already in the
learner's possession. Learning is thus a matter of acquiring the truth by drawing on
one's own inner resources. In this sense, the learner has "eternal" truth within
her/him and is already in truth. Socrates' one creed, therefore, is "Know Thyself',
and his posture as a "teacher" is maieutic and one of ignorance.19 Kierkegaard
argues in his dissertation that, "for Socrates this self-knowledge was not so
copious; it actually contained nothing more than the separating, the singling out what
later [in speculative philosophy] became the object of knowledge".20
Kierkegaard interprets the Socratic exhortation to self-knowledge as an
injunction to, "separate yourself from the other", which in turn is an entirely
"negative result".21 Climacus operates with the same understanding of Socrates on
this point. Thus, the Socratic "know yourself' is "entirely congruous with the
ignorance previously prescribed. The reason he could continue to insist upon this
negative point is . . . because his life task and interest were to affirm it—not
speculatively, for then he would have had to go further, but to affirm it
practically".22 So for Socrates, the question of learning the truth is equivalent to the
existential question of being in the truth—it has both ontological and ethical
dimensions.
Taken in its most broad and basic way, the subject matter of ethics is, for
Kierkegaard, subjectivity—the sphere in which humans are, or exist, and act and can
be held accountable for those actions. That is, the subject matter of ethics is the same
as that of ontology—the actual or actuality itself—only its goal is not to describe
what actuality is, but to prescribe how it should be. For this reason Kierkegaard
project' by merely claiming that the wrinkle makes his constructed view genuinely different form
the Socratic perspective". Evans, Passionate Reason, 14.
19 Plato, "Phaedrus", in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington
Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 230 a.
20 KW II m/SVl 207.
21 KW II lll/SV I 207.
22 KW II 178/Sf I 207.
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accuses Hegel of having no ethics. Hegel (so Kierkegaard inveighs) constructed his
system sub specie aeternis and conceived of the human subject as an abstract (and
therefore a non-actual, possible) point. The ethical, as pertaining to the actual, the
existence of humans as their historical (time-space) actions or movements as a
coming-to-be (Tilblivelse], cannot arise for any person who is an abstract Hegelian
subject, because this subject is "pure thinking" and does not act sensu eminenti [in
the strict sense].23 In its essence, then, ethics is the subjective sphere of interest, and
relates to the free movement or transition of human agents (concrete, subjective I's)
who effect and are effected in possibiles becoming actual. Ethics is not (in this most
basic way) about the science of morality, and may even be said to be overlapping
with theological concerns. Climacus says, "But as soon as I begin to want to make
my thinking teleological in relation to something else, interest enters the game. As
soon as it is there, the ethical is present".24 In Repetition Constantin Constantius
links the historical (time-space) transition of possibility to actuality and interest to
ethics, arguing that,
Repetition [as a self-conscious movement of freedom from possibility to actuality] is the
new category that will be discovered. . . . repetition properly is what has mistakenly been
called mediation. . . . There is no explanation for how mediation takes place . . .
[however] when one says that life is a repetition, one says: actuality, which has been,
now comes into existence. . . . repetition is the interest [Interesse] of metaphysics, and
also the interest on which metaphysics comes to grief; repetition is the watchword
[L0snet\ in every ethical view".25
Following Kierkegaard, Paul Ricoeur states: "I will therefore call ethics this
movement of actualization, this odyssey of freedom across the world of works, this
proof-texting of the being-able-to-do-something (pouvoir-faire) in effective actions
which bear witness to it. Ethics is the movement between naked and blind belief in a
primordial 'I can,' and the real history where I attest to this 'I can'".26
Kierkegaard's understanding of ethics, then, is virtually identical to Paul Ricoeur's
23 See KW XI 23\/SV VII 50; KW XII. 1 119, 296n-97, 310-11, 503n/SV IX 102, 248n, X 17,
180n. See also Chapter Six for more discussion of the concept of "the ethical" in Kierkegaard.
24 KW XII. 1 319/SV X 24 (his emphasis).
25 KW VI 149/SV V 130 (his emphasis). See also Concept ofAnxiety (jKW VIII 18n/SV VI 116n)
where Vigilius Haufniensis declares that when, "[i]n actuality, the whole interest of subjectivity
steps forth, and now metaphysics runs aground", ethics takes over from metaphysics.
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and Kevin Vanhoozer's comments apply equally to Kierkegaard's view of ethics
when he explains that, "Ethics for Ricoeur is the movement from bondage to
freedom's actualization whereby we fulfill our desire to be. . . . Ricoeur understands
ethics in a more fundamental sense, as referring to our most basic desire to be and
our effort to exist. Philosophy 'after Kierkegaard'27 is about that desire ... for
Ricoeur, 'ethics' is not the science of morality but rather the process of our desire
and effort to be".28
The domains of ethics and religion are both dealing with essentially the same
supra-rational sphere of human existence or subjectivity, albeit from differing
perspectives. For this reason Kierkegaard often speaks of the "ethical-religious".29
This is not to completely collapse the two spheres, for Kierkegaard vigorously holds
the ethical and the religious apart. However, as is clear from volume two of
Either/Or, existing in the ethical or the religious requires that one embrace the
categories of good and evil and choose to interpret one's life and determine one's
course of action according to them.30 Therefore, the commensurability of the ethical
and religious modes of being lies in the fact that each entails a volitional, responsible
human agent; from there they go on to treat the human agent differently.
The Socratic emphasis on self-knowledge was an emphasis on what Kierkegaard
calls existence, and is thus caught up in ethical-religious (existential) issues. "The
great merit of the Socratic", Climacus declares in Postsript, "was precisely to
emphasize that the knower is an existing person and to exist is the essential".31
Ultimately though, Socrates remains bound to immanence and only imagines human
existing-in-truth as a transcendence-within-immanence. He has no revelation beyond
the limits of reason to guide him (the Delphic god only prescribes the limits of
26 Ricoeur, "The Problem of the Foundation of Moral Philosophy", Philosophy Today 22 (1978),
177.
27 See Ricouer, "Philosophy After Kierkegaard", in Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader, eds. Jonathan
Ree and Jane Chamberlain (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 9-25.
28 Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: A Study in Hermeneutics and
Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 41, 126, 272 n.128.
29 As in, for example, KW XIX 45-6, 94/SV XV 101, 146.
30 KW IV 169/SV III 159.
31 KW XII. 1 201/SV IX 173.
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reason and does not transgress them), and thus does not envision an eternal
blessedness in time, or a possession of the truth as a historical feature of human
existence. Therefore the Platonic-Socratic injunction is for one to engage in the
activity of rational introspection because the source of truth lies within us and is
ready to hand.
We have noted that Climacus thinks that Socrates has done quite well for
himself, but in the end finds recollection a poor answer to Meno's dilemma. The
issue for Climacus lies precisely in the existential thrust of the Socratic
understanding of learning the truth and here Climacus finds Socrates' answer to be
inadequate. To frame the question so his point becomes obvious, Climacus brings
into the discussion the very thing that Socrates, as we have seen, ruled out from the
start32—a temporal point of departure for an eternal consciousness or knowledge of
the truth. The logic of Climacus's position seems to be as following:
1. If I am to come to "know" the truth, then it must be within time, for that
is where I am situated; or to say it differently, human "salvation" must
occur within time for that is where humans are.
2. If I am an historical being, then for me to know the truth essentially
requires a moment of time in which I acquire it.
3. But, in the theory of recollection, "The temporal is a nothing", with no
moment, and ultimately "there is no Here and no There, but only an
ubique et nusquamthat is, for Socrates (or Plato) there is no temporal
world, no learning, no salvation, and ultimately no self.
4. Therefore, either (a) with Socrates we deny premise one, and reject human
temporality and agency and consequently the need or possibility of
Salighed itself; or (b) we deny that the truth is inherently in our
possession, and accept that we need the truth to come from outside of
Climacus opts for the second half of the disjunction, 4(b). At this point Climacus
does not have a strict argument except the implication that to accept -1(a) is to accept
that there is a negative answer to his rephrasing of the Socratic question, "Can the
32 In Plato, "Meno" 81 d, p. 13, the only justification Socrates can offer for his rejection of the
Sophistical conclusion that one cannot learn what one does not presently know is that "it would
make us idle, and fainthearted men like to hear it, whereas my argument makes them energetic and
keen on the search".
33 Climacus reviews this disjunction of Fragments in KW XII. 1 95/SV IX 81: "Christianity enters
and posits the disjunction: either an eternal happiness or an eternal unhappiness, and a decision in
time".
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truth be learned?" in the epigraph. Climacus reveals that Socrates had not yet
understood all the implications of the issue in Meno. The epigraph of Fragments
demonstrates that the issue of learning the truth, being in truth, is ultimately salvific;
it is a matter of one's eternal consciousness having a temporal point of departure
and having eternal happiness as a historical feature of human existence. Socrates'
conclusion entails that strictly speaking there is no self who acts, and chooses,
because there is no actual temporal point, no moment at which s/he does so (premise
3).34 If there is no moment, there is no coming to be in the truth, no salvation—for
we are already in a state of eternal blessedness: "As eternal the individual is above
time and therefore always has [her/]his eternal happiness behind [her/]him".35
Climacus thus takes it to be self-evident that the Socratic position is untenable
because of its lack of reference to, and capacity for, Salighed. Therefore, any
alternative situation in which eternal blessedness is attainable is preferable. And this
is also how Climacus intends to expose the indigence of modem epistemology.
Climacus's strategy in Fragments is to provide an alternative to the Socratic
view of truth, and to demonstrate a way (which as we will see is Christianity) of
"going beyond" it, one that accounts for our Salighed. But Climacus also intends
this to be a critique of modem philosophy in two ways. First, Climacus thinks that
Hegel and the Enlightenment share with the Socratic and Platonic understanding of
truth (as recollection) the notion that truth is immanentally available to human
cognition. While modem philosophy may not agree with the whole of Platonic
epistemology, it at least agrees with Plato's thesis that human reason is sufficient to
gain access to truth. In fact the Cartesian view of the radically autonomous subject is
an attempt to establish just such a conclusion. Thus, modem philosophy also
commits the corresponding error of failing to account for the crucial being in truth
34 Kierkegaard's argument regarding the category of "the moment" as it is used in the theory of
recollection in Concept of Anxiety, bolsters Climacus's argument. There Haufniensis argues that
Plato's treatment of "the moment" confusingly begs the question by identifying it as the category
in which temporal transitions occur, but then treating it as "a silent atomistic abstraction". See
KW VIII 82n-84/SV VI 171n-73. I also refer the reader back to our discussion of the moment in
Chapter Two, in which this passage is noted.
35 KW XII. 1 95/SV IX 81.
105
of existing humans, in so far as they too assume that the learner is ontologically in
the position to acquire truth within her/his own noetic resources.
But there is a second lesson here for modem philosophy. Similarly to Socrates,
modem philosophy sees truth as something immanently available to human thought
and therefore takes self-knowledge to be the foundational epistemic activity (hence
the Cartesian cogito ergo sum). However, unlike Socrates, speculative philosophy
takes the self to be the object of knowledge in an objective sense, and claims more
than Socrates in his ignorance claimed. The trouble is that speculative philosophy
has no more resources than Socrates did. It operates with the same immanental
categories as Socrates and refuses to acknowledge a supernatural revelation. Modem
philosophy, therefore, cannot claim any significance for the moment as an historical
departure for a human's eternal blessedness. Climacus's "moral" at the end of
Fragments is poignantly aimed at the systematic epistemology of Hegel (et al.) and
states: "But to go beyond Socrates when one nevertheless says essentially the same
thing as he, only not nearly so well—that, at least, is not Socratic".36 In Postscript
Climacus affirms this position where he argues that in Fragments,
I carried the Socratic back to the thesis that all knowing is recollecting. . . . The thesis
that all knowing is recollecting belongs to speculative thought, and recollecting is
immanence, and from the point of view of speculation and the eternal there is no paradox.
The difficulty, however, is that no human being is speculation, but the speculating person
is an existing human being, subject to the claims of human existence. To forget this is
no merit, but to hold this fast is indeed a merit, and that is precisely what Socrates did. . .
. Basically Socrates is beyond all speculation, because he does not have a fantastical
beginning.37
What Climacus presents in Fragments as going beyond the Socratic has certainly
been Christianity, but he is able to do this only by using Christian categories like
faith, sin, the moment, and the Absolute Paradox. The problem of modem
philosophy is that it claims to be Christian and to "go beyond" Socrates while
using essentially Socratic categories, which is neither Socratic nor Christian—"It is
simply muddled".38
36 KW VII 111 /SV VI 99.
37 AW XII. 1 206n/5V IX 173n.
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Truth Incarnate
Climacus finds the Socratic doctrine of recollection to be an inadequate, though
not completely misguided, answer to the question, "Can the truth be learned?" The
seminal issue in this epistemological question, for both Socrates and Climacus, is
one of moral and religious import.39 Learning involves possessing the fundamental
condition, both cognitive and spiritual, of human persons to know truth. The
assumption is that for humans to prehend truth they must themselves be in
accordance to the nature of truth. Truth is approached as a salvific issue because
both Socrates and Climacus see the foundational issue of epistemology as relating
eternal truth to the existence of the human knower (as a coming-to-be, a Tilblivelse,
in time). Neither thinker disarticulates moral and religious truth from "ordinary"
truth. Learning the truth, then, involves overcoming the epistemic obstacles inherent
in the human existential situation. For Socrates this obstacle was ignorance as state
of forgetfulness of the truth, and for Climacus (as we shall see) it is sin as a position
of being in untruth. Neither thinker is sceptical about the possibility of knowledge or
the reality of the world, but neither do they think that in their present condition
humans have the luxury of side-stepping or disregarding the obstacle of human
existence.40
On Climacus's understanding then, Socrates and he are each ascribing a general
epistemology within an overtly "theological"41 epistemology.42 It will not do, as
38 Evans, Passionate Reason, 30.
39 Cf. Evans, Passionate Reason, 27: "It is fair to say that in Plato's own thought, knowledge of
truth takes on a religious significance. Plato assumes that our highest human task is to gain true
knowledge, and, as Climacus notes, even bases his argument for the immortality of the soul on the
ability of the soul to grasp eternal truths".
40 Therefore Climacus comes to argue in Postscript that, "it will be important to distinguish
between Socrates and Plato on this point. The thesis [of recollection] certainly belongs to both of
them, but Socrates continually parts with it because he wants to exist. By holding Socrates to the
thesis that all knowing is recollecting, one turns him into a speculative philosopher instead of
what he was, an existing thinker who understood existing as the essential"; KW XII. 1 206n/SV IX
173n. The revelation of this discrepancy between the Socratic doctrine of recollection and Socrates'
actual practice as an ethical philosopher—his insistence on proceeding from his ignorance and thus
always keeping his epistemic limits in the foreground of all he said and did—was what Climacus
achieved in Fragments.
41 "Theological" is used to denote the reliance on a framework that deliberately appeals to a ground
for human beings and discourse {logos) that exceeds human contingency and temporality as the
telos of human being-ness. It does not necessarily refer to revelation, Christianity, or even to a
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some commentators attempt, to explain the discussion of truth in Fragments as a
discussion of simply "religious" or "moral" truth—as if Fragments was isolated
from any general epistemological ramifications.43 It is true that Plato's discussion of
learning "the truth" is in the context of virtue and Climacus's in the context of the
Christian concept of salvation, but both make it abundantly clear that the issue of
knowing truths depends upon one's being in truth. If one completely rules out the
general epistemic ramifications of Fragments, one must ignore the fact that the
human capacity to know truth (the virtuous or religious side of truth), for both
Socrates and Climacus, is a crucial link to the truths human know. Socrates and
Climacus self-consciously intermix their discussions of religious or moral truth with
ordinary truths. A very important example of this is the demonstration of the theory
of recollection in Meno is a "recollection" of truths about geometry, not moral
truths. In Fragments, Climacus likewise discusses the existence of Napoleon
alongside his discussions of the existence of God and repeatedly moves between
religious and more mundane truths with little or no transition between them
throughout the entire book.44 Climacus furthermore speaks of truth as "index sui et
falsi [the criterion of the false]" along side the paradox as "index and judex falsi
[the criterion of itself and of the false]",45 and he discusses "faith [Tro]" alongside
"historical facts" and "historical eyewitnesses".46 Climacus also engages in an in-
depth analysis of the nature of historical knowledge in the "Interlude", in which he
further distinguishes "faith in the ordinary sense" from "faith in the eminent
metaphysics of presence, Instead "theological" here refers to that which is common to all religious
frameworks and could be properly called the ethical-religious. Thus Socrates, while remaining
completely within immanent, philosophical categories, is nonetheless "theological".
42 This argument is continued below in the next section under the heading, "The Nature of Truth".
43 Stephen Evans, for example, argues that, 'Fragments is not really a hook about how we gain
various kinds of truths . . . The Truth here is closer to what religions have termed salvation . . .
the question with which it begins is of course a central Platonic question. In Plato's thought it is
fair to say that the question of truth takes on religious significance. Plato assumes that our highest
human task is to gain true knowledge, and . . . even bases his argument for the immortality of the
soul on the ability of the soul to grasp eternal truth. Hence Climacus' use of 'the Truth' is in part
simply a conjugation and extension of the sense 'truth' takes in Plato." Evans, Passionate Reason,
27; my emphasis.
44 See KW VII 15-19/SVVI 19-22.
45 KW VII 50-1/5V VI 49.
46 KW VII 59/SV VI 55-6.
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sense", and then proceeds to discuss them alongside each other.47 What is more, in
Postscript Climacus explicitly describes his project in Fragments as intermixing
general and theological epistemology, saying that there he was simultaneously
discussing a general epistemological paradox (the Socratic) and the Absolute
Paradox of the god-man. At the same time Climacus distinguishes between Socratic
faith (defined as having close parallels to Plato's pistis) from faith sensu eminentiori
(Christian faith). However, Climacus admits that he was not completely explicit
about this in Fragments because,
"I [Climacus] was afraid to make complications by promptly using what seem to be the
same designations, at least the same words, about different things when the imaginary
construction was to be presented as different from these. Now, I think there would be no
objection to speaking of the paradox in connection with Socrates and faith, since it is
correct to do so, provided that it is understood correctly.48
It is to be concluded, then, that Socrates and Climacus alike are discussing the
condition for the possibility of knowing truth, which for both of them is inevitably a
religious and moral matter. Climacus is most certainly discussing religious,
Christian truth specifically in terms of salvation, but the notion that this entails a
strict dichotomy between the two is mistaken.
The possibility of human learning depends, for Socrates and Climacus both, on
the immortality and eternality of humans as well as the ability of the human self to
transcend its present state of existence (in which it does not appear to know truth).
Merold Westphal observes that in Fragments, "The immediate purpose of this
experiment is to discover whether there is a cogent alternative to the Socratic theory
of knowledge as recollection".49 Westphal continues and notes that, "In keeping
with the fundamental intentions of Socrates, Kierkegaard [Climacus] takes the issue
not to be the truth of everyday facts such as the time of day or of sophisticated
scientific theories ... but the ethical-religious Truth—a Janus-faced truth that looks
both toward the nature of ultimate reality, the Eternal, and toward the personal
47 KW VII 72-88/SV VI 67-80.
48 70V XII. 1 206n-07/SV IX 173n-4.
49 Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard's Critique ofReason and Society (University Park, Pennsylvania:
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), 109.
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question of how I should live my life".50 Socrates and Climacus each believe
humans do in fact know general truths but see our access to these as the product of
the nature of human subjectivity—which transcends the limits of human reason. A
focus on general epistemology only takes us away from subjectivity and therefore
both the ground and organising point for general truths.
Climacus and Socrates both ultimately take leave of speculative and
transcendental philosophy and recognize that being in truth cannot be arrived at in
that way. A transcendental epistemology does not explain human truth—similarly to
Haufniensis who comments that his program to delineate a "new ethics" does not
proceed transcendentally, but "sets ideality as a task, not by a movement from above
downward but from below upward".51 Our theories can only proceed from where
we are. Socrates and Climacus are each concerned first to account for the being in
truth of humans for this is what is essential to human's who exist in history. We do
not have access to "the things themselves" except as they are for us. In a sense
Climacus and Socrates are interested in the same question as Descartes who looked
to the human subject as the ground of human noetic activity. The difference (which
makes all the difference) is that Climacus and Socrates situate the subject in time and
space, including the self-knowing of the subject. Ethics (or the ethical-religious),
broadly construed as the sphere of inquiry pertaining to the being of human
existence, therefore becomes First Philosophy and the very basis of
epistemology—only for Climacus ethics becomes theology.52
In place of a concept of truth as a "result", or a purely objective view of truth
such as one finds in speculative philosophy, Climacus takes from Socrates the idea
50Ibid.
51 KW VIII 20/5V VI 118.
52 In Concept of Anxiety, Vigilius Haufniensis states: "It is common knowledge that Aristotle
used the term itporcov cptAoaocpia [first philosophy] primarily to designate metaphysics, though
he included within it a part that according to our perception belongs to theology. In paganism it is
quite in order for theology to be treated there. It is related to the same lack of an infinite penetrating
reflection that endowed the theater in paganism with reality as a kind of divine worship. If we
abstract from this ambiguity, we could retain the designation rcpurtov (piAoaotpia inderstanding
that the totality of science which we might call 'ethnical,' whose essence is immance and is
expressed in Greek thought by 'recollection,' and by secunda philosophia [second philosophy]
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of a suffering truth; a truth that perdures through time as the result of striving and a
passionate engagement with our world in the actuality of existence. "All coming into
existence [Tilblivelse] is a. suffering [.Liden]", argues Climacus, and this "change of
coming into existence is actuality".53 Therefore, observes Marilyn Piety, "the
consciousness of change is itself characterised by change, thus the suffering of
change associated, by Kierkegaard [Climacus], with change becomes associated with
consciousness itself to the extent that the object of consciousness is change".54
Climacus later in Postscript argues that, "All existence-issues are passionate,
because existence, if one becomes conscious of it, involves passion".55 The
suffering of truths about existence and the suffering of being in truth, is not an
accidental feature of human existence as that which is brought about by some
misfortune. Instead, suffering is an essential feature of things in temporal
perdurance, in which humans must participate if they are to possess truth with
respect to those things. Socrates' self-knowledge, Climacus understands, consists in
maintaining his existential position of ignorance in every situation as an ethical-
religious mode of being that requires constant vigilance, or passionate interest and
attention. That is, Socrates underwent a constant self-inflicted suffering as he strove
to maintain his existential orientation while his surrounding temporal environment
underwent perpetual change. It is this view of a victorious truth—a truth that is won
through our subjective, passionate and ethical entanglements—that Climacus retains
and finds indispensable in Socrates. In the end, it is also this concept of existential,
subjective truth which Climacus uses as the basis for his critique of Socrates, as we
saw above, as Climacus pushes this Socratic concept of truth to its logical, salvific
end.
The pivotal point in Climacus's divergence from Socratic recollection and its
immanental categories lies in their opposite understandings of the state of humans
understand that totality of science whose essence is transcendence or repetition". KW VIII 21 /S V
VI 118.
53 KW VII 74-5/SV VI 68-9.
54 Marilyn Gaye Piety, "Kierkegaard On Knowledge" (Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 1994), 48.
55 KW XII. 1 350-1/SPX 51.
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prior to their learning the truth. Socrates describes the learner's state prior to
learning truth as a type of ignorance that is more like a state of amnesia; that is, a
type of forgetfulness not caused through any fault of the learner. The teacher's role,
then, is maieutic and s/he functions not to lead people to the truth which hitherto was
external to them, but to act as a midwife to people's own true, eternal ideas. Thus
Climacus views Socrates as operating with a legitimate (but inadequate), immanental
type of faith/belief [Tro] that allowed him to have a "direct and ordinary . . .
relationship with the historical", but could not relate the historical and the eternal to
his own temporal, historical existence (as coming-into-being, Tilblivelse).56 David
Gouwens comments that, "For Socratic faith, the follower moves from ignorance to
self-knowledge, but there is an essential continuity within the self in the sense that
one develops one's own inner subjectivity in 'recollection'".57 Socrates could
therefore proclaim that virtue is knowledge and that no one ever knowingly
performed an evil action, because the Socratic construal of truth remained completely
within immanental categories.
Climacus, on the other hand, describes the learner's state as sin. If there is to be
an alternative to the Socratic, Climacus contends that it must be one in which "the
seeker up until that moment must not have possessed the truth, not even in the form
of ignorance".58 The opportunity for a genuine coming-to-truth (salvation) demands
a moment of truth-acquisition (redemption) in time and rather than the learner being
qualitatively in the truth; for salvation to be possible (required) the learner must first
be qualitatively untruth (note: this is a grammatical comment). Furthermore,
Climacus argues, this condition of untruth must be due to the fault of the individual
human or else "[s/]he would have possessed the condition only accidentally, which
is a contradiction, because the for the truth is an essential condition".59 This
changes everything for the teacher as well since the teacher must possess the truth as
56 KW VII 87-88/SV VI 79-80.
57 David Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 124-5; his emphasis.
58 KW VII 13/.SV VI 17.
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an ontological feature of her/his existence. Rather than the teacher simply being an
occasion to midwife the eternal truth within an individual, the teacher must bestow
upon the individual the condition for knowing the truth. Thus the teacher cannot be
another human in untruth, but must be one who is ontologically identical with eternal
truth. "The teacher, then, is the god himself, who, acting as the occasion, prompts the
learner to be reminded that he is untruth and is that through his own fault. But this
state—to be untruth and to be that through one's own fault—what can we call it? Let
us call it sin".60
By positing the ontological untruthfulness of the human condition, Climacus has
radically changed the situation pertaining to human truth acquisition.61 He must now
use essentially different categories to explain how humans learn truth that extend
beyond the immanental categories of Socrates (philosophical categories)62 to a
genuine transcendence beyond philosophical purveyance and in which there is space
for human subjectivity and a fortiori an accurate account of doxastic regulation. The
Socratic account of faith/belief [Tro\ cannot be seen to be adequate. Climacus
therefore posits faith "in the eminent sense", which is Christian faith, and is
obtained only by receiving the condition for truth from the teacher on whom the
learner is in constant dependence. Such a teacher is a "god" who, Climacus
observes, is more appropriately called "savior", "deliverer", and "reconciler".63
The bestowal of the condition to receive truth by the "god" cannot happen as a
result of human effort but can only happen as the individual is transformed into a
59 AWVII 15/SV VI 19. Climacus's argument here seems to be based on the hidden premise that
freedom is an essential feature of human beings. Cf. JP II 1251 /Pap. VII1 A 181.
60 KW VII 15/SV VI 19.
61 This does not necessarily commit Climacus to the strong view that unbelievers (non-Christian
"pagans") possess no knowledge whatsoever and have no access to general truths because of their
unregenerate condition (as being in untruth). What it does commit him to (at minimum) is a grace-
filled picture of all human noetic activity. This position would fall under the theological category
of common grace.
62 Climacus tells us that in Fragments Socrates' position represented "what was supposed to be the
philosophical, the pagan philosophical position"; ATVXII.l 206n/SV IX 173n.
63 KW VII 11 /SV VI 21. See also Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 123-127, who
gives an excellent account of Climacus's discussion of, "The 'What' and the 'How'", as it features
in Climacus's understanding of Christian faith.
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"new person" by the god through a change Climacus describes as "conversion".64
Conversion, Climacus suggests, comes from a sorrow, or "repentance", over our
condition of untruth that has been revealed to us in our encounter with the god-in-
time, in which one repents of one's former state and makes the transition from
untruth to truth called "rebirth".65
The main concern of Socrates and Climacus is not to unearth objective facts
about the universe whether they be metaphysical, epistemological, etc., but rather to
discover the way of being as a human person (existing) in time and space, here and
now, so that truth is available to one. The How takes precedence over the What so
that our ontological positions are deeply interwoven with the truths we know, and
vice versa. Socrates' professed ignorance and subsequent emphasis on subjectivity
represents, for Climacus, the highest that philosophy can achieve and the Socratic
doctrine of recollection answers the question, "Can the truth be learned?",
according to the logic of immanence. In the end Climacus finds the Socratic "How"
never to account for being in truth of human persons, what Climacus refers to as
Salighed, and he therefore wants to go beyond Socrates. The way forward thus
entails a break with immanence, and can only come through an incursion of the
eternal, "the god", in time.
Subjectivity and Truth
Climacus does not end his epistemological reforms with his shift in Fragments
from immanental to a transcendent, theological epistemology that operates with the
categories of revelation. In Postscript he further refines his epistemological position
and forms what we are calling (with Kierkegaard) the "subjectivity principle". With
the subjectivity principle Climacus hopes to capture and articulate the correct
orientation to epistemic issues that in Fragments he found in the Socratic emphasis
on subjectivity. Climacus's discussions in Postscript extend the arguments of
Fragments and explore in far more detail the concept of subjectivity as a formal
M KW VII 18/51/ VI 22.
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principle for the being in truth of human individuals. As Climacus himself notes in
the "Introduction", the first part of Postscript is a proper sequel to Fragments
because it treats, as a kind of polemic, the "objective issue" of the historical truth of
Christianity and therefore extends the argument in Fragments as it promised.66
However, "the second part is a renewed attempt in the same vein as the pamphlet, a
new approach to the issue of Fragments''',67
As he fleshes out his analyses in Postscript Climacus identifies two kinds of
truth: objective or accidental truth and subjective or essential truth.68 We shall argue
that these two types of truth operate on a continuum so that one kind of truth cannot
be strictly separated from the other. Both sorts of truth indicate two different and
opposite ways of pursuing the question of truth. The superiority of one of these
approaches will be established if, by seeking truth in that manner, one may possess
the other type of truth as well. As a method of determining tmth, Climacus rejects
the objective way as inferior, as its express point is to disregard subjectivity.69 One
may also pursue truth subjectively to the neglect of objective truth, so that "the
individual is in [subjective] truth, even if in this way [s/]he were to relate
[her/]himself to [objective] untruth".70 However, Climacus thinks that if one
earnestly pursues truth as subjectivity; that is, actually seeks truth with the all the
passion of subjectivity (the How), then one becomes truth and attains objective truth
as well (the What).71 In so doing one achieves the being in truth sought in
Fragments, which acts as the basis for general doxastic regulation. That is, in
subjectivity one comes to know oneself and is thereby correctly oriented to, or
positioned in, reality and the world around them. This is, in fact, the subjectivity
principle. Subjectivity, then, takes on a dual meaning so that, on the one hand, it
65 KW VII 19/SV VI 22.
66 In Fragments, Climacus states: "in the next section of this pamphlet, if I ever do write it, I
intend to call the matter by its proper name and clothe the issue in its historical costume"; KW VII
109/SV VI 97.
67 KW XII. 1 17/SV IX 19.
68 See for example, KW XII. 1 192, 196-97, 199, 202, 205/SV IX 159-60, 163, 167, 168, 170.
69 KWXWA 192, 196-97/SV IX 159-60, 163.
70 KW XII. 1 X99/SV IX 167.
71 KW XII. 1 613n-614/SV X 274.
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refers to the subject as constituted in temporal, historical, and existential
concreteness through "passion", or "inward deepening". On the other hand
subjectivity can also mean the existential activity or process of becoming concrete
(actual)—so that when Climacus or Kierkegaard refer to "subjectivity" they are
often also referring to the activity of "inwardness", "passion", or what is
sometimes called "subjective thinking", itself.
Postscript may be read as a grammar of the concept of truth. The basic concept
of truth signifies, Climacus thinks, a relation between thinking and being, between
the thoughts (as possibilities) a person has and the actuality of that thing. The name
Climacus gives to this relation is Fordoblelse, the exact equivalent of the English
word "redoubling", and consequently Climacus stipulates that, "truth is a
redoubling [Fordoblelsef?2 Anti-Climacus, who shares Climacus's definition of
truth as redoubling, argues that "Truth is not", therefore, "something simple but in
an entirely abstract sense [is] a redoubling, which is nevertheless canceled out at the
very same moment".73 The truth-relation of redoubling is an identity-relation in
which the mode of reflection matches the object of reflection so that what is reflected
upon is "reduplicated" for the human person. Truth, therefore, exists in reflection
and as a reflective property, for "Reflection is", Climacus states, "the possibility of
the relation . . . reflection's categories are always dichotomous".74 For Climacus
(and Kierkegaard) reflection is a broad term which includes cognition and critical
thinking but more accurately refers to the activity of consciousness itself
("consciousness is the relation" itself).75 This concept of reflection includes,
Gouwens observes, "any capacity to 'negate immediacy'", and simply designates
12 KW XII. 1 190/SV IX 158. In Practice in Christianity Anti-Climacus also expresses the nature
of truth as this same relation of "redoubling"; KW XX 205/SV XVI 192. It is fair to say that this
is how Kierkegaard himself views truth.
73 KW XX 205/SV XVI 192.
74 KW VII 169/Pap. IV B 1 147; his emphasis.
75 KW VII 169/Pap. IV B 1 147; his emphasis.
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the capacity of humans to abstract concepts from experiences and linguistically
express these.76 The truth-relation then, exists as a redoubling in reflection.
The redoubling truth-relation may be either a subjective or an objective relation
and may thus refer to truth or truths, "essential truth" or "accidental truth".
Kierkegaard's Anti-Climacus notes that, "There is a difference between truth and
truths, and this difference is recognizable in the term 'to be' [at vcere] or is
recognizable in the distinction made between way and final decision, which is related
at the end, the result".11 Climacus explains the difference this way:
When the question about truth is asked objectively, truth is reflected objectively as an
object to which the knower relates [her/]himself. What is reflected upon is not the relation
but that what [s/]he relates [her/]himself to is the truth, the true. If only that to which
[s/]he relates [her/]himself is the truth the true, then the subject is in the truth. When the
question about truth is asked subjectively, the individual's relation is reflected upon
subjectively. If only the how of this relation is in truth, the individual is in truth, even if
in this way [sljhe were to relate [her/]himself to what is untruth. . . . What is being
discussed here is essential truth or the truth about existence.78
The identity-relation between being and thought in the redoubling of truth occurs in
reflection and is either objective, in which case the focal point of reflection is outside
the subjectivity of the thinker on an external object, or subjective, in which case the
focal point of reflection is within the subjectivity of the person and on the nature of
the redoubling relation (between the person and the object) itself. The implication is,
though it is not explicitly drawn, that falsehood is the failure of a redoubling
relationship to obtain actually so that the relation in reflection is one of mA-relation
or non-identity. Note that it is still possible for Climacus to identify the possibility
of (objective) untruth in the subjective truth-relation, so that one can be said to be
subjectively and essentially in the truth even if this person "were to relate
[her/]himself to what is untruth".19 The subjective mode of reflection and the
objective mode constitute, then, the two poles of any truth-relation that can possibly
obtain for human persons.
76 Cf. David Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 30; and Michael Strawser,
"Kierkegaardian Meditations on First Philosophy: A Reading of Johannes Climacus", Journal of
the History ofPhilosophy 32,4 (October 1994): 640.
77 AW XX 206/SV XVI 194; his emphasis.
78 KW XII. 1 199/SV IX 167; my emphasis.
79 See above block quote in text.
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In his shift away from the objective method of seeking truth, Climacus does not
ever deny either possibility of attaining objective truth or its epistemic validity. He
begins the discussion of truth in Postscript by saying that, "objectively understood,
truth can signify: (1) historical truth, (2) philosophical truth".80 Climacus defines
the latter "philosophical truth" as being "a doctrine, historically given and verified"
as "eternal truth".81 He therefore retains the intuition of Fragments that the concept
of truth essentially denotes something universal and unchanging and is in this sense
"eternal". In the former case, Climacus tells us that if it is to be had, "historical
truth must be established by a critical examination of the various reports, etc".82
We have already seen from Fragments that for Climacus, because it pertains to
contingent, coming-into-existence (Tilblivelse), "the historical" has a double
illusiveness for human thought and therefore cannot be the basis of an "eternal
happiness" or of an "eternal consciousness". Therefore in Postscript it is claimed
that, "with respect to the historical the greatest certainty is only an approximation,
and an approximation is too little to build [one's] happiness on and is so unlike an
eternal happiness that no result can ensue".83 However, this does not mean that such
"truths" are epistemically illegitimate. The obtaining of an objective truth-relation
does function, as Anti-Climacus affirms, to safe-guard against improper and false
ways of thinking about reality and also "guarantees validity to thinking" so "that
what is thought is—that is, has validity".84 So when Climacus claims that objective
truths are approximation he means that these truths are contingent and not necessary
and that they will not constitute the kinds of clarity and distinctness (objective self-
knowledge) that the Cartesian cogito claimed for itself. In other words, the truths of
"the historical" are not self grounding.
Climacus also investigates philosophical truth as a possibly for yielding
epistemic certainty for human knowledge and the point of departure for the eternal
80 KW XII. 1 2\/SV IX 23.
81 KW XII. 1 2\/SV IX 23.
82 AW XII. 1 21/SV IX 23.
83 KW XII. 1 23/SV IX 23; his emphasis.
84AiWXX 205/SV XVI 192.
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consciousness and eternal happiness of temporally qualified, existing humans.
Philosophical truth is concerned with the possession of eternal, unchanging truth(s).
Climacus analyses philosophical truth in terms of the empirical and rationalist
theories of how the truth-relation exists for humans and rephrases these two theories
according to his basic concept of truth as an identity-relationship.85 The empirical
definition of the truth-relation he defines as "the agreement of thinking with being",
and the rationalist understanding of the relation he states as "the agreement of being
with thinking".86 Climacus's critique of these two truth theories centers around
"what is understood by being" in these definitions. He continues to insist that our
theories of truth must be attainable by temporally situated humans lest "the knowing
spirit... be lured out into the indefinite and fantastically become something such as
no existing human being has ever been or ever can be".87 The ensuing examination
of empiricism and rationalism on these terms reveals that neither can present an
adequate account of truth.
The empirical and rationalist renderings of the truth-relation are each attempts to
see this relation objectively—in terms of a person's relation to the object of
reflection—and because of this they both encounter difficulties when implemented
as theories of temporal cognition. Kierkegaard has no trouble accepting an objective
definition of truth as an identity between thought and being for mathematical and
even ontological truths (remember that for Kierkegaard ontology is a logic of
conceptual essences). Kierkegaard notes that, "The certainty of these is
absolute—here thought and being are one, but by the same token these sciences are
85 Climacus appears to believe that rationalism and empiricism exhaust the logical possibilities for
truth theories, and taken crudely this is likely to be correct. These two theories were in any case the
only epistemological options of Kierkegaard's day. In this case Climacus takes empiricism broadly
to be the rejection of a priori ideas and categories in the mind and to hold that the only way we
obtain ideas is through sense experience; therefore he takes the central issue in an empirical
definition of truth to be the accurate representation of these ideas obtained through sense experience
to the world from which they were gleaned. Rationalism, for Climacus, is understood as the
general thesis that prior to any sense experience the human mind contains a priori ideas and/or
categories and thus can know things apart from experience. Climacus therefore takes the critical
element in a rationalist definition of truth to be the correspondence of the world (or being) to the
ideas of the world (or being) and the categories that structure the mind's thoughts of it.
86 KW XII. 1 1S9/SV IX 157.
87/OrXII.l 1S9/SV IX 157; his emphasis.
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hypothetical."88 Note that Kierkegaard uses the term "certainty" here in such a
way that it is compatible with "hypothetical". Mathematics, ontology, logic, etc.,
yield a sort of deductive certainty, given the presupposition of the truth of their
foundational axioms. These certainties cannot be transposed to other sorts of
knowledge that we have of the real world (actuality) because the truths we have in
mathematics (etc.) exist as possibility (conceptual essences), and not actuality (as
concrete historical temporality). In the same journal entry noted above, Kierkegaard
contrasts ontology (the science of conceptual essences) and mathematics with
Existentiel-Videnskab, or what is literally in English "existential science" or
"existential scholarship". We may have absolute certainty regarding mathematical
(etc.) truths because these proceed from (hypothetical) axioms whose truth are
presupposed, but these "certainties" have no necessary content from the real, actual
world in them. As Kierkegaard elsewhere argues:
A conviction [Overbeviisning] is called a conviction because it is over and above proof
[Beviisning]. Proof is given for mathematical propositions in such a way that no disproof
is conceivable. For that reason there can be no conviction with respect to mathematics.
But as far as every existential [existentiel] proposition is concerned, for every proof there
is some disproof, there are a pro and a contra.89
Kierkegaard is arguing that if one accepts the foundation axioms of mathematics,
then (note the subjunctive mood!) a proof is theoretically possible on the basis of
those axioms. He is not holding out mathematics as the paradigm of human
knowledge, and in one sense is arguing for the existential irrelevance of
mathematical knowledge.
Climacus outlines two options the empiricist or the rationalist has with respect to
how being [Vceren] is understood in their respective truth formulas. Either the being
of the truth-relation is an "empirical being" that exists in time as a coming-to be, or
by being is meant "the pure the "objective subject" of abstraction, the self as
it exists for itself in reflection. Climacus argues that the former understanding of
being is not an option for philosophical conceptions of truth because such a relation
transforms truth, by definition, into a "desideratum [something to be desired]"
88./P I 197IPap. IV C 100.
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because "the empirical object is not finished".90 By bringing truth into relation with
being-as-becoming the philosophical understanding of truth is abandoned because
truth conceived this way can only be an approximation. There is no place in which
the object fully stands so that it can be grasped (thought) in one cognising act.
Instead the rationalist or empiricist intend an objective definition of truth, which,
precisely because it is objective, completely ignores the temporal existence of the
thinking subject and must conjure up "the pure I-I" as the foundation of the truth-
relation in which being and thought (regardless on which half of the conjunct the
emphasis is placed) find themselves in agreement.
There are two problems Climacus finds with the objective understanding of
being in relation to truth. First, he notes that the objective formulae cannot explain
the intentional structure of truth because "the [truth] formula is a tautology; that is,
thinking and being signify one and the same".91 The truth-relation is therefore no
longer possible in the objective way for now it is simply a relation of thought with
other thoughts, not thought with the object of thought (being). Secondly, the truth
relation in which thinking and being are in agreement does not apply to human truth
because the agreement achieved is on the basis of their shared atemporal properties
but humans inescapably exist in time and space. "A system of existence
[Tilvcerelsens System]", Climacus argues, and "cannot be given. . . . Existence itself
is a system—for God, but it cannot be for any existing spirit".92 There are two
options Climacus foresees for the existing person: "either [s/]he can do everything
to forget that [s/]he is existing [i.e., abstract from one's existence] and thereby
89 JP II 2296/Pap. VII1 A 215.
90 AW XII. 1 189/SVIX 157.
91XWXII.l 190/SV IX 158.
92 KW XII. 1 118/SV IX 101. Existence cannot become a system even for the historian because,
"when an existence is a thing of the past, it is indeed finished, it is indeed concluded, and so to that
extent is turned over to the systematic view. Quite so—but for whom? Whoever is himself
existing cannot gain this conclusiveness outside existence, a conclusiveness that corresponds to the
eternity into which the past has entered. ... an individual existing now undeniably comes
afterward in relation to six thousand years that preceded, the curiously ironic consequence would
emerge—if we assumed that he came to understand them systematically—that he would not come
to understand himself as an existing being, because he himself would acquire no existence, because
he himself would have nothing that came afterward. It follows that such a thinker must be either
the good Lord or a fantastical quodlibet [anything]"; KW XII. 1 118-19/5V7 IX 101-02.
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manage to become comic ... or [s/]he can direct all [her/]his attention to [her/]his
existing".93 For his part, Climacus remarks, "I would rather remain what I am, a
poor existing individual human being".94 The conclusion that Climacus reaches
(again) is that all objective truth is only approximate truth and cannot be viewed as
ultimate truth or as providing anything like indubitable epistemic foundations. All
forms of objective truth, then, are accidental, approximate truth and thus cannot be
the basis of the truth-relation of eternal truth to an existing human person: "The
eternal, essential truth, that is, the truth that is related essentially to the existing
person by pertaining to what it means to exist (viewed Socratically, all other
knowledge is accidental, its degree and scope is different), is a paradox".95
Subjectivity, however, is the truth, essential truth. To possess truth in subjectivity
is precisely to have an absolute relation of oneself to existence, to have "the
inwardness of infinity",96 so that at every moment one is in the proper existential
mode as one engages her/his world. Climacus explains his logic:
At its highest, inwardness in an existing subject is passion; truth as a paradox corresponds
to passion, and that truth becomes a paradox is grounded precisely in its relation to an
existing subject. In this way the one corresponds to the other. In forgetting that one is an
existing subject, one loses passion, and in return, truth does not become a paradox; but
the knowing subject shifts from being human to being a fantastical something and truth
becomes a fantastical object for its knowing.97
Subjectivity, as the continuous state in which a temporally qualified human person is
subject (versus object), is an inwardness (versus an external relation) that is present
within the person as passion. Climacus notes that, phenomenologically, "passion is
only momentary",98 and, as we learned in Chapter Two, the paradox is the
"unknown" realm of existing (the temporal flux) that is outside of human thought
and beyond reason. Passion therefore corresponds to the paradox as it too is a
temporal feature and essentially supra-rational. Climacus's argument is that truth is
subjectivity because, as the medium of human existence, subjectivity is the mode in
93 AW XII. 1 120/SV IX 102-03.
94 ATVF XII. 1 190/SV IX 158.
95 AW XII. 1 205/SP IX 170.
96 AW XII. 1 194n/SV IX 162n.
97 AW XII. 1 199/SVIX 165.
98 AW XII. 1 199/SV IX 165.
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which truth must present itself to humans if it is to be truth-for-humans. As
Haufniensis notes, "truth is for the individual only as he produces it for himself in
action".99 Climacus has, in effect, reversed the Socratic-Platonic formula and, rather
than fashioning humans in the likeness of truth, has delineated a grammar of truth to
suit its embodiment in human existence. Subjectivity is the truth because its
existential mode as a striving, suffering truth is suited to the temporal nature of
human existence so that, as we have already seen in Fragments, the existing human
may increasingly come to know eternal truth. So, for Climacus, becoming truth in
subjectivity is the way for one to be in truth, and therefore "subjectivity",
"inwardness", and "passion" are the means to self-knowledge and serve as
necessary, foundational epistemic activities.
To support his distinction between objective, accidental truth and essential,
subjective truth Climacus also discusses in considerable detail the modes of
reflection corresponding to the two kinds (or ways) of truth. Suited to objective
truth, the way of objectivity, is "objective reflection", and subjective truth is the
product of "subjective reflection".
When for the existing spirit qua existing there is a question about truth, that abstract
reduplication of truth recurs; but existence itself, in the questioner holds the two factors
apart . . . and reflection shows two relations. To objective reflection, truth becomes
something objective, an object; and the point is to disregard the subject. To subjective
reflection, truth becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the point is to
immerse oneself, existing, in subjectivity.100
Climacus goes on to note that, because objective reflection is preoccupied with
objects and therefore has its redoubling truth-relation outside the subject and when
sustained it "turns the subjective individual into something accidental and thereby
turns existence into an indifferent, vanishing something".101 Objective reflection is
thus characteristic of all abstract thinking such as logic, "mathematics", "historical
knowledge", etc. It treats the subjectivity of human knowers as accidental to truth,
and likewise the obtaining of truth—i.e., the truth-relation itself—as an indifferent
matter, a relation between two relata, rather than between a subject and an object.
99 KW VIII 139/SV VI 218.
l00KWXII.l 192/SV IX 159-60; my emphasis.
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David Law defines Kierkegaard's notion of objective reflection as simply the ability
"to abstract from concrete reality in order to provide the human being with the
concepts which make things possible".102 Objective reflection is not necessarily
illegitimate (ethically or epistemically) but cannot yield essential truth or ground
itself.
Subjective reflection is referred to by Climacus as "inwardness" and
"subjectivity" and is itself a process of "appropriation". What is appropriated in
subjective reflection are the concepts one has gleaned in objective reflection. The
difference, however, lays in the manner in which the subjective thinker relates to the
concepts s/he employs. Climacus elaborates: "the reflection of inwardness is the
subjective thinkers double-reflection. In thinking, [s/]he thinks the universal, but, as
existing in [her/]his thinking . . . [s/]he becomes more subjectively isolated".103
Because the "universal" concepts, or abstract possibilities, of objective thinking are
themselves mere "approximations", and because the objective reflection is situated
in human subjectivity and a product of passion, subjective thinking produces
essential truth. Subjective thinking constantly relates the propositions and thoughts
of the person to every dimension of the thinking person's existence (as a coming-to-
be, Tilblivelse). This activity Kierkegaard (throughout his writings) calls
inwardness.104
The concept of inwardness, as the key component in subjective thinking, is a
kind of existential reflection in which one integrates a given proposition and
thought-possibility with her/his dispositions and actions and thereby attains a unity
of thought and action so that a self-knowledge and self-understanding emerges. In
101 KWXll.l 193/SV IX 161.
102 David Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 82.
103 KW XII. 1 73/SVIX 63; my emphasis.
104 Cf. C. Stephen Evans's concise definition of Kierkegaard's inwardness as "an examination of
the larger patterns of action in a person's life", in S0ren Kierkegaard's Christian Psychology:
Insights for Pastoral Care (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990), 37. Cf. Robert C. Roberts's
discussion of inwardness in his, "Existence, Emotion, and Virtue: Classical Themes in
Kierkegaard", in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard , eds. Alastair Hannay and Gordon D.
Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 178, where he defines inwardness, in
distinction to subjectivity, in Kierkegaard's literature as specifically denoting a contrast with
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fact, Climacus makes the astounding claim that inwardness is "transparency of
thought in existence".105 David Gouwens rightly observes that, "Inwardness and
subjectivity therefore have as much to do with the external actions and publicly
observable dispositions of a person as with the alleged 'contents' of private
consciousness".106 Existential thinking (inwardness) involves propositions, or
"postulates", and genuine metaphysical commitments, but not in the sense of
Kant's practical postulates, much less the metaphysical languages of Hegel,
Descartes, et al. For the existential, subjective thinker, one's propositions of reality
are such that they are integrated into one's life so that they occupy an integral role in
the way one views one's life and world.107 These thoughts and propositions arise
from the exigencies of existence and comprise an integral component in one's
ethical-religious entanglements with the world. Indeed, they derive from a
(subjective) reflection that self-consciously arises from and pertains to the actuality
of the thinker's existence, and in this sense the subjective thinker stakes her/his
entire life with them. The double reflection of inwardness is, then, a genuflection of
"externalities" of social position, reputation, and the "results" of actions to interiority, inner
motivations and one's relationship to God, ethical standards, and oneself.
105 KW XII. 1 255/SVIX 213. Transparency is an important concept for Kierkegaard's subjectivity,
and we shall treat it more comprehensively in Part Two. For now it is sufficient to note that
subjectivity, or inwardness, is seen by Kierkegaard to ground thinking in a kind of clarity or
"transparency". This transparency is, however, radically different from its Cartesian predecessor for
it is an existential (ethical) transparency of a sullied and situated consciousness—it is not the self-
transparency of a pure, rational consciousness. Kierkegaard writes that, "No . . . person, even the
purest, has sheer, purified subjectivity or pure transparency"; instead there is always "a residue still
not wholly penetrated, a remote portion of [her)his original subjectivity still uncaptured, perhaps as
not yet even really discovered in the depths of [her/]his soul—out of this come the reactions". JP
IV 4384/Fap. XI2 A 132.
106 Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 57.
107 Climacus makes this point in his two examples of subjective thinking, knowing the existence
ofGod and the Socratic proof of immortality, in Postscript; KW XII. 1 199-201/SV IX 165-167;
cf. JP 113/Pap. X2 A d06. See especially the note on KW XII. 1 200/SV IX 166, where Climacus,
in reference to knowing the existence of God, states that, "God is indeed a postulate [for the
subjective thinker], but not in the loose sense in which it is ordinarily taken. Instead, it becomes
clear that . . . the dialectical contradiction brings passion to despair and assists him in grasping
God with 'the category of despair' (faith), so that the postulate, far from being the arbitrary, is in
fact necessary defense, self-defense; in this way God is not a postulate, but the existing person's
postulating God is—a necessity". Climacus also states in KW XII. 1 201 /SV IX 166: "But
Socrates! He poses the question objectively, problematically: is there an immortality. So,
compared with one of the modem [purely objective] thinkers with the three demonstrations, was he
a doubter? Not at all. He stakes his whole life on this 'if; he dares to die, and with the passion of
the infinite he has so ordered his whole life that it might be acceptable—if there is an
immortality".
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ideas qua ideas back on themselves through the lens of one's own life-experience.
In this action the subjective thinker has both a realisation of the situatedness of all
"objective truth" and "objective reflection" in passionate subjectivity, and also
thinks these abstractions back across (and through) the horizon of one's existential
possibilities and concrete historicity—keeping one's own subjectivity constantly in
the foreground.108 These, "Concerned reflections on reflections [i.e., reflexive
subjectivty]", Edward Mooney argues, the reflections we perform "on our ideals,
and emerging identities, locates subjectivity—the space where selves develop and
reside".109
There is no objective truth for Kierkegaard without subjectivity, and objective
truths qua human objectivity are always permeated with and conditioned by human
subjectivity—which is why they are always approximate and objectively uncertain.
As Johannes De Silentio claims, "Just to make the celebrated Socratic distinction
between what one understands and does not understand requires passion".110 De
Silentio's observation takes place in the context of a discussion of Hegel's
philosophical method, "mediation", as a method that does not (and cannot) explain
how it is that movement, or transitions, happen. De Silentio makes the simple
observation that every movement "is carried out passion, and no reflection can
produce a movement".111 His conclusion is that passion cannot be ignored in
philosophical methodology, and that "mediation is a chimera, which in Hegel is
supposed to explain everything and which is also the only thing he never has tried to
108 As David Gouwens claims, with his ideas of inwardness and subjective thinking Climacus is
outlining a method of reflection which preserves one's subjectivity as a central concern. See
Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 43. Gouwens also is correct when he claims that
"despite all his talk about 'inwardness,' Kierkegaard does not give evidence of a view that we
identify our emotions by a process of introspection. Introspection is used not to identify
something, but to reflect on one's life". Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 78. Cf.
Climacus's claim that, "the subjective thinker is an existing person, and yet [s/]he is a thinking
person. [S/]He does not abstract from existence and from the contradiction, but [s/]he is in them . .
. In all this thinking, then, [s/]he has to include the thought that [s/]he [her/]himself is an existing
person. But then in turn [s/]he will always have enough to think about"; KW XII.1 351/SV X 51-
2.
109 Edward F. Mooney, Selves in Discord and Resolve: Kierkegaard's Moral-Religious Psychology
in Either/Or and Sickness Unto Death (London: Routledge, 1996), 68.
110 KW VI A2n/SV V 40n.
111 KW VI 42n/5V V 40n.
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explain".112 The point (of De Silentio, Climacus, and Kierkegaard) is not that
passion must be acknowledged in philosophy because it is something foreign to, and
therefore not present in, objective reflection. The claim is rather that passion is
already present but ignored and overlooked so that it is finally distorted. In other
words, this is again a grammatical comment. The Kierkegaardian call is to recognize
that passion is a constituent part of human existing—including objective
reflection—and that this must be recognised, and if recognised will provide an
insight into how we must reflect on things.
Thus Climacus's two kinds of truths cannot be discussed in isolation from each
other. They constitute a truth-continuum and together form the completed
redoubling relation of truth. To possess one kind of truth to the exclusion of the
other is to have an incomplete or partial truth—and therefore not to have truth.113
Climacus's point is that there is no knowledge, no learning of truth, apart from
subjectivity. A purely objective relation to something (another person, an object, a
proposition, etc.) is to be falsely in relation to that thing. Objective truth is only for
subjects, and this only as "approximation". Objective truths cannot find a human
home outside of human subjectivity, and within subjectivity these truths remain in an
accidental, partial relationship to the human thinker's actuality (subjectivity).
Therefore, if one advances objectively to know truth one finds that subjectivity
vanishes, and with it any absolute truth. Conversely, if one approaches truth with
112 KW VI 42n/SV V 40n.
113 On the one hand Climacus demonstrates that, "The objective truth as such does not at all decide
that the one stating it is sensible; on the contrary, it can even betray that the man is lunatic, even
though what he says is entirely true and especially objective"; KW XII. 1 194/SV IX 162.
Climacus then goes on to relate a tale of an escaped patient from a lunatic asylum who attempts to
demonstrate his sanity by tying a "skittle ball" on the tail of his coat and each time it knocks him
on the backside exclaiming, "Boom! The earth is round"; KW XII. 1 195/SVIX 162. The trouble is
not that what the patient exclaims is objectively false but that this objectively true fact was not
subjectively integrated into an unified expression of the patient's existence. On the other hand,
Climacus makes it clear that a genuine possessing of truth in subjectivity includes what is
abstractly referred to as objective truth. But also, he notes, it is possible to have a pseudo-
inwardness in which one becomes fixated on an "objective something" and then attempts to
"embrace it with passion", as for example with Don Quixote. This actually turns the objective
truth into a falsehood. See KW XII. 1 194-6/SV IX 162-3. This objectively false position,
Climacus notes, is not a product of a genuine subjectivity but a pseudo-subjectivity. The cure,
therefore, is not a return to objectivity but an appropriate subjective relation to actuality that is
infused with "the inwardness of infinity".
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subjectivity, objectivity becomes less and less of an issue as it increasingly becomes
that which is incorporated into subjectivity.114 If we are to ask on which side of the
truth-continuum is the truth, the subjective or the objective, Climacus notes that it is
correct to say that on neither side is the whole truth because absolute (eternal) truth
consists in objective truths being conjoined to an existing human subject. However,
an existing person cannot attempt to approach truth as a unity of objectivity and
subjectivity because humans do not have the luxury of existing eternally and cannot
integrate the subjective and the objective: "An existing person", argues Climacus,
"cannot be in two places at the same time, cannot be subject-object".115 The human
task is to mediate the two poles of truth in time and space, and this attempt requires
passion, "the highest pitch of subjectivity".116
Truth qua human truth, then, must begin in subjectivity, and, Climacus repeats,
the truth of subjectivity is that subjectivity is untruth.117 Socratic ignorance is "the
truth in the highest sense within paganism", but Climacus reiterates his argument of
Fragments that new theological categories are needed to achieve the existential,
ethical-religious truth for which Socrates strove, and in which an individual, through
self-knowledge, is appropriately conditioned to receive the truth. Following Socrates,
human subjectivity encounters an aporia in which it is recognised that human
activity cannot be the ground of eternal truth. "Every qualification of that which
actually goes beyond the Socratic must essentially have a mark of standing in
relation to the god's having come into existence",118 and this, Climacus argues, is
found in Christianity.119
In Postscript, consequently, Climacus presents the subjectivity principle of
Fragments as a formal principle and performs a grammar of truth in which
subjectivity is truth: "Here is such a definition of truth: An objective uncertainty,
held fast through an appropriation with the most passionate inwardness is the
1,4/Ok XII. 1 196/5T IX 163.
U5KW XII. 1 199/5V IX 166.
116 KW XII. 1 199/5VIX 166.
ni KW XII. 1 207/5V IX 173.
118XWXII.l 210/SVIX 175.
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truth, the highest truth there is for an existing person".120 Climacus, like Socrates
before him, is discussing the condition for the possibility of humans knowing the
truth and is seeking establish the foundations for an epistemology, or normative
doxastic regulation. He is therefore talking about absolute, or ethical-religious truth,
but with the view that this being in truth is directly related to the possession of
truths. As Anti-Climacus explains, "[t]here is a difference between truth and
truths", and "knowing the truth is something that accompanies being the truth, not
the other way around".121 The Climacean epistemic project122 is partly descriptive
and partly prescriptive. That is to say that Climacus is performing a grammar which
combines a phenomenological, conceptual component (observation and description)
with a logical component that tells us how these concepts work together so that we
can better understand them (prescription). Climacus descriptively approaches belief
and truth and tells us how truth is for humans, and then he prescribes how epistemic
issues must be approached and understood so that humans may truly be in truth.
Subjectivity as a Critical Principle
In the final section of this chapter we shall see that the Kierkegaardian notion of
truth as subjectivity is an attempt to articulate a theory of truth as a suffering and
victorious human truth that may serve as a normative basis for human doxastic
practice. The normativity that Kierkegaard sketches (primarily through his
pseudonym Johannes Climacus) is fundamentally theological because it proscribes
the limits of human reason, restricting the access of unaided human reason to truth,
while situating the locus of truth (for humans) in a transcendent, eternal Truth that
does not change. Through Climacus's writings Kierkegaard outlines the dialectic or
119 KW XII. 1 230/5V IX 191.
120 kWXII.l 203-04/SVIX 169; his emphasis.
121 KW XX 206, 205/SV XVI 193, 192. Climacus similarly argues that, "subjective thinking
invests everything in the process of becoming and omits the result, partly because this belongs to
[her/Jhim, since [s/]he possesses the way, partly because [s/]he as existing is continually in the
process of becoming . . . KW XII. 1 73/SV IX 62, my emphasis.
122 Climacus's project is distinguished from Kierkegaard's total epistemological effort only as a
part-to-whole relationship. In other words, in Fragments and Postscript Climacus accomplishes
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grammar of subjectivity as a critical principle that stands as the normative basis for
human belief and action. Kierkegaardian subjectivity also stands over and against the
rational critiques of Hegel and Kant (and the rest of modem philosophy), while at
the same time providing a critique of tradition and religion—the sources of pre-
modem authority and social control—that does not collapse into nihilism or
relativism. Subjectivity is, for Kierkegaard, the means to transparency and being-in-
truth. Kierkegaard's concept of subjectivity performs this task by re-asserting
Socratic ignorance and establishing sin as an epistemological category.
Kierkegaardian subjectivity is thereby able to perform a critical and regulatory role
in our personal rational processes, our communal practices and policies of
justification, and ultimately subjectivity undermines all anthropocentric theoretical
postures and rational, socio-political embodiments. Following from his critique of
reason and metaphysics, human reflection, for Kierkegaard, is always embodied
reflection and not the activity of a metaphysically interior, private, mental event of
some invisible Cartesian substance. All human reflection is always interested
reflection and eternal blessedness (Salighed) emerges, therefore, as the central, basal
normative concept in the subjectivity principle.
one particular aspect of Kierkegaard's epistemological reforms (which turns out to be central to
Kierkegaard's overall project).
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The Task of Subjectivity
In Chapter Three we underscored the fact that Kierkegaard saw philosophy as
part of a therapy which ultimately pointed beyond itself to subjectivity as the ground
and goal of the human search for truth. In this sense then, philosophy is the antidote
to diseases of human reflection123 and is an attempt to shift one's cognitive
orientation to the world so that one's use of concepts is not confused. But all this is
nothing but "shadowboxing" and ineffectual if one's subjectivity is not
appropriately engaged in our pursuit of these philosophical truths.124 The second
and more substantial stage of Kierkegaard's therapy is, therefore, "becoming
subjective", as Climacus puts it in Postscript.
In the Kierkegaardian literature, especially in Postscript, becoming subjective is
the regarded as "the highest task of a human being".125 This is because human
existence is, to repeat, a becoming in time [Tilvcerelse\—a contingent, possible (non-
necessary) existence—and therefore a human person is always in a process that in
the end may fail to actualise fully. On Kierkegaard's view, human persons are not
born subjects, rather it is something we must work to become. A necessary part of
becoming subjective, or becoming human subjects, is that humans engage in
subjective reflection and begin to think existentially, as persons of flesh and blood
who exist in and through our embodiments in a temporally qualified reality. This
activity Kierkegaard calls "subjectivity", which requires "inwardness" and
"passion".
123 This is David Gouwens' term and he identifies two diseases of reflection in Kierkegaard's
thought: (1) "failure to live within the concepts on which one reflects", and (2) "self-
forgetfulness", in which one ceases to include in one's reflection that one is an existing person.
See David Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 34, 37. From our study thus far,
particularly Chapter Three, we may add another Kierkegaardian disease of reflection, in which, (3)
one employs one's concepts confusingly.
124 Cf. Kierkegaard's statement in Works ofLove: "It is one thing to let ideas compare with ideas,
and it is one thing to argue and win a dispute; it is something else to be victorious over one's own
mind when one battles in the actuality of life. However hard one contending idea presses upon
another, however hard one contender presses upon another in a dispute, all this contending is still
at a distance and is like shadowboxing"; KW XVI 78/5V XII 80.
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It is important, therefore, to distinguish two senses in which Kierkegaard means
the word "subjectivity".126 First, there is what may be called constitutional
subjectivity. This is the way the term subjectivity is perhaps most commonly used by
philosophers and refers to a particular state of an entity which may be described—it
is something humans are (or can be in the process of becoming), and refers to
beings insofar as they are subjects, or have a self and are agents who possess an
"I". Subjectivity qua subject is to be spirit, and as such humans are only derived
and potential subjects.127 Climacus uses the term subjectivity in the constitutional
sense on occasion in his discussions of the subjectivity principle, as for example,
when he refers to God as a "subject" who, as subjectivity, can consequently only be
known in subjectivity;128 or when he refers to becoming a Christian as "truly
becoming a subject".129 But Kierkegaard notes that in Climacus's subjectivity
principle, what is meant "by subjectivity is not what is called a subject as such but to
become subjective or the developed subjectivity".130 Kierkegaard's second
connotation of subjectivity, which we will call reflexive subjectivity, refers to the
general subject-forming activities that comprise the process of becoming subjective.
In this sense, subjectivity is something humans must do\ Climacus (and
Kierkegaard) call us to become subjective, to exercise inwardness, to be
passionate—all of which he refers to under the hospice of "subjectivity". The
concept of reflexive subjectivity trades on the coming-to-be nature of human
temporal existence and, as a kind of activity, is therefore virtually synonymous with
inwardness as its primary expression. For Kierkegaard, then, the term
"subjectivity" in the subjectivity principle refers to the process of becoming a fully
125 AW XII. 1 129/SV IX 107. See also AW XII. 1 130-144, 158-59, 163-65, 167-70, 176, 349-
60/SVIX 107-119, 131-32, 136-37, 138-141, 146, X 50-59; KW XIX 13-14, 35/SV XV 73, 92;
KW XX 159/SVXVI 154.
126 This distinction is also found in Myron B. Penner, "The Normative Resources of Kierkegaard's
Subjectivity Principle", International Journal ofSystematic Theology 1 (1998): 75-6.
127 Kierkegaard produces his most detailed discussion of the self as spirit in The Sickness Unto
Death (KW XIX/SV XV 66-179), which takes as its task the grammar of Christian subjectivity.
See also Concept ofAnxiety {KW VIII/SV VI 102-240).
128 AW XII. 1 200/SV IX 166.
129 KW XII. 1 131/SV IX 108.
130 A note from a draft copy of Postscript, KW XII.2 54-5/Pap. IV B 40:32.
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The reflexive nature of the Kierkegaardian concept of subjectivity provides its
normative thrust and critical capacity. In the end, Kierkegaard's concept of
subjectivtiy (in its reflexive sense) is a new kind of objectivity that is not merely
subjectivism, but yet not the objectivism of the Enlightenment.
There are two ways in which reflexive subjectivity functions as a critique of
human thought and action. First, as we have seen above, subjective thinking or
inwardness, goes beyond objective thinking, which merely entertains an idea. What
Kierkegaard does with the subjectivity principle is, in effect, to create a new kind of
objectivity—an objectivity achieved via a stringent process of inwardness
(subjectivity). Kierkegaard argues, in fact, that proper subjectivity is "pure
transparency, infinite control", while "an objectivity [traditionally conceived] is
opaque".131 Subjectivity in this first, Socratic sense has as its task "precisely to be
objective toward oneself and subjective toward all others".132 The inter-related
Kierkegaardian concepts of subjective thinking, subjective reflection, passion, and
inwardness all function as a critique of the illusory pure objectivity of modernity, but
also mean that the subjects own thoughts, interests, and passions are placed under
critical scrutiny. So, while subjectivity features as a general critique of reason (as we
saw in Chapter Two) and the social structures of legitimisation, it also functions as a
critique of the subject and her/his own rational processes. Subjectivity, as a self-
conscious process of coming-to-be, is not an unreflective, criterionless embracing of
any subjective whim, but on the contrary "means to be up for examination; to
believe, to will to believe, means to change one's life, to be up for examination".133
In fact it is the only means of attaining a critical distance, or objectivity, that is
available to human persons. Kierkegaard holds out Socrates as an prototype of this
subjectivity-as-objectivity:
131JP IV 4564/Pap. X4 A 346.
132 JP IV 4542/Pap. VIII1 A 165.
133 JP I 73/Pap. X2 A 406.
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Take Socrates ... in danger he relates objectively to his own person ... He is
subjectivity raised to the second power . . . with this objectivity he relates to his own
subjectivity. This is no mean achievement. Generally we get one of two things—either an
objective something, an objective piece of furniture that is supposed to be a human being,
or we get a jumble of accidental occurrences and arbitrariness. But the task [of
subjectivity] is to relate objectively to one's own subjectivity. . . . [God] relates
objectively to his subjectivity ... in his being subjective there is no imperfection at all
that should be taken away, nor is there anything lacking that should be added, as is the
case with human subjectivity and which explains why being related objectively to one's
own subjectivity is also a corrective.134
With the concept of reflexive subjectivity, Kierkegaard clearly means to present a
principle that serves as "a corrective" to, and a middle way between, a false
objectivity which ends in falseness (approximate truth) and the loss of humanity, and
a (pseudo) subjectiveness characterised by an absentminded "arbitrariness" in
which all truth is relativised. Kierkegaard urges us to eschew the (false) dichotomy
of modernity between objectivity and subjectivity and instead points toward an
objectivity that comes from within subjectivity and is achieved through an equilateral
balance of objectivity and subjectivity. In fact, Kierkegaard tells us, this subjective-
objective imbalance is uniquely human and would not arise were we not in an
imperfect state (which for Socrates is ignorance, and for Climacus is sin). God, as
the paradigmatic knower, is the one subject who has attained pure objectivtiy
precisely because God is the only being who is pure subjectivity.
Subjective reflection, as an expression of one's entire being in its embodied and
temporal situatedness, is a passionate concern about the actualisation of one's
interests. It is a re-thinking of concepts in terms of one's life as a whole through all
its sundry expressions so that one can proactively engage oneself in one's
environment and shape the comprehensive direction of one's life. Thus, as with the
Socratic refutation of the sophists, reflexive subjectivity simply takes the real world
for granted because it is essentially interested; it is situated in time and space (Inter-
esse) and has as its interest and passion its own being-in-truth. Reflexive subjectivity
cannot afford the philosophical luxury of being epistemically sceptical for we must
be—but for the same reason it also can ill afford to ignore conceptual rigor. The re¬
thinking process of subjectivity is, then, not simply another abstract process in which
134 JP IV 4571/Pap. XI2 A 97.
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actions are thought about, but it is a thinking through acting, of "understanding the
abstract concretely".135 It is thus a bridging of the gap between theoria and praxis
in which the theoretical stance one takes is necessarily commingled with the means
of expressing one's theoretical judgments.136 This process of inward deepening is
inherently self-reflexive and thereby self-limiting and normative. The passion born
of interest (Interesse) prevents one from living arbitrarily and commits one to
pursuing and actualising the truth in the way one lives. This passionate, inward
process of appropriation, this thinking in and through one's embodied and temporal
existence, provides the individual with a self-transparency that operates as a sort of
foundation for one's belief and action. But note that this is not a Cartesian self-
presence. Haufniensis argues,
The most concrete content that consciousness can have is consciousness itself., of the
individual himself—not the pure self-consciousness, but the self-consciousness that is so
concrete that no author . . . has ever been able to describe a single such self-
consciousness, although every single human being is such a one. This self-consciousness
is not contemplation, for he who believes this has not understood himself, because he
sees that meanwhile he himself is in the process of becoming and consequently cannot be
something completed for contemplation. This self-consciousness, therefore is action, and
this action in turn is inwardness,137
In the end, the exercise of Kierkegaardian inwardness results in a practical capacity
for critical awareness that prepares us for "sincere participation in discourses of
legitimation".138
Kierkegaard's concept of reflexive subjectivity does not, however, as Patricia
Huntington observes out, commit the "category mistake" in which "the boundary
between an existential mode of action (the how) and the substantive choice one
makes in action (what one enacts)" is slurred.139 The subjectivity principle does not
collapse into a form of decisionism in which any action or decision that is
135 KW XII. 1 352/SV X 52. See also Judge William's assertion that, "the ethical person knows
himself, but his knowing is not simply contemplation ... It is a collecting of oneself, which
itself is an action, and this is why I have often used the expression 'to choose yourself instead of
'to know yourself.'" KW IV 258/SV III 238.
136 J. Heywood Thomas, "Kierkegaard's Alternative Metaphysical Theology". History of European
Ideas 12, No.l (1990), 59-60. Cf. KW XII. 1 73-80/SVIX 62-68.
137 KW VIII 143/SV VI 224; my emphasis.
138Patricia J. Huntington, "Heidegger's Reading of Kierkegaard Revisited: From Ontological
Abstraction to Ethical Concretion", in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, eds. Martin J. Matustfk and
Merold Westphal (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995), 56.
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passionately made constitutes both the means and end of that choice and thereby
provides itself with a normative basis for determining a course of action.140 For
Kierkegaard, the object of faith or belief {Tro) is not constituted in the resolve to
believe, or the act of believing or having faith—it is rather accessed in this act. A
failure to understand this has led some interpreters to view his subjectivity principle
as metaphyscially irrealist and epistemologically subjectivist, but this is plainly not
the case. Reflexive subjectivity or inwardness does not manufacture (or justify) the
ideational content of a given belief by virtue of its passionate appropriation, but is
instead the formal condition for the appropriate cognitive posture with respect to a
given phenomena. The argument presented here is not that the How is the What, but
that the How carries with it, or determines, the kind of What we get. The How, in
other words, is a modal qualification that characterises the manner in which one
engages in or relates to theoretical and practical activities.141 The establishment of
this formal condition for doxastic practice acts to check doxastic errors as it
positions one appropriately as subjects in the world.
To engage in reflexive subjectivity is to place oneself in a dialectical relationship
with one's entire world (including self, world and others) so that one's cognitive
orientation to the world proceeds from an ethical-religious point of departure that
realises the paucity of one's own cognitive resources. The ethical-religious
orientation, in turn, extends to the human philosophical endeavour. With the
subjectivity principle, Evans notes, "Kierkegaard has . . . rejected what Gadamer has
called the Enlightenment 'prejudice against prejudice.'"142 The subjectivity
principle is a critique of all human, modernist tendencies to conduct our theoretical
inquiries from a purely (pseudo) objective stance. Because of this critique of
objective reason, the domain ethics is privileged over that of epistemology or
139 Ibid.; her emphasis.
140 Therefore Kierkegaard states that, "The absurd, the paradox [the object of tro] is composed in
such a way that reason has no power at all to dissolve it in nonsense and prove that it is nonsense;
no it is a symbol, a riddle, a compounded riddle about which reason must say: I cannot solve it, it
cannot be understood, but it does not follow that it is nonsense". JP 11/Pap. X2 A 354.
141 Huntington, "Heidegger's Reading of Kierkegaard", 57.
142 Evans, Passionate Reason, 1 BO.
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metaphysics as the ground of human truth.143 Reflexive subjectivity rejects any
ahistorical (transcendental) view of human reason and emphasizes the historical
embeddedness of reason as an inherently social enterprise. Vigilius Haufniensis, for
example, argues that, "Every individual is essentially interested in the history of all
other individuals, and just as essentially as in his own. ... No individual is
indifferent to the history of the race anymore than the race is indifferent to the
history of the individual. ... the individual begins constantly anew, because he is
both himself and the race, and by this, in turn, the history of the race".144 Human
persons naturally find themselves in an interdependent relationship with their
community and environment in which they are born that ultimately extends to their
global society and historical ancestry. We may say with Calvin Schrag, therefore,
that for Kierkegaard, "Reflection ... is always from bottom up social, always
situated within the density of world-engagements".145 We can defer neither to the
incontrovertibility of our own human rational powers, nor to the schemes of
justification sanctioned by our cultural and social institutions, but instead it is our
task to win the truth for ourselves and be alethically victorious in existence.
Kierkegaard, then, has three different senses of objectivity. First, objectivity in
Kierkegaard's literature most often refers to the God's-eye point of view, an attempt
to reason from a presuppositionless starting point in order to build absolute
epistemic foundations. Kierkegaard often refers to objectivity in this sense as "pure
objectivity" and can be a method of reasoning in which one attempt to forsake
subjectivity in order to attain a completely neutral cognitive position, or it can refer to
a purely objective thing which is not subject. This type of objectivity is available only
to God, and this only because He is able to relate all existing and possible things to
his own subjectivity with absolute objectivity; that is, God is pure subjectivity. Pure
143 See the note earlier in this chapter in which Kierkegaard's concept of ethics is defined.
144 KW VIII 29/SV VI 124. The editorial note in JP I p. 597 explains that, "As an individual one
stands in a relationship of thoroughgoing dependence on the race and environment. . . . The
individual must work [her/]his way out of [her/]his dependence in order to win self-dependence".
145 Calvin O. Schrag, The Resources of Rationality: A Response to the Postmodern Challenge
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 177. Schrag is not specifically referring to
Kierkegaard in this passage.
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objectivity is neither a live option for temporal-spatial, finite (and sinful) human
knowers; nor is it appropriate for humans to employ its method. Second, objectivity
in Kierkegaard's literature also means a quasi-objectivity that exists as
approximation. This is the sense in which human truth may exist as objective.
Objectivity here simply refers to the fact that the concepts employed in our acts of
cognition, as well as the logical relations between conceptual essences in our
cognitive acts, obtain independent of any person's recognition of them. These are
abstractions that may be considered independently of their relation to the human
subjects which recognise them. These abstract considerations are, then,
objective—but only derivatively—and yet are approximate because they only truly
exist in their relations with subjects. Mathematics, ontology (as a logic of conceptual
essences), logic, etc. would be said to possess this type of objectivity because they
proceed from assumed axioms and also because these pursuits are merely
abstractions and only exist in their concretions. Such objective relations are the
kinds of things we refer to as "facts". This second type of objectivity is completely
appropriate for and available to humans but is in itself utterly useless to human
persons. Lastly, Kierkegaard fashions for himself a new kind of objectivity—which
he rarely refers to under that term—that is the objectivity attained in a passionate and
inward subjective relation to oneself and the world in which one lives. This type is
both the means to the second type of objectivity and the ground of Kierkegaard's
critical philosophy.
The second form of critique in reflexive subjectivity arises from Climacus's
theological subjectivity that is qualified by "sin consciousness", made possible by
the incarnation of "the god" into time. The theological form of the critique of
subjectivity completes the critique of reason nascent in Socratic subjectivity by
combining human finitude with and the noetic effects of human sin so that, as
Merold Westphal notes, it "becomes a critique of ideology".146 The Socratic
146 Westphal, Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society, 22. Westphal's very good chapter in
this book called, "Inwardness and Ideology Critique in Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript",
treats this same issue in more detail and with a different agenda than our discussion. Cf. KW IV
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critique still remains a transcendence-within-immanence and conceives the telos of
human interest (human being in truth) within the horizon of human imagination. The
imperfection of humans is their ignorance and their failure to live up to their inherent
potential. With the introduction of sin as a fundamental epistemic category,
Kierkegaard wrecks all attempts to valorise human reason and invest it with even the
powers of producing from within its own resources the appropriate postulates. As
has been shown from Fragments, the interest of subjectivity as the being-in-truth of
the human person is a concern with Salighed—eternal blessedness—and is
something that cannot be attained through immanental categories. What is absolutely
required is a revelation—an encounter with "the god" in time. "Genuine
transaction in Salighed entails at the least an exercise of one's passional capacity",
and, notes Abrahim Kahn, "the acknowledgment of complete human inefficacy with
respect to Providential concerns, and one's reliance on God's grace".147 Thus, with
the theological dimensions of reflexive subjective, not only is the self decentered, but
the entire human enterprise of self-transcendence.
Human attempts at systems of knowledge and ideological constructs will always
be mired in human sin—power struggles, oppression, injustice, marginalisation, etc.
Therefore all propositional expressions of truth are approximate and lack objective,
foundational certainties on which to base action or belief, and thus are fundamentally
at risk and ultimately rely on either secular (Socratic) or religious faith.148 Objective
uncertainty (i.e., the lack of infallible epistemic foundations) and the corruptness of
human thinking extends not only to secular theory or doctrine (whether it be
political, philosophical, scientific, etc.), but also to religious doctrine. Westphal
argues that Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle is also a critique of orthodox
Christianity: "For truth in the ethicoreligious sense is inseparable from the inward
258/SV III 237-38; KW VII \69/Pap. IV B 1 147-48. See also David Gouwens, Kierkegaard as
Religious Thinker, 30-1; Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard's Critique ofReason and Society, 22-3; C.
Stephen Evans, "Kierkegaard's View of the Unconscious", in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, 76-
97; and Mooney, Selves in Discord and Resolve, 66-70.
147 Abrahim H. Kahn, "Happiness in Kierkegaard's Edifying Discourses", Kierkegaardiana 12:
(1982), 72.
148
Mooney, Selves in Discord and Resolve, 66.
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transformation of the self; and this cannot be identified either with mental assent to
propositions or with having had a rite performed on one in the helplessness of
infancy [e.g. baptism]".149 The ground and goal of all human truth, essential truth,
is being-m-\m\h and not, as Westphal noted, doctrinal correctness (per se) or ritual
performances. Propositional and doctrinal formulations are natural (and in one sense
necessary) expressions of being in truth, but they are accidental to one's being in
truth. Thus, Kierkegaard's reflexive subjectivity, which, as we shall see in Chapter
Six culminates in "Religiousness B", operates as a "principle of protest" against
all "idolatric tendencies and social evils", perpetuated by the wielding of truth qua
objective truths as instruments of ultimacy, power, and absoluteness.150 This in turn
establishes the human person in a transparently in which one is "contemporaneous
with oneself' and provides one with the basis on which to proceed in a discourse of
legitimation.
Conclusion to Chapter Four
In Chapter Four we have seen that Johannes Climacus' claim that "truth is
subjectivity" emerges from his grammar of truth in Postscript, which completes
Kierkegaard's critique of epistemology begun in Fragments. On our reading,
Fragments essentially is a grammatical inquiry into the issue of learning the truth.
Climacus introduces Christian categories to critique the Socratic-Platonic doctrine of
anamnesis and its contention that eternal truth is immanental to human persons as a
constitutive feature of human ontology. Fragments performs its critque of
recollection by focussing on the failure of the Socratic version of being-in-truth to
account for the salvation (Salighed) of human persons in time-space. When he
introduces Salighed as the logical extention of Socrates' discussion of truth,
Climacus thereby demonstrates that Socrates' default acceptance of recollection as
the explanation of the relationship between humans and (eternal) tmth involves some
149 Westphal, Kierkegaard's Critique ofReason and Society , 123.
150 Calvin O. Schrag, "The Kierkegaard Effect in the Shaping of the Contours of Modernity", in
Kierkegaard in Post!Modernity, 16n-17.
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deep incoherences with his (correct) methodological ignorance. The belief of
Socrates and Plato that truth is immanent within humans, expressed in modem
philosophy as an autonomous subject, ultimately erases the historical subjectivity of
individual persons, as well as doing away with the possibility of a victorious truth
(learning the truth) in time. Socrates has exhausted immanenental categories, so
Climacus goes beyond him and proposes the Christian theological categories of the
incarnation, sin, repentance, and atonement as necessary epistemological categories.
Kierkegaard's second move of his epistemological critique comes in Postscript.
In Postscript Kierkegaard broaches the same issue as Fragments, this time in the
form of a grammar of the concept of truth. As Kierkegaard parses the concept of
truth he distinguishes accidental truth as truths that are not essential to a thing's
conceptual essence, from essential truth as truth that fundamentally pertains to
human existing. He also identifies that there are two kinds or poles of truth, objective
truth and subjective truth. Climacus argues that "becoming subjective" is the way
of human truth and that for humans "truth is subjectivity" because human access to
truth is always from within subjectivity. Objective truths cannot be grounded in any
way other than through subjectivity because: (1) they are themselves approximation;
and (2) the objective means of gaining truth demands an atemporal, nonexistent, and
non-human subjectivity. However, the truth of subjectivity is ultimately revealed, by
the god's entrance into time, to be that subjectivtiy is untruth. Once more Climacus
asserts that a general epistemology must be inscribed within a theological
epistemology and that any other account of human truth fails to adequately explain
human truth acquisition.
Kierkegaard does not think that objective statements of truth are wholly
illegitimate or epistemically inappropriate, only that these cannot be the ground or
goal of human belief (Tro). Kierkegaard does not think that the telos of human
cognitive powers (Salighed, or eternal happiness) lies in the attainment of a
collection of the maximal number of true propositions available in the universe. That
would be, to use Kierkegaard's term, a purely esthetical existence (as possibility),
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lacking the inwardness of a self (subjectivity) as a "unifying point". Rather,
Kierkegaard thinks that "objective", propositional truths, and the human cognitive
capacity to possess them, are: (1) valuable only as part of the whole person—i.e., the
ethical-religious being-in-truth of the person and as part of the attainment of a
unified, deep subjectivity that functions to ground these propositions in truth; and
(2) in turn conditioned by the manner in which we involve ourselves in reality—i.e.,
propositional truths are features of and dependent upon our subjectivity so that
ultimately the kind of self or subjectivity we develop proportionately determines the
quantity and quality of the propositional truths we possess. Kierkegaard thinks,
therefore, that human subjectivity is intinsically characterised by a need for truth, and
that all human endeavours toward truth exhibit a teleological structure that is
reducible to the search for eternal blessedness.
When Climacus says that truth is subjectivity, the concept of subjectivity denotes
Kierkegaard's use of subjectivity both as subject qua human subject, or
constitutional subjectivity, and reflexive subjectivity as the subject forming activities
that constitute the process of becoming a subject, such as inwardness and passion.
Subjectivity as reflexive subjectivity involves a deliberate engagement in subjective
double-reflection (versus objective reflection) in which the thinker deliberately
applies her/his conceptual understanding across her/his entire embodied existence.
In the end, Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle operates as a critical principle which,
much like modem philosophy, places the human subject at the center of our
epistemic activity. However, Kierkegaard's subject is duly decentered and the
establishment of a concrete, actual historical subject replaces Descartes' thinking
substance. The normative function of constitutional subjectivity, the fully delveoped
human self, functions as the ground of human truth. Kierkegaard's temporally and
spatially conditioned self of belief also opens the door to a communitarian view of
selfhood and implies that for Kierkegaard a full account of belief must be located
within the social and communal dynamics of our praxial engagements with the
world. Kierkegaard's pseudonymous statement that "truth is subjectivity", then,
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means: (1) that humans truths exist only in and for subjectivity so that the way of
approaching truth is through subjective appropriation or passionate inwardness; and
(2) that the ground of human truth is the establishment of a full, or deep subjectivity,
which is described throughout the Kierkegaardian literature as self-transparency.
What is needed now is a grammar of this subject, which is the topics of Chapter
Five and Chapter Six, and which in turn provides a normative basis by which we can
evaluate our praxis or ways being in the world. It is the task of Chapter Seven, then,




SUBJECTIVITY AND THE GRAMMAR OF BELIEF
CHAPTER FIVE
GRAMMAR OF SUBJECTIVITY 1:
THE CONTOURS OF THE SELF
To be spirit is to be /.
Spren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
The majority of men are truncated 7's; what was structured as the possibility of being
sharpened to an I is quickly truncated to a third person. In margin: Like Munchausen's
dog, a greyhound that wore down its legs and became a daschund.
Spren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
Part One concluded with the determination that Kierkegaard's subjectivity
principle functions as a critical principle that provides norms for human belief and
action. It was noted that there are two uses of the term subjectivity in the
Kierkegaardian literature, and that there is an attending normativity with each sense.
Reflexive subjectivity, characterised by subjective reflection and a passionate
inwardness in and through one's subjective engagements with reality, is actually a
new concept of objectivity which serves as the substance or mode of human truth-
acquisition. Reflexive subjectivity is the means of human truth and it is through the
inward deepening of subjective reflection that humans achieve self-transparency as
the ground of truth. Constitutional subjectivity refers to fully developed, self-
transparent (deep) human subjects and provides the normative standard by which
human practices of justification are judged. Part Two of this dissertation seeks to
establish this claim more fully.
The focus of Chapter Five once more is Kierkegaard's concept of subjectivity,
only now our analysis turns to subjectivity qua human subject, or what we
designated earlier as constitutional subjectivity. In the Kierkegaardian literature we
have two different analyses which, taken together, provide us with a comprehensive
grammar of human subjectivity. Kierkegaard comments that,
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Even though I achieve nothing else, I nevertheless hope to leave very accurate and
experientially based observations concerning the conditions of existence [Tilvcerelsens]. I
am convinced above all that these conditions are always essentially the same. . . . Using
my diagram, a young person should be able to see very accurately beforehand, just as on a
price list: if you venture this far out, then the conditions are thus and so, this to win and
this to lose; and if you venture out this far, these are the conditions, etc.1
The account of Kierkegaard's grammar of human subjectivity given here is
heavily indebted to Calvin Schrag's work and his Kierkegaardian notion that human
subjectivity inhabits in the interstices of human communicative praxis. Schrag moves
from this concept of subjectivity into the concept of a "praxial critique".2 The broad
approach to Kierkegaardian subjectivity detailed here is heavily informed by, and is
on many points synchronous with, Schrag's work, but there are a variety of
differences. Most significant is the germinal role belief plays in the establishment of
human subjectivity on our reading. In turn, the role that the logic of subjectivity
plays in regulating belief is also very different on our view. For example, Schrag
argues that, "[bjodily presence . . . announces its presence in person. This presence
of the body-subject in person is posited neither as a metaphysical nor as an
epistemological self-identical foundation".3 He later expresses a deep suspicion of
beliefs saying: "It is this heavy accent on the role of beliefs and theories that
occasions for us certain concerns".4 In the end, Kierkegaard's concept of belief as
presented here is very different from Schrag's and therefore the role it plays in the
grounding of subjectivity means, in opposition to Schrag's contentions, that
epistemological concerns—in so far as this means concerns over beliefs and their
regulation—maintain a significant role. Ultimately the kind of subjectivity Schrag
offers is very different from the kind Kierkegaard is found to envision in our study.
1 JPI 1046/Pap. VIII1 A 127. In this regard Kierkegaard also wrote: "Through my writings I hope
to achieve the following: to leave behind me so accurate a characterization of Christianity and its
relationships in the world that an enthusiastic, noble-minded young person will be able to find in it
a map of relations as accurate as any topographical map from the famous institutes. I have not had
the help of such an author. The old Church Fathers lacked one aspect, they did not know the
world"; JP V 6284/Pap. IX A 448.
2 See Calvin O. Schrag, Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity (Bloomington, IN:
University of Indiana Press, 1986); Schrag, The Resources of Rationality: A Response to the
Postmodern Challenge (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1992); and Schrag, The Self
After Postmodernity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
3 Schrag, Communicative Praxis, 154-55; his italics.
4 Schrag, The Resources ofRationality, 178.
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In Postscript Johannes Climacus provides one axis of Kierkegaard's grammar
in terms of the four conceptual spheres of human existence: the esthetical, the ethical,
and religiousnesses A and B. With a broad brush, Climacus traces the movements
and existential possibilities of a fully developed subjectivity. Through Anti-
Climacus's The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard offers a different, but
complementary, analysis of human subjectivity that is not as expansive as
Climacus's grammar of the existence spheres. Instead, Anti-Climacus provides a
detailed examination of a deep subjectivity in contrast to a thin subjectivity, and
scrutinises the dysfunctions that afflict the movements of human subjectivity. Here
Kierkegaard specifically examines the concept of human personhood and the
ontological determinants of a fully established self. Chapter Five will focus on this
portrait of the self in Sickness Unto Death as a self-relating relation. In Anti-
Climacus 's analysis a thin self is given to us as a task in order to develop a deep
subjectivity, in which the self is grounded "transparently in the power that
establishes it".5 Chapter Six takes up the theme of the Kierkegaardian grammar of
the range of possible existential modes of human existence articulated in his theory
of the "stages" of existence or "existence-spheres". The theory of stages is
examined as a logic of the teleological development of a deep subjectivity that
develops a unified self-narrative with multi-dimensionality and achieves
"transparency". And in Chapter Seven we look at the role that belief plays in the
establishment of a deep subjectivity and how the theory of existence-spheres
illuminates belief acquisition and doxastic regulation. The final chapter of Part Two
investigates how Kierkegaard's grammar of the human subject functions to provide
the means of doxastic regulation and may serve as the basis for a praxially oriented
critical principle for beliefs.
Kierkegaard's Situated Self
5 KW XIX 14/.SVXV 73.
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Chapter Two detailed Climacus's rejection of the Cartesian cogito as the basis
for a presuppositionless starting point and indubitable foundation in epistemology
along with its postulation of an epistemological subject that has unique and pure
access to the contents (beliefs) of consciousness. Climacus rather points to an
ethical and situated self-presence as the starting point in any investigation of our
beliefs, for we do not have ourselves in contemplation but only in our intentional
actions (which oblige us to exist).6 In Sickness Unto Death Anti-Climacus, in
agreement with Climacus before him, criticises both the Greek conception of the
knowing, believing self, and the cogito of modem philosophy, as erasing the ethical
significance of the human self. He argues that,
In pure ideality, where the actual individual is not involved . . . there is no difficulty at all
connected with the transition from understanding to doing. This is the Greek mind (but not
the Socratic, for Socrates was far too ethically minded for that). And the secret of modem
philosophy is essentially the very same for it is this: cogito ergo sum [I think therefore I
am], to think is to be (Christianly however, it [the formula for self-knowledge] reads:
according to your faith, be it unto you, or, as you believe, so are you, to believe is to be).
Thus it is evident that modern philosophy is neither more nor less than paganism.7
Here in Sickness Unto Death, the most extensive and mature treatment of human
ontology8 in the Kierkegaardian literature, we find a version of Climacus's ethical-
religious ego in which Kierkegaard's peculiar concept of belief functions as a
critique of modernist philosophy. In the above passage Anti-Climacus makes clear
once again that the kind of self-knowledge available to humans is not that of a
Cartesian self-presence who, in abstraction, ideally sees itself from an eternal,
ahistorical vantage point of pure self-presence. Kierkegaard's pseudonym is
interested in the concerned, historically concrete, actual self that is temporally and
spatially embodied in a matrix of social relations, and who therefore thinks,
understands, or believes, about itself and other things, from within that historically
6 Refer to Kierkegaard's critique of the cogito in Chapter Two and our discussion of inwardness and
subjective reflection in Chapter Four.
7 KW XIX 93/SV XV 145; his italics.
8 Recall that Kierkegaard thinks of ontology as a science of conceptual essences. Whereas
metaphysics speaks of being qua substance (i.e., it speaks of the nature of a things's "thatness"),
ontology speaks of being qua essence, or in terms of what makes a thing this thing and not that
thing (i.e., it speaks of a things "thisness"). It is therefore completely coherent for Kierkegaard to
denigrate metaphysics and yet speak of ontology—provided this is in the subjunctive mood and not
the indicative mood ofmetaphysics.
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and socially limited framework. Human subjectivity, for Kierkegaard, is simply not
the purely rational agency envisioned by modernity, but instead is "the point outside
the world", existing in the supra-rational realm of "paradox", and "the absurd",
and in relation to others. This is a distincly ethical-religious9 and Christian view of
our self-presence that is epistemically fallible and perceives itself through its
concretions—a self which ultimately requires, as we will see, a repetition for it to be
tmth.
Thin Subjectivity
In Kierkegaard's writings we have delineated two categories of human
subjectivity: first, what may be called a thin subjectivity or self, and secondly, a deep
subjectivity.10 Once again, because of his non-dualist and anti-metaphysical
tendencies, Kierkegaard does not see these categories of subjectivity as separate,
distinct entities, but rather views them as two ends of a continuum. It is not strictly a
question of an individual being (in actuality) wholly one or the other. There is no
strict disjunction between a thin and deep subjectivity and it is rather an issue of
being more of one or the other.11 There is a sense in which humans qua members of
the human race simply are (or become) subjects in Kierkegaard's thin sense. The
natural ability a human has to relate to oneself is "[hu/]man's superiority over the
animal".12 Thin subjectivity is given to us in the awareness of self that we achieve
9 Recall that for Kierkegaard ethics is not the science of morality but rather the intentional, supra-
rational sphere of human subjectivity characterised by passion, concern, and the striving of
existence (coming-to-be). It is concerned with human self-transcendence and therefore includes a
religious dimension as well.
10 Although he does not use the exact terms "thin" and "deep" selves or subjectivities, Kierkegaard
clearly operates with these concepts, as when in his upbuiliding discourse, "To Need God is a
Human Being's Highest Perfection", Kierkegaard refers to the "first self' and the "deeper self'; KW
V 297-326/SVIV 170-194.
11 There is a critical threshold between the two, however, that, once crossed, qualifies one under the
other category. The point here is merely to indicate that the difference between a thin and a deep
subjectivity is not metaphysical, but phenomenological and ontological/conceptual.
12 KW XIX 15/SV 15 74. In context Anti-Climacus actually refers to the possibility of despair as
humanity's superiority over animals. However, despair is defined by Anti-Climacus as the
possibility of misrelation of oneself to oneself; see KW XIX 14/SV XV 72. The possibility of
despair, therefore, is a direct reference to the self-relation previously described by Anti-Climacus as
"the relation that relates itself to itself'. In other words, what makes despair possible for
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through our actions in and interactions with our world. Thin subjectivity, however, is
merely an incipient, nascent self, and is not what it means to be fully developed
human person. It is more like the basic condition for personhood. Therefore, in an
important sense, humans, although possessing thin subjectivity, may still fail to
achieve deep subjectivity and thus fall short of becoming completely "human", with
a fully developed personhood.
Despite their different perspectives and emphases there is a fundamental
agreement between Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms in their view of the thin
subject. John Glenn aptly summarises Kierkegaard's overall view of the incipient
self when he notes that for Kierkegaard, "Human existence is a kind of paradox. A
human being is neither a god nor a beast—yet is somehow like both".13 The
aesthete in Either/Or asserts that, "The basic concept of [hu/]man is spirit, and one
should not be confused by the fact that [s/]he is also able to walk on two feet".14 In
the opening line of Sickness Unto Death Anti-Climacus affirms A's analysis stating,
"Human being is spirit", and elaborates saying that spirit is "the self'. Anti-
Climacus further qualifies spirit/self saying that the self is "a relation that relates
itself to itself', and that, "a human being is a synthesis of the infinite and finite, of
the temporal and eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short a synthesis".15 A
synthesis, Anti-Climacus explains, is "a relation between the two", and he is
adamant that a human being thought of this way "is still not a self\ This self is a
"negative unity" that refers only to the fact that a human being, "under the
qualification of the psychical and the physical is a relation".16 This idea that human
beings are a bodily-soulish synthesis is pervasive throughout all of Kierkegaard's
Kierkegaard is the fact that the self substantially is a self-relation; KWXIX 13/SV XV 73. See the
following discussion of this definition of the human self.
13 John D. Glenn, Jr., "The Definition of the Self and the Structure of Kierkegaard's Work", in
International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness Unto Death, Volume 19, ed. Robert L.
Perkins (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1987), 6.
14 KW III 65/SV II 62.
15 KW XIX 13/SV XV 73. See also Haufniensis's definition: "[A human being] is a synthesis of
the psychical and the physical; but this synthesis is unthinkable if it is not united in a third. This
third is spirit"; KW XIX 43/SV VI 137.
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pseudonyms,17 and Vigilius Haufniensis remarks that in this state "man is not
merely animal" but that "spirit [selfhood] is present, but as immediate, as
dreaming".18 Selfhood in its dream-state is what we are calling a thin subjectivity.
Thin subjectivity is, then, more like a capacity for self-unity in time and space than it
is properly a self, and it is the tension between this capacity and the propensity of
human experience to be attenuated and diffused through time from which deep
subjectivity or genuine selfhood emerges.19
The description of the human person as a complex set of relations must be
understood within its general context. Recall from Chapter Two that Climacus in
Postscript describes the human person as a "duplexity" and noted that this was
because humans exist in a temporal-eternal tension so that human existence is a
juxtaposition of contraries. In Chapter Two we also noted Merold Westphal's
admonition that Kierkegaard is never simply anti-Hegelian, but had a very high
esteem for Hegel's thought. In many significant ways Kierkegaard's thinking was
shaped by Hegel and utilised an intrinsic Hegelian structure.20 In his descriptions of
the "self' or "spirit", Kierkegaard adopts much of Hegel's vocabulary and
dialectic—which Kierkegaard apparently finds satisfactory—but uses them to quite
different ends. The self that Kierkegaard describes is not constituted by the kind of
clarity derived from the rational "standpoint of Science"21 as with Hegel, but is
instead a self whose only hope for self-transparency is that won through a
16 KW XIX 43/SV VI 137; my italics. The terms Anti-Climacus uses for "the psychical" and "the
physical" are respectively the Danish terms "Sjel" and "Legeme", which may be translated
respectively as "soul" and "body".
17 On the concept of human beings as a synthesis see, for example, KW VIII 43, 48-9, 52, 58, 61,
64-65, 68-9, 71-2, 81, 85, 88, 90-1, 117, 122, 142, 155/SV VI 137, 141, 145, 149, 152, 155-56,
159, 161, 170, 173, 176, 178, 201, 205, 223, 234; KW XI 39, 170/SV VII 39, 151-52; KW
XII. 1 56, 579/SV IX 51, X 245; JP I 55, 86/Pap. VI A 102, JP V 5792/Pap. VI B 18.
18 XIV VIII 43/SV VI 137.
19 John Glenn, "the Definition of the Self', 9.
20 This last point is the substantive argument of Stephen Dunning's work. See especially his,
Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of the Stages
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), passim.
21 See Georg W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology ofSpirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977), passim.
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redemptive striving in existence.22 What Kierkegaard preserves in Hegel's
vocabulary of spirit is the concept of synthesis, which carries with it the concept of
relation, or of two things being in relation. This synthetic being-in-relation is, for
Kierkegaard, the phenomenological hallmark of distinctly human existence.
Synthesis, for Kierkegaard, refers to the tension in which (or relation between)
two opposite things (or "contraries") are held together so that on the one hand, the
two entities are inseparably conjoined, but on the other hand, neither one subsumes
the other in the relation. A simple, or pure synthesis, as the human person incipiently
is, is a "negative unity" because each component of the relation is only related to
the other by virtue of its being placed in a relation to the other.23 In other words, a
simple synthesis is an "immediate" unity that lacks a self-reflexive context in which
the two relata are brought together (mediated) as two parts of one term. In a negative
unity there is no further relation in which the initial synthetic relation is itself
established, and is subsequently an accidental unity—not a fully concrete, self-aware
(essential) unity.
Once more Kierkegaard borrows the concepts of negativity and positivity from
Hegel and uses them frequently throughout his literature.24 Kierkegaard uses the
Hegelian concept of synthesis to describe the dialectic, or grammar, of the human
self to establish the quite un-Hegelian conclusion that the human person is always
and in its very essence situated. Furthermore, Kierkegaard emphasises that it is not
22 In the "Preface" to Sickness Unto Death Anti-Climacus argues that, "it is Christian heroism—a
rarity, to be sure—to venture wholly to become oneself, this specific individual human being", but
"it is not Christian heroism to be taken in by the idea of [hu]man in the abstract or to play the
wonder game with world history"; KW XIX 5/SV XV 67. This is undoubtedly another Parthian
shot at Hegel and in Sickness Unto Death Anti-Climacus may be understood to use Hegel's
dialactical method and technical vocabulary against themselves so that Hegel's conclusions are
undermined.
23 KW XIX 13/SV XV 73. See also Elizabeth A. Morelli, "The Existence of the Self Before God
in Kierkegaard's Sickness Unto Death", Heythrop Journal 36: (1995), 19. Stephen Crites, in "The
Sickness Unto Death : A Social Interpretation", in Foundations of Kierkegaard's Vision of
Community: Religion, Ethics, and Politics in Kierkegaard, eds. George B. Connell and C. Stephen
Evans (London: Humanities Press, 1992), 149, explains very lucidly that, for Kierkegaard, "The
self is not merely a soul, an immaterial thing related to a body-thing (for that would make the
relation ... a mere negative unity, like two elements in a solution). The relating activity is a
'positive third' that constitutes whatever is related by it. It constantly materializes, is in that sense
physical through and through, although it is never a fixed, self-identical, material thing".
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just that the human self is situated in relation to other things—although it is
that—but it is itself a relating of various synthetic relations. Generally speaking, the
concepts of negativity and positivity relate respectively to non-being or a lack of
presence, and being or presence. For Kierkegaard, positivity essentially denotes an
affinity with the concepts of immutability, eternal, infinitude, absolute certainty, spirit,
and complete presence or historical concretion. Aligned with negativity are the
concepts of transition, finitude, coming to be in time, uncertainty, irony, sensate,
physical substance, and incompleteness or lacking historical presence. A simple
synthesis of two factors or opposing elements, therefore, is a "negative unity" in
that it is simply qualified as an existing thing, coming-to-be in time, and does not
have the "positivity" of complete, historical and self-conscious presence. In
Postscript, for example, Climacus argues that all earthly existence, and especially
human existence, is characterised by negativity because it is unceasingly in the
process of coming-to-be.25
Thus for Kierkegaard the human person as a thin subjectivity is radically
situated. In its givenness, human (thin) subjectivity is defined largely by its total
situation in the world. But this is not the complete self. Kierkegaard claims that
"Spirit [Aand]", however, "is the power a person's understanding exercises over
[her/]his life;"26 and that to be spirit is to have a first-person perspective on oneself
and the world.27 Aand is a corollary of the German word Geist and similarly can be
translated into English as mind or spirit.28 In its initial, primitive form, human
subjectivity is identified by Kierkegaard as self-conciousness—or an awareness of
24 See Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969),
84-5, 103-07, 835.
25 AW XII.1 80-86/5VIX 69-74. On Kierkegaard's use of the concept of negativity, see also KW
II 53, 135, 144-5, 159-60, 312, 322, 351, 378/WI 106-07, 173, 180-81, 194, 317, 324-25, Pap.
III C 27; KW III 285/SV II 263; KW VIII 21n, 78n-9, 81-2, 134, 139, 145, 181, 187 /SV VI
293n, 167n-68, 170-71, 215-16, 220, 226, Pap. V B 49:6, Pap. 59:18; AW XI 61, 443-44/5V VD
57-8, 238-39; AW XII. 1 76, 89-91, 524-25/SV IX 65-6, 77-8, X 198-9; AW XXII 83/SV XVIII
130; JP I 639, III 3284, V 5795/Pap. VI B 11, III A 107, VI B 35:19.
26 JP IV 4340/Pap. X3 A 736.
27 As noted in the epigraphs to this chapter, Kierkegaard states: "To be spirit is to be /". JP TV
4350/Pap. XI1 A 487. See also JP I 71, 12/Pap. X2 A 78; JP II 1144/Pap. X4 A 422; JP H
2015/Pap. XI' A 533; JP II 2011/Pap. XI 587; JP III 3219/Pap. XI1 A 51; JP IV 491 l/Pap. XI1 A
516-JP VI 6440/Pap. X1 A 531.
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one's temporal, situated emodiment in the world in which one "has [her/]himself for
[her/]himself\29 The linking of spirit [Aand] to "the power a person's
understanding exercises over [her/]his life", indicates that Kierkegaard is not
refering to the self or consciousness as a non-material substance (viz-a-vis
Descartes) that mysteriously clings to or associates with human bodies.30
Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers include some revealing statements regarding
how Kierkegaard understood the concept of spirit. He states: "Spirit is this: to live
as if dead (to die to the world)";31 also "The presence of spirit means that the more
a man contemplates life, the harder and more strenuous it becomes for him";32 and
"Spirit is restlessness".33 Kierkegaard is clearly operating with an notion of
"spirit" that eschews a metaphysical and substance dualist definition. Throughout
his various comments on the nature of spirit Kierkegaard maintains that humans are
not born as fully established spirits. What is more, Johannes Climacus claims that,
"Development of spirit is self-activity; the spiritually developed individual takes his
spiritual development along with him in death;" and that, "The most inferior person
can relate[her/]himself absolutely in the qualification of spirit fully as well as the
gifted person because endowments, proficiency, and knowledge are a 'what,' but the
absoluteness of the relation of spirit is a 'how' with regard to what one is, be it
much or little".34
28 Aand also bears comparison with the Greek concept of nous.
29 Anti-Climacus states that, "Every human being is primitively intended to be a self, destined to
become [her/]himself, and as such ever self certainly is angular, but that only means that it is to be
ground into shape, not that it is to be ground down smooth, not that it is utterly to abandon being
itself out of fear of men, or even simply out of fear of men not to dare to be itself in its more
essential contingency (which definitely is not to be ground down smooth), in which a person is
still [her/]himself for [her/]himself'. KW XIX 33/SV XV 90. Furthermore, recall from Chapter
Three that the Danish word for consciousness is Bevisted, which, unlike the English term denotes
self-awareness or full-consciousness. In Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard tautologically links
consciousness with the concept of the self, or spirit/mind, when he states that "Consciousness
[Bevisted] is mind [or spirit—Aand]". KIT VII 169/Pap. IV B 1 148.
30 For the most sustained discussion of spirit in the Kierkegaardian literature see Vigilius
Haufniensis's The Concept ofAnxiety, KW VIII/SVVI 101-240.
31 JP IV 4360/Pap. XI2 A 279.
32 JP IV 4359/Pap. XI2 A 246.
32 JP IV 4361, 4362/Pap. XI2 A 317, 353.
34 KW XII. 1 345, 540/SV X 47, 211; my emphasis.
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We conclude, then, that Kierkegaard's analysis is a "naturalistic",
phenomenological definition of the self which resists both a metaphysical rendering
of the self as a bit of immaterial stuff, and a reductionistic, physicalist view of the
self as an illusion that is reducible to one's brain chemistry. The self, the I, is that
which emerges from the exercise of intentional consciousness in existential
transactions with reality so that one attains a unific, first-person point of view. Thin
subjectivity is for Kierkegaard the subjective condition for the possibility of a person
seeing the world of things or "objects" in distinction to oneself; it is that which
makes its possible for one to have a perspective on the world as one's own and is
therefore what (essentially) separates humans from the animal kingdom. This first
person perspective, however, is more of a personal competence than an entity.
Understood this way, "The I has not been reduced to nothing, but it also does not
have the status of an object in the world, of a[n objective] something".35
In particular, we want to note three ways in which human subjectivity, as a thin
subjectivity, is not a pure, atemporal, conscious substance in Kierkegaard's writings,
but how this subjectivity is given to us by virtue of our innate humanity finds itself
already situated in and qualified by its world.
The first way in which the Kierkegaardian self is situated is in its material,
embodied presence and physical, time-space location in the world. Humans are, as
we have just seen, a psycho-somatic synthesis of body-soul, finite-infinite, which
entails a further synthesis of time-etemity—as a continuous becoming in time-space
that has the ability to abstract away from that and perceive itself and other
things/ideas "timelessly".36 The human self is not only the physical aspect of a
human person—we "should not be confused by the fact that [a human] is able also
35 Hans Sluga makes this statement of Wittgenstein's concept of self but it equally applies to our
reading of Kierkegaard's self. Sluga also draws a parallel between this understanding of the self and
Wittgenstein's comment in Philosophical Investigations, 304, that the sensation of pain is "not a
something but it is not a nothing either". See Hans Sluga, '"Whose House is That?' Wittgenstein
on the Self', in The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, eds. Hans Sluga and David G. Stern
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 329.
36 See John Glenn's definition of Anti-Climacus's use of eternal in reference to the self, in "The
Definition of the Self', 9, as, "the sense of transcending the temporal dispersion, without
becoming merely abstract or stultifying".
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to walk on two feet"37—but the self or spirit that relates to itself finds that a
significant feature of the synthesis to which it relates is an embodied physical,
psychological, and social being. That is, the original (primitive) synthesis of the
human person is a lived body, subject to the constraints of time and space and the
concrete situations in which human existence finds its home. John Glenn provides
some helpful commentary.
the "infinitude" of the self does not primarily mean the possession of an immortal soul,
but the capacity to transcend one's own finite situation, either in such a way that this
finite situation is somehow neglected or that an expanded, ideal form of the self is
envisioned and movement toward its actualization is possible the "finitude" of the
self does not mean [just] its bodily character per se, but its involvement in actual
situations, particularly as this entails a tendency to be involved in social roles.38
Kierkegaard's understanding of the self, then, is opposed to Plato's view, and more
like Aristotle's conception of human nature. Kierkegaard believes the human self
always to be a finite one that is limited by its temporal and spatial material presence
and already-present relations. The affirmation of the self as having a finite
dimension is what John Elrod refers to as an acknowledgement of the self's
"facticity", and includes the self's given "sex, race, personal appearance,
psychological characteristics, talents, interests, and abilities as well as its more
general, yet concrete natural environment and social, political, and cultural milieu".39
Elizabeth Morelli contends that for Kierkegaard, "the self cannot exist without
limitation, definition, temporality, necessity (in short without a body)".40 Although
we may be able to envision an incorporeal existence for human selves, in which they
exist as body-independent entities, Kierkegaard insists that this is not in fact the case
(empirically) for humans. The human self that comes to understand and relate to
itself finds that it is already in the world, has a body, a history, and a whole array of
in/competences, etc. Thus Judge William argues in Either/Or that "the I chooses
itself or, more correctly, receives itself. . . . Now [s/]he discovers that the self [s/]he
chooses has a boundless multiplicity within itself inasmuch as it has a history, a
37 KW III 65/SV II 62.
38 John Glenn, "The Definition of the Self', 8.
39 John W. Elrod, The Self in Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms", International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 4 (Winter 1973), 225.
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history in which [s/]he acknowledges identity with [her/]himself'.41 Judge William
is adamant that the human self cannot possibly exist as an atemporal, unchanging
substance, or "algebraic symbol", that remains numerically self-identical through
change.42 Instead the judge believes the self to be something we find already in
existence as we ethically assume responsibility for it in an act of choosing our self.
Kierkegaard thinks, secondly, that the self is qualified by language by virtue if its
connection to consciousness. The Hegelian concept of an unconditioned,
presuppositionless, and pure consciousness hinges upon a culpable naivete
regarding the nature of consciousness and language. The first-person perspective,
the incipient I of a thin subjectivity, is located within a person's Bevisted, or full-
consciousness. Chapter Three argued that consciousness for Kierkegaard is
comprised of a relation beween reality (the immediate perceptual presentation of
reality) and ideality (language and concepts). There are, then, in consciousness, two
poles—linguistic and perceptual—that are unified in a (third) single point—the self.
Thus, Climacus declares that "the categories of consciousness are . . .
trichotomous" 43 In so far as being a self or having spirit entails self-
consciousness, this consciousness is mediated by the language and concepts we
have prior to this self-awareness. The pseudonymous A writes in volume one of
Either/Or that there is an essential link between spirit/selfhood and language, such
that it is only through the appropriation of language by spirit (a self) that language is
"installed in its rights;" and yet language functions at the same time as "the
authentic medium" for expressing spirit/self.44 Thus Ronald Hall observes that, for
40 Morelli, "The Existence of the Self', 20.
41 KW IV 177, 216/SV III 165, 201.
42 Judge William argues that, "The reason, however, it may seem to an individual as if [s/]he could
be changed continually and yet remain the same, as if [her/]his innermost being were an algebraic
symbol that could signify anything whatever it is assumed to be, is that [s/]he is in a wrong
position, that [s/]he has not chosen [her/]himself, does not have a concept of it"; KW IV 215/SV
III 199.
43 KW VII \69/Pap. IV B 147-8.
44 KW III 67/SV II 64. Ronald L. Hall, in Word & Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique of the
Modern Age (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993), makes (too) much of this
passage in Either/Or, and argues that here it is demonstrated that for Kierkegaard it is only in the
felicitous speech-act, defined as the act by which we "own our words and own up to our words"
(Word and Spirit, 51), that the human self achieves the necessary historical continuity it needs to
158
Kierkegaard, "Our first-person speech-acts intend a dialectical self/world relation.
Or to put this differently, the self that we are called to be, the self as spirit, the self
that is constituted in relation, is given within the first-person speech-act".45 In so far
as we are self-conscious human subjects, our subjectivity must emerge in and
through the medium of language—a medium we did not choose for ourselves and
that plays an essential role in forming the shape of the subjectivity with which we
find ourselves in our praxial, existential engagements.
Kierkegaard explains his position more fully in one of the most profound
statements of the situatedness of the self in the Kierkegaardian literature. Although
we have already refered to this passage in Chapter Two, because of its importance
we will quote the full journal entry:
If it were the case that philosophers are presuppositionless, an account would still have to
be made of language and its entire importance and relation to speculation, for here
speculation does indeed have a medium which it has not provided for itself, and what the
eternal secret ofconsciousness is for speculation as a union ofa qualification ofnature and
a qualification of freedom, so also language is partly an original given and partly
something freely developing. And just as the individual, no matter how freely he
develops, can never reach the point of becoming absolutely independent, since true
[human] freedom consists in appropriating the given and consequently in becoming
absolutely dependent through freedom, so it is with language, although we do find at
times the ill-conceived tendency of not wanting to accept language as the freely
appropriated given but rather to produce it for oneself, whether it appears in the highest
regions where it usually ends in silence or in the personal isolation of jargonish nonsense.
Perhaps the story of the Babylonian confusion of tongues may be explained this way, that
it was an attempt to construct an arbitrarily formed common language, which, since it
lacked full integrative commonality, necessarily broke up into the disparate differences, for
here it is a matter of totum est parte sua prius, which was not understood.46
In this passage Kierkegaard brings further insight into the meaning of A's
statements regarding language and spirit in Either/Or. There are four things from
this selection to note in particular regarding the situation of human subjectivity
within language. First, there is an interdependence between language and human
selfhood so that, on the one hand, language exists prior to the individual and is a
necessary medium for the establishment of selfhood, and yet it is also the case that
language develops freely and finds its life by being used by individuals ("language
emerge through the flux of temporal existence and attain existential concretion. For a critique of
Hall's position see, Myron B. Penner, "Intending To Speak: A Critique of Ronald Hall's Word and
Spirit", European Journal of Theology 8: (1999), 78-94.
45 Hall, Word & Spirit, 10; his emphasis.
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is partly an original given and partly something freely developing"). Note that the
argument here is that our ability to possess and use language is a necessary formal
condition for the establishment and constitution of human subjectivity. The point is
not, as Ronald Hall in Word and Spirit appears to claim, that using language
constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for human selfhood.47 Human
subjectivity, as an incipient feature of human existence, is always inscribed within
language, and just how we engage language and approriate it plays a crucial role in
the nature of the subjectivity we develop. Second, because of the relationship
between human subjectivity and language, human subjects do not have liberium
arbitrium, or absolute, unqualified freedom. This is once more a criticism of the
Enlightenment idea of the autonomous human subject. Kierkegaard argues that we
are always in the situation of having to appropriate what we find given to us in our
language, cultural and religious practices, biology, etc. ("true freedom consists in
freely appropriating the given"). Human persons do not have a transcendental,
extra-linguistic vantage point immanentally available to them on which they can
ground their subjectivity, and from which they may develop as subjects. Thus our
freedom to develop as subjects is constrained by the linguistic categories through
which we conceive and express ourselves. We learn, thirdly, that language is an
intrinsically communal enterprise and that it is not appropriable by human subjects
apart from their inter-subjective relations. Human language requires, Kierkegaard
argues, a "full integrative commonality" if it is to be successful. It cannot be
produced in "personal isolation", nor can it be appropriated except from within a
given linguistic community—lest it end in "silence" or "jargonish nonsense".
46 JP III 3281/Fap. Ill A 11; my emphasis.
47 See Penner, "Intending to Speak", 91. Hall's argument in "Language and Freedom: Kierkegaard's
Analysis of the Demonic in The Concept of Anxiety", in International Kierkegaard Commentary:
The Concept of Anxiety, Volume 6, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University
Press, 1985), 153-166, is preferable to that of Word and Spirit because the argument in "Language
and Freedom" is less ambitious and carries a more modest conclusion: "one can thus conclude that .
. . [Kierkegaard insists ] on the essential role that language has in the concrete actualization of
freedom, and hence its essential role in the life of faith" (166). This is different than insisting that
the use of language is the self, and is the life of faith.
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With the claim that language and self-hood are fundamentally communal in
nature, we have, as Hermann J. Cloeren argues, a pre-Wittgenstein private language
argument.48 Wittgenstein never actually uses the term "private language argument",
but this label refers to a widely-held interpretation of certain passages in
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, and other various comments
Wittgenstein makes about the communal nature of language and following rules in
other writings. Saul Kripke's book, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language,
championed this view among philosophers.49 Kripke is mistaken to believe that
Wittgenstein's discussions of private language to commit him to the sceptical thesis
that there is never any determinate meaning to a speaker's words.30 On our reading,
both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard are getting at the same thing regarding private
language. For example, compare Kierkegaard's comments on language above to
those ofWittgenstein:
[A]ny kind of explanation of a language presupposes a language already. And in a certain
sense, the use of language is something that cannot be taught, i.e., I cannot use language
to teach it in the way in which language can be used to teach someone to play the
piano.—And that of course is just another way of saying: I cannot use language to get
outside of language.51
Stern's analysis of Wittgenstein, in Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, applies
equally to Kierkegaard:
[The] point here is not that we could not go on to use a private definition consistently,
but is much more elementary: that nothing one could actually do would ever amount to
setting one [i.e., a private language] up, for the role of training and practice in language
prevent a 'private linguist' from using a sign to mean anything at all, even once. This is
not the epistemological problem that one would have no reliable test, or no test at all, as
to whether one was using language correctly, but rather a logical problem: the stage-
setting necessary for one to be able to say anything at all would not be in place.52
Finally, in the journal entry above it is affirmed that Kierkegaard views thinking
and reasoning as linguistically structured. In language, Kierkegaard affirms,
48 See Cloeren, "The Linguistic Turn in Kierkegaard's Attack on Hegel", International Studies in
Philosophy 17/3: (1986), 3
49 Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1982).
50 For a very thorough reading of Wittgenstein on private language that shares this view, see David
G. Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 175-186.
51 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, R. Rhees, trans. R. Hargraves and R. White (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1975), §6.
52 Stem, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, 182-83.
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"speculation does indeed have a medium which it has not provided for itself'.
Furthermore, because of the communal nature of language, reason is also a fortiori
communally structured as well. The consequence of this seminal passage on
language and subjectivity is that the primitive, thin subjectivity humans find
themselves with through their existential praxis is an amalgam of physical
embodiment, speech, and action. Kierkegaard appears to be saying, quite literally,
that the self discovers and develops its first-person voice as it "lives in and through
a maze of speech acts and a plethora of language games".53
The self, the first-person voice that is both discovered and created by us in our
embodiments and discourse, finds itself, then, located within a given community.
This is the third way in which Kierkegaard's thin subjectivity is situated in a pre-
established given. Human persons, as comprised of both a bodily presence in the
world and a linguistically structured self-consciousness, are established as selves in
and through their interactions with a community of other human persons. The self
that discovers itself through self-choice already has a history with ethical
entanglements, and what is appropriated as "given" in language is a "full
integrative commonality". Kierkegaard's emphasis on the concreteness of human
subjectivity as a lived actuality, over and against the pure abstraction of Cartesian and
Hegelian subjectivity, implies that "as concrete selves we are necessarily embedded
in a concrete context of social relations".54
In Anti-Climacus's formula in Sickness Unto Death a human being is a self
(intrinsically), and the self is a fundamental relating activity of self to a synthetic
relation.55 In other words, Kierkegaard qualifies the human person at every level as a
relation. Essential to the self-relating activity of the self is its indebtedness to others
because the human self, Anti-Climacus asserts, is a "derived relation" that in its
self-relating depends upon its relationship to "another".56 Thus Stephen Crites
53 Calvin Schrag, SelfAfter Postmodernity, 19.
54 M. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1991), 4.
55 KW XIX 13/SV XV 73.
56XWXIX 13-14/5V XV 73-4.
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maintains that, "Strictly defined, the self', for Kierkegaard, "is intersubjective,
social, and an individual can be a self-relation only because he or she can be related
to others".57 The self-awareness of thin subjectivity, as that which differentiates
humans from animals, comes from the human ability to abstract from oneself and
encounter an other. Without this encounter there could be no self-awareness, and
subsequently we find that all our concepts of self and others are social products. Adi
Shmiielli aptly concludes: "The individualism expressed in Kierkegaard's
philosophy has often been misunderstood. It has not been realized that this
individualism can only develop in society. ... the birth and evolution of subjectivity
in [humans] depends on the maieutic communication by which one [hujman
educates another".58
Therefore, despite his heavy emphasis on individuality, this is never presented
nor conceived by Kierkegaard as operating outside of community. It is in fact, for
Kierkegaard, an inescapable feature of human existence that we are (exist) in
community. The question is simply whether we will have a community of
individuals, who are each "essentially and passionately related to an idea and
together are essentially related to the same idea" and yet maintain "the individual
separation of inwardness", or whether we will have a "crowd" or "herd" in which
"we have a tumultuous self-relating of the mass to an idea".59 The issue is, in other
words, what kind of relation our subjectivities will have in our communities, and not
whether humans qua subjects will have any relation at all to a community. All
human subjectivities are primordially situated, then, and find themselves limited by
their particular situation in world that is determined by all the factors which comprise
their environment—including their genetic structure, physical appearance, parents,
race, language, political system, community, etc.
57 Stephen Crites, "The Sickness Unto Death : A Social Interpretation", 150.
58 Adi Shmiielli, Kierkegaard and Consciousness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971),
171-72.
59 KW XIV 62-3/SV XIV 57. We will have more to say about this passage in relation to
community in Chapter Seven.
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Deep Subjectivity
The self we have defined as situated in its physical comportments, language, and
community, is a thin subjectivity; it is simply that first-person perspective which
separates humans ontologically from animals. If we return to Anti-Climacus's
grammar of subjectivity in Sickness Unto Death, the various synthetic relations of
the human self—the pre-established syntheses of infinite and finite, temporal and
eternal, freedom and necessity—comprise the "immediacy" or giveness of the self
prior to our discovery and acceptance of our responsibility for a first-person
perspective in the world. Our interpretation of Sickness Unto Death sees its two
parts as working together to provide the grammar of deep subjectivity. In Part A of
Part One, titled "Despair is the Sickness Unto Death", Anti-Climacus outlines the
contents of the book, beginning with the barest notion of what it means to be a
human subject—"The human self is ... a derived, established relation, a relation
that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates itself to another"—and
ends with this self as teleologically developing into a deep subjectivity that "in
relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the
power that established it".60 Thus, this first, seminal passage of Sickness Unto
Death presents a precis or abstract for the argument of the entire book.61 In Part
One Anti-Climacus defines the contours of human subjectivity as multi-relational
and developmental, and Part Two details the relation of the thin self to God as the
power that establishes it and defines the "transparency" or telos of the self as
consciously bringing the first-person perspective directly before God. In Part Two
Anti-Climacus comments that,
the previously considered gradation in the consciousness of the self [in Part One] is within
the category of the human self, or the self whose criterion is [hu]man [i.e., our thin
subjectivity]. But this self takes on new quality and qualification by being a self directly
before God. The self is no longer merely the human self but is what I, hoping not to be
misinterpreted, would call the theological self, the self directly before God.62
60 KW XIX 13- 14/5P XV 73-4.
61 See Anti-Climacus's comments in the last paragraph of Sickness Unto Death, KW XIX 131/SV
XV 179, where he states that the central thesis that "has been advanced throughout this entire
book", was "at the outset introduced in Part One, A, A [the opening section of the book]".
61 KW XIX 79/SV XV 132.
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Anti-Climacus's point is that human subjectivity is inherently teleological. He
continues in the same passage to argue that "The criterion for the self is always: that
directly before which it is a self, but this in turn is the definition of 'criterion.' . . .
everything is qualitatively that by which it is measured. ... the criterion and the goal
are what define something, what it is".63 Human subjectivity, because it is temporal,
is a constant coming-to-be. It is therefore qualified by the criterion by which one
measures oneself and is defined according to its self-appropriated telos.64 Alastair
Hannay explains that, "The crucial thing", in defining one's telos, "is that for
Kierkegaard one does not choose the goal. As with Hegel, there is an ideal of true
selfhood, specified in terms of 'spirit,' that one renounces in vain. Not because, due
to the unfolding of some inner dialectic, renouncing it will inevitably, or in the long
run, be transformed into acceptance [as with Hegel]; but because to try to renounce
the ideal is to try to not be the programme one inevitably is".65 Kierkegaard's
comments are yet again grammatical and he is emphasising that selfhood is the
attainment of a deep subjectivity; or, in other words, the telos of the self is to become
itself. To have a self that is not multi-dimensional and deep is precisely to lack a self
to the degree that one lacks depth.
As the self attains its first-person perspective and accepts responsibility for it, the
self becomes increasing aware of itself and its ethical responsibility; that it has an
"eternal" element not exhausted in its performances or reflections. Anti-Climacus
argues, therefore, that the thin self described in Part One cannot be the goal of the
self, for it defines the human person "within the category of human self, or the self
whose criterion is [hu/]man". The self of Part One cannot be a full or deep
subjectivity, bul is inslead a thin self. All attempts to define the self according to an
immanental, purely human telos encounters an aporia of self—"the sickness unto
death"—which Anti-Climacus calls both despair (in Part One) and sin (in Part
63 KW XIX 79/SV XV 132.
64 Elizabeth Morelli explains this very well in, "The Existence of the Self', 26.
65 Alastair Hannay, "Solitary Souls and Infinite Help: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein", History of
European Ideas 12, No.l: (1990), 48. In context Hannay is speaking directly of Judge William's
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Two). Immanentally considered, the self is either compared with (or measured)
against the animal kingdom—in which case it becomes the hairless ape of the natural
sciences; or it is measured against other men and becomes an ethical agent with free
agency—a rational, socio-political animal.66 In either case, human subjectivity is
universalised and the "eternal self' (or the "infinite" element in the human
synthetic relation) threatens to erase individual subjectivity.67 The result of this
aporia of self is a misrelation of self to itself because the self regards itself as self-
constituted and is either ignorant of or denies its groundedness in "the power that
establishes it".
In Part Two Anti-Climacus carries human subjectivity deeper into a grammar of
the self conscious of itself before God. In this consciousness the self attains the
transparency alluded to in the opening section of Part One. Sickness Unto Death
states:
if the self does not become itself it is in despair, whether it knows it or not. Yet every
moment that a self exists, it is in a process of becoming, for the self Kara 5uvap.iv [in
potentiality] does not actually exist, is simply that which ought to come into existence.
In so far, then, as the self does not become itself, it is not itself; but not to be itself is
precisely despair. . . . Infinitude's despair, therefore, is the fantastic, the unlimited, for the
self is healthy and free from despair only when, precisely by having despaired, it rests
transparently in God.68
injunction to choose oneself, but this self-choice is the exactly the same concept employed by
Anti-Climacus and Hanny's analysis equally applies to Anti-Climacus.
66 Morelli, "The Existence of the Self', 26.
67 See KW XIX 19/SV XV 132. This aporia of self happens because the self is regarded as a
universal expression of human capabilities, or as something fulfilled in temporal terms or as
something to be denied. Anti-Climacus explains: "Every human existence that is not conscious of
itself as spirit or conscious of itself befire God as spirit, ever human spirit that does not rest
transparently in God but vaguely rests in and merges in some abstract universality (state nation,
etc.) or, in the powers to produce without becoming aware of their source, regards [her/]his self, if
it is to have intrinsic meaning, as an indefinable something—every such existence, whatever it
achieves, be it most amazing, whatever it explains, be it the whole of existence, however
intensively it enjoys life esthetically—every such existence is nevertheless despair"; KW XIX
46/5V XV 92. And then, regarding the second way: "When the self with a certain degree of
reflection in itself wills to be responsible for the self, it may come up against some difficulty or
other in the structure of the self, in the self's necessity. For just as no human body is perfect, so
no self is perfect. This difficulty, whatever it is, makes [her/]him recoil. Or something happens to
[her/]him that breaks with the immediacy in [her/]him ... So [s/]he despairs . . . [S/]He thinks
[s/]he is despairing over something earthly . . . and yet [s/]he is desparing of the eternal, for the
fact that [s/]he attributes to something earthly such great worth ... is in fact to despair of the
eternal. . . . this despair is classified under the form: in despair not to will to be oneself;" KW XIX
54, 61, 62/51/XV 109-10, 116, 117.
68 KW XIX 30/5V XV 87-8.
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For Anti-Climacus sin and despair occlude and attentuate human subjectivity so that
it cannot attain transparency.69 Thin subjectivity is therefore a temporal connatus
that must be constantly re-established and, with its inherent dependence upon its
environment and others, has as its task to develop into a fully complete, multi¬
dimensional (deep) human subject.70 Climacus contends that, "[t]he transparency of
thought in existence is inwardness",71 and we are reminded once more of
Haufniensis's point that "[t]he most concrete content that consciousness can have is
consciousness of itself, of the individual [her/]himself—not the pure self-
consciousness . . . This self-consciousness, therefore, is action, and this action is in
turn inwardness".72 The self is grounded, then, in its on-going, dependent,
relationship with God, as the power that establishes its own ability for self-
relation—and this whether it is recognised by the human person or not. The telos of
the human self is realised in reflexive subjectivity as the only process by which the
self can become itself. The process of bringing our dependency on God to our
constant consciousness in and through our thought and actions constitutes the
grounds of our self-knowledge.
Thin subjectivity, as a continuous act of self-relation must, if it is to be
maintained and deepened, recognise and accept its depedence and thereby achieve
transparency as a perpetually strived for state in which one is "contemporary with
oneself'. Kierkegaard explains that, "to be contemporary with oneself (therefore
neither in the future of fear or of expectation nor in the past) is transparency in
repose, and this is possible only in the God-relationship".73 There is no inherently
pure or unmediated human self-consciousness for Kierkegaard and one cannot
69 In KW XIX 48/SV XV 103, Anti-Climacus uses the metaphors of "darkness" and "ignorance" to
describe the self who lacks transparency and is sinful and in despair.
70 Anti-Climacus argues that, "In the life of spirit there is no standing still [Stilstand] (really no
state [Tilstand], either; everything is actuation)"; KW XIX 94/SV XV 145. To this end Stephen
Crites insists that for Kierkegaard, "It is not, in scholastic fashion, that the self is caused by God
and resembles its first cause. The life of spirit is a constellation of motions and commingling, like
the fiery wheels within wheels of EzekieTs vision. The self is a relating activity that exists in
freedom as a part of that relational constellation founded on the pure activity of divine spirit";
Crites, "The Sickness Unto Death. A Social Interpretation", 153.
71 KW XII. 1 255/SV IX 212.
72 KW VIII 143/SV VI 224.
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know by simple introspection the contents of one's consciousness. This is not to
say, of course, that one cannot know what one is thinking at a particular point in
time, but rather that the inner motives, passions, etc. (i.e., my self), cannot be
penetrated and one cannot know oneself as oneself through purely abstract self-
contemplation. Kierkegaard argues that, instead of genuine transparency of the sort
he outlines, "we [humans] would rather deal with something objective, for an
objective something is opaque, and all kinds of lunacy can go on behinds its
back".74 In fact, transparency is described by Kierkegaard as "subjectivity" itself
and as "depth".75 Anti-Climacus explains that "[e]very human that is not
conscious of itself before God as spirit or conscious of itself before God as spirit,
every human existence that does not rest transparently in God but vaguely rests in
and merges in some abstract universality (state, nation, etc.).. . every such existence
is nevertheless despair"76—that is, such a self is not a fulfilled self or deep
subjectivity. Transparency for human persons occurs, then, when one allows God to
permeate one's consciousness so that one is infinitely reflected in the relation to the
power that establishes it.77 The self is thereby decentered from its Cartesian
foundations and dependency on God permeates all of the expressions of one's
being (thoughts and actions). Elizabeth Morelli explains that, "The self, in light of
this imagery, is reflected infinitely in God in so far as the self is always standing
before God. The self rests transparently before God, in so far as there is no
opaqueness, no barrier, behind which or from within which God is absent".78
Kierkegaard's concept of transparency stands as the conditio sine qua non for a
deep subjectivity, and quite obviously has epistemological import as the
73 JP I 1050/Pap. VIII1 A 320.
74 JP IV 4564/ Pap. X4 A 346.
75 JP IV 4434/Pap. VII1 B 192. For references to transparency, see also KW IV 179, 254/SV HI
162, 233-34; KW XII. 1 255/SV IX 212; KW XVI 361 /SV XII 342; KW XIX 14, 30, 42, 46, 49,
82, 101, 124, 131/SV XV 73, 88, 98, 101, 103, 135, 152, 172, 179; JP I 1050/Pap. VIII1 A 320;
JP II 2119/Pap. VIII1 A 5111; JP III 3105/Pap. X3 A 542; JP III 3224/Pap. XI2 A 107; JP ffl
3228/Pap. XI2 A 432; JP IV 3955/Pap. X3 A 777; JP IV 4313/Pap. X1 A 452; JP IV 4384/Pap.
XI2 A 132.
76 KW XIX 46/SV XV 101.
77 KW XIX 14/SV XV 73.
78 Morelli, "The Self Before God", 25.
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Kierkegaardian counterpart to the Cartesian cogito.19 Transparency is, for
Kierkegaard, the understanding one achieves of the immediacy in which one finds
oneself—that is, transparency is a move or transition beyond the simple self-relation
of a thin subjectivity. To put it differently, in the transparency of a deep subjectivity
in which through all the sundry expressions of our being is conscious of one's
God-relationship, one achieves an existential clarity that serves as the ground for
one's doxastic practice. In Works of Love Kierkegaard explains that when one
"think[s] in such a way that one's attention is continually only outward, in the
direction of the object that is something external", this results in "unclear thinking"
in which the "thinker explains something else by [her/]his thinking and, behold,
[s/]he does not understand [her/]himself. . . . when the object of a person's thinking
is extensive in the external sense, or when [s/]he transforms what [s/]he is thinking
into a learned object, or when [s/jhe leaps from one object to another, then, [s/]he
does not discover this last discrepancy: that at the bottom of all the clarity lies an
unclarity, but true clarity comes only in transparency".80 The self-clarity achieved in
transparency is not, then, the Cartesian clarity and distinctness of ideas held before
oneself in the private theater of the mind, rather it is an understanding of self through
one's concretions, one's actions. Transparency is an understanding of self by being
oneself, and in which "the individual sees this, [her/]his actual concretion as task, as
goal, as objective".81 One's self-understanding of this sort has as its content the
telos of itself, the task of being itself and becoming itself, and not its thoughts as
such; the task of the self is to realise its telos (i.e., itself) throughout all its various
modes of being.
In Either/Or self-transparency is explicitly linked to the choice of oneself in and
through one's ethical (in the Kierkegaardian sense) entanglements, and furthermore
self-repentance is a crucial component to the action of self-choice for, "to choose
79 See KW XIX 93/SV XV 145, quoted earlier.
80 KW XVI 361/5V XII 343.
81 KW IV 251/SV III 231. See also the entire discussion in KW IV 251-54/SV III 231-35.
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onself is to repent oneself'.82 Anti-Climacus also maintains that "The condition for
healing is always this repenting o/'.83 Repentance is a theological (i.e., ethical-
religious) category that refers to the concrete act of an individual in which s/he
realises (i.e., makes actual) through all the sundry expressions of her/his being
(cogntive and embodied) her/his inherent limitedness and dependence upon God,
and accepts responsibility for this situation.84 Genuinely salvific, self-ratifying
repentance cannot be accomplished via philosophical categories—that is, it cannot be
merely an "esthetical" or "metaphyiscal" realisation of self and a purely
hypothetical projection of possibilties for this abstract conception of self. Instead,
the self repented of is the actual, lived self, and repentance takes the form of
realising possibilities as existential, lived actual, concretions. Judge William explains
that,
The reason that [esthetical and metaphysical attempts at self-repentance] do not succeed [in
achieving self-transparency] is that the individual has chosen [her/]himself in [her/]his
isolation or has chosen [her/]himself abstractly. To say it in other words, the individual
has not chosen [her/]himself ethically. [S/]He therefore has no connection with actuality .
. . But the person who ethically chooses [her/]himself concretely as this specific
individual, and [s/]he achieves this concretion because this choice is identical with the
repentance which ratifies the choice. The individual, then, becomes conscious as this
specific individual with these capacities, these inclinations, these drives, these passions,
influenced by this social milieu, as this specific product of a specific environment. But as
[s/]he becomes aware of all this, [s/]he takes responsibility for it all. ... In the moment
of choice, [s/]he is in complete isolation, for [s/]he withdraws from [her/]his social
milieu, and yet at the same moment [s/]he is in absolute continuity, for [s/]he chooses
[her/]himself as a product. And this choice is freedom's choice in such a way that in
choosing [her/]himself as product [s/]he can just as well be said to produce [her/]himself. .
. . in the choice [s/]he makes [her/]himself elastic, transforms everything exterior into
interiority. [S/]He has [her/]his place in the world; in freedom [s/]he [her/]himself chooses
[her/]his place—that is, [s/]he chooses this place.85
82 KW IV 248/5V III 228. Judge William also comments that in the self-choice he refers to, the
individual "chooses [her/]himself and struggles for this possession as for [her/]his salvation, and it
is [her/]his salvation. ... for this acquiring is—repentance. [S/]He repents [her/]himself back into
[her/]himself, back into the family, back into the race, until [s/]he finds [her/]himself in God. Only
on this condition can [s/]he choose [her/]himself'. KW IV 216/SV III 201.
83 KW XIX 6In/SV XV 116n. See also Frater Taciturnus's very important discussion of
repentance in KW XI 475-79/SV VIII 264-68.
84 In KW XI 476-77/5V VIII 266, Frater Taciturnis asserts: "it is a matter of persevering in the
dialectical with deliberation as the antecedent and with repentance as the consequent. Only the
person who in deliberation has exhausted the dialectical, only [s/]he acts, and only the person who
in repentance exhausts the dialectical, only [s/]he repents. . . . the ethical sphere is a passageway . .
. repentance is its expression . . . repentance goes backward, continually presupposing the object of
its investigation. In repentance there is the impulse of motion, and therefore everything is
reversed".
iSKW IV 250-51/5V III 231.
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This passage reveals that the essential ingredient in knowing oneself is
action—in repentance—and this action is the means of existential concretion. There
is no abstract way to repent for genuine repentance must place "the individual in the
most intimate relation with an outside world"86 so that one "repents" oneself not
only out of the world, but back into it, accepting and embracing it as one's own.87
The repentance to which the judge refers is the essential matter around which the
entire issue of transparency and the issue of deep subjectivity revolves.88 Repentance
is a specific mode of being in the world, one that "ratifies the choice" of self by
living through the consciousness of one's finitude and dependency, and then
accepting these as the place in which one must be and become, ultimately (as Anti-
Climacus adds) in and through one's relation to God. For Kierkegaard, the
transparency or self-understanding achieved in self-repentant action is precisely
what it means to know oneself.*9
Conclusion to Chapter Five
Chapter Five began our look at Kierkegaard's grammar of human subjectivity
with Anti-Climacus's understanding of constitutional subjectivity in Sickness Unto
Death. The self is defined in the opening of Sickness Unto Death as a self-relating
relation. It is apparent in Anti-Climacus's analysis that human selves are both
situated—in time-space, language, and community—and we are dynamic. Anti-
Climacus argues that human subjectivity cannot be thought of as a purely rational
86 AW IV 241/5V III 223.
87 Judge William writes: "The true concrete choice is the one by which I choose myself back into
the world the very same moment I choose myself out the world. That is, when repenting I choose
myself, I collect myself in all my finite concretion, andwhen I have chosen myself out of the finite
in this way, I am in the most continuity with it". KW IV 249/SV III 229. Cf. Johannes De
Silentio's "knight of faith" who, after resigning all receives the world back again, in AW VI 48-
51/SV V 45-48.
88 Judge William claims that, "to choose oneself is to repent oneself, however simple it is in and
by itself, I cannot return frequently enough. In other words, everything revolves around this"; A"W
III 248/5V III 229.
89 Judge William also states that the person who has chosen her/himself "knows [her/] himself, but
[her/]his knowing is not simply contemplation, for then the individual comes to be defined
according to [her/]his necessity. It is a collecting of oneself, which itself is an action, and this is
why I have with aforethought used the expression 'to choose oneself instead of 'to know oneself'";
KW IV 258/5V III 238.
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self-relating entity with abstract self-knowledge, and that we may fail to know
ourselves and may even fail to be a self, in the fullest sense. The language of thin
and deep subjectivity was then appropriated to explain this conception of the self.
Humans are "given" a thin self as the incipient ability to speak in the first-person,
and it is then our task to develop this into a fully unified, multi-dimensional "deep"
self that knows itself transparently. Through the activity of repentance a deep
subjectivity achieves transparency as an on-going activity in which a constant self-
relation to God is perpetually sustained.
At this point it not clear how constitutional subjectivity functions in any kind of
normative manner except, perhaps, that we now understand that we must assume a
self-relation that includes a relation to God. What is lacking from Anti-Climacus's
analysis is an account of the movements of thin subjectivity to transparency. In
Chapter Six we examine Climacus's grammar of the movement of thin subjectivity
towards the activity of the self as it becomes a more complex and deeper relational
field. This analysis completes Kierkegaard's grammar of subjectivity and provides
us with the resources to articulate the normative nature of subjectivity.
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CHAPTER SIX
GRAMMAR OF SUBJECTIVITY 2:
SELF, TIME, AND OTHERS
The states of a [hu]man's soul ought to be as the letters are in dictionaries—some are very
strongly and copiously developed, other have but few words listed under them—but the
soul ought to have a full and complete alphabet.
Spren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
Spirit is: to live as if dead (to die to the world).
Spren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
Chapter Five concluded that Kierkegaard intended to leave behind in his writings
a grammar—a map or topography—of human existence and the conditions for the
attainment of full and deep subjectivity—or, in the language of Fragments, "eternal
consciousness" or "salvation". In Sickness Unto Death Anti-Climacus contrasts a
completed or fully attained self and a nascent, incipient self, in his careful diagnosis
of the malaise that causes a human person to become a fully unified, complex, multi¬
dimensional, relational field. Chapter Six continues Kierkegaard's grammar of
subjectivity by looking at Climacus's development of the theory of "existence-
spheres" or "stages". The terms "stage" and "existence-sphere" are used
alternately in Kierkegaard's writings to denote his concept of modes of existence.
However, the term that occurs most often is "sphere", especially in the more mature
writing of Johannes Climacus's Postscript. The language of "existence-spheres" is
therefore preferable to "stages" because, in Calvin Schrag's words, the term
existence-spheres "avoids the imagery of a succession of levels of development that
attaches to the grammar of stages. Also, it signals the peculiar qualification of
aesthetics, ethics and religion as manners or modes of existing".1
1 Calvin Schrag, "The Kierkegaard Effect in the Shaping of the Contours of Modernity", in
Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, eds. Martin J. Matustfk and Merold Westphal (Bloomington,
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995), 4. See also "Historical Introduction", x-xi, in KW XI;
and Stages on Life's Way, trans, and ed. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1940), 335n-36.
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Anti-Climacus's clinical analysis of thin and deep subjectivity does not address
the question of how humans acquire depth and become deep subjectivities in time. A
grammar of this movement, shown in the preceding section to be repentance, is what
Kierkegaard accomplishes through his other pseudonyms, culminating in the second
part of Climacus's Postscript. Kierkegaard maps the topography of self-ratifying
repentance through three (or four) existence-spheres—the esthetic, ethical, and
religiousnesses A and B—that serve to demarcate the cross-sections of a self,
capable of unifying its own temporal-spatial, historical existence (past, present, and
future) into a cohesive, coherent, first-person perspective.
Chapter Six begins by establishing that the central concept of Kierkegaard's self
is a unity in time best construed as a narrative unity. The unification of a self is
plotted by Climacus through the esthetic, ethical, and religious existence-spheres.
The language of existence-spheres is employed by Kierkegaard to provide the
conceptual co-ordinates that exhaustively supply the basic frame of reference for
understanding a human life. These existential co-ordinates do not erase the
individual characteristics of a human person, but they form the conceptual grid of
logical possibilities by which a human life may be conceptually grasped. As such,
they also frame the possibilities and limits of self-knowledge.
The movements of a subject through its existence-spheres are explained by
Climacus by examining Kierkegaard's other pseudonymous literature. Climacus
puts the pseudonyms to work by using them to embody his existential grammar of
human subjectivity. The key Kierkegaardian texts in this grammar of subjectivity
are: Either/Or, Volumes One and Two,2 Fear and Trembling,3 Postscript,4 and
Works ofLoved According to Climacus's grammar of subjectivity, the self expands
and develops itself through the existence-spheres by encountering frustrations and
an impotence to realise its goal of self-unity. The inability of a self to ratify itself
within a given existence-sphere is referred to as an "aporia of self'. Ultimately,
2 Published by "S. Kierkegaard", but "edited" under the pseudonym "Victor Eremita".
3 Published under the pseudonym, "Johannes De Silentio".
4 Published under the pseudonym, "Johannes Climacus".
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Climacus's grammar of the self requires a movement beyond the Socratic,
immanental vision of human subjectivity. Selfhood and Self-knowledge can only be
accomplished through a crucifixion of the self—or, a self-renunciation. In self-
sacrifice the self attains itself in Religiousness B, where it also achieves transparency
and lives a life of transcendence through the works of love.
Existence-Spheres andNarrative Subjectivity
The Kierkegaardian self is a narrative self, and although Kierkegaard does not
specifically use this terminology,6 the degree to which one is successful in attaining
a self depends, for Kierkegaard, upon the success one has in "collecting" one's
temporal-spatial emodiments (actions and cognitions) into a unified, lived, point of
view. That is, becoming fully human requires the emplotment of the activities and
events of one's life into a narrative that renders them intelligible to oneself and
allows one to see these activities and events as those initiated by and belonging to
oneself.7 Edward Mooney discusses Kierkegaard's notion of the self as a
"narrative center of gravity" alongside the metaphor of the self as an harmonious
ensemble of musical tones.8 The essential concept in the metaphors of narrative and
musical harmony is unity among disparate elements—that lack any necessary
element of cohesion between them—through temporal duration. The narrative model
is preferable to describe Kierkegaard's view of the self, over the concept of musical
harmony, because narrative more readily implies the presence of loose-ends that
need to be tied. Narratives are constructed, and this suggests that the emplotment of
self occurs at the expense of not being able to explain some events or features of
5 Published under Kierekgaard's own name, "S. Kierkegaard".
6 Kierkegaard instead employs the analogous term "life-view", which we will discuss more in
Chapter Six.
7 Calvin Schrag develops superbly a view of the self under the category of narrative in his Self
After Postmodernity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), while linking his position to a
grammatical reading of Kierkegaard's existence-spheres. C. Stephen Evans, in Passionate Reason:
Making Sense ofKierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1992), 126, also makes reference to Climacus' view of human persons in terms of "narrative"
fulfilment.
8 Mooney, Sevles in Discord and Resolve: Kierkegaard's Moral-Religious Psychology from
Either/Or to Sickness Unto Death (London: Routledge, 1996), 99-100.
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one's life—as in the emplotment of a literary narrative from a set of events
(historical or fictional). Musical harmony, on the other hand, implies perfection or a
finished or attained state. Harmony is achieved all at once and in an instant that
admits of no disharmony. Emplotting a narrative involves the shaping and
configuring of a whole from a set of divergent entities, and is therefore an active, not
passive, event for the observer (as the one for whom the narrative exists). In
narration something is done to the events or entities so that they make narrative
sense to the observer. Shaping a narrative is thus an arranging of time, actions, and
events into a cohesive story—it is the taking of a given set of actions and events to
have happend in a certain order and to mean thus-and-so. Narrative making,
therefore, always means fashioning something more from what is simply present in
the phenomena. For Kierkegaard the self is never finished and always short of
perfection.9 The result is that, for Kierkegaard, the self, as an embodied self that is
communally situated in language, is a self that emerges as a first-person voice out of
and from within its speech and the self-narration performed through its various
speech-acts. Kierkegaard's analysis of existence-spheres is, then, a grammar for the
narrative fulfilment of self.
The Concept ofExistence-Spheres
We now turn to Kierkegaard's topography of human subjectivity.
Kierkegaard's attempt to articulate a non-metaphysical grammar of existence and the
category of paradox leads him to formulate his rather familiar theory of the "stages
on life's way", or "existence-spheres". Our concern in this chapter is not to
elucidate a comprehensive understanding of Kierkegaard's existence-spheres as a
total interpretation of his thought, as this carries us beyond the parameters of our
study. The task undertaken here is instead to outline an approach to the grammar of
9 The concept of narrative also works well with Kierkegaard's understanding of the nature and
scope/limitations of human reason. While narrative may connote an all-encompassing meta-
narrative, tantamount to a perfect or complete explanation, making narrative sense is entirely
intelligible as a matter of personal and communal (local) narratives. In this language, Kierkegaard
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existence performed the Kierkegaardian spheres of existence, and relate these to the
Climacean subjectivity principle.
A basic outline of the movements of subjectivity may be gained by examining
four Kierkegaardian texts. First, Either/Or (both volumes) articulates the parameters
and logic of the esthetic and ethical spheres through the correpondence between
Judge William (the ethicist) and A (the estheticist). Next, in Fear and Trembling
Johannes De Silentio demarcates the boundary of the ethical by making a clear
distinction between ethical and religious modes of being. The writings of Johannes
Climacus present a dialectical (or philosophical) account of the logic of the
existence-spheres. Postscript represents a more mature perspective on the other
pseudonymous writings and it is here that the formal "theory" of existence-spheres
introduced in Stages On Life's Way is rendered in its most advanced form. In
Postscript the category of the religious is subdivided into a generic Religiousness A
and a Christian Religiousness B. Finally, we have in Works of Love a study in the
grammar of Christian religiousness.
The chapter of Postscript in which Climacus introduces his subjectivity
principle, "Subjective Truth, Inwardness; Truth is Subjectivity", concludes with
Climacus resolving to "start from the bottom" and "to have the existence relation
between the esthetical and the ethical come into existence in an existing
individuality".10 However, Climacus observes that this project has already been
accomplished by Either/Or. Climacus therefore launches an appendix to this chapter
in order to cast "A Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature" and
pursue this notion further.11 Climacus "discovers" that the concept of existence-
spheres developed through the rest of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship,
performs for him (although the pseudonyms themselves, he claims, are unaware of
their complicity) the task of embodying the subjectivity principle at work as a
finds that a legitimate meta-narrative exists only for God, while local narratives are the only sort
available to humans—ergo the "objective uncertainty" of human reason.
10 ATVL XII.l 251/SLIX 209; his italics.
11 See AW XII. 1 251-300/5V IX 209-251.
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grammar of the spheres/modes of existence.12 Climacus, in fact, explicitly links the
prior pseudonymous accomplishments as establishing his thesis that "truth is
inwardness".13
Although the actual concept of "existence spheres" must wait for Stages On
Life's Way to be formally articulated, Climacus understands there to be evident
already in the sharp disjunction between the ethical and esthetic asserted in
Either/Or a rough concept of the different existence-spheres. Climacus reads the
issue in Either!Or to concern essentially three stages, but understands the book to
have somewhat confusingly presented this as only two: the esthetic and the ethical-
religious.14 However, Climacus points out that Either/Or does not "didacticize" and
its merit consists in the fact that "it does not provide any conclusion but in
inwardness transforms everything . . . with the quiet incorruptible, and yet infinite
passion of resolution, of the ethical's modest task, built up thereby, open before God
and men".1'1 The trouble Climacus finds with Either!Or is that it stops with the
ethical-religious and does not proceed on to religiousness proper.16
For Climacus, then, there are three basic spheres of existence, and he clearly
states this: "There are three existence-spheres: the esthetic, the ethical, the
12 Cf. Climacus's comment at the close of the appendix in which he states: "My thesis was that
subjectivity, inwardness, is truth. For me this was crucial with regard to the issue of Christianity,
and out of the same regard I thought I ought to pursue a certain endeavor in the pseudonymous
writings, which to the very last have honestly refrained from didacticizing [i.e., explicitly
recommending, as does Climacus, a particular mode of existence as truth], and I thought that I
ought to pay special attention to the latest one [i.e., Stages], because it came out after my
Fragments and, freely reproducing other themes, calls to mind the earlier books and by means of
humor as a confinium [border territory] defines the religious stage"; KW XII. 1 300/SVIX 251.
13 KW XII. 1 254/SVIX 212.
14 One finds in the language of B, Judge William, the ethicist, many references to God and religion
as if religiousness included in the ethical. In fact, Victor Eremtia, the pseudonymous "editor" of
Either/Or, concludes the book with a sermon. The further development of the religious sphere in
Stages On Life's Way beyond the esthetic and ethical spheres of Either/Or is, for Climacus,
entirely appropriate, but "despite this tripartation, the book [Stages] is nevertheless an either/or.
That is, the ethical and the religious stages have an essential relation to each other". KW XII. 1
294/5V IX 246. In other words, as we maintained in Chapter Four, Climacus understands ethics
and religion to be deeply connected so that ethics is fundamentally theological and properly
expressable as the "ethical-religious".
15XWXII.l 254/SVIX 212.
16 Climacus claims that, "The ethicist in Either/Or had saved himself by despairing . . . but in my
opinion there was a discrepancy here. ... If it were to be pointed out clearly in Either!Or where the
discrepancy lies, the book would have to a religious instead of an ethical orientation". KW XII. 1
257-58/.SV IX 214-15.
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religious".17 Frater Taciturnus' has already explicitly developed these stages in the
pseudonymous literature prior to Climacus' writing ofPostscript.
There are three existence-spheres: the esthetic, the ethical, the religious. The metaphysical
is abstraction, and there is no person who exists metaphysically. The metaphysical, the
ontological, is [er], but does not exist [er ikke til], for when it exists it is always in the
esthetic, in the ethical, in the religious, and when it is, it is the abstraction from or a
prius [something prior] to the esthetic, the ethical, the religious.18
We find here a couple of things we should note by way of introduction to our
reading of Kierkegaard's existence-spheres. First, this passage emphasises the
points made in chapters Two and Three—namely that the substance of metaphysics,
as that which really is, is not directly accessible to the human mind. Kierkegaard's
existential categories of the esthetical, ethical, and religious, are an attempt to, on one
hand, formulate a non-metaphysical conceptual map of human existence, while
maintaining the "realist assumption" that there is presumed to be a mind-
independent reality, or a metaphysical giveness, encountered in and through human
existence which serves as the prius for human existence. The emphasis in this
passage is once more that of Kierkegaard's overall emphasis on the temporality, the
becoming aspect, of human existence: "no person exists metaphysically".
The existence-spheres are not to be conceived as linear "stages" of a life, in
which one progresses through and beyond to the next, leaving behind the former
stage forever, because the stages are most basically about the various relational
spheres of a human person. Instead the existence-spheres are cross-sections of a
human life and are more like existential dimensions that are inhabited by the self.
Schrag phrases it well when he explains that "these manners or modes of existing
are more like cross-sections of possible lifestyles within the concrete history of the
sell than like developmental stages that progressively succeed each other".19 In this
regard, Judge William notes of the transition from the esthetic to the ethical sphere
that, "[the ethical] does not want to destroy the esthetic but to transfigure it".20 In
17 KW XII. 1 50l/S'V X 179. Climacus later splits the religious into two: Religiousness A and
Religiousness B.
18 KW XI 476/SV VIII 266; my italics. Climacus also affirms this analysis:
19 Schrag, "Kierkegaard Effect", 4.
20 KW IV 253/SV III 233.
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fact, the judge asserts, the ethical takes the accidental elements that comprise the
esthetic dimension and uses these as "the material with which it is to build and that
which it is to build".21
The transition to, or addition of, a new existential dimension or mode of being is
thus both hierarchical and complementary. The acquisition of a new existence-
sphere is therefore best modelled as a progression through concentric circles, where
the circle one leaves is not abandoned but "caught up" (.Aufheben) in the next.22 In
this sense the spheres are hierarchical, in that there is a definite order to their
acquisition—so that the lower or outer spheres serve as pre-requisites for the higher
or deeper ones (e.g., one cannot attain the ethical without the esthetic, and so on). Yet
the existence-spheres also co-exist in complementarity so that they constitute the
depth and multiple dimensionality of a human self.23 The central issue in defining
human subjectivity according to this schematic concerns the particular sphere in
whose terms one primarily understands the existence of oneself and one's world.
Our proposal in this section is that Kierkegaard's theory of stages or existence-
spheres supplies for us a grammar of the movements from thin to deep subjectivity
in human persons. There are two very important features of our prior analysis upon
which we must now draw. When we combine the definition of self that Kierkegaard
through Anti-Climacus presents in Sickness Unto Death as that which has itself as
its goal and criterion, with the notion of truth as intimately connected to Salighed that
Climacus develops in Fragments, it becomes clear that Salighed is to be closely
21 KW IV 253/SV III 233.
22 This is another instance in which Kierkegaard appropriates an Hegelian concept to suit
Kierkegaard's own ends. See Chapter Two for a brief discussion of Kierkegaard's use of the
Hegelian concept of aufhebung.
23 Cf. Calvin Schrag's statement , in Self After Postmodemity, 144, that, "the advance from the
aesthetical to the ethical and from the ethical to the religious is not a serial progression in which
the former is somehow left behind. The aesthetical, the ethical, and the religious are constitutive
and and complementary cross-sections of the self in its historical becomings". And C. Stephen
Evans' comment, in Kierkegaard's "Fragments and "Postscript": The Religious Philosophy of
Johannes Climacus {Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983), 49: "The answer, then, to
the question as to whether the spheres are mutually exclusive is as follows: they are mutually
exclusive if the distinctive content of each sphere is absolutized. But if what is absolute is allowed
to be absolute, the relative can be retained as relative".
180
identified with the primary force behind the deepening of one's subjectivity.24 To be
a self is simply to have eternal blessedness as one's goal.23 Ultimately, then, to lack
any concept of eternal blessedness is to lack a self; and therefore to lack a
subjectivity qualified across the spectrum of existence-spheres is to lack eternal
blessedness.
The potential of the theory of the existence-spheres to act as a critical principle
emerges when a sphere encounters an inherent aporia of self—as a lack of eternal
blessedness—that is resolved in the next "stage" through acquisition of a new
dimension to one's subjectivity.26 The term "aporia of self' is used to indicate the
existential and conceptual limitations of a given sphere of existence to consolidate a
self in a complete unity. These aporias of self are experienced by a person when, in
Anthony Rudd's terms, she meets with "a sense of something lacking in her life, a
need for meaning that is unmet within her current way of life".27 In other words,
when one encounters an aporia of self, one meets with a situation that produces the
frustration and inability of one's present life-view, defined within a particular sphere
of being, to account for and make sense of one's life in its various relations. What
becomes obvious to one with a conception of self (i.e., a first-person perspective) in
24 See, for example, Climacus' identification of eternal blessedness as the absolute telos and
highest good for human persons in KW XII. 1 385-92/SV X 79-86. Recall Alastair Hannay's earlier
quote, from "Solitary Souls and Infinite Help", 48, in which he insists that for Kierkegaard the self
is tautologically teleological: "The choice [of self] in other words, is to be the self one presently is
but in a way that reflects the traditional philosophical goal of completeness or perfection
The crucial thing is that for Kierkegaard one does not choose the goal. As with Hegel, there is an
ideal of true selfhood, specified in terms of 'spirit,' that one renounces in vain. Not because, due to
the unfolding of some inner dialectic, renouncing it will inevitably, or in the long run, be
transformed into acceptance [as with Hegel]; but because to try to renounce the ideal is to try to not
be the programme one inevitably is".
25 See "The Expectancy of Eternal Salvation", in KW V 256-61 /SV IV 228-33.
26 Cf. David Gouwens' claim, in Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker (Cambridge: Cambidge
University Press, 1996), 85, that "another way to view the stages is to see them as strategies for
happiness. . . . Ethical and religious (including Christian) existence can then be seen as strategies
for resolving the dilemmas brought about by the failure of the previous stage to obtain that
happiness". Note that the ability of one sphere to act critically over and against another "lower"
sphere exists only potentially, and not necessarily. There is no transcendent logic being appealed to
(by, for instance, Judge William in Either/Or) and the ability to be challenged depends for its force
upon one's choice of self. One may always, as does A in Either/Or, remain recalcitrant and
entrenched in one's present view of reality
27 Anthony J. Rudd, "Kierkegaard and the Sceptics", British Journal for the History of Philosophy
6: (1998), 87. Rudd similarly sees these experiences as, "What drives—or may drive—the
existentially concerned indivdual from the aesthetic to the ethical, and on to the religious", ibid.
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the encounter of the existential and conceptual limits of a particular existence-sphere
is that a change is needed and that one's existence must be qualified differently so
that what is problematic will disappear.28 These aporias of self are evidenced, for
Kierkegaard, through the dual relationships to time and others that are avaiable to
one within the particular sphere in question.
Fundamental to the reading of Kierkegaardian subjectivity developed thus far
has been the concepts of temporality and self-relation as the media for and
possibility of a concrete, historical human subjectivity. For Kierkegaard it is through
a human being's identification of and relation to others in one's temporal-spatial
nexus that a self emerges and is established in time and space and the nature of these
relations is a crucial feature that qualifies our individual existence. The process of
becoming a self involves interaction with those who are "other" (including oneself
as an "other") through the act of distanciation of self from self by which the self
distinguishes itself from others. We shall follow Calvin Schrag and interpret the
theory of existence-spheres "as displaying different experiences of temporality and
alterity", so that they are seen to be distinguishing the possibilities that may (and
do) obtain for humans in their relations to time and to others.29 There are three
relational axes of a human person that must be drawn onto one baseline (to change
metaphors) for the self to become a full, deep unity: time, self, and others. This can
be expressed, albeit with less precision, in terms of the narrative formula we have
already employed. Rendered in narrative terms, a deep subjectivity must emplot a
narrative unity in its relation to time, to others, and to itself. As Climacus works
through the immanental (finite) movements of subjectivity and disassembles the
metaphysical approach to the transcendent-immanent relationship of human
subjectivity, the grammar of dialectics opens up into the grammar of paradox so that
Climacus' theory of existence-spheres in Postscript combines with his discussion
28 Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), 27: "The way to solve
the problem you see in life is to live in a way that makes what is problematic disappear".
29 Schrag, "Kierkegaard Effect", 5.
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of truth in Fragments to form a grammar of transcendence (the infinte as
paradox).30
Kierkegaard' grammar of the existence-spheres does not attempt to provide the
content of existence for his readers, but the conceptual categories to understand
existence. The essential content of the existence-spheres is embodied instead in the
pseudonymous communication of them. The pseudonyms display the content of the
existence-spheres—because in a real sense it cannot be directly told. The content of
existence is actual and lived and thus not (strictly) able to be rendered in the medium
of possibility. This does not entail that there cannot be a theory or grammar of
existence-spheres. Rather it follows that the theory or grammar of existence-spheres
cannot be the existence-spheres themselves—i.e., the living of them. It is once more
a matter of talking about versus being a thing. C. Stephen Evans provides some
needed clarification:
Kierkegaard does not give his readers results. He rather attempts in the pseudonymous
literature to embody these existential view points or 'spheres.' Readers are not simply
given information, they are imaginatively presented with existential possibilities which
they must reflect on and interact with. The pseudonymous characters do not merely tell us
about the existence-spheres: they live out those spheres, within the realm of imagination,
naturally, not as actual fact.31
Climacus certainly understands (along with Tacitumus) that human existence is lived
in the conceptual categories of the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious. Climacus is
also commited, at the same time, to the proposition that the conceptualisation of
human existence in terms of these three spheres is itself an esthetic entity or event.
Presumably this is why Climacus comes along after the other pseudonyms have
demonstrated existentially his thesis and then he "didacticizes" and explains it all in
conceptual terms—all the while rightly denying that he exhibits truth as subjectivity
or that his thesis is itself the truth of subjectivity.
The Self in Esthetic Existence
30 Cf. Calvin Schrag, Self After Postmodernity, 135.
31 Evans, Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript, 14.
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Frater Taciturnis in Stages On Life's Way provides a rough preliminary
description of the existence-spheres, which functions as a precis of the grammar of
self in each of the existence-spheres:
The esthetic sphere is the sphere of immediacy, the ethical the sphere of requirement (and
this requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes bankrupt), the religious the
sphere of fulfilment, but, please note, not a fulfillment such as when one fills an alms
box or a sack with gold, for repentance has specifically created a boundless space.32
Judge William provides a further description of the nature of esthetic existence
in Either/Or , volume one:
But what is it to live esthetically, and what does it mean to live ethically? What is the
esthetic in a person and what is the ethical? To that I would respond: the esthetic in a
person is that by which [s/]he simultaneously and immediately is what [s/]he is; the
ethical is that by which [s/]he becomes what [s/]he becomes. The person who lives in and
by and from and for the esthetic that is in [her/]him, that person lives esthetically.33
The esthetic sphere is, then, the sphere of immediacy, and for Kierkegaard
denotes a way of viewing life (and reality) from the perspective of immediacy: "The
person who lives in and by and from the esthetic that is in [her/]him, that person
lives esthetically". The definitive feature of the concept of immediacy is for
Kierkegaard a lack of relation, and he even uses immediacy in this sense as
descriptive of reality [Realitet] itself.34 In other words, immediacy refers to things as
they are apart from their coming into relation with a human mind. "The esthetic" is
the category Kierkegaard uses to delineate a particular perspective taken towards
reality; or yet, it is descriptive of a specific mode of being-in-the-world and being-
towards-the-world. The primary standpoint of the esthetical mode of being is, as
Stephen Crites notes, one of "objective apprehension".35 Crites builds his
understanding of Kierkegaard's category of the esthetical upon the etymological
derivation from the Greek aesthonomai—which means literally "perceive",
"apprehend by the senses", "learn", "understand", and "observer".36 With this
category Kierkegaard means to describe logically the parameters of human existence
32 KW XI 476/SV VIII 266; my italics.
33 KW IV 178/SV III 167.
34 KW VII 167-68/Ba/?. B 1 145-47. See also our discussion of this in Chapter Three.
35 Stephen Crites, "Introduction", in Spren Kierkegaard, Crisis in the Life of an Actress, trans.
Stephen Crites (London: Collins, 1967), 21.
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when qualified only in terms of immediacy—both perceptual and reflective. "The
esthetic" is therefore a category that every human person adopts in so far as s/he is
a knower or a perceiver.37 A person whose life is qualified only in terms of the
esthetical standpoint is essentially an observer of events, not a participant in them,
and views reality as a stage on which s/he is the central subject around whom events
revolve. In short, for the esthetician, reality is perceived as consisting of objects to be
experienced in abstraction from any existential considerations. We may therefore
characterise Kierkegaard's grammar of esthetic immediacy as the grammar of the
conceptual co- ordinates of presence and distanciation.
The esthetic sphere is imaginatively captured in volume one of Either!Or by A
the esthete.38 The character of A's self-relation (as representative of that of the
esthetic sphere) is tellingly protrayed in the section "Diapsalmata", which is a
compilation of lyrical and aphoristic witticisms that read like a random collection of
stream of consciousness literature. Each aphorism has its own sense and poetic
beauty, but on the whole lacks any unilateral organisational content. It is not that the
esthete is unreflective—in fact Climacus claims that "as as a thinker, A is
advanced", and that "as a dialectician, he [A] is far superior to B [the ethicist]".39
What is characteristic of A, as an embodiment of the esthetic, is an allegiance to
"sensuous" categories by which he attempts to interpret all of his life-experience.
The term sensuous connotes a reference to the etymological roots of the English
term "esthetic" which is in the Greek word aestheisa, designating "sensation",
rather than the popular usage.40 Therefore Climacus explains that the esthetic sphere
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. Crites provides a very helpful discussion of the nature of the esthetical in Kierkegaard, on
which the remainder of the remainder of this paragraph is modelled. See Crites, "Introduction", 19-
28.
38 See Climacus observation in Postscript, KW XII. 1 253/SV X 211.
39 KW XII. 1 253/SV X 212. Recall from Chapter Three that for Kierkegaard reflection is simply
two ideas brought together, without any relation to each other: "Reflection is the possibility of
relation; consciousness is the relation. . . . reflection's categories are always dichotomous". KW
VII 169/Pap. B 1 145.
40 Evans, Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript, 34.
185
is concretely qualified by the categories of "pleasure-perdition",41 and these
prescribe the parameters of the esthete's conscious experience of reality. A attempts
to live his life as a work of art and he therefore uses all his powers of reflection and
imagination to remain in a conscious state of immediacy in order that pleasure may
be maximised and misfortune minimised. As Evans remarks, "The really skilled
aesthete learns to enjoy her own imaginative creations. The real world becomes a set
of 'occasions' for the exercise of her creative fancy. The end result is . .. not limited
to pleasure in any ordinary sense of that word. The aesthete learns, for example that,
sorrow can be as aesthetically satisfying as joy".42
Let us return to our analysis of the esthete's experience of temporality and
alterity. There are some important observations to be made regarding Kierkegaard's
category of the esthetic as the grammar of immediacy. The esthetic, Crites observes,
is not qualified in relation to temporal duration since the esthetic is by definition a
process of objectification whose "goal... is the transmuting of reality into a system
of internally related ideal forms".43 "Reality" is experienced by the esthete as
comprised of moments of pleasure, to be either physically or cognitively
enjoyed—in either case—in abstraction from any concrete, existential historicity of
either subject or object. The objects of pleasure are simply "given" in the esthete's
consciousness and directly transposed into conceptual awareness. These are
considered to be objective, and independently real objects that possess validilty in
their own right, but only as existing in abstract relation to other internally consistent
conceptualisations.
Three things follow from this analysis. First, time is accidental for the esthete,
and accoidingly, Ihe existence-sphere of the esthetic refers to an atemporal
41 KW XII. 1 294/SVIX 256. Evans notes, in Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript, 53, that the
Danish terms used here are lykke-ulykke, which is the standard expression used in Danish for "best
wishes", or when congratulating someone, and even for "happy birthday".
42 Evans, Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript, 35. This leads Anthony J. Rudd, in Kierkegaard
and the Limits of the Ethical (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 70, to assert that there are
two kinds of esthetes in Either/Or: (1) the "immediate esthete" who "just acts on impulse"; and (2)
"the reflective esthete" who "either fails to act at all because [s/]he reflects too much, or [s/]he
reflects until [s/]he is sick of reflection; and then just acts on impulse anyway".
43 Crites, "Introduction", 22.
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dimension of human experience. Time is experienced by the esthete as external and
objective. History, as such, does not properly exist for the esthete as time is reduced
to a successive series of "nows".44 The standpoint of the observer is essentially
timeless, and the self-involving nature of perceptual experience, the fact that the
subject of experience also participates in the contingencies and limitations of
existence, is precisely that which the esthetic relation seeks to negate.45 But not,
however, in a manner that re-establishes a connection with a concrete historicity. The
esthete seeks to avoid existential concretion by remaining in the present-tense,
floating in an infinite sea of possibilities that always remain open to her/him.46 This
leads us to our second point, that existence itself is accidental for the esthete. Taken
purely in terms of immediacy, the esthetic sphere is the sphere of possibility. The
esthete attempts to squeeze all of reality into an erotic, instantaneous, moment of
time.47 But, an erotic "instant" is fleeting and so the esthete can (or will) never
ground her/himself in a temporal horizon of past leading to the future.
Consequently, genuine existentially concrete existence, of either oneself or of an
external reality, is of interest to the esthete only in so far as it provides the backdrop
for sensual experience.48 Lastly, the "other" is also accidental for the esthete. The
existence of an "other" is reduced to an object of the esthete's pleasure—as either
an object for thought or sensual involvement. There is a recognition of the other, but
it is as the "other-for-methe other is, as it were, an "objectified and faceless
other" who is "[ajlways a means to an end, but never an end in itself'.49 Within the
existence-sphere of the esthetic there is a complete lack of the conceptual resources
44 Schrag, "The Kierkegaard Effect", 5.
45 Crites, "Introduction", 21.
46 For example, note A's comments in the "Diapsalmata": "If I were to wish for something, I
would wish not for wealth or power but for the passion of possibility, for the eye, eternally young,
eternally ardent, that sees possibility everywhere. Pleasure disappoints; possibility does not. And
what wine is so sparkling, so fragrant so intoxicating!" KW III41/SF II 42.
47 Schrag, "The Kierkegaard Effect", 5-6. This is why the young lover in the "The Seducer's
Diary", who woos a girl and then cruelly manuevers her to break her engagement with him and
loathe herself, is portrayed, along with literary and musical characters of Don Giovanni, Faust, and
Don Juan, as the perfect embodiment of the esthetic. See KW III 301-445 and passim/ SV II 281 -
410 and passim.
48 Crites, "Introduction", 22.
49 Schrag, "The Kierkegaard Effect", 6.
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necessary to identify and respond to other persons as subjects with ethical
dimensions (i.e., with genuine actuality). "For the aesthete", Stephen Dunning
concludes, "the other is an object to be manipulated. Aesthetic internalization never
accepts the other as other; it is only a strategy for dominating the other".50
The esthetic sphere is that dimension of human existence capable of
experiencing the immediate, sensuous, and often erotic pleasure of, on one hand, the
satisfaction of purely physical drives, and on the other, the pleasure of imaginative,
fantastical self-creations.51 (But on a very mundane level, the esthetical also refers
most basically to that dimension of our existence in which we know and perceive.)
The perspective on reality adopted by the esthete lacks the dimension of temporal
reference, and instead struggles to view all phenomena in relation to the present
moment. This effort, however, is in vain, and reveals A's deep-seated self-
contradiction that results in an aporia of self. The esthete's life-experience is devoid
of any organisational or normative structure whatsoever and thus it expresses a
complete lack of unity.
John Glenn's analysis of the esthetic dimension of selfhood in Kierkegaard is
helpful in illuminating the aporia of self encountered in the esthetic sphere.32 Glenn
brings the dialectic of thin and deep subjectivity of Anti-Climacus in Sickness Unto
Death alongside the portraits of subjectivity provided by Judge William and the
esthete in Either!Or. Subsequently, Glenn reads the esthetic dimension of the self in
reference to the set of conceptual poles of the self given in the formula of Sickness
Unto Death: "A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and finite, of the
50 Stephen N. Dunning, Kierkegaard's Dialectic ofInwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory
ofStages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 179-180.
51 Cf. Ibid. Ronald Hall provides an extensive analysis of the various senses of immediacy in
Kierkegaard's thought in Word and Spirit, 6-7. Hall identifies three kinds of immediacy for
Kierkegaard: sensuous, reflective, and existential: "What is immediately present to the senses is
sensuous immediacy; what is immediately present to thought is reflective immediacy; what is
immediately present within reflection and within the historical continuity of past and future,
actuality and possibility, is existential immediacy. To complicate matters there are two senses of
sensuous and reflective immediacy, but only one sense of existential immediacy. Sensuous and
reflective immediacy can be either psychical [pertaining to the Greek notion of psyche, or soul] or
pneumatic [pertaining to the Christian notion of spirit]; existential immediacy can only be
pneumatic". In our analysis, the esthetic is comprised of only sensuous and reflective immediacy.
52 Glenn, "The Definition of the Self', 6-11.
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temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short a synthesis".53 When
brought into conversation with Anti-Climacus's analysis, the dialectic of immediacy
embodied in the esthete's "Diapsalmata" reveals that the esthetic dimension of the
self lacks any positive self-relation—"[A] is committed above all to non-
commitment and so his self-relation does not take the form of explicit will, but rather
only of (often ironic) self-observation".54 As a result, the esthetic dimension of the
self cannot resolve the tension between infinitude—as the ability to transcend one's
finite situatedness—and finitude—as a human person's overall situation in actuality.
Glenn points to A's remarks in the "Diapsalmata":
[My] desires concern sometimes the most trivial things, sometimes the most exalted, but
they are equally imbued with the soul's momentary passion. At this moment I wish a for
a bowl of buckwheat porrridge. ... I would give more than my birthright for it!55
Glenn's analysis also reveals that A cannot resolve the tensions of possibility
and necessesity, or of eternity and temporality, in the self-relation. Recall that the
esthete attempts to remain in the sphere of possibilty as an ideal, uninvolved observer
for whom the world is an occasion for self-gratification. Yet in his abstractions from
existence, A finds that his lack of existential concern (or involvement) leaves him at
the mercy of necessity and a deterministic fatalism! A despairs: "So I am not the
one who is the lord ofmy life; I am one of the threads to be spun into the calico of
life"!56 Similarly, A fails to integrate the eternal aspects of his self-relation with its
temporal entanglements. He proudly acknowledges that his esthetic efforts are an
attempt to live "aeterno modo [in the mode of eternity]",57 but A then complains
that in his timeless esthetic abstractions he cannot reconcile himself with time and
master it: "Time passes, life is a stream, etc., so people say. That is not what I find:
time stands still, and so do I. All the plans I project fly straight back at me; when I
want to spit, I spit in my own face".58
53 KW XIX 13AT XV 73.
54 Glenn, "The Definition of the Self', 9-10.
55 KW III 26/SV II 29.
56 KW III 31/W II 33.
57 KW III 39/SV II 40.
58 KW III 26/SV II 28.
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Glenn's analysis gives content to the esthete's self-contradiction and the aporia
of self encountered in the esthetic existence-sphere. The point is that the esthetic
dimension of life cannot support itself on its own terms; that is, the esLhetic
perspective deconstructs itself. This is not an outside critique of the esthetic, but one
which points out that the esthetic vantage point cannot have reality as it requires,
because its view of reality undermines the possibility of completing its program of
self-indulgence. The gist of this argument is that A's method of self-fulfilment
requires that he not have a self-relation. A lack of self-relation however, precludes
the possiblity of self-fulfilment. To place this in the language of Chapter Five, A
struggles with his incipient first-person perspective. He finds that he does in fact
have this self-relation, and that it is required for esthetic experience. Yet, at the same
time, this self-relation threatens to actualise A in an existentially concrete history,
which would jeopardise A's esthetic objectivity. A must continuously strive to
undermine his first-person perspective in order to remain in esthetic immediacy.
This is essentially Climacus's point when he argues that the esthete cannot
account for misfortune, because:
Misfortune is like a narrow pass on the way; now the immediate individual is in it, but
his view of life must essentially always tell him that the difficulty will soon cease to
hinder, because it is a foreign element. If it does not cease, he despairs, by which his
immediacy ceases to function, and the transition to another understanding of existence is
rendered possible.59
The esthete, Climacus contends, cannot maintain her/his immediacy—i.e., a personal
distance—when confronted with circumstances that require her/his actual self-
involvement; such as, disappointment, or the frustration of one's desires. It is
precisely this inherent feature of human sensual experience, Climacus goes on to
affirm, that subverts the ultimacy of the esthetic sphere and opens up an aporia, a
window of opportunity, whereby life may be viewed under different categories than
the esthetic. As Glenn has shown, A cannot quite sustain this struggle with
59 Spren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. D. F. Swenson and
W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 388. Our point is better made from the
Swenson/Lowrie translation instead of the Hongs Kierkegaard Writings. Cf. KW XII. 1 434/5V7 X
122.
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immediacy and he founders on a complete lack of self-relation. Within the esthetic
existence-sphere, then, one encounters an inability to have a self-relation and to the
degree that one is an esthete, to that degree one also suffers from a lack of selfhood.
This opens up the existential possibility for an existence that is ethically qualified.
The Self in Ethical Existence
We began our analysis of the esthetic existence-sphere with Frater Taciturnis's
description of the esthetic as the sphere of immediacy. We may look to Frater
Tacitumis for help again as we begin our analysis of Kierkegaard's grammar of the
ethical sphere of existence. "The ethical", Taciturnis tells us, is "the sphere of
requirement (and this requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes
bankrupt)".60 In the shift from the esthetic to the ethical, then, the grammar of
presence and distanciation used to articulate the existence-possibilities within the
esthetic sphere of immediacy, is replaced by "the grammar of norm and law", as the
language of requirement.61 The ethical view of life does not see humans merely as
the subjects of experience, but understands humans as proactive agents who act in
the world, and initiate those actions through responsible choices.
Let us look at the grammar of norm and law that emerges in Judge William's
Volume Two of Either/Or. Kierkegaard uses the judge to embody the ethical
through a series of letters to the esthete urging him to the ethical perspective.62 The
judge urges the esthete:
I only want to bring you to the point where this choice truly has meaning for you . . .
rather than designating the choice between good and evil, my either/or designates the
choice by which one chooses good and evil or rules them out. Here the question is under
what qualifications one will view all existence and personally live. . . . Therefore, it is
not so much a matter of choosing between willing good or willing evil as of choosing to
will . . ,63
60 KW XI 476/SV VIII 266.
61 Cf. Schrag, The Self After Postmodernity, 143, where he describes the grammar of the ethical
and Religiousness A as a "grammar of norm and law".
62 It is important and interesting to note that volume 2 of Either/Or does not present a
philosophical treatise on ethics in the form of transcendental arguments that appeal to universal
(and abstract) rational principles. Instead, what we find are personal letters of advice from one friend
to another. See Anthony Rudd, Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical, 68-9.
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In Judge William's mouth, the ethical is, as was the esthetic, descriptive of a position
one takes in the reality. The ethical sphere is, in other words, a mode of being-in-the-
world and being-toward-the-world. "The ethical" describes, "the qualifications
[under which] one will view all existence and personally live". Judge William
clearly understands the ethical as an existential mode that refigures and transforms
the objectivisation and depersonlisation of reality that generates the esthetic aporia
of self. Instead of an abstract self-relation that is divorced from its existential
engagements, the ethical self chooses itself in its social and physical embodiments
and relations. Judge William continues:
The person who has ethically chosen and found himself possesses [her/]himself defined in
its entire concretion. [S/]He then possesses [her/]himself as an individual who has these
capacities, these passions, these inclinations, these habits, who is subject to these
external influences . . . Here the objective for [her/]his activity is [her/]himself, but
nevertheless not arbitrarily determined, for he possesses [her/]himself as a task that has
been assigned to [her/]him, even though it became [her/]his by [her/]his own choosing. . .
. [this self] is not an abstract self that fits everywhere and therefore nowhere but is a
concrete self in living interaction with these specific surroundings, these life conditions,
this order of things. . . . [this self] is not only a personal self but a social, a civic self.M
Where the esthetical self had a detached relation to time and others, the ethical
existence-sphere transforms these relationships through a fundamental choice of
oneself.65 The judge asserts that, "On the whole, to choose is an intrinsic and
stringent term for the ethical".66 Note that it is the act of "choosing to will" as the
"choice by which one chooses", and not any specific choice as such, that
inaugurates the breach with the detached disengagement of the esthetic, and qualifies
existence in the ethical.67 In his commentary, Anthony Rudd helpfully interprets this
fundamental choice to exercise one's will as a willingness "to make some serious
and long-term commitment, such as marriage, [or] starting a career".68 An act of
commitment of this sort transforms the self-relation by configuring a completely
new set of relationships with self, time, and others. The esthete was free from ethical
63 KW IV 168-69/SV III 158-59; my italics.
64 KW IV 262/SV III 241; my italics.
65 Schrag, "Kierkegaard Effect", 6.
66 KW IV 166/5VIII 157.
67 KW IV 169/5V III 159. See also Judge William's comments: "But what is it, then, that I
choose—is it this or that? No, for I choose absolutely, and I choose absolutely precisely by having
chosen not to choose this or that", KW IV 214/SV III 198.
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considerations precisely because his lack of commitment to anything or anyone
(including himself) and this by definition excluded the categories of good and evil
from ever arising.69 By committing oneself to a project it becomes possible to have
oneself in such a way that self-evaluation is possible. In the commitment of oneself
to a project, an individual "has consciously taken [onejself into a sphere of life
where [one] must apply to [one]self the predicates of 'good' and 'evil' where [one]
must judge [one]self in moral terms, according to commonly accepted criteria".70
The ethical self is defined by the category of choice. And it is in this
foundational act of choosing that the possibility of genuine selfhood emerges—not,
as we have seen, a disengaged Cartesian self, but one "concrete" and "in living
interaction" with its surroundings. Furthermore, the esthete's relation to time is
transformed in choosing, for now there is a "moment" of time that stands as a
reference point for all the relations of self—whether to oneself or others. The self is
now baptised into temporal relations and can no longer hover above them in
atemporal abstraction. The ethical self is now committed to this self, these projects,
these social roles and relationships, etc., all of which exist within the constraints of
the temporal dimensions of past, present, and future. The ethical self is first, then,
self-responsible, whose task it is to overcome the fragmented, disembodied self of
the esthetic sphere, and to achieve a genuine first-person unity; that is, actual
existence.
But another type of responsibility emerges out of this new time-alterity relation.
The task of the self is not only to achieve itself, but now as part of that first task it
recognises its ethical requirements to others. Calvin Schrag observes that, "The
ethically chosen self finds that it has not only duties for and to itself but also for and
to others as it is shaped by concrete reciprocal relations with its natural and social
surroundings".71 It is in the acceptance of the claims of other selves that the self is
able to be a self. It is this conception of a "civic self', and the attending normative,




civic structures, that reveals Kierkegaard's category of the ethical to share much
more affinity with Hegel's ethics of Sittlichkeit, as the "laws, customs, practices, and
institutions of a people",72 than with Kant's deontological view in which the ethical
(or morality) is the universal condition of action for any maximally rational agent.73
It is at this point that the grammar of norm and law asserts itself. Anthony Rudd
points out that committing oneself to social roles and relationships not only involves
recognising the other as an ethical subject, but also means accepting the standards of
evaluation that go with them.74 The ethicist recognises that being a self entails duties
and obligations, to oneself and to others, and the ethical self is therefore defined
precisely within those parameters. The grammar of the ethical is a grammar of
"requirement".
Judge William explains that these requirements entail that, "[t]he ethical is the
universal", and "[t]hus the ethical takes the form of the law".73 Ethical duties to the
other are expressed as "laws". But how are these moral decrees to be understood as
law-like and "universal" for Kierkegaard? He has rejected Kantian rationalist ethics
and does not want to ground morality in the "universal" dictates of human reason.
Ethical laws, for Kierkegaard, are universal in two distinct ways. First, ethical
requirements are universal because they are a feature of existence. Because the
ethical self is always in the process of becoming itself in time, there is no finishing
point in time. Both the other and myself exist in the ethical, and there is therefore no
discharging ofmy responsibility to maintain my self-relation and to regard the other.
71 Schrag, "Kierkegaard Effect", 7.
72 Merold Westphal, Becoming A Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific
Postscript (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1996), 24.
73 See Rudd, Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical, 71-2, 134-37, for a good argument for this
conclusion. See also the discussion of the relationship of "the ethical" in Kierkegaard to the
Hegelian notion of Sittlichkeit in Merold Westphal's recent work, especially Westphal, Becoming
A Self, 24, 26, 102-03, and passim; also Westphal, "Kierkegaard and Hegel", in Cambridge
Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. A. Hannay and G. Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), 105-07, 109-10; Westphal, Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society (Macon,
GA: Mercer University Press, 1987), 75-78; and Westphal, Hegel, Freedom, and Modernity
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), passim.
74 Rudd, Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical, 72.
75 KWIV 255/SV III 235. See also the judges remarks: "Duty is the universal; it is required of me,
Consequently, if I am not the universal, I cannot discharge my duty either", KW IV 263/SV HI
242.
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But ethical requirements are universal also because, secondly, the duty to others
generated by the ethical is inexhaustible. Ethical duties include responsibility to, and
for, the entire human race—past, present, and future; that is, they pertain to the
"universally human". Judge William explains:
Now he discovers that the self he chooses has a boundless multiplicity within itself
inasmuch as it has a history, a history in which he acknowledges identity with
[her/] himself. ... in this history [s/]he stands in relation to other individulas in the race
and to the whole race . . . and yet [s/]he is the person [s/]he is only through this history.76
The judge later adds that "every human being is the universally human".77 Judge
William's point is that we cannot escape our duty in the ethical because those to
whom we are bound to regard ethically include the entire human race. What is more,
the duty of the ethical itself, the judge contends, is to become and embody in
ourselves the highest principle of humanity—that is, we are to become the
"universally human".78 Elaborating on the choice which defines the ethical, Judge
William digresses:
But I go back to my category—I am not a logician and so I have only one category, but I
assure you that it is . . . my salvation—I go back to the significance of choosing. When I
choose absolutely ... I myself am the absolute; I posit the absolute, and I myself am the
absolute . . . and what is the absolute? It is myself in my eternal validity.79
These comments of the judge lead directly into the above passage on the identity of
the ethical self with the history of the human race. Judge William's logic is that the
act of choosing in the ethical sense places absolute demands on the self that cannot
be shirked because the transition out of the esthetic sphere is made by virtue of a
commitment to an absolute telos of the self—to be itself. In the act of this
commitment, the absolute telos of the self is organically linked to the human race in
its entirety as supplying its content. Thus, the requirements of the ethical cannot be
exhausted because they come from within (i.e., are an intrinsic feature ot) the ethical
self, and involve the entire human race, historically—the present through the future.
16 KW IV 216/SV III 199.
77 KW IV 332/SV III 304.
78 The judge is quite clear about this and states: "In other words, the universal in itself is nowhere
to be found, and it is up to me, to my enterprising consciousness, whether I will see the universal
in the particular, or only see the particular", KW IV 329/SV III 301.
79 AW IV 215-16/5VIII 199.
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But how are we to understand Taciturnis's statement that under the requirements
of the ethical "the individual always goes bankrupt"? We find a clue to this
question in the concluding section of Either/Or, Volume Two, called "Ultimatum [A
Final Word]". The book ends with Judge William sending to the esthete, apparently
sometime after his original set of letters, a copy of a sermon titled, "The Upbuilding
That Lies in the Thought That in Relation to God We Are Always in the Wrong",
by a pastor-friend of the judge from Jylland.80 The gist of the sermon is that we can
only be in proper relation with ourselves and others when we relate to God in such a
way that we actively acknowledge that in relation to Him we are always in the wrong.
The concluding sentence of the sermon ends with the phrase that "only the truth that
builds up is truth for you".81 Judge William lacks the resources within the ethical
sphere to complete his program of self-unity. The reason for this is that the power
from which the ethical operates lies within the self (recall Judge William's remark
that, "I posit the absolute, and I myself am the absolute"). Unlike the esthete, the
judge has recognised that the means of achieving a self amounts to accepting
responsibility for one's relations—both with oneself and others. The demands of
the ethical are, however, absolute and ultimately the self lacks the power to fund
these demands on its own. This analysis is suggested first by Climacus in Postscript
The discrepancy [in Either/Or] is that the ethical self is supposed to be found
immanentally in despair, that by enduring the despair the individual would win
[her/]himself. . . . But that does not help. In despairing, I use myself to despair, and
therefore I can indeed despair of everything by myself, but if I do this I cannot come back
to myself. It is in this moment that the individual needs divine assistance . . .82
Climacus in this section, and Victor Eremitas in his inclusion of the sermon, are
each referring to the uputia of self in the ethical. In working out the internal logic of
the ethical it is apparent that the ethical cannot ground the self to which it is now
commited. The ethical self discovers that it cannot meet the demands of the ethical
and formulate a unified, first-person perspective on the world. This is the case for
80 KW IV 335-354/W III 313-324.
81 KW IV 354/SV III 324.
82 XIV XII. 1 258/SVIX 215.
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two reasons. First, Climacus's argument highlights the self-contradiciton of an
individualistic ethics. Climacus observes that the ethicist is in a simliar position to
the esthete who lost her/himself. To move beyond the no-self relation of the esthete
requires the establishment of laws, obligations to others, that in effect negate, or
abrogate, the self and assert the primacy of the welfare of others over the desires of
self (what Climacus calls "despairing" over self). In this condition, Climacus
contends, the ethical self cannot recover itself and fulfil its own telos. Its available
resources to do so remain within itself—and this is just what is annulled by the
ethical self.
Secondly, Anthony Rudd cogently argues that framed only within the means of
the ethical, ethics cannot stave off the threat of a plurality of demands (or
requirements, or systems of law), and this also threatens the unity of the self. "The
rationale for making ethical commitments in the first place", Rudd explains, "was
that only in this way could selfhood be achieved, could the multiplicity in the
individual's soul be resolved into a unity. But a non-religious ethics remains
pluralistic".83 The question now becomes: Whose law do I follow? How do I fulfil
all my obligations in the face of so many different and complex claims on my
person?
The problem that the ethicist encounters now is that it cannot ground the ethical
outside itself in the law either. This jeopardises both the self-relation, as we have
seen, and the relation of self to others, for not only is the self-relation consumed by
the universal constraints of the law, but the basis of the relation to the other is also
correspondingly subverted. "The ethical type seeks harmony with the other",
concludes Stephen Dunning, "but also fails to appreciate adequately the extent to
which the other is really other and not merely an instrument for ethical self-
realization".84 There is therefore a radical contradiction in the grammar of law and
norm as it is expressed in the ethical sphere, for ethics returns to its point of
departure from the esthetic—using the other as a means of self-advancement (which
83 Rudd, Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical, 134; see 131-140 for the full argument.
197
is unethical), and not treating them as ends. The ethical self thereby loses its basis
for both a genuine self-hood and sincere ethical action.85 As Climacus has already
observed, and Judge William implies, the way forward is not back to esthetical, but
on to the religious existence-sphere.
The Self in Religious Existence
The ethical life-view is to be replaced with the religious sphere—the sphere of
"fulfilment" as Frater Taciturnis put it. From the ethical existence-sphere, the
grammar of norm and law shifts from its location in the ethical acceptance of the
requirements of a self to a new ground within the consciousness of a law-giver; the
ethical self is transformed by the consciousness of "the power that established
it".86 In short, the ethical self finds it must be qualified under religious categories.
The ethicist finds it useful to refer to "God", but her/his program remains one of
self-realisation and under ethical constraints and thus references to God are invoked
only as a heuristic device to accomplish self-unification.87 In Fear and Trembling,
speaking on behalf of the ethical Johannes De Silentio explains that, "The ethical is
the universal, and as such it is also the divine".88 Ethical requirements persist as
essentially human products and thus Mark C. Taylor concludes that, "In ethical
obligation, one remains within the human realm", and precisely therein lies the
difficulty for the ethical self.89
84 Dunning, Kierkegaard's Dialectic ofInwardness, 180.
85 In Concept of Anxiety Vigilius Haufniensis describes the situation resulting from the ethical
aporia: "Ethics points to ideality as a task and assumes that every [hu]man possesses the requisite
conditions. Thus, ethics develops a contradiction inasmuch as it makes clear both the difficulty and
the impossiblity. . . . Ethics will have nothing to do with bargaining; nor can one in this reach
actuality. To reach actuality the whole movement must be reversed. This ideal characteristic of
ethics is what tempts one to use first metaphysical, then esthetic, and then psychological
categories in the treatment of it. But ethics, more than any other science, must resist these
temptations", KW VII 16-17/5V VI 114-15.
86 KW XIX 13/SVXV 73.
87 Mark C. Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 237.
88 KW VI 68/SV V 63.
89 Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, 238. De Silentio explains the ethical
conception of "God": "Thus it is proper to say that every duty is essentially duty to God, but if no
more can be said than this, then it is also said that I have no duty to God. The duty becomes duty
by being traced back to God, but in the duty itself I do not enter into relation to God. ... If in this
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The collision of the ethical sphere of existence with the religious, with "the
power that establishes it", is artfully (if somewhat laboriously) portrayed by De
Silentio as the "teleological suspension of the ethical" in Fear and Trembling.90
Echoing our above discussion of the aporia faced by the ethical self, De Silentio
states that, "Every time the single individual, after having entered the universal, feels
an impulse to assert [her/]himself as the single individual, [s/]he is in a spiritual trial
[Anfcegtelse ], from which [s/]he can work [her/]himself only by repentantly
surrendering as the single individual in the universal".91 That is, the telos of the
ethical, as the establishment of a self with a unified first-person perspective, reveals
itself to be such that it is only fulfilled only in spiritual or religious categories, such
as temptation, sin, repentance, guilt, salvation, and God. De Silentio continues to
explain that, "[i]f this is the highest that can be said of [a person] and [her/]his
existence, then the ethical is of the same nature as a person's eternal salvation, which
is the xeXog forevermore and all times", and a "teleological suspension of the
ethical" is required.92 De Silentio's fabled example of this is the Old Testament
story of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. The situation with Abraham is such that
"[b]y his act he transgressed the ethical altogether and had a higher xe^og outside if
in relation to which he suspended it".93 Abraham has heard the voice of God and he
is acting in obedience to a "higher power" who commands Abraham to perform
what the ethical, the Sittlichkeit as the "universally human", cannot allow. De
Silentio argues:
The ethical in the sense of the moral was present, it was cryptically in Isaac . . . and must
cry out with Isaac's mouth: Do not do this, you are destroying everything. . . . Why then
does Abraham do it? For God's sake and—the two are wholly identical—his own sake. . .
. The unity of the two is altogether correctly expressed in the word already used to describe
this relationship. It is an ordeal, a temptation. ... As a rule, what tempts a person is
something that will hold [her/]him back from doing his duty, but here the temptation is
connection I then say that it is my duty to love God, I am actually pronouncing a tautology,
inasmuch as 'God' in a totally abstract sense in here understood as the divine—that is, the
universal, that is, the duty", KW VI 68/5V V 63.
90 For an excellent treatment of this concept in Fear and Trembling see Calvin O. Schrag, "Note
on Kierkegaard's Teleological Suspension of the Ethical", Ethics 70: (1959), 66-68.
91 KW VI 54/5V V 51.
92 KW VI 54/5V V 51.
93 KW VI 59/SV V 55.
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the ethical itself, which would hold him back from doing God's will. But what is duty?
Duty is simply the expression for God's will.94
The situation of Abraham and Isaac described above perfectly illustrates the
aporia encountered by the ethical self. Isaac is an "other" who represents the
"universally human" and whose very presence appeals to Abraham on behalf of the
ethical. However, Abraham finds himself also in the presence of the Law-Giver, and
recognises that his self-relation to himself and all others is eclipsed by the presence
and demands of this Other. Abraham in fact perceives that his fortune is necessarily
linked to God—"the two are wholly identical". In the presence of God the ethical
cannot ground the self. The ethical, as the codification of the self's attempts to
achieve itself, represents sin as self-assertion over and against the will of God—and
the ethical is therefore a "temptation".
Religiousness A
The narrative of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac played out in Fear and Trembling
is the embodiment of what Climacus discusses under the locution of "Religiousness
A". This is essentially the "collision" of the ethical with the religious.95 In
Postscript Climacus carefully distinguishes a mundane, generic sort of religiousness
that maintains a congruity with moral consciousness and its requirement of choosing
of the ethical, from a more radical Christian religiousness that is designated
"Religiousness B". "Religiousness A", Climacus claims, "is the dialectic of
inward deepening", and subsequently is not "paradoxically dialectical", but is
instead "the relation to an eternal happiness that is not conditioned by a something
but is the dialectical inward deepening of the relation, consequently conditioned only
94 KW VI 59-60/SV V 55.
95 Climacus comments regarding Fear and Trembling that, "To represent this existence-collision
[between the ethical and religious] in an existing individual was impossible, since the difficulty of
the collision, although lyrically it extorts the utmost passion, dialectically holds back the
expression in absolute silence", KW XII. 1 262/SV IX 219. Note that De Silentio and Climacus
have two different purposes in their works. De Silentio seeks to describe the existential collision of
the ethical individual with the ethical, while Climacus seeks to describe the conditions under which
a Christian existence is qualified. Thus, while Climacus distinguishes between two types of
religiousness, Fear and Trembling makes no such distinction and refers only to "the religious".
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by the inward deepening".96 In other words, Religiousness A is basically
contiguous with the ethical and remains the "religion of immanence"; i.e., it is the
logical extension of "ethical-religious". Calvin Schrag outlines the affinities
between Religiousness A and the ethical, explaining that, "[Religiousness] A still
proceeds hand in glove with the project of the ethically existing subject in the
process of 'becoming subjective' . . . [and] there is already a God-relationship, but
as Climacus points out this is within the dialectic of an inward appropriation".97
Climacus summarises the grammar of subjectivity traced thus far:
Immediacy, the esthetic, finds no contradiction in existing; to exist is one thing,
contradiction is something else that comes from without. The ethical finds contradiction
but within self-assertion. Religiousness A comprehends contradiction as suffering in self-
annihilation, yet within immanence; but ethically accentuating existing, it hinders the
existing person in abstractly remaining in immanence or in becoming abstract by wanting
to remain in immanence.98
The "contradiction" lacking in the esthetic sphere is the absence of an awareness of
the aporia of (non)self-relation which characterises the esthetic mode of being. The
esthete of Either!Or does not perceive that there is a fundamental contradiction
between his goals and his perspective on the world. The ethicist, on the other hand, is
aware of the contradiction facing the esthetic sphere and chooses to assert himself.
In so doing, however, the ethical discovers its aporia—that in choosing oneself in
this manner, one also "annihilates" oneself. Religiousness A, then, transforms the
ethical and offers the self a transcendence-within-immanence. The basic grammar of
the ethical, as that of norm and law, is still in force only the locus of this grammar is
shifted away from the universally human by the presence of God. The self now has
the resources it needs for fulfillment.
Again we see that the qualification of a new existence-sphere just is a mode of
being-in-and-toward-the-world. The new categories of Religiousness A, such as
"guilt-consciousness" and "the eternal", position the self so that it has a view of
reality that includes, and indeed requires, a self-relation beyond itself in time.
Climacus explains that one whose life is defined by the dimension of Religiousness
96 AW XII. 1 556/SV X 225.
97 Schrag, "Kierkegaard Effect", 8.
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A relates oneself to the eternal and "collects [her/]himself' in this relation." In
Religiousness A, then, the self obtains an "eternal" vantage-point so that it may
achieve self-transcendence and acquire itself. The transcendence of Religiousness A
is nonetheless within immanence and is understood within the categories of
immanence so that "eternity" remains congruent with and intelligible from within
temporal existence.100
When we combine Climacus's insights with De Silentio's working out of the
suspension of the ethical in the story ofAbraham and Isaac in Fear and Trembling,
several things become apparent regarding the existence-sphere of Religiousness A in
contrast to the ethical. First, the grammar of norm and law, rooted now in the
consciousness of God, produces the existential determinant of guilt-
consciousness.101 The possibility of guilt does not exist in the ethical as one is
ultimately beholden only to oneself (as the "universally human"). Therefore the fact
of sin and the awareness of one's guilt cannot arise in the ethical sphere of life. Sin
is "the crucial point of departure for religious existence",102 for it entails
transgression against an Other beyond my control or manipulation. It is true,
Climacus admits, that, "[i]n Fear and Trembling sin was used occasionally in order
to throw light on Abraham's ethical suspension, but no more than that".103 The
ethical is characterised positively by the requirement on the self established through
the act of choosing and it is precisely the collision of the ethical self with its own
inability to contend with these demands that propells the self to the limits of the
ethical. The phenomena of "guilt-consciousness" thus signifies that the self
measures itself against something other than itself as the "universally human".
98 KW XII. 1 572-73/SV X 239.
"XWXII.l 510/SV X 237.
100 "Religiousness A accentuates existing as actuality, and eternity, which in the underlying
immanence still sustains that while, vanishes in such a way that the positive becomes
distinguishable the negative. ... for Religiousness A, only the actuality of existence is, and yet
the eternal is continually hidden by it and in hiddeness is present. ... In Religiousness A, the
eternal is unbique et nuquam [everywhere and nowhere] but hidden by the actuality of existence",
KW XII. 1 510/SV X 237-38; his italics.
101 KW XII. 1 569-70/SV X 228-29.
102 KW XII. 1 268/SV IX 224.
103 KW XII. 1 268/5V IX 224.
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Second the telos of the ethical is taken up (,aufheben) into the sphere of religion.
That is to say, the ethical is teleologically suspended and therefore its basic program
of self-realisation is recontextualised and continued on in the religious mode of
being. The duties or requirements of the ethical are absolute and universal in that
they are intimately concerned with the actualisation of the self in time. Another way
to understand the aporia of the ethical self is the realisation that the object(s) of its
commitment, its projects (e.g., institutional roles like marriage), are relative while its
requirements qua means of self-realisation are absolute. So there is an
incommensurability between the telos of the ethical and the means available to the
ethical to achieve that end: "But do not forget that marriage is not the absolute
xe^o^", Climacus reminds us.104 On the other hand, in Religiousness A the
absolute telos is brought into relation with an absolute object—God. Abraham
discovers that doing his duty for his sake is coincidental with obeying God's
commands for God's sake. Thus Climacus formulates the axiom: "the maximum of
the task is to be able simultaneously to relate oneself absolutely to the absolute
xeXog and relatively to the relative ends, or at all time to have the absolute xe/.oq with
oneself'.103 The exercise of the absolute relation in Religiousness A remains within
immanental categories and is therefore defined in terms of its "cultural
predicates"—religious institutions and their attending beliefs, practices, and
institutional roles.106 Calvin Schrag's conclusion is that Religiousness A "is an
inmixing not only of the ethical sphere but also with the aesthetic sphere", so that it
"is able to express itself in a variety of religious forms, be they Christian, buddhist
or Islamic, Jewish or Hindu".107
Third, in Religiousness A we have the self-relations of self-to-self and self-to-
other eclipsed by the intrusion of the self-to-God relation. Climacus describes this
feature of
104 KW XII. 1 412/SVX 104.
105 KW XII. 1 414/SKX 105.
106 Schrag, "Kierkegaard Effect", 9.
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Religiousness A as "the self-annihilation that finds the relationship with God within
itself'.108 The ethical in Isaac, as one who constitutes part of the Sittlichkeit, tempts
Abraham and cries out that he is destroying everything. And indeed, Abraham is
destroying everything, for he is placing his God-relation above all else—self, other,
and world.
Religiousness A is the first movement of religiousness109 and configures the
absolute telos of the self under the aegis of the eternal. This is the fourth element of
Religiousness A. Temporal relations are now construed in light of their relation to
the eternal. The combination of the eternal and a Law-Giver transform the grammar
of norm and law so that one's relations to self and others must be reconfigured
according to the laws sanctioned and decreed by God. This produces an awareness
of the individual's guilt, or failure, to uphold these duties and to be in relation to
God. In Religiousness A an individual is positioned within the world so that, as with
Abraham, "God's sake" and the individual's sake are wholly identical. One's duty
was formerly defined in the ethical by the "universally human" and in terms of
societal norms, whereas now one's allegiance in Religiousness A is now to the
norms of a religious tradition or institution, defined by one's duty to an absolute
telos.
Religiousness A is the "dialectic of inwardness"—-it is part of the process of
self-realisation, and within this process it is discovered that the self's infinite and
eternal dimension point to a transcendent "power that establishes" the self. God,
then, functions in Religiousness A something like Kant's postulation of God,110 and
this initial religious sphere recalls the basic structure of Kant's moral construal of
107 Ibid., 8. Cf. Climacus comment that, "Religiousness A can be present in paganism, and in
Christianity it can be the religiousness of everyone who is not decisively Christian, whether
baptized or not", KW XII. 1 557/SV X 226.
108 KW XII. 1 560/SV X 229.
109 Climacus writes, "Religiousness A must first be present in the individual before there can be
any consideration of becoming aware of the dialectical B", KW XII. 1 556/SV X 226.
110 See Immanuel Kant, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith
(London: MacMillan, 1950), 644, where Kant argues that we postulate the existence of God "in
order that through such agency effect may be given" to the laws of morality. For discussion of
God's existence in Kant see Lewis White Beck, A Commentary On Kant's Critique of Practical
Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), 171-178.
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religion as understood "within the bounds of reason alone".111 The eternal (God) is
found through human initiative and effort and is closely linked with the rational and
existential demands of moral responsibility.112 In this respect, Religiousness A is
coincidental with the Socratic as the highest expression of subjectivity within
immanental categories. The truth, the being in truth of the individual (as Salighed), is
presumed in Religiousness A to be a feature of human existence that is attainable
through the exercise of human rational capacities. Climacus states that, "Viewed
Somatically, the eternal essential truth is not at all paradoxical in itself, but only by
being related to an existing person".113 The Socratic relation of the individual to the
eternal generates the aporia of self in Religiousness A, which we have already seen
worked out by Climacus in Fragments."4 In the spirit of his remarks in Fragments,
Climacus notes in Postscript that bringing the human person in relation to the
eternal produces "another Socratic thesis: that all knowing is a recollecting".115
Religiousness A is thus faced with the challenge of accounting for the being-in-
truth of the individual in time that presented itself to Greek philosophy. One can
either be a Socrates (or Abraham) and continue paradoxically to emphasise existing,
or one can flee existence and take refuge in speculation, as did Plato (and Descartes,
Hegel, and "modem philosophy"). Chapter Four explained that Socrates and Plato
both postulate that humans are able to know the truth because they are eternal beings
who possess the truth from eternity. Eternity is therefore viewed in relation to the
individual as laying behind and within human existence. Human knowing is a
recollecting back to what one acquired in a prior, eternal state, that remains
incipiently present to the individual. The basis for self-relation, the eternal, is
therefore within apex son and the self actually lives itself backwards towards its past
fulfillment. There is, in otherwords, no future fulfillment of self. Climacus critiques
111 See Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. T.M. Greene and H.H. Hudson
(London: Open Court Publishing, 1934). For a superb exposition of the relation between Kant's
critique of religion and Religousness A, see Schrag, "Kierkegaard Effect", especially 9-10.
112 Schrag, "Kierkegaard Effect", 10.
113 KW XII. 1 204/SV IX 171.
114 See Chapter Four for this discussion.
115 KW XII. 1 204/SV IX 171.
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Socratic/Platonic Recollection because it ignores the temporal dimension of human
existence and ultimately entails that, strictly speaking, there is no self who acts and
who has as a feature of its historical existence an eternal happiness. Recall
Climacus's point in Fragments in which he argues that in the Socratic schemata,
[particular historical relations] cannot concern me with regard to my eternal happiness,
because this is given to me retrogressively in the possession of truth that I had from the
beginning without knowing it . . . the temporal point of departure is a nothing, because
in the same moment that I discover I have known the truth from eternity without
knowing it, in the same instant that moment is hidden in the eternal, assimilated into it
in such a way that I, so to speak, still cannot find it because there is no Here and no
There, but only an ubique et nusquam [everywhere and nowhere].116
There is, in other words, no "moment" for the self, no genuine historical
concretion in which the self is able to collect itself. The theory of recollection is a
Socratic confusion—one which Socrates himself contradicts existentially in his faith
in an "unknown God" for whom he willing surrenders his life. The untenability of
Socratic Recollection has dire consequences for the absolute telos of the self in
Religiousness A. One who is in the sphere of Religiousness A must choose if s/he
wishes to follow Socrates in the continuing development of her/his subjectivity, and
achieve her/his existence as an historical feature of reality; but then s/he must also
face the ironic incoherence of Socrates's life/death—that s/he cannot actually bring
one's subjectivity into relation the truth and ultimately must cast one's fortunes
upon "the god". Or one may opt to follow the route of speculation, in which case
one must maintain an untenable atemporal view of the self that becomes an
"objective fiction", disconnected from historical, existential concretion. Either way,
via the Socratic or via Speculation, the self is trapped in a contradiction that it cannot
of itself resolve. (And we are once more reminded of Climacus's caution in
Fragments that to claim to go beyond Socrates when one nevertheless says
essentially the same thing as he, is a fundamental confusion.)117 The self has
exhausted its conceptual resources and can proceed no further on its telos by way of
immanental categories. The transcendence-within-immanence of Religiousness A is
116 KW VII 12/SV VI 17.
117 KW VII 11 l/SV VI 99.
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impoverished to provide the self with a genuine transcendence—or "eternal
happiness".
Religiousness B
The only possibility for a fully integrated, unified self must come, then, from
outside the resources of the self and must involve a break with immanence. The type
of religiousness which accepts this proposition Climacus calls "paradoxical-
religiousness" or Religiousness B.us The guilt-consciousness of Religiousness A
becomes "sin-consciousness"119 in Religiousness B, as the self recognises its mis-
relationship to God and the hopelessness of its moral striving.120 It is precisely this
type of religiousness that has been worked out by Climacus in Fragments.'2I There
we saw, that a move beyond the Socratic required a complete rupture of immanental
categories—what is required is the eternal-in-time, and a revelation of God (not just
from God) in which the condition for the possibility of being-in-truth is bestowed
upon the individual within time. In Postscript Climacus expounds on this:
In Religiousness B, the upbuilding is something outside the individual; the individual
does not find the upbuilding by finding the relationship with God within [her/]himself but
relates [her/]himself to something outside [her/]himself in order to find the upbuilding. . .
. The paradoxical upbuilding therefore corresponds to the category of God in time as an
individual human being, because, it is the case that the individual relates [her/]himself to
something outside [her/]himself. That this cannot be thought is precisely the paradox.122
Where the Socratic thesis of Religiousness A began with the principle that
subjectivity was truth, it ended with the realisation that subjectivity was in fact
untruth. Now in a second movement of subjectivity, this time initiated by God,
Religiousness B restores subjectivity to the truth. Religiousness B is circumscribed
by the Christian narrative of the incarnation of Jesus Christ as the Son of God. No
longer are the requirements on the self able to be construed according to the
grammar of norm and duty, nor can they be sustained as rational principles of
118 KW XII. 1 556/SV X 225.
119 KW XII. 1 583/SV X 249.
120 Schrag, "Kierkegaard Effect", 11.
121 In discussing the difference between Religiousnesses A and B in Postscript Climacus states:
"Please compare this with Fragments, Chapters IV and V, where the distinctive dialectic of the
paradoxical-historical is emphasized", KW XII. 1 579/SV X 245.
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thought meant to organise our world and self-relations. In Religiousness B the self
is drawn out through a "grammar of grace and gift" that is articulated through the
"dynamics of in the paradox of gift-giving and gift-receiving, which is at once
transcendent and immanent, operative within the economies of human endeavour but
living off resources that are supervenient".123
Religiousness B functions as a critique of both teleological and deontological
construals of ethical-religious duties facing the self.124 In this new sphere of
Christian religiousness, the unity of the self is received, not conjured, and is realised
(paradoxically) in and through its giving away of itself, not in the execution of a
cannonised and codified set of prescriptions and procedures. The shift to the
grammar of grace and gift does not entail a jettisoning of the grammar of norm and
law, but rather a fulfdling of it. There is a recontextualising of the law so that the
ethical-religious requirements (laws) of Religiousness A are transvalued (to co-opt a
term from Nietzsche) in Religiousness B.123 It is not that the standards for ethical-
religious being of Religiousness A are now seen as wrong or false or no longer
applicable. Instead, it is the case that in Religiousness B these are no longer required
as the basis for achieving one's absolute telos or eternal happiness. In other words,
the law is not abolished but preserved—only with a different function. The eternal
God who comes to be known by us in time, to graciously bestow on us the
possibility of appropriate self-relation, has initiated a mode of self-relation through
his loving, participation in the suffering of the coming-to-be of existence.
Religiousness B maintains the dialectical tension between law and grace, affirming
the ethical-religious pathos of Religiousness A, while at the same time making this
dependent upon an historical encounter wilh God that effects an historical
transformation of a person's life.126
l22KWXll.\ 561/5V X 229.
123 Schrag, The Self After Postmodernity, 143, 141.
124 Ibid., 143.
125 Calvin Schrag uses the term "transvalued morality" in relation to Kierkegaard's grammar of
Religiousness B in "Kierkegaard Effect", 11.
126 Climacus contends that the defining characteristic is that it maintains a position that preserves a
dialectical tension so that it properly called "paradoxical religiousness ... or the religiousness that
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The grammar of grace and gift is spelled out clearly in the veronymous Works of
Love in which Kierkegaard affirms that in the Christian narrative love is commanded
of us by God. In the command to love we find the coincidence of the perfect law and
love. This command, however, cannot be understood simply through the grammar of
norm and law. Thus, Works of Love is properly understood as working out the
grammar of grace and gift of Religiousness B.127 It is on this point that issue must
be taken with Merold Westphal's reading of the relationship Religiousness B and
Works of Love}2* Westphal argues that Kierkegaard's Works of Love demarcates
another religious sphere that represents Kierkegaard's vision of the truly Christian
way of being-in-the-world. Works of Love thereby completes the theory of
existence-spheres. In Works ofLove, Westphal argues, we have Christ as the Pattern
to be imitated, and not merely the Absolute Paradox to be believed, as in Climacus's
Religiousness B.129 Therefore, Works of Love offers a new distinctively Christian
religiousness—a Religiousness C—as opposed to the quasi-Christian religiousness
of Climacus's Religiousness B. Westphal's analysis is a major contribution to the
literature on Kierkegaard's stages, but there remains a marked difference between
the treatments of Christianity by Climacus and S. Kierkegaard in Works of Love.
Kierkegaard does not articulate a sphere distinct from that delineated in Climacus's
Religiousness B. For both Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms belief is a mode of
being in the world of time-space.130 Consequently, belief in the Absolute Paradox
means imitating Christ the Pattern. Because its author (Johannes Climacus)
has the dialectical in the second place", KW XII. 1 556/SV X 225; see the full discussion of this in
KW XII. 1 555-578/6V X 224-244. Later Climacus mkaes it clear that the dialectical nature of
Religiousness B is directly related to its preserving Relgiousness A: "Religiousness B is isolating,
separating, is polemical. . . . Every Christian has pathos as in Religiousness A, and then this
pathos of separation", KW XII. 1 582/SV X 248.
127 For this claim see Calvin Schrag who argues: "Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling and his
Either/Or need to be read against the backdrop of his Works of Love", Schrag, The Self After
Postmodernity, 143.
128 See Westphal, Becoming A Self, 194-196; see also Westphal's argument in, "Kierkegaard's
Teleological Suspension of Religiousness B", in Foundations of Kierkegaard's Vision of
Community: Religion, Ethics, and Politics in Kierkegaard , eds. George B. Connell and C.
Stephen Evans (London: Humanities Press, 1992), pp. 110-129.
129 Westphal, Becoming a Self, 198; and Westphal, "Kierkegaard's Teleological Suspension of
Religiousness B",l 17 ff.
130 This will be treated in detail in Chapter Seven.
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ostensibly is not a Christian and does not believe in Christ (that is, he does not have
faith), Postscript discusses the dialectic of Religiousness B (i.e., Christianity)
esthetically from outside of it as a thought-possibility. Works of Love, however,
speaks from within Religiousness B and is an example of it.
In this way, Works of Love completes the pseudonymous authorship and the
theory of stages, but not in the manner Westphal outlines. Climacus in Postscript
communicates the theoretical and dialectical dynamics of Christianity (as possibility)
while Works ofLove communicates actual Christianity—that is, it is Christianity, the
book itself is a work of love. To this end, Kierkegaard argues in Chapter X of the
Second Series in Works of Love that praising love is itself a work of love.
Kierkegaard argues that praising love is not a poetic art, which primarily requires
talent, but is instead something that is a work, fundamentally requiring personal
effort. Therefore praising love transforms the laudatory one into a loving person.
Praising love, "is a work, and of course a work of love, because it can be done only
in love or, more accurately defined, in the love of truth".131 Having carefully argued
that "worldly" erotic love is actually love of oneself and that Christian love is self-
denial,132 Kierkegaard contends that, "in order to be able to praise love, self-denial is
required inwardly and self-sacrificing unselfishness outwardly",133 In so doing one
is actually being Christianity in actuality by allowing the God-relationship, through
Christ, to transform and shape one's subjectivity, and thus embody Christ's
narrative in a repetition.
Works of Love is thereby able to give us a picture, or a grammar, of the self in
transcendence. The First Series (of the book's two) focuses on expositing the
biblical command: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself'. The command to
love maintains the paradoxical feature of Religiousness B in that, Kierkegaard
observes, it "contains an apparent contradiction: [that] to love is a duty".134 Making
love into a duty that one has towards each neighbour one transgresses the esthetic
131 KW XVI 360/SV XII 342.
132 KW XVI 55-6/SV XII 60.
133 KW XVI 374/SV XII 356.
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dimension of love by destroying love's sensual immediacy. Yet, framed within the
grammar of grace and gift, the Christian command to love the neighbour as oneself
also subverts an ethical-religious construal of love in two ways. First, as Kierkegaard
notes in the preface, the love described in Works of Love does not concern the
concept of love from an abstracted, eternal point of view, "as if hereby all its works
were now added up and described".133 This type of approach is not possible from
within Religiousness A—as perhaps in a Platonic project of grasping of the eternal
forms, or a Kantian project of projecting the basis for rational moral action—and
entails a radical break with immanence. Instead, the deliberations in Works of Love
are "about works of love" which "in its total richness is essentially inexhaustible"
and "in its smallest work essentially indescribable just because essentially it is
totally present everywhere and essentially cannot be described".136 The love
required in Religiousness B cannot be recollected (in the Socratic sense) but only
revealed by God in time.137
Secondly, the command to love the neighbour outstrips Religiousness A because
the possibility of giving love (i.e., obeying the command) does not come from within
the natural resources of human subjectivity but is predicated upon first receiving the
love of God, which is then freely given to the neighbour. Kierkegaard elaborates on
this point:
Just as the quiet lake originates deep down in hidden springs no eye has seen, so also does
a person's love originate even more deeply in God's love. If there were no gushing spring
at the bottom, if God were not love, then there would be neither the little lake nor a
human being's love. Just as the quiet lake originates darkly in the deep spring, so a
human being's love originates mysteriously in God's love.138
The very thing commanded of humans by God is that which we cannot do without
his aid. It is also that which he graciously gives. The command to love, as belonging
to the grammar of norm and law, is undercut by its placement within the context of
God's economy of grace and gift. The self who performs the works of love by
134 KW XVI 24/SV XII 28.
135 KW XVI 3/SV XII 9.
136 KW XVI 3/SV XII 9; his italics.
137 KW XVI 27/SV XII 31.
138 KW XVI 9-10/SV XII 14-15.
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loving the neighbour, by receiving the gift of love and in obedience reciprocating that
love, is a self in transcendence. Kierkegaard's prefatory prayer to Works of Love
makes this clear by situating the source of all earthly love with God in heaven.139 Yet
the opening prayer also affirms that this self is still a human self in historical
concretion by scripting the self within the redemptive narrative of Christ's
incamational "love-sacrifice".140 The stunning result is that Kierkegaard succeeds
in "showing how the love of one's neighbor is quite commensurate with a proper
regard for oneself. In the love relationship both self and other are enriched, against
the backdrop of God's unconditional love for both".141 The self of Religiousness B
is therefore afulfilled self—a multi-dimensional selfwith a fully unified first-person
perspective on the world. In Religousness B, the self is granted the resources to
achieve itself from outside of itself and thereby gains a genuine transcendence as an
historically concrete, existing person. The self in Religiousness B attains
Salighed—or more precisely, in Religiousness B the self receives the condition for
the possibility of Salighed.
There is therefore a radically different perspective gained on reality within the
sphere of Religiousness B that effects a complete transformation of one's relations
to self, time, and others. First, in Religiousness B the self gains, to revert to the
language of Anti-Climacus employed in Chapter Five, "transparency". The self
attains a unity in all its sundry expressions of a type that is very different from the
abstracted unifying point of Cartesian subjectivity. In Kierkegaard's Religiousness
B the self is decentered from its Cartesian throne. However, as a product of its
relation to God as the power that establishes it, the self achieves a unity across its
existential concretions that is best described in what Schrag calls a transversal
unity.142 The concept of transversality denotes most basically a line extending across
139 KW XVI 3-4/SV XII 9-10.
140 KW XVI 3/5V XII 10.
141 Schrag, "Kierkegaard Effect", 16 nl3.
142 Schrag, The Self After Postmodernity, 128ff. See also Schrag's Chapter Six, "Transversal
Rationality", in The Resources of Rationality: A Response to the Postmodern Clwllenge
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 148-179, for a discussion of transversality
applied in a slightly different context than in relation to a Kierkegaardian notion of subjectivty. In
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a field of diverse, self-contained domains. Thinking of Kierkegaard's transparency
as a transversal unity displays a sensitivity to temporal and spatial constraints as a
basic framework of the self, and acknowledges various modes or modules within
that framework. The unity that is achieved transversally from among many varied
expressions is one of "convergence without coincidence, conjuncture without
concordance, overlapping without assimilation, and union without absorption".143
To say further that the unity expressed by Kierkegaard's transparent subjectivity is a
transversal unity is to say that it is never (for the existing subject in time) a finalised
result that is enjoyed from an eternal, totalised (presuppositionless) vantage point—it
is always being worked out with "fear and trembling". The transversal unity of the
Kierkegaardian subject is a unity that has as its condition a transcendent point
outside itself—as its future hope. This unity is worked out by a person in a
perpetual unifying process of collecting in the God-relation one's various modes
and expressions of being together in and through time-space so that the eternal
vantage point is made historically concrete. This account convereges with Anti-
Climacus's notion of the transparency of a deep subjectivity. For Anti-Climacus
transparency is never conceived in Kierkegaard's writings as an atemporal self-
cognition, but is the achieving of an existential clarity in which one knows oneself in
and through one's actions.144 The expression and content of the transversally
unified self is a self who is and does the works of love.
Second, in relation to time, the self in transcendence inhabits time in relation to a
present reality that holds within it a future (not past) hope of eternal blessedness
(,Salighed). Time now is imbued with the possible "moment" of attaining the truth
(as beiiig-in-lrulh). The self is situated within kairotic time; an opportune time that is
both instances Schrag does not use the concept of transversality in direct correlation to
Kierkegaardian subjectivity or the concept of transparency, and in the end he puts the concept of
transversal unity to different purposes than that for which it is used here.
143 Schrag, The SelfAfter Postmodernity, 128.
144 See, for example, KW XIX 94/SV XV 145; and JP I 1050/Pap. VIII1 B 192.
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bursting with promise and the hope of fulfilled possibilities.143 This transformation
of the self-time relation also, thirdly, reconfigures the relation of self to others. We
inhabit time and space that is also shared by others. These others arc now
understood as the neighbour who is no longer preferentially defined (as in
Religiousness A) as the one who is closest to me and to whom I must discharge a
duty in the name of self-fulfilment. Instead, in Religiousness B the neighbour is a
fellow sinner to whom grace has been given, as one co-implicated with me in the
suffering of coming into existence, sharing my human sinfulness, but also to whom
God has graciously extended his redemption and forgiveness.146 The question
regarding to whom my duties apply cannot arise within the economy of
Religiousness B. Kierkegaard defines the neighbour by expositing Jesus's story of
the Good Samaritan in Luke 10, and notes the response of Jesus to the Pharisee's
question of him, "Who is my neighbour"?
If someone . . . asks, "Who is my neighbor?" then that reply of Christ to the Pharisee
will contain answer only in a singular way, because in the answer the question is actually
first turned around, whereby the meaning is: how is a person to ask the question. . . . The
Pharisee's answer [that the neighbor is the one who showed mercy to the Samaritan] is
contained in Christ's question, which by its form compelled the Pharisee to answer in that
way. The one to whom I have a duty is my neighbor, and when I fulfill my duty 1 show
that I am a neighbor. Christ does not speak about knowing the neighbor but about
becoming a neighbor oneself, about showing oneself to be a neighbor . . .147
Relgiousness B inverts the objectification of the neighbour that is part of
Religiousness A. Jesus defines the neighbour subjectively and thereby frustrates the
Pharisaical desire to discover objectively the scope of one's responsibility so one's
duty may be dispensed. The question "Who is my neighbour?" becomes in
Religiousness B, "To whom am I being a neighbour?", or yet, "Are those I
encounter each day being encountered by me as neighbours?".
The point is that the encounter of others in the kairotic time of Relgiousness B
takes place within the redemptive narrative of the life of Jesus Christ. In Works of
Love Kierkegaard explains that Christian love—as the sort of love that is
145 This is the thesis of Chapter III of the Second Series in Works of Love, "Love Hopes All
Things - and Yet Is Never Put To Shame". See KW XVI 246-263/SV XII 237-253. See also
Schrag, "Kierkegaard Effect", 11.
146 Schrag, "Kierkegaard Effect", 11.
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commanded of us—is the fulfilling of the ethical-religious law, and as such, it is
"sheer action".148 The action of love, which is also the very substance of love, is
embodied in the life of Christ who is the "end of the Law"149 in two ways: (1)
Christ is the fulfillment of the law as its intended goal, and (2) Christ brings the law
to completion and renders it obsolete. As Kierkegaard explains, the life of
transcendence (as the life of love) is therefore to be understood through and by
means of the narrative of Christ's life:
Christ was the fulfilling of the Law. How this is to be understood we are to learn from
him, because he was the explanation, and only when the explanation is what it explains,
when the explainer is what is explained, when the explanation [Forklaring] is the
transfiguration [Forflarelse], only then is the relation the right one.150
Christ's life is the both the explanation and the explanans; the narrative of
Christ's life is both the explanation and the criterion for the life of Relgiousness B.
Living the life of love means living in terms of and through the very power of the life
of Christ. One who wishes to participate in the hope of eternity and the transparency
of Salighed must therefore look to Christ as "the Way".151 The first movement of
the narrative of Christ's life is his "debasement", his voluntary kenosis as a self-
renunciation and participation in the suffering of coming-to-be in the temporal and
spatial order that lead ultimately to crucifixion.152 There is no getting to Christ's
exaltation without going through his humiliation. Religiousness B therefore entails
what Kierkegaard describes in Works of Love as an "annihilation before God"153
in "self-denial and sacrifice".154 At the center of Religiousness B stands the cross
of a suffering, crucified God, who provides the occasion that transfigures our
experience of time and others. Thus, before the cross all persons are equal as
147 KW XVI 22/SV XII 27; my italics.
148 KW XVI 98-100/5V XII 99-100.
149 Kierkegaard quotes the apostle Paul from Romans 10:4: "Christ was the end of the Law"; KW
XVI 99/SV XII 99; my italics.
150 KW XVI 101/5V XII 100.
151 KW XVI 248/5V XII 238. See also KW XX 171/5V XVI 168; KW XV 221/SV XI 205-06; JP
IV 4279, 4360/Pap. X3 A 253, XI2 279.
152 KW XVI 102-03, 111-12, 248/5V XII 102-03, 111-12, 238. Kierkegaard also explains
elsewhere that, "to follow Christ means to take up one's cross or, as it says in the text just read,
carry one's cross. To carry one's cross means to deny oneself'; KW XV 221/5V XI 205-06.
153 KW XVI 103/5V XII 103.
154 KW XVI 113/5V XII 113.
215
condemned as sinful and those for whom God has suffered to atone. However,
instead of seeing others as infinitely sinful, the person in Religiousness B
encounters others as infinitely redeemable. The neighbour presents me with myself
as an object—my ethical-religious self is reified in the face of the other as I with
inwardness view the other, not as an object in my world to whom I have an
obligation, but as a subject to whom I must give myself, as one with whom I am
being redeemed by grace.155 In this self-denying exchange I am constituted as a
point actually existing in my world. Religiousness B is the paradoxical economy of
faith in which one finds oneself by losing oneself, where giving oneself away means
receiving oneself back by grace, and where the crucifixion of the self yields eternal
blessedness.
Conclusion to Chapter Six
Kierkegaard constructs his grammar of the movements of human subjectivity
towards a fulfilled, complete, and self-transparent subjectivity in terms of three basic
existence-spheres: the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious. These are distinct and
possible modes of being-in-the-world and being-towards-the-world of a human
subjectivity and a self within an existence-sphere which carries with it that mode of
apprehending and comprehending the world.
Let us review how this grammar developed through four seminal works. The two
volumes ofEitherlOr present the basic structure of esthetic and ethical existence. An
esthete lives in an atemporal world of sensual immediacy that is characterised by a
lack of relation and expressed in a grammar of presence and distanciation. Esthetic
existence is marked by a kind of abstract distance from the world, and the esthete
objectively apprehends reality as a stage for self-gratification. The aporia of self in
esthetic existence is that there is no self for the esthete. The ethical self transforms
the sensual immediacy of the esthete into a temporal horizon of past, present, and
future by choosing itself. In choosing oneself the world is viewed by the ethical
155 In a draft copy of Works of Love Kierkegaard wrote: "But the neighbor is not the other /, the
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person as a place of requirement. Reality and our sensual involvements in the world
are now perceived as a place of commitment and self-evaluation expressed in a
grammar of norm and law. Fear and Trembling clearly demonstrates that the
aporia of the self in the ethical stems from the fact that the self cannot ground a
grammar of norm and law within itself, as a finite and temporal creature. In this
situation, the ethical self loses itself and the other. The grammar of norm and law
therefore comes to be expressed in terms of Religiousness A, in which the self
encounters a "teleological suspension of the ethical". The ethical self finds it
necessary to change its perception of its moral requirements so that these are
grounded in eternity. Ultimately this remains within immanental categories and the
self cannot achieve a genuine unity or transcendence (that is, transparency). The
aporia of the self in Religiousness A concerns the inability of its immanental
conception of eternity (as laying behind the subject) to ratify the self in time. What
is required is a complete break with immanence and the resources for a fulfilled
subjectivity must come from outside of it. The logic of this move is detailed in
Postscript and embodied in Works of Love. This final movement of the self entails
an identification with the eternal-in-time, the god who suffered in existence, so that
one is able to unify one's existence by transcribing it into and through Christ's
redemptive narrative. The life of Christ is the life of transparency and this
transparency is continually achieved through the self-sacrifice of the life of love,
lived through the works of love.
In the development of Climacus's grammar of the existence-spheres it has
become obvious that ontology begins to encroach on epistemology. The result of the
grammar of subjectivity is a self that sees or knows itself transparently. Chapter
Seven explores this theme further in Kierkegaard's grammar of belief.
neighbor is the other you who is every other human being"; KW XVI 431 /Pap. VIII2 B 31:15.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE GRAMMAR OF BELIEF
To you it shall be as you have believed . . . what is done for a man is always according to
his faith.
S0ren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
What the skeptics really should be caught in is the ethical.
Spren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
The law for the development of the self with respect to knowing, insofar as it is the case
that the self becomes itself, is that the increase of knowledge corresponds to the increase
of self-knowledge, that the more the self knows, the more it knows itself.
Anti-Climacus, Sickness Unto Death
Chapters Five and Six form a comprehensive grammar of Kierkegaardian
subjectivity. There are really two complementary grammars of subjectivity we find in
Kierkegaard's writings. One, discussed in Chapter Six, details the basic features of
human subjectivity in its ontological coordinates. A human self is finite and situated
temporally (and in other ways) and is such that we may fail to acquire one. In other
words, a human self is action—a becoming [Tilblivelse] in time. There is a contrast
between thin subjectivity that is able (just) to reflexively refer itself in the first-
person, and a fully developed, multi-dimensional, and first-person perspective on the
world—which may be termed a deep subjectivity. Kierkegaard describes the action
of becoming a self as repentance. Chapter Six presented a grammar of the
movements or actions of repentance as the self acquires its depth-dimensions. These
are the existential coordinates of the self, understood m relation to time and others,
and are detailed in Kierkegaard's pseudonymous theory of the existence-spheres.
The end of the existence-spheres is the self-transparency, or deep subjectivity,
described in the grammar of Chapter Five.
At this point in our study we finally are positioned to see how Kierkegaard's
development of subjectivity is fundamentally epistemological. In his theory of stages
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and his grammar of subjectivity Kierkegaard is mixing ontological and
epistemological categories. What we find is that his phenomenology of subjectivity
depends also upon a phenomenology of belief formation.
Before moving from Kierkegaard's grammar of the existence-spheres to his
account of belief, we must first turn to the nature of the transitions between the
existence-spheres. How are existential transitions made according to Kierkegaard;
how does one move from one sphere of existence to another? And what does this
have to do with belief? The aim in this closing chapter is to make good on the claim
that Kierkegaard's theory of existence-spheres is deeply epistemological and has an
essential cognitive element. This is evidenced, it will be argued, by the pivotal role
that beliefs play in the transition between existence-spheres, as well as by the manner
in which a person's belief-states are changed by these ontological transformations.
On Kierkegaard's account, belief and subjectivity run together and one must always
speak of one when speaking of the other. Kierkegaard's meta-epistemology requires
an ethics of belief. Finally, upon examination, Kierkegaard's account of beliefs
requires that we understand there to be different levels at which beliefs are formed,
ranging from beliefs about specific states of affairs to an over-arching life-view.
These belief levels are hierarchical in that the upper-levels of belief influence, or
provide the context for, the levels of belief that fall under them.
Existence-Spheres and the Transition to Belief
To properly begin to articulate Kierkegaard's grammar of belief, we must return
to his theory of the existence-spheres. This is because the theory of the stages
presents the starting point of Kierkegaard's phenomenology of doxastic formation.
Four important concepts converge in Kierkegaard's account of the existence-
spheres and the transitions that occur in a movement from one sphere to the next:
imagination, will, passion, and belief. As we shall see below, these four concepts
combine to produce the conditions for the transitions between one existence-sphere
to the another.
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An existential "movement" between existence-spheres must not be thought of
as a linear progression. We have already noted that a transition between existence-
spheres takes the character of an Aufhebung in which the transition does not leave
behind, but rather refigures, the former mode of being and its attending life-view.
The terminology of "transition" and "movements" is therefore potentially
misleading. Rather than thinking of these existential shifts as moves strictly from
one domain to another, it is more accurate to view them as the gaining of a new set of
ontological attributes. These new qualities then reconfigure and resituate the former
ontological properties in a new context. In this case we may speak of a movement
between two stages as the addition of a new existence-sphere in which the former
sphere is immersed in a wider (or deeper) context and retains a relative identity and
distinctness from the new sphere. As one "progresses" through the stages, one
does not leave the "former" stage behind. So that, for example, one still engages
one's world esthetically and ethically (or acts within the esthetic sphere and the
ethical sphere) after having attained a religious qualification of existence. The
difference is that now these esthetic and ethical engagements have a wider frame of
reference so that ultimately they mean something different for the religious person
than for those persons whose lives are only qualified esthetically and ethically.
The terminology Kierkegaard uses to describe these transitions from one
qualitative form of existence to another is "the leap" [Spring],1 and sometimes he
uses the Greek construction meta-basis eis alio genos [change or shift from one
genus to another].2 The category of the leap plays an important role in
Kierkegaard's thought as a reaction to Hegel's speculative account of reality and
coming-to-be. Kierkegaard finds that it is precisely the transitions between thought
1 The term occurs first in Kierkegaard's published authorship in Climacus's Fragments, in KW VII
43/SV VI 42. This term also occurs copiously throughout Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers. See
JP I 26, 385, 653, 808, 912/Pap. IV C 87, X2 A 16, VIII2 B 85, IV C 105, X1 A 360; JP II 1248,
1603, 1607/Pap. V B 55:26, IV C 81, VI B 40:3; JP III 2704, 2807, 3247, 3598/Pap. II A 631,
VII1 A 182,1 A 99, II A 763; JP IV 4421/Pap. IV C 94.
2 KW VII 73/SV VI 67; and KW XII. 1 98/ SV IX 84.
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and actuality for which Hegel fails to account.3 In the Kierkegaardian literature "the
leap" is a category that applies to all existential transitions between the existence-
spheres as ontological shifts in a person's being. Each shift to a new set of
ontological determinants also constitutes a new way of perceiving reality and being
in it. These transitions open up new existential possibilities for a person and one is
afforded a different set of conceptual coordinates through which to view their world
that formerly were unavailable. The concept of "the leap", then, does not apply only
to the transition to Christian religiousness, as the transition to faith (belief) sensu
eminentiori. The transition to Christian religiousness is both the most dramatic and
the most important for Kierkegaard, but it is not the only type of existential
transaction that transforms one into a person of Tro (belief).
The category of leap, then, is one that inherently concerns our transitions to
belief. Kierkegaard introduces the category of the leap through Climacus in
Fragments, and Climacus uses it throughout both Fragments and Postscript. M.
Jamie Ferreira makes the crucial observation that while the leap to faith is central in
Kierkegaard's thought, he never uses the Danish equivalent of the circular English
phrase "leap of faith", where it is implied that the leap to another mode of being is
made by faith, in an overtly question begging fashion as some form of decisionism.4
Instead the leap is better characterised as a leap to faith in which the qualitative
transition in a mode of being-in-the-world that results in a different quality of Tro in
a person. In Fragments we read that whenever one is inquiring into the nature of
existence one finds that belief is generated by "meine Zuthat [my contribution]" in
3 In TP I 110/Pap. IV C 80, Kierkegaard notes that, "Hegel has never done justice to the category
of transition", and in reference to this Climacus claims that "the leap is the most decisive protest
against the inverse operation of the method [of Hegel's speculative System]", KW XII. 1 105/5V
IX 107. See also KW XII. 1 337-38/SV X 40-1, for a detailed argument against Hegel's treatment
of transition. Jamie Ferreira makes a similar point in "Faith and the Kierkegaardian Leap", in The
Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, eds. Alastair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 211-12; and Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and
Will in Kierkegaardian Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 8-9.
4 See M. Jamie Ferreira, "Faith and the Kierkegaardian Leap", 207-08. Ferreira's work on
Kierkegaard's category of the leap is arguably the most comprehensive and careful in the literature.
See especially Ferreira, Transforming Vision, passim. The following analysis of Kierkegaard's leap
category is deeply indebted to Ferreira and draws heavily on her "Faith and the Kierkegaardian
Leap".
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"letting go" of rational demonstrations.5 We are then told that this transition (to
belief) is characterized as a leap. This transition to Tro is an archetypical instance of
Kierkegaard's category of "leap of faith".
The issue of "the leap" is taken up extensively by Climacus in the chapter,
"Possible and Actual Theses by Lessing", of Postscript.6 The "leap" is not just a
religious category (although it is certainly that). Rather, the category of the leap is
explicated within the context of Climacus's discussion of existence and the
relationship of thought to existence (this is also, for example, the chapter where
Climacus discusses Hegel's presuppositionless beginning and states that an
existential system is not possible). Climacus later explains his language of "the
leap" as the category by which "[t]he transition from possibility to actuality" is to
be explained.7 The transition to which Climacus is referring is exactly that transition
in a person who moves from one (any) existence-sphere to another, and he indicates
this by using the "leap" into "the ethical" as an example of the sort of transition he
has in mind.8 Climacus certainly understands "the leap" as a category covering all
that occurs in a shift between existence-spheres—like the one that takes place
between the esthetic and the ethical. The caprice lies in the fact that Kierkegaard
wants to speak simultaneously of belief and being, of epistemology and ontology.
On his view these two domains can only be separated logically and even then the
logic of one has implications for the other.9
Climacus clearly intends his category of the leap to refer more globally to
transitions in general, beyond those involved simply in coming to religious faith. In
Journals and Papers Kierkegaard writes that, "By analogy and induction the
conclusion can only be reached by a leap".10 The point of this comment is that the
category of the leap is used to describe how it is that we humans come to accept
conclusions, or come to see conclusions as true, in the case where they are not
5 AW VII 43/5V VI 42.
6 AW XII. 1 72-126/5V IX 61-106.
7 AW XII. 1 342/5VX 44-5.
8 AW XII. 1 342/5VX 45.
9 This also recalls Climacus's discussion of truth examined in Chapter Four.
222
tautological. With the category of the leap Kierkegaard is not prescribing a method
of belief formation as much as he is observing how in fact humans do form beliefs,
and he is making the point that human doxastic formation is bound by ontological
constraints as well as rational ones. Part of this argument includes the further
observation that forming beliefs in this manner is inescapable for humans, given
their noetic capacities, and that as such it is wholly legitimate (epistemically) for
humans to do so. Kierkegaard wants only that this feature of human cognitive life
not be ignored or glossed over, and that the ontological and ethical (paradoxical)
elements of human reason and belief are properly acknowledged.
Kierkegaard describes the existential transition to Tro, whether in the eminent or
ordinary sense, as a passionate and decisive act of the will.11 As Ferreira notes, this
qualitative change is an exercise of freedom in that it is not compelled or forced on
the believer.12 For Kierkegaard, human freedom is never liberium arbitrium
[freedom of indifference] and human choice is never "abstract freedom of choice",
"bare naked", "contentless", and achieved through the exercise of a "perfectly
disinterested will".13 In Ferreira's words, "[For Kierkegaard], freedom is always
interested, contextualized freedom".14 The change of state in the believer is not
prescribed by reason but is objectively risque. In shifting from one existence-sphere
to take on another, we do not do so by taking a purely cognitive or rational step, as
one would do, for example, in deducing a geometric proof. Even in induction and
analogical reasoning we have something more than what reason can positively
produce on its own. The transition from one mode of being-in-the-world to another
is instead a "letting go", although this is by no means positively ir-rational—i.e.,
against reason. This kind of transition is a qualitative transition, a change involving
a new set of possibilities and a break with former ones. In an attack on Hegelian
speculative method, Climacus announces in Postscript that on the speculative
10 JP III 2341/Pap. V B 1:3. See also JP III 2350/Pap. V C 8; and JP I 258/Pap. IV C 48.
11 KW VII 84, 92-94, 92/SV VI 76, 83-84. Cf. KW XII. 1 136/SV IX 112.
12 Ferreira, "Faith and the Kierkegaardian Leap", 219.
13 JP II 1249, 1261, 1269, 1268, 1260, 1241/Pap. V B 56:2, X2 A 428, X4 A 177, X4 A 175, X2
A 243, IV C 39.
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(Hegelian) account, "the method advances—by necessity", so that "Whenever a
transition must be made, the opposite continues so long until it switches over into its
opposite—and then one proceeds further", rendering the transition mute. Thus,
asserts Climacus, "The spurious infinity is the hereditary enemy of the method; it is
the nisse that accompanies every time there is a move (a transition) and prevents the
transition. The spurious infinity is infinitely stubborn; if it is to be overcome, there
must be a break, a qualitative leap, and that is the end of the method, of the dexterity
of immanence and the necessity of transition". 15
The qualitative change brought about in the believer is a shift where what was
once construed in one manner is now configured in an entirely different light.
Jastrow's popular "gestalt shift", where one picture can be seen to be either a duck
or a rabbit, in one sense exemplifies the kind of transition that Kierkegaard has in
mind in moving from one belief state to another. However, this shift should not
naively be understood too literally as a "simple gestalt". The simple gestalt model
suggests that the transition involves an in-principle symmetry and a sort of magical
change that takes place, with no contiguity between the two poles of the shift. In
order to correct and complement the simple gestalt model, Ferreira argues for an
understanding of the leap in terms of a metaphorical reconceptualization.16 The
model she privileges over the simple duck-rabbit model is the "critical threshold
model" where "a new quality emerges at a critical threshold", that was attained
gradually by degrees—yet this new state/condition itself is devoid of degrees.17
Ferreira employs the metaphor of the transition involved in boiling water: water heats
up by degrees and when it reaches a critical threshold it boils—but boiling itself is
14 Ferreira, "Faith and the Kierkegaardian Leap", 219.
15 See KW XII. 1 337-38/SV X 40-1; my italics.
16 Ferreira, Transforming Vision , 76-81.
17 Ferreira, "Faith and the Kierkegaardian Leap", 207-08. There are three discernible reasons why
Ferreira argues for the critical threshold model against the simple gestalt model: (1) it expresses the
decisiveness of the transition better; (2) simple gestalt involves an in-principle symmetry, hence a
reversible conclusion; and (3) simple gestalt does not retain a relation between the two states—i.e.,
there is no contiguity between what was (e.g., the duck) and what has become (e.g., the rabbit),
and consequently this model remains agnostic on this point and the relationship may be arbitrary.
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not something that happens by degrees and is at the same time a qualitative change
from its former state:
The qualitative change at a critical threshold is decisive since any increases after that
threshold are superfluous, but such change is a function of what precedes it; although the
change is not just cumulative, it is integrally related to what goes before. ... the
transition is a qualitative one—that is, it is an all-or-nothing kind of movement, rather
than a quantitative accumulation by degrees—it is nevertheless anchored in what
precedes.18
The result is that we must be careful not to view "the leap" too prosaically. We
must take care not to erase or divorce the developing aspect of Tro from these
transitions. Neither should we ignore some of the important elements of existential
transitions other than those expressed in the metaphor of leaping. In a very telling
passage for this understanding of the leap, Kierkegaard states that, "what I call a
transition of pathos, Aristotle called an enthymeme".19 An enthymeme (for
Aristotle) is a one-sentence rhetorical device that implies a syllogism for the sake of
creating "a practical, concrete, nonnecessary transition in the audience".20 In other
words, enthymemes depend upon a shared way of seeing the world and being in the
world that is then manipulated so that a particular proposition becomes intelligible.
This suggests many things about Kierkegaard's leap category, but what is most
important here is that the leap is not an ungrounded transition. Instead the leap
appears to be rooted in something akin to a Wittgensteinian conception of forms of
life, as grounded (Grundlage)21 in specific, public engagements or interactions with
a given reality from which emerge social norms.
This further suggests that there is an implicit structure to our leaps—that is, they
are teleological and have some sort of "retrospective justification" open to them.
Climacus alludes to this in his discussion of the possibility of demonstrating
18 Ferreira, "Faith and the Kierkegaardian Leap", 217-18.
19 JP III 2353/Pap. VI A 33.
20 Ferreira, ibid., 222.
21 This is Wittgenstein's term to describe the foundation of one's "world-picture [Weltbilt]", and
literally refers to the "ground (Grund) - layer (Lage)" of something as its basis or foundation. See
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), 167. Cf. Wittgenstein's discussion
regarding forms of life throughout Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953),
especially 23, 241, and Wittgenstein's discussion of "grounds" for belief in Investigations,
especially 479-481.
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something's existence, in Fragments,22 as does Kierkegaard in Journals and
Papers, where he claims that, "The paradox presumably can be conquered and
digested, as it were, for retrogressive thinking".23 Fcrrcira draws our attention to
another passage in Postscript that amply demonstrates that Kierkegaard does not
think of existential transitions as operating in isolation from all normative
constraints:24
There are examples enough of a mistaken effort to assert the pathos-filled and earnestness
in a ludicrous, superstitious sense as a beatifying universal . . . No, everything has its
dialectic—not, please note, a dialectic by which it is made sophistically relative (this is
mediation), but by which the absolute becomes distinguishable as the absolute by means
of the dialectical. Therefore, it is just as questionable, precisely as questionable, to be
pathos-filled and earnest in the wrong place as it is to laugh in the wrong place.25
Once more Climacus's point with the leap category is that Hegel's attempt to
prescribe the category of transition into logic, as part of a speculative "System", is a
fundamental confusion. Climacus rejects Hegel's account, not because there is a
problem in conceiving leaps as having a "structure", but because Hegel tries use his
concept of a logical transition to bridge the gap between actuality and thought.
Hegel's category of transition does this by making existential transitions into logical
necessities that are premised on abstractions. There seems little room to question
Ferreira's conclusion that Keirkgaard's "pathos-filled" existential transitions can
be "critically assessed".26 Ferreira also notes27 a passage in Journals and Papers
in which Kierkegaard states that the paradox has "a continuity only in reverse, that
is, at the beginning it does not manifest itself as a continuity", but (presumably)
does so after one has believed it.28 While Kierkegaard clearly does not think we can
epistemically justify beliefs in isolation from a context (or epistemic community) in
which those beliefs are accepted, he does not think that this fact removes all rational
22 KW VII 40-42/SV VI 41-43.
23 JP III 2345/Pap. V C 1. Cf. Ferreira, ibid., 222, 233 n.13.
24 Ferreira, ibid., 222.
25 KW XII. 1 525/SVX 199.
26 Ferreira, ibid.
27 Ferreira, ibid., 218.
28 JP III 3073/Pap. IV C 29.
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constraints on belief,29 nor does it remove the possibility and need of justifying our
beliefs epistemically. Beliefs, then, would be justified according to the doxastic
practices that emerge from a community of people who participate in common
forms of life, or (in more Kierkegaardian terms) engage the world with the same
passions.
In aWittgensteinian manner, we may define a doxastic practice as "a system or
constellation of dispositions or habits, or, to use a currently fashionable term,
mechanism, each of which yields a belief as output that is related in a certain way to
an 'input'".30 The concept of doxastic practices refers (roughly), then, to the fact
that beliefs emerge out of our specific engagements with reality. This descriptive
approach to epistemology is begins with a phenomenology of doxastic (or belief)
formation that takes special care in observing how it is that we do in fact go about
forming our beliefs and justifying them. William Alston outlines the basic contours
of a "doxastic practice approach to epistemology" and gives four features of a
doxastic practice, all of which are features of the Kierkegaardian account outlined
here:31
1. There are many doxastic practices we engage in—from perceptual,
memory, thought, fantasy, etc.—and each operates in relative isolation to
each other with their own subject matter, conceptual frameworks, and
standards.
2. A person engages in doxastic practices long before s/he is explicitly
aware of them and is able to critically analyse them.
29 Cf. Kierkegaard's statements in JP 11/Pap. X2 A 354, where he claims: "not every absurdity is
the absurd or the paradox. The activity of reason is to distinguish the paradox negatively . . . No,
the concept of the absurd is precisely to grasp the fact that it cannot and not be grasped. This is a
negatively determined concept but is just as dialectical as any positive one . . . reason has no
power at all to dissolve it in nonsense and prove that it is nonsense . . .it is a symbol . . . about
which reason must say: I cannot solve it, it cannot be understood, but it does not follow that it is
nonsense".
30 William P. Alston, "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology", in Knowledge and
Skepticism, ed. Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1989), 5.
31 Alston, "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology", 5-9.
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3. Practices of belief-formation occur in a wider context of other practices
in which we engage, so that our practice of forming beliefs is dependent
upon other interactions we have with things independent from ourselves.
4. Doxastic practices are social practices that are established through our
shared activities and learning processes.
In recommending that we construe Kierkegaard's meta-epistemology as a doxastic
practice approach two basic features of Kierkegaard's thought are preserved. First,
Climacus speaks of beliefs as if they "happen" to human persons as they engage
their world. In the formation of beliefs leaps are made that are strictly neither rational
nor conscious. Second, this approach also fits well with Kierkegaard's grammatical
(non-metaphysical and phenomenological) method of theorising and his
psychologising of the human person.
There are two further lines of support that can be drawn for understanding
Kierkegaard's account of belief this way. First, in Fragments, Climacus advances
the position that beliefs are justified in a posthoc manner. A close look at the
passage in which Climacus argues that one cannot justify belief in the existence of
God, or even another person, by an appeal to the deeds of the being in question,
reveals that he does not reject demonstrations (or arguments, or justifications) as
legitimate tout court?2 What Climacus rejects is a phenomenology of belief in
which one confuses the fact that a justification for a given belief exists for a believer,
with the notion that this justification is then the basis on which the believer accepts
(or accepted) the belief. Climacus concludes:
Therefore anyone who wants to demonstrate the existence of God (in any other sense than
elucidating the God-concept and without the reservatio finalis [ultimate reservation] that
we have pointed out—that the existence itself emerges from the demonstration by a leap)
proves something else instead, at times something that perhaps did not even need
demonstrating, and in any case never anything better.33
The "God-concept" is elucidated in the demonstration, Climacus insists. The logic
of the God-concept may in fact "need demonstrating" at times, only it must be done
32 See KW VII 39-43/ST VI 40-43.
33 KW VII 43/SV VI 43.
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with the understanding that belief in the existence of God comes about through a
leap.
Next, in Two Ages Kierkegaard employs the concept of an epistemic community
that is united on the basis of a common passionate pursuit of truth. He asserts that,
"When individuals (each one individually) are essentially relayed to the same idea,
the relation is optimal and normative".34 This comment indicates that Kierkegaard
most certainly has a concept of community that is distinct from the category of "the
crowd", which he so often excoriates.33 What is more, Kierkegaard's view of
community in Two Ages is one in which the members of the community are
organised around a common set of passions and beliefs. Thus Kierkegaard operates
with a rudimentary concept of epistemic communities formed by a common search
for the truth—or "the Good". In this case, justifications for beliefs happen within
these communities, but these occur neither in isolation from a particular group of
people who reflect the same basic view of the world, nor from a presuppositionless
vantage-point. Given this view of beliefs and their justifications, Climacus's
denunciations of the use of theistic proofs (or any historical arguments) to "prove"
or demonstrate metaphysical being may be seen in another light—one that affirms a
place for such arguments or justifications for belief. What we have in Fragments,
then, is another argument for the situatedness and contextualisation of human
reason—especially in its role of justifying belief. Ambiguity on this point seems to
stem from the fact that Kierkegaard is struggling (through Climacus) to articulate a
fallibilist epistemology in which our beliefs do not have open to them universal and
absolute justifications. The confusion is created by the fact that Kierkegaard must
advance his discussion of epistemic fallibilism without a well-developed
philosophical vocabulary in which to do so (such as exists today). Thus at many
points his vocabulary is equivocal; one moment apparently sceptical about
"knowledge" and denouncing epistemology, the next assuming we have a kind of
knowledge and speaking as if we must move beyond scepticism.
34 KW XIV 62/SV XIV 57.
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One final aspect of this aspect of Kierkegaard's account of the leap to Tro as a
pathos-filled transition remains to be addressed: the joint role of the will and
imagination. As we saw earlier that the transition to belief is understood by
Kierkegaard to be an exercise of the will.36
It is important to understand that, for Kierkegaard, the concept of willing
operates in concert with imagination. Imagination is an important concept for
Kierkegaard and it functions in his thought to perform several functions. David
Gouwens identifies the various roles of the imagination in Kierkegaard's thought as
including its being a "medium, state, activity, capacity, disposition, and passion".37
Our main interest in the concept of imagination with respect to Kierkegaard's
category of "the leap" is the more general cognitive capacity of imagination and
what role it plays in the transition between existence-spheres.
Imagination is referred to by Anti-Climacus as "the capacity instar omnium [for
all capacities]", and he calls it "the medium for the process of infinitizing".38 In
Journals and Papers Kierkegaard expands on the general capacity of imagination in
humans:
Imagination is what providence uses to take men captive in actuality [Virkeligheden], in
existence [Tilvoerelsen], in order to get them far enough out, or within, or down into
actuality. And when imagination has helped them get as far out as they could be—then
actuality genuinely begins.39
Kierkegaard clearly sees the imagination playing a vital role in the translation of
thought and possibility into actuality. The imagination is understood by Kierkegaard
to hold a much more important place in human affairs than simply providing the
content of illusions, fantasies, and daydreams. It is, he assures us, an important
capacity for existential concretion, for humans to move from the realm of thought-
possibility or the world of ideas, to actual existence in time and the domain of
action. Ultimately the human imagination is what provides us with the capacity for
35 See, for example, KW XXII/SV XVIII passim; but especially 106-12/152-157.
36 KW VII 84/SV VI 76. Cf. KW XII. 1 136/SV IX 112.
37 David J. Gouwens, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of the Imagination (New York: Peter Lang, 1989),
141. Gouwens's treatment of imagination in Kierkegaard's thought is extremely rigorous and
helpful.
38 KW XIX 31/5V XV 88.
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logic, knowledge and just abstract thought in general.40 Anti-Climacus's analysis
gives the imagination a central place in both the human process of knowing and all
the ingredients we have identified as essential to an existential transition (or "leap"),
as well as the process of becoming a self:
As a rule, imagination is the medium for the process of infinitizing; it is not a capacity,
as are others—if one wishes to speak in those terms, it is the capacity instar omnium.
When all is said and done, whatever offeeling, knowing, and willing a person has depends
upon what imagination [s/]he has, upon how a person reflects [her/]himself—that is,
upon imagination. . . . even in relation to knowledge the categories derive from the
imagination. The self is a reflection, and the imagination is reflection, is the rendition of
the self as the self s possibility. The imagination is possibility of any and all reflection,
and the intensity of this medium is the possibility of the intensity of the self.41
In this passage Anti-Climacus makes the role of the imagination in the transitions
between the spheres of existence explicit. Imagination plays a critical role in this
aspect of doxastic practice because it is the vehicle by which we perform the process
of translating actuality into possibility (what Anti-Climacus calls "infinitizing"), and
vice versa.
Imagination, then, is the creative capacity of a human subject that provides the
content and elements of thought. Imagination is engaged imagination, and there is
no neutral, disinterested exercise of human imagination.42 By placing elements of
thought into relation with each other human imagination holds concepts together or
alongside each other in a tension so that they may be compared or explored or
fancifully enjoyed.43 Imagination therefore gives expression to the act of willing in
the form of "interested appropriation".44 This link of imagination and will is what
Evans calls the "intentionality of passion".45 By this he means that for Kierkegaard
{via Climacus) it is by way of imagining that one translates existential actuality into
mJP II 1832/Pap. XI1 A 288.
40 Gouwens, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of the Imagination, 142. The concept of imagination is not
employed in Kierkegaard's writings as a monolithic entity that is an entirely positive asset, or even
relatively benign. In Kierkegaard's Dialectic of the Imagination, 2-3, passim, Gouwens
demonstrates that Kierkegaard's concept of imagination is multifaceted and may be used for evil as
well as good. See also Jaime Ferreira, Transforming Vision, 1-2; and Murray A. Rae,
Kierkegaard's Vision of the Incarnation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 35-39.
41 KW XIX 30-31/SV XV 88; my italics.
42 ATT VII 121 /Pap. IV B 1 107-08.
43 Recall that Johannes Climacus thinks of reflection as "the possibility of the relation", that is
"disinterested"; AW VII 169-70/Pap. IV B 1 147-48, his italics.
44 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, 126.
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conceptual possibilities, and these imagined possibilities are the catalyst for and
object of our passions. After this initial translation process, imagination again
enables us to project a nonactual horizon of possibilities and on that basis we may
passionately unify our existence by acting on and actualising a specific set of those
possibilities. Without the vital capacity of imagination we would be unable to think,
reach conclusions, have beliefs, and we would furthermore be unable to move
[Spring] from one sphere or stage of existence to the next. The possibilities
presented to us by our imaginations provide for us a goal and context for our
actions.46 Note, however, that imagination provides only the context and the
possibilities for transitions, and cannot bring one about of itself. What is imagined
still exists in possibility, not actuality, as something outside oneself.47 Passionate
resolve to act on these possibilities actualises a transition.
To summarise, the transitions between existence-spheres are presented in the
Kierkegaardian literature as existential movements that include a cognitive
transformation. The term "transition" is used here because it concerns the process
of translating actuality into possibility in any conceptualising act, and then also of
turning possibility to actuality by deliberately acting in order to realise some goal.
These transitions are described in Kierkegaard's writings (especially by Climacus)
as "the leap". Central to Kierkegaard's account of the leap, we noted, are the
concepts of imagination, will, passion, and belief. Transitions of this kind are
referred to as "pathos-filled" and to some degree are products of human will that
require resolve. As we passionately engage our imaginations and bring it into
relation with our own concrete actualities an aperture for personal transformation is
opened. We may, then, in Kieikegaardian terms, speak of the self of belief, for the
self is both formed by believing a set of imaginatively constructed range of
45 Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript", 70.
46 Thus Kierkegaard rejects the Cartesian-Enlightenment contention that philosophy begins with
doubt and returns to the ancient Greek contention that philosophy always begins with
wonder—adding that beginning philosophical reflection requires a resolution of the will; JP II
2292/Pap. VII1 A 34. De Omnibus is dedicated exclusively to this thesis and is Kierkegaard's most
lengthy treatment of the nature and source of philosophical reflection. See KW VII 160-72/Pap. IV
B 1 141-150.
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possibilities and results in a definite range of possibilities as the self's present stock
of beliefs. In other words, the self for Kierkegaard is both defined and shaped by its
beliefs.
In the next section we examine more closely how Kierkegaard develops this
concept of belief through the Climacus pseudonym.
Climacus on Belief
Kierkegaard begins to develop his grammar of belief through the pseudonymous
writings of Johannes Climacus. In the "Interlude" of Fragments Climacus offers a
detailed phenomenological analysis of the nature of belief—one that consistently
runs throughout the Kierkegaardian authorship and is adopted by Kierkegaard and
pseudonyms alike.48 The focus of the "Interlude" of Fragments is on the issue of
historical knowledge and the possibility of knowing something historical, which
Climacus uses as the point of departure for his exploration of the concept of belief
[Tro].
Climacus first defines the historical as anything that "has come into
existence".49 All human beliefs, then, are included here as "historical"—in fact
doubly so for they all enter into existence themselves as well as being about things
that enter into existence (with the possible exception of mathematical and logical
beliefs for the latter category). Climacus next makes it clear that anything that is
historical has gone (and is going) through the process of "coming into existence",
which indicates its radical contingency as a possibility (versus necessity). Non-
human things have, of course, temporal and spatial duration but in a strict sense they
47 George Pattison, "Kierkegaard and Imagination", Theology 87 (1984), 11.
48 Anthony Rudd, '"Believing All Things': Kierkegaard on Knowledge, Doubt, and Love", in
International Kierkegaard Commentary: Volume 16, Works of Love, ed. Robert L. Perkins,
(Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1999), 125-26, claims that Postscript and Fragments "work
out the epistemology used as a premise in works of love" and that "it should be apparent to any
attentive reader of the Fragments and Postscript that the epistemology employed in Works of Love
is precisely that worked out by Climacus in these works" (128). Rudd also points to Marilyn Gaye
Piety's "Kierkegaard On Knowledge" (Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 1994), in which she draws
on the whole of Kierkegaard's authorship to construct a coherent view of his epistemology and in
so doing convincingly demonstrates the unity of Kierkegaard's authorship on this point.
49 KW VII 15/SV VI 69.
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only exist historically for humans, who are able to understand objects in terms of
their past as well as their present (or future). All finite objects and events are
contingent, non-necessary things and are ontologically qualified under the concept
of possibility. "But", Kierkegaard asks hypothetically, "is not the historical the
actual [i.e., having had real existence]"? "Certainly", he responds. "But what is
history? Six thousand years of the world's history is certainly actuality, but a
traversed actuality; it is and can exist [vcere til] for me only as thought-actuality, i.e.,
as possibility".50
Climacus therefore talks about two kinds of history. First, there is "the coming
into existence of nature", which is "historical" in that it enters and then persists
through time—i.e., has a history. There is also, secondly, "[t]he more special
coming into existence" which is "dialectical with respect to time" that can
"redouble" existence (i.e., think about it) and bring it into existence again as
"possibility", which is what the historical is for human thought.3' The first type of
history refers to the contingent (possible) nature of things in the universe and
acknowledges that in the sense that things (the world) are contingently in time and
space they may be referred to as historical for they can be said to have existed.
However, these "historical" things do not existfor themselves as historical, because
they have no conception of their temporal duration. That is, things in the universe
(objects, animals, etc.) exist in a constant "now", in the present tense, and have no
ability to relate themselves to their past. Only humans are "dialectical" with respect
to time in that they alone are able consciously to relate the present temporal-spatial
duration, the continuous coming in and going out of existence that comprises the
contingent "now", to the past (or fulure) as that which came (or will come) into
50 JP I 1059/Pap. X2 A 439.
51 Climacus's awkward way of putting it is that, "coming into existence [as contingent human
existence] can contain within itself a redoubling [Fordobling], that is, a possibility of a coming
into existence [as a thought-possibility] within its own existence ", KW VII 16/SV VI 69-70.
Climacus is simply discussing the logic of his previously stated position that all thoughts about
actuality are possbility (not actuality) and he is mererly saying here that humans have thoughts
about historical things and can thereby bring things into a kind of existence (as possibilities). On
the idea of history redoubling in thought compare Anti-Climacus's discussion of truth redoubling
in thought in Practice in Christianity, KW XX 205/SV XVI 182.
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existence. Therefore (for human consciousness) even the awareness of the
"present" is dialectical and is "historical". The present is always that which is
arriving and slipping away.
The constant dialectical oscillation of this process, combined with the very fact of
contingent temporal extension, causes the historical as it is for humans (the second
sense of history) to have an intrinsic illusiveness [Svigagtiged] about it so that "it
cannot be sensed directly and immediately. [Therefore t]he impression of a natural
phenomenon or of an event is not the impression of the historical".52 In a move that
is very important for our discussion of belief, the logic of Climacus's position
forces him to distinguish between a perception of a historical, contingent thing, and
the historical as it is in the beliefs we have about those contingent things. The latter
is what Climacus designates as "the historical" (versus the immediate sensation of a
thing's presence) because it is the way in which the past exists in the present as
history. Therefore Climacus writes that, "Immediate sensation and cognition cannot
deceive. This alone indicates that the historical cannot become the object of sense
perception or of immediate cognition", and then later repeats himself saying,
"Immediate sensation and cognition cannot deceive. It is important to understand
this in order to understand doubt and in order to assign belief it place. However
strange it may seem, this thought underlies Greek skepticism".53 The Greek
sceptics of antiquity, Climacus observes, "doubted not by virtue of knowledge but
by virtue of will".54 Anthony Rudd argues that Climacus's distinction between
classical scepticism and a "modern, post-Cartesian" scepticism contrasts a
scepticism motivated by ethical concerns, aimed at ataraxia (peace of mind) in the
52 KW VII 81/5V VI 73.
53 KW VII 81, 82/SV VI 73, 74; my emphasis. This is manifestly Kierkegaard's personal view,
and not just an intellectual exercise he engages in through one of his pseudonyms. See, for
example, JP II 1243/Pap. IV C 56; JP II 1244/Pap. IV C 60; JP I 11A/Pap. IV A 72; JP I
776/Pap. IV B 5:13.
54 KW VII 82/SV VI 74. We find a similar phenomenological account of belief presented in Works
of Love, where Kierkegaard argues that, "there is no decision in knowledge; the decision, the
determination, and the firmness of the personality are first in the 'ergo,' in belief'; KW XVI
231/5V XII 222. In this section Kierkegaard continues on to argue that, on the basis of the same
knowledge, love and mistrust come to opposite conclusions.
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former case, against the latter, modem scepticism that was purely intellectual in
nature.55
Climacus wants to discuss things under their appropriate categories and thereby
avoid the category mistakes he finds in modem philosophy. He therefore separates
the conceptual sphere of knowledge from that of belief in its proper sense.
Knowledge is assigned to the sphere of perception and sensate immediacy, while
belief falls under the categories of cognition and will. The former concerns
appearances or sensations (immediacy), and perceptual states or something like a
perceptual mode of consciousness; while the latter involves concepts, propositions,
volitions, and, as we shall see, passions as well.
In Chapter Three we argued that in this section Climacus uses the term
"immediacy" to refer to the perceptual state of a human person who is perceptually
appeared to in any of the human sensory modes (in the case of the discussion in
Fragments it is "when the perceiver sees a star"). These perceptual states appear to
have, for Climacus, as attending features, mental states. Climacus has no technical
name for these states but we may describe them as doxastic states. A doxastic state
is defined as a subclass of mental states of human persons and refers to the mental
state(s) or event(s) a person is in or has when s/he believes something, or withholds
belief, or prefers to believe something. Believing p (in the case that p is any state of
affairs), withholding a believing p, and preferring to believe p are all examples of
doxastic states.56 A more concrete example would be the state one is in of believing
the ball to be blue when appeared to by a blue ball. Doxastic states can be
characterised as a kind of "seeing", or an inclination to view p as such-and-such, or
even a tendency to be cognitively disposed in a certain manner toward p. This sort of
distinction may be made only if we do not beg the question and assume that all
mental states are propositional states—a common assumption in Anglo-American
55 See Rudd's excellent treatment of Kierkegaard's relationship to scepticism in, "Kierkegaard and
the Sceptics", British Journal for the History ofPhilosophy 6: (1998), 71-88, especially 72-3. See
also Rudd, '"Believing All Things'", 126-27; and Rudd, Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical,
36-7.
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philosophy. If mental states are propositional states then all belief states must be
characterised as propositional states, or beliefs that p. This is what Kierkegaard
rejects.57 Note that doxastic states, as defined above, are psychological or mental
states of persons regarding some person or object p, or any other state of affairs p.
They express a fundamental relationship that obtains between some person and
another person, object, or state of affairs, and are not propositional states. They
cannot be construed as abstract relations between propositions, as expressed in
terms of some person's belief that p, where p is some proposition. A person may
therefore have a doxastic state believing p and no conscious awareness or
propositional attitude toward that object p—which is yet another, different kind of
mental state.
As shown in the above example, some subject (S), in a particular doxastic state
(e.g., believing) regarding some person, object, or proposition (p), in which s/he
takes p a certain way (x), is expressed linguistically (in English) in the following
grammatical form: "S believes p to be x". Doxastic states could not be characterised
(at least by Climacus) as being attending features of one's consciousness because in
that case they would be reducible to our beliefs that p (our propositional states) as
consciousness is always linguistically structured. Instead doxastic states are a kind
of seeing of the world, a taking of the world to be x. Doxastic states relate to
propositional states as dispositions to believe corresponding propositional
characterisations of the world that express p. A doxastic state, then, is not a state of
consciousness, and when it becomes such is expressed as a propositional state. Thus
Climacus explains that, "Greek skepticism was a withdrawing skepticism (ejtoxti
[suspension of judgment]); they doubted not by virtue of knowledge but by virtue of
will".58 Climacus clearly believes that the ancient sceptics had cognitive capacities
55 Roderick M. Chisholm, "Firth and the Ethics of Belief' Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 51/1 (March 1999): 123.
57 Interestingly, it is the lack of just such a distinction, where he really ought to have made such a
discernment, that Stephen Priest finds Hegel failing to make, in at least one place. See Stephen
Priest, "Subjectivity and Objectivity in Kant", in Hegel's Critique of Kant, ed. Stephen Priest
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 104.
58 KW VII 82/SV VI 74-5.
237
(perceptual mechanisms, credulity dispositions, deductive and inductive powers, etc.)
that yielded for them a general picture of the world so that they were inclined to take
the world to be a certain way—in like manner to what we have identified as doxastic
states. Later Climacus continues his exposition of Greek scepticism saying, "The
Greek skeptic did not deny the correctness of sensation and immediate cognition,
but, said he, error has an utterly different basis—it comes from the conclusion I
draw".59 So the Greek sceptic chose to doubt the veracity or proper functioning of
her/his cognitive faculties and opted for denying the truthfulness of her/his belief as
the appropriate response to one's natural doxastic inclinations.60 The sceptic
doubted, then, "not by virtue of knowledge, but by virtue of will (deny assent—
pexpLOJtaBeiv [moderate feeling]".61
Perception is for Climacus, then, a matter of being appeared to by contingent,
historical things and this produces a doxastic state in the perceiver appropriate to the
perceptual mode of the appearing (in Fragments the mode is visual—seeing a star).
Climacus then links this to belief proper and explains that,
the star becomes dubious for [the perceiver] the moment he seeks to become aware of its
existence. It is just as if the reflection removed the star from [her/] his senses. It is clear,
then, that the organ of the historical must be formed in likeness to this, must have within
itself the corresponding something by which in its certitude it continually annuls the
incertitude that corresponds to the uncertainty of coming into existence . . . This is
precisely the nature ofbelief [Tro], for continually present as the nullified in the certitude
of belief is the incertitude that in every way corresponds to the uncertainty of coming into
existence. Thus belief believes what it did not see; it does not believe that the star exists,
for that it sees, but it believes that the star has come into existence. The same is true of
an event.62
Climacus uses the term belief, here, to express the conjunction of a doxastic state, as
a disposition to see things as such-and-such, with an acceptance of this state as
true.63 This is a definite departure from the view of belief typical in modern
philosophy, particularly Kant, who insisted that certain a priori concepts were the
59 KW VII 82/SV VI 75; my emphasis.
60 See Rudd, '"Believing All Things'", 126-27.
61 KW VII 82/SV VI 75.
62 AW VII 81/SVVI 74.
63 This adds support to Marilyn Gaye Piety's claim that, "knowledge, according to Kierkegaard, is
more properly characterized as a justified true mental representation than as a justified true belief'.
See Piety, "Kierkegaard On Knowledge", 121. One could argue that the content of a doxastic state
is what Piety calls a "mental representation".
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condition for the possibility of human experience. Climacus distinguishes, first, the
pre-conceptual mental (doxastic) state of a human, regarding states of affairs and
brought about through an attending perceptual state (or similar mental state arising
from some doxastic practice). Secondly, Climacus points to the conceptual
judgments we make about those mental states—e.g., "My believing p" (or
"inclination to take the world to be a certain way with respect to p") is epistemically
appropriate", or even simply, "I believe that p".
Note that there is crucial ambiguity in Kierkegaard's use of the term belief at
this point, for he wants to discuss knowledge as if it did not include beliefs. On the
other hand, he clearly thinks that knowledge is also knowledge for some person S.
In that sense there must be something that makes knowledge of some p, S's
knowledge ofp. The standard way of attaching a veridical mental state to S so that it
is knowledge for S is to say that S believes the relevant veridical mental state. In this
way we are able to identify what is generally a true fact as knowledge that is had by
human persons. We have called these mental states doxastic states and they may
now legitimately be referred to as beliefs in some relevant sense, because they
perform for Kierkegaard the copulative function that beliefs play on the traditional
schema. We must recognise, of course, that in assigning the term "belief' to
Kierkegaardian doxastic states that we are not dealing with Kierkegaard's full sense
of Tro, but some minimal level of belief. This will be discussed more in the next
section "Passion and Belief'.
One could say that in Fragments Climacus is parsing the phenomena of
perceptual experience for us so that we have a phenomenology of perceptual
doxastic formation. On this account, our interactions with the world produce in us
doxastic states, or a view of the way things are with respect to a person, object, or
state of affairs. When this state of "immediacy" is brought to our conscious
awareness, acceptance (or rejection) of these doxastic states becomes directly a
matter of volition. Clearly for Climacus these doxastic states function epistemically
something very much like the traditional concept of belief—only he refers to this as
239
"sensation", "immediate sensation", or "immediate cognition", and denies it
propositional content. Belief-states regarding states of affairs in the world,
considered as our beliefs "that p", involve then a sensual element and a conscious
element—both of which may be viewed as aspects of our cognitive, temporal-spatial
embodiment in the world.64 It is Kierkegaard's rejection of the Cartesian view of
human persons and his insistence upon an existential and embodied subject that
make this insight possible. Kierkegaard is no longer compelled to view scientific or
factual knowledge as propositional knowledge65 because mental states, instead of
being disembodied ahistorical entities with a disjuncted, rational subsistence, are
fused together with our temporal-spatial situations. Kierkegaard is thus free to view
mental states—including propositional states—as essentially cognitive dispositions
that reflect a relationship between a person (S) and some other person(s), or objects,
or states of affairs (p).
64 Thus, if Kierkegaard's Notes of Schelling's Berlin Lectures, "Philosophic der Offenbarung
[Philosophy of Revelation]", at the University of Berlin, 15 November 1841 - 4 February 1842,
may be regarded as expressing Kierkegaard's personal opinion, the contrast between this
"immediate cognition", of which Climacus speaks in Fragments, is very different from cognition
proper: "Everything actual has a double aspect: quid sit (what it is), quod sit (that it is). . . . one
can have a concept without cognition* [in margin: *a concept is expressed by quid sit, but from
this it does not follow that I know quod sit,'] but not cognition without the concept. In cognition
there is a doubleness whereby it is memory. In seeing a plant, I remember it and convert it to the
universal by recognizing it as plant. This was also seen in the doubleness implicit in the Latin
cognitio [knowledge] and in the Hebrew [word for knowledge]" KW I 335/Pap. C 27. Note that
this discussion is of cognition and not perception as such, and therefore it is entirely consistent
with my above analysis of Climacus's statements in Fragments. The above quote from
Kierkegaard's lecture notes of Schelling's Berlin lectures are from the second lecture, of which
Kierkegaard wrote, "I am so happy to have heard Schelling's second lecture—indescribably. . . .
The embryonic child of thought leapt for joy within me . . . when he mentioned the word
'actuality' in connection with the relation of philosophy to actuality. I remember almost every
word after that", JP V 5535/Pap. Ill A 179. Although Kierkegaard quickly became disillusioned
with Schelling's lectures, it seems that there is some plausibility in thinking that Kierkegaard
generally agrees, at this early stage of the lectures, with the above account of cognition. See
Howard V. and Edna H. Hong's, "Historical Introduction", in The Concept of Irony: With
Continual Reference to Socrates, and Notes ofSchelling's Berlin Lectures, in KW II vii-xxv, for a
discussion of these issues.
65 Of the five Danish words for the English word "knowledge", the one Climacus uses in the
discussion of belief in Fragments is in fact the Danish word Viden, which corresponds to the
German word Wissen, and is one of the two Danish words normally used to denote propositional
knowledge. The other word for propositional knowledge is Erkendelsen, although Kierkegaard is
not consistent in his differentiation between the two. This is also the same word translated as
"knowledge" in the previous referenced discussion of knowledge in Works of Love\ KW XVI
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Passion andBelief
The distinction between perception and belief or cognition allows Climacus to
view belief as an aspect of our volition, because it opens up the concept of belief to
function in a dual capacity. So beliefmay now refer either to our beliefs that p, or to
our dispositions that cause us to accept our beliefs that p. Climacus elaborates,
saying that, "Belief is the opposite of doubt. Belief and doubt are not two kinds of
knowledge that can be defined in continuity with each other, for neither of them is a
cognitive act, and they are opposite passions. Belief is a sense for coming into
existence, and doubt is a protest against wanting to go beyond immediate sensation
and immediate knowledge".66 Climacus seems to be playing upon a distinction
between (what we have called) doxastic states, as a minimum level of belief, and
something like full-fledged belief.
Given our previous analysis of the relationship of imagination to will in
transitions between existence-spheres, it should be no surprise now that the
dispositions to form beliefs to which we are passionately moved are inherently
teleological in nature. Beliefs are formed as we passionately engage ourselves in
reality with specific intentions in mind. It is the task of the human thinker qua
subject to adopt, or will, the appropriate passion and position themselves in a
corresponding way to that which they desire to know—or form felicitous beliefs
with respect to. Vigilius Haufniensis argues that all intellectual inquiries (as the
deliberate positioning of ourselves in order to acquire certain kinds of beliefs)
presuppose a mood that corresponds both to the mode of inquiry in which we are
engaged and the object of that inquiry.67 Thus the error of adopting an inappropriate
mood for an inquiry of some sort is as serious an error as committing a logical
blunder and jeopardises the reliability of the conclusions reached in that inquiry. In
Postscript Climacus further argues for the principle, "quicquid cognoscitur per
modum cognoscentis cognoscitur [whatever is known is known in the mode of the
231 /SV XII 222. See Piety, "Kierkegaard On Knowledge", (Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 1994),
18-25, for an excellent discussion of the Danish terms for knowledge used by Kierkegaard.
66 KW VII 84/SV VI 76; my emphasis.
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knower]", and rhetorically asks, "Consequently, what if objective indifference
cannot come to know anything at all?".68 The point is that all human knowing
involves subjectivity, or passion, and therefore human knowledge requires that "the
observer be in a definite state" corresponding to the object known.69 "[I]t holds
true", then, "that when [a human knower] is not in that state [s/]he does not know
anything whatever", even when "given the same objective data".70
The knife of subjectivity cuts in two directions epistemically, according to
Climacus. Without subjectivity we have no beliefs, and therefore know nothing; that
is, subjectivity is the formal condition of our belief-formation and an essential
element in belief-formation. But the things we believe and know also are products of,
or depend upon, or even happen according to, the qualification of our subjective
modes of being, so that by exercising a certain type of subjectivity we come to accept
or form beliefs correlative to that mode. So subjectivity is both the mode of belief
formation, and at the same time the means of belief assessment.
Belief, for Kierkegaard, is not a purely objective, cognitive (and ahistorical)
entity. There is a sense in which Kierkegaard believes it is nonsense to inquire into
the universal (objective) validity of a belief of some person—as if we could actually
isolate a belief of some person and legitimately consider it apart from its context as a
unique, passional (existential) aspect of that particular person's existence. (Keeping
in mind that, on the other hand, he does believe there is a legitimate way to speak of
beliefs as expressing objective, "accidental" truths.) The nature of belief for
Kierkegaard is a feature of our subjectivity—of our humanity—that consolidates our
rational and non-rational modes of being-in-the-world.
In the dominantWestern tradition and certainly in modem philosophy, "belief"
typically refers to some person's rational (cognitive) acceptance of some specific
proposition so that they express the propositional attitude "I believe that p" (where
p is any proposition, and a proposition is that which is expressed by a declarative
67 KW VIII 14n/SV VI 113n.
68 KW XII. 1 52/SV IX 48.
69 KW XII. 1 52/SV IX 48.
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sentence in any language).71 A propositional attitude may be described as a mental
(cognitive) state of any person in which that person's psychological relation to an
abstract object is expressed in the form of a sentence of some language—i.e., a
proposition. In this case "propositional attitude" denotes a mental state that is
propositional in nature and the relation expressed is that of some person to a
particular propositional construal of a state of affairs.72 A propositional attitude is
identified simply as our psychological relationship to the possibility of the truth of
any proposition of which we are cognizant. (Belief, then, is only one propositional
attitude we may have. We may, of course, also "disbelieve", "hope", "fear",
"think", "deny", "wish", etc., that p is true.) But Kierkegaard does not primarily
use "belief' to designate a particular type of propositional attitude, and this has
contributed to confusion regarding his account of and statements about faith and
belief. The majority of the time when we read the word "belief' [Tro] in
Kierkegaard's writings it refers to the inclination or disposition to accept
propositions, and not belief simpliciter (as propositional belief that p), Climacus
calls belief "a sense for coming into existence". Belief that p, as a feature of our
subjectivity, is not simply a disembodied rational entity, but is instead the expression
of a passionate disposition that is the product of the ways we act in the world. David
Gouwens argues that the way to understand Kierkegaard is to see that his account
here is a virtue theory.73 For Kierkegaard, a belief is not a Cartesian (or Kantian, or
mKW XII. 1 52/SV IX 48.
71 Although it is true that the Western analytic tradition understands "belief' to designate either the
psychological state of believing, or the intentional content of a belief (i.e., a proposition which is
believed), it is unclear that the former is ever treated seriously as different from the latter. In other
words, my claim is that, while recognising a logical distinction, in the Western analytic tradition
most often our believings are understood to be our beliefs that p.
72 This account of propositional attitudes departs from the more standard version—as given, for
example, in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, s.v., "Proposition", by Steven J. Wagner.
Wagner defines a propositional attitude as a psychological state that expresses in language the
relationship of an abstract object to a person. As will become clearer in subsequent discussion,
Wagner's analysis is not adequately nuanced. This account passes over the troublesome connection
of "abstract objects" to the propositions that express them, so that it is assumed that the
relationship between a person and a proposition just is the relationship between that person and the
object picked out by the proposition. The ambiguity caused by this sort of analysis creates
confusion in understanding human belief and belief acceptance.
73 David J. Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 94.
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Hegelian) transcendental entity that exists sub specie aeternis. A belief is an
embodied cognitive act, immanent within historical time and space.
Kierkegaard is interested in cognitive dispositions, which may be called virtues
and include emotions and moods. The dispositions and capacities Kierkegaard is
interested in are not only emotions but non-emotional too—e.g., earnestness,
inwardness, and passion.74 As we proactively engage ourselves in certain kinds of
activities we adopt and develop corresponding "passions" or dispositions
(capacities or virtues). In Concept of Anxiety, for example, Vigilius Haufniensis
argues that one of the central problems with the Hegelian "System" is that it
approaches all intellectual inquiries alike by collapsing each mode of inquiry into a
"scientific" mood of objective distanciation, and thereby ignores the mood which is
appropriate to each.75 This indicates that Kierkegaard believes it is possible to
improve both our cognitive equipment (and thereby influence our doxastic states),
and our "sense" for believing (and thereby be disposed to accept/reject proper
beliefs).
For Kierkegaard, then, beliefs are passions. In Fragments Climacus argues that,
when we are presented with events and form the belief, "X exists",
The conclusion of belief is no conclusion [Slutning] at all but a resolution [Beslutning]. . .
It might seem to be an inference from effect to cause when belief concludes: this exists, ergo
it came into existence.76 But this is not entirely true . . . because I cannot immediately
sense or know what I immediately sense or know is an effect, for immediately it simply is.
That it is an effect is something I believe, because in order to predicate that it is an effect, I
must have already made it dubious in the uncertainty of coming into existence. But if belief
decides on this, then the doubt is terminated . . . not knowledge but by will. Belief is the
opposite of doubt . . . neither of them is a cognitive act, and they are opposite passions.
Belief is a sense for coming into existence, and doubt is a protest against any conclusion
that wants to go beyond immediate sensation and immediate knowledge.77
74 KW VIII 148-151/SV VI 228-30.
75 KW VIII 9, 14, 14n/SVVI 109, 112-13; KWXII.l 109-125/AW IX 93-106.
76 This is awkward and puzzling phraseology. In this phrase, "this exists ergo it came into
existence", Kierkegaard should be understood to be deploying two different concepts of existence.
(Although there is no difference in the Danish; both words for "existence" are forms of vcere til.) In
the first instance he means "exists" in a non-technical, ordinary usage to denote a sensory
experience of something. In the second instance he is using the concept of existence in his
technical sense to denote something becoming in time. Taken this way, the above statement is read
to be saying something like, "when belief concludes: I have been appeared to in an X-like way,
ergo X is in existence [metaphysically] . . ." The practice to which Kierkegaard refers is that of
inferring the existence of 'things' upon having experience of them.
11KW VII 84/SV VI 76; his italics.
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Belief sui generis is not simply being in a certain propositional state, nor is it
something to which we must of necessity consciously reason. It is something
altogether different. The crux of this dense passage is that belief and nonbelief (of
any kind of proposition) are states of an individual's volition and that this is so
because belief is concerned with existing things and is itself a transition in the
(non)believer. That is, it is a cognitive disposition that is activated by (in the case of
perception) sense experience, not a process of ratiocination (i.e., not "a cognitive
act"). It is of utmost significance that Climacus argues that "belief concludes" and
"decides" that what is immediate in our sense experience came into existence, and
that "doubt is a protest" against forming conclusions, and that he does not say that
it is the person doing the cognising who concludes and protests. Belief and doubt
are the intentional activities of some (human) subject, to be sure, but they are not
necessarily conscious activities. In Climacus's grammar of belief, our everyday
kinds of beliefs are themselves "paradoxical" in the sense noted earlier in so far as
they go beyond reason to make actual claims (in the indicative mood) about
existence (in Kierkegaard's sense of coming into existence), not merely possible
claims (in the subjunctive mood). Belief is an intentional feature of human
consciousness and concerns itself with the flux, the kinesis, of reality and is
therefore by (Kierkegaard's) definition, operating beyond pure reason and in the
sphere of subjectivity: "Thus belief believes what it does not see".
Recall that for Climacus human existence is the conjunction of eternity and time
and as such is always becoming. What is decisive for existence is a person's
momentary unity of self in a decisive expression. This unity is not possible in an
Hegelian (or otherwise) conception of sheer objectivity, but only in and through
subjective self-expression in time and space. Climacus writes, "The [Hegelian] /-/
is a mathematical point that does not exist . . . Only momentarily can a particular
individual, existing, be in a unity of the infinite and finite that transcends existing.
This instant is a moment of passion".78
78/Of XII. 1 197/WIX 163.
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In Two Ages, passion is put forward as an essential and necessary ingredient in
an individual's development of character.79 Harvie Ferguson notes that
Kierkegaard's concept of passion is distinct from both the British Empiricist notion
of passion as "a disturbing element within a rationally conceived and intentional
ego", and the continental metaphysical tradition for whom "passion was conceived
in terms of an 'absence' within the ego—and this as a stimulating desire to possess
something that would 'complete' and thus express the self".80 Against these
conceptions Kierkegaard views passion as the force which brings structure and form
to human experience. The expression of passion that shapes and molds the human
person and gives it permanency over time is character.
If the essential passion [vcesentlige Lidenskab] is taken away, the one motivation, and
everything becomes meaningless externality, devoid of character, then the spring of ideality
stops flowing and life together becomes stagnant water . . . Morality is character
[Charakteer]; character is something engraved ("/aptxCTom); but the sea has no character, nor
does the sand, nor abstract common sense, either, for character is inwardness.81
It is in passionate formation of character that a person's life is held together in a
unified perspective and presents the cognitive subject its collocation in the midst of
the motion of reality. Passion is able to do this because it is in fact the context and
substance ofmotion itself.82 To be an existing subject is to be in motion and motion
is inherently agent-ful. Thus it is in passion-as-agency (i.e., subjectivity) that one
achieves the genuine motion of existence as a unified self. Kierkegaard reminds us,
"Here one is again reminded of my thesis that subjectivity is truth".83 To act
79 See KW XIV 62, 64, 68AST XIV 57, 58-60, 62-63. For discussions of Kierkegaard's concept of
character, compare Roberts, "Classical Themes in Kierkegaard", 180-182; and Gouwens,
Kierkegaard As Religious Thinker, 94-96.
80 Harvie Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity: Spren Kierkegaard's Religious
Psychology (London: Routledge, 1995), 77.
81 KW XIV 62, 77-8/SV XIV 57, 71.
82 Climacus writes, "Inasmuch as existence is motion, it holds true that there is indeed a continuity
that holds motion together, because otherwise there is no motion. Just as the statement that
everything is true means that nothing is true, in the same way the statement that everything is in
motion means that there is no motion. The motionless belongs to motion as motion's goal, both
in the sense the teXoc, [end, goal] and pexpov [measure, criterion] . . . the difficulty for the
existing person is to give existence the continuity without which everything just disappears . . .
passion is the momentary continuity that simultaneously has a constraining effect and is the
impetus ofmotion . . . passion is an anticipation of the eternal in existence in order for an existing
person to exist"; KW XII. 1 312/SV X 19; my emphasis.
83 KM/XII. 1 313/SVX 19.
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passionately is to exist. Thus inwardness is so important, for one must act
assiduously in existence if one to be the genuine self one is called to become.84
Kierkegaard sees both doubt and belief as expressions of the will and identifies
them as activities that cannot be determined by the intellect alone. Westphal takes
Kierkegaard to mean by this that the will has a vital impact on what we believe, but
that this is neither direct nor total. In other words, the role of our will in belief
formation is of such a nature that our doxic responsibilities can be countenanced and
assessed so that we may develop our perceptual and cognitive perspective on the
world.83 The question remains as to the degree to which the will functions as a doxic
feature in the transitions to belief that occur as we shift from one existence-sphere to
another. In so far as belief is, for Climacus, a passion it is also linked to the will.
"Belief', he tells us, "is not a knowledge but an act of freedom, an expression of
the will".86 It is difficult, then, to understand the position Kierkegaard works out in
the Climacus writings, as anything other than some form of volitionalism—the idea
that we, in some significant way, choose our beliefs. Climacus clearly understands
human volition to function in a significant way in the forming of our beliefs. The
pertinent question is whether he sees beliefs as being directly willed, or if the will is
functioning in some other doxastic capacity. Should we as esthetes, for instance, will
to believe propositions that the ethicist believes—to see the world through the
ethicist's conceptual coordinates—in order to make the transition to the ethical and
acquire an ethical life-view, even though these propositions contradict our present
esthetic evaluation of the world?
84 Climacus says that in order to illustrate this point, "if Pegasus and an old nag were hitched to a
carriage for a driver not usually disposed to passion and he was told: Now drive—I think it would
be successful. And this is what existing is like if one is to be conscious of it. Eternity is quick
like that winged steed, temporality is an old nag, and the existing person is the driver, that is, if
existing is not to be what people usually call existing, because then the existing person is no
driver but a drunken peasant who lies in the wagon and sleeps and lets the horses shift for
themselves. Of course, he also drives, he is also a driver, and likewise there are many who—also
exist"; KW XII. 1 311-12ASVX 18.
85 Westphal, Becoming A Self, 77.
86 KW VII 83/SV VI 75.
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Perhaps the most thorough and fastidious analysis of Kierkegaard on this point
is to be found in Louis Pojman's The Logic ofSubjectivity}1 From Pojman we learn
that there are several kinds of volitionalism.88 In his estimation Kierkegaard is a
direct volitionalist who thinks that all our beliefs are acquired by direct acts of the
will.89 In Kierkegaard's volitionalism (according to Pojman), the object of our
willing is the specific belief itself.
C. Stephen Evans makes two very good points against this reading of
Kierkegaard as a direct volitionalist. First, he points out that Kierkegaard does not
think that we are necessarily (or even very often) conscious of our choices.90 In The
Sickness Unto Death Anti-Climacus endorses this view when he argues that most
people are unconscious of their willing complicity in their own despair and
sinfulness.91 If Kierkegaard is, on the one hand, claiming that one is directly willing
these states, as Pojman would have to claim, it seems odd that Kierkegaard would
also maintain that it is even possible to be unaware of willing their own despair—let
alone make the claim that as a matter of fact people generally are not aware of so
doing. The second point Evans makes is that Climacus nowhere claims that specific
belief states or propositions are the direct objects of our will.92 Climacus
understands belief and doubt to be passions.93 Passions are things that are cultivated
and this is accomplished by willing to do other things, which our imagination is able
to present to our consciousness as possibilities for actualisation.
87 Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1984). For a
critical discussion of Pojman on Kierkegaard's volitionalism see C. Stephen Evans, "Does
Kierkegaard Think That Beliefs Can Be Directly Willed?", International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 26: (1989) 173-184.
88 Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity, 143-148.
89 Ibid., 146. David Law also seems to see Kierkegaard as something of a direct volitionalist when
he writes that, "For Kierkegaard knowledge is belief. . . .[Belief] does not come about by the
cultivation of an objective and impersonal cognitive attitude but by a passionate act of the
will to accept something as true despite all who might argue against it". Law, Kierkegaard
as Negative Theologian, 88 (his italics, my bold). It seems clear that Law agrees with Pojman
regarding Kierkegaard's volitionalism and thinks that the object of the act of volition is the
specific belief itself.
90 Evans, "Does Kierkegaard Think That Beliefs Can Be Directly Willed?", 178ff.
91 KW XIX 45/SV XV 100. See whole section, "The Despair That Is Ignorant of Being Despair, or
the Despairing Ignorance of Having a Self and an Eternal Self', KW XIX 42-47/SVXV 98-101.
92 Evans, "Does Kierkegaard Think That Beliefs Can Be Directly Willed?", 178.
93 KW VIII 84/SV VI 76.
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There is a third reason, in addition to Evans's two arguments, to reject the idea
that Kierkegaard was a direct volitionalist. Climacus in Postscript explicitly rejects
the idea that Christianity is to be believed against the understanding.94 The Christian,
Climacus believes, possesses reason and must use it to identify which object of faith
is truly beyond reason from those that are just confused "nonsense". Assigning to
reason a regulative role in faith militates against the idea that Kierkegaard thinks we
can and must will ourselves into specific belief states. On his view we always are
limited in our selection of legitimate candidates for belief to those propositions that
express the range of possibilities which cohere with our general picture of the world.
We simply cannot will to accept as true a proposition that according to our present
understanding of the world counts as utter nonsense. Nonsensical propositions (in
the trivial sense) are understood to be so precisely because they cannot be imagined
to be true. A proposition of this sort may become an acceptable candidate for belief
only if our mode of being-in-the-world is altered so that the proposition in question
becomes imaginable (as true).
In light of these points, Kierkegaard is to be read as an indirect volitionalist, who
thinks that we make choices to be certain kinds of people, who in turn value certain
kinds of things. Kierkegaard is simply claiming, "that what we want to believe and
think ultimately plays a decisive role in what we do believe and think".93 By
projecting for ourselves a range of possibilities via imagination, and then choosing
to pursue a particular range of those, we cultivate specific and correlative kinds of
passions96—which in turn influence our belief dispositions. It is in this sense that
our beliefs are products of our volition and are resolutions. We will or choose to
believe or disbelieve certain propositions in the same way we will or choose to find
certain character qualities in other people morally laudable or repugnant. We do not
94 KW XII. 1 568/W X 235.
95 C. Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard's "Philosophical
Fragments" (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1992), 136.
96 See Evans comment, "Passions are things that must be slowly cultivated and constantly
renewed. Acts of willing play a role in this cultivation and Kierkegaard regards the higher ethical
and religious passions as things we are responsible to achieve. However, by and large our passions
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perform these actions as directs acts of the will, nor do we do them (usually) through
conscious deliberation. We just find ourselves drawn to or repulsed by certain
qualities in people. These judgments, or states of our persons, arise out of a complex
constellation of choices and decisions we have made over a period of time—choices
that have shaped and influenced our character and sensibilities prior to any act of
judgment.
Passion, then, is Kierkegaard's term for the constitutive force of the human
subject which enables the human person to achieve the existential concretion
(subjectivity) of her/his abstract "eternality" (thought, consciousness, that which is
not subject to temporal flux) with her/his temporality (existence). The term passion
implies a link with human emotions, and for Kierkegaard it is a particular kind of
nonrational (emotional) inward possession that is an essential force in directing and
shaping a person's life. This concept of passion is correlative to our everyday use of
the terms "values" and "ideals", which are not strictly rational entities but are inner
capacities that find expression through emotions.97 These are dispositions that must
be slowly cultivated, and this is accomplished by willing to do other things, which
our imagination is able to present to our consciousness as possibilities.
As a type of passion belief is a nexus of possibility and actuality in the
individual and is the site of existential concretion,98 Belief, for Kierkegaard, is
literally, "an anticipation of the eternal in existence".99 Belief is the point at which
propositions (as thought) and actuality (as historical presence) converge in a human
person. Belief operates as a sort of copula, a conjoining of the temporal and the
eternal, the actual and the possible, what is thought with the existence of the subject,
as the existential expression or concretion of a thought possibility. Our acts of
are formed on a long-term basis, and are not simply willed into existence, but formed indirectly
through a process of willing to do other things". Evans, Passionate Reason, 134.
97 Evans, Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript, 69.
98 Emmanuel Levinas eloquently makes a similar point regarding this juxtaposition of belief when,
in "Existence and Ethics", in Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader, edited by Jonathan Ree and Jane
Chamberlain (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 29, he comments that: "[For Kierkegaard,]
[b]elief stands in the midst of this conflict between presence and absence—a conflict which remains
for ever irreconcilable, an open wound, unstaunchable bleeding".
99 KW XII. 1 313/SVX 19.
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knowledge are an attempt to reproduce reality but these attempts, because of the
ontological difference between propositions (as thought) and reality (as actuality),
are at their best mere "approximations" of reality.100 Propositions do not exist
either in the sense that material objects or humans exist, but have thought-
existence.101 They are ideal objects that exist as possibilities in the minds of human
subjects who entertain them, and in the linguistic matrix in which they have a
function. Propositions are "visible", or made actual, in the acts in which they are
believed by existing beings (humans). Beliefs in this sense are the cognitive
acceptance of entertained propositions thereby constituting a nexus between the
possibility (thought) and the actuality or subjectivity of the thinker.
The next section explores the logic of Salighed as the constitutive passion that
brings together Kierkegaard's grammar of subjectivity with his grammar of belief.
Existence-Spheres and Kierkegaard's Ethics ofBelief
We may further conclude that for Kierkegaard beliefs are necessary states of
human persons if they are to attain a fully developed subjectivity. On Kierkegaard's
account, belief is an ontological force that places us in reality in a particular way so
that we actually perceive reality in a way that is different than if we did not believe as
we do. The beliefs that we have are engagements with reality and are understood to
be ethical, temporal, entanglements of our being, not disengaged esthetic
abstractions.
Throughout the grammar of existence presented in the previous two chapters,
concern over or passion for eternal blessedness or happiness (en evig Salighed)
emerged as the central concept in the logic of the existence-spheres. Two further
features about Salighed are now evident. First, Salighed is the primary motivating
force (as a passion) behind the transitions between existence-spheres. Second, and
100 See KW VII 92-3/SV VI 83-4; and KW XII. 1 23-5, 30-1, 81, 212/SV IX 23-5, 29-30, 69-70,
177. Cf. KW VII 141, 199/Pap. IV B 1:124, VB 12:8; and AW XII. 1 38, 200-01/5V IX 37, 166-
67; KW XII.2 52/Pap. VI B 42.
101 Cf. JP I 2, \051/Pap. II A 496, X2 A 328. See also C. Stephen Evans's brief discussion
in,"Realism and Antirealism in Kierkegaard", 172.
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more importantly, Salighed is what unites Kierkegaard's grammar of subjectivity
with epistemic concerns so that the existence-spheres have immense epistemological
import.
Eternal blessedness is the central theme of the Climacean writings, beginning
with the focus of Fragments on the possibility of achieving eternal blessedness as
an historical feature of a temporal existence.102 Climacus, we learned, treats the
concept of Salighed as a parallel concept to the Socratic and Platonic idea of being
virtuous or possessing the truth. Climacus therefore understands Salighed to
function in an epistemic manner analogous to the Socratic-Platonic account of virtue.
Although it is often overlooked, Climacus continues with Salighed as a primary
concept in Postscript in his elucidation of subjectivity. In Chapter IV of Part Two,
"The Issue in Fragments: How Can an Eternal Happiness Be Built on Historical
Knowledge?", Climacus presents his emphasis on subjectivity and the grammar of
life's stages in Postscript as another way of getting at the centrality of Salighed in
Fragments. Climacus describes the "existential pathos" that is "the transforming
relation of the idea to the individual's existence" as a person's passionate quest for
eternal happiness.103 The end or telos of the existence-spheres as a grammar of
human subjectivity is achieved through the pathos of eternal happiness and is in fact
described by Climacus as the necessary condition for an existential transition.104
David Law therefore states that, "As an initial definition, then, eternal happiness is
the highest good and the goal of human existence".105 Climacus describes the task
each individual has of realising eternal blessedness and becoming the self s/he has
102 It is worthy of our notice that the upbuilding discourse, "The Expectancy Of An Eternal
Salvation", published veronymously by "S. Kierkegaard" on 8 June 1844, just a few days before
Fragments was published, explores the logic of the concept of Salighed. The title literally is,
"Forventningen af en evig Salighed", and so it is clear that while "salvation" is a better translation
of Salighed in this context, Kierkegaard is nevertheless referring to the same concept discussed by
Climacus. KW V 253-273/SV IV 237-243. In this discourse Kierkegaard explores the logic of the
concept of Salighed in relation to human existence. There are numerous direct parallels between
Climacus's use of Salighed and Kierkegaard's treatment of it in the discourse.
103 KW XII. 1 387/5E X 81.
104 Climacus states: "If the absolute telos [to which an individual relates] does not absolutely
transform the individual's existence by relating to it, then the individual does not relate
[her/]himself with existential pathos but with esthetic pathos". AW XII.1 387/SV X 81-2.
105 David R. Law, Kierkegaard As Negative Theologian (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 102.
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been given as having "Simultaneously to Relate Oneself Absolutely to One's
Absolute xeA-og and Relatively to Relative Ends".106 Climacus elaborates:
Therefore eternal happiness, as the absolute good, has the remarkable quality that it can
only be defined by the mode in which it is acquired, whereas other goods, just because the
mode of acquisition is accidental or at any rate relatively dialectical, must be defined by
the good itself. . . . eternal happiness ... is the good that is attained by absolutely
venturing everything. . . . [Therefore] the discourse [about eternal happiness] is long
indeed, the longest of all discourses, because to venture everything demands a
transparency of consciousness that is only acquired slowly.107
Note two points that Climacus is making in this passage. First, a person's eternal
happiness cannot be an objective feature of a person's life. Eternal happiness is only
for subjectivity (only subjects receive it), and therefore is only possessed by those
who exercise their subjectivity. In other words, Climacus believes that eternal
happiness corresponds directly to the exact nature of truth when defined as
subjectivity: in each the mode of apprehension defines what is obtained. Abrahim
Kahn takes this to mean that for Climacus, "[Salighed] is not an object of
assessment but a criterion for one's life".108 As a criterion for one's life, Kahn
notes that Salighed may be reflected upon, but it is not an objective cognitive
assessment: "By the sharpest passion possible for Salighed a person succeeds in
knitting the concept to the structure of [her/]his own being, in reconstituting
[her/]himself, or in stimulating capacities within [her/]himself to engender an
authentic existence".109 Thus, the proper conclusion to draw regarding the treatment
of subjectivity in Postscript is that it actually is a phenomenological description of
how the passion of Salighed is executed in an individual human existence.110
For Climacus Salighed has as its goal the unified self and to that degree is
coterminous with his concept of subjectivity—in both its constitutive and reflexive
sense. Salighed is both the end of human subjectivity as its terminus ad quem and is
the context (as a passion, an existential pathos) in which subjectivity flourishes.
106 Quoted from the title of Part Two, Chapter IV, Section A, "PATHOS", §1. KW XII.1 387/.S'V
X 81. See also KW XII. 1 407, 414, 422, 431 /SV X 98, 105, 111, 119.
107 KW XII. 1 426-27/SV X 115-16; his italics, my bold.
108 Abrahim H. Kahn, Salighed as Happiness? Kierkegaard on the Concept Salighed (Waterloo,
ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1985), 84.
109 Kahn, Salighed as Happiness? Kierkegaard on the Concept, 84.
110 Ibid.
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Constitutional subjectivity is the term we employed to express Climacus's concept
of human subjectivity as a realised state. Salighed is the final goal of human
subjectivity and thus coincides with Climacus's constitutive subjectivity. Thus
Salighed is also quite literally the constituting factor in the development of the
human self. To have as one's essential passion one's eternal happiness is to
perform the tasks Climacus has already (early in Postscript) assigned to the
"subjective thinker" who exercises "inwardness" or "double reflection" in order
to "understand oneself in existence" by "understanding the abstract
concretely".111 It is this element of Climacean subjectivity we have designated as
reflexive subjectivity.
Implicit in the first assertion in the above excerpt from Postscript, Climacus
secondly posits a direct link between the concepts of Salighed and transparency.
Salighed is realised in a person's temporal existence as transparency. The passion
for Salighed is a passion for wholeness or unity in one's existence and one achieves
this, Climacus tells us, through inwardness (reflexive subjectivity), or when in Anti-
Climacus's terms one "rests transparently in the power that establishes" one's
selfhood. At this point it becomes clearer how Salighed connects Kierkegaard's
discussion of existence-spheres to epistemology. The existence-spheres are "stages
on life's way", and the terminus ad quem of a human life is being-in-truth—that is,
eternal blessedness and self-transparency. Kierkegaard explains the link between
inwardness and transparency in Works ofLove:
When a person thinks only one thought the direction is inward. ... It is one thing to
think in such a way that one's attention is continually and only outward, in the direction
of the object that is something external; it is something else to be so turned in thought
that continually, every moment, one is conscious, conscious of one's own state during
the thinking or of what is happening in oneself during the thinking. But only the latter is
essential thinking—it is namely, transparency, the former is unclear thinking, which
suffers from the contradiction that that which, thinking, clarifies something is itself
basically unclear. Such a thinker explains something else by [her/]his thinking."2
Once more the idea is that a detached, "objective" approach to life—and oneself in
particular—does not yield the kind of certainty and self-knowledge that Descartes
111 KW XII. 1 73, 353, 352/SV IX 63, X 53, 54.
112 KW XVI 361 /SV XII 343; my italics.
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sought. Transparent self-apprehension (as the getting of oneself) comes by the
inward action of reflexive subjectivity, and this cannot come through the
disinterested contemplation of self. To achieve transparency and for inwardness to
have content, the self must act and must have its action as its object of reflection.
Through this exercise of reflexive subjectivity one achieves a "deeper seeing" that
is "as much a vision of the world as it is of the self'.113 In the attainment of
transparency human persons are changed by coming to see themselves in a certain
way, which in turn entails construing the world in a manner in which this new
conception of self fits.
Transparency is thus the attainment of a kind of unity of the self. This self-unity,
however, is best described as a transversal unity—one that depends not upon a
transcendence-within-immanence, such as Kant's exercise of transcendental reason,
but upon a radically transcendent ground that is not available to humans from within
their own rational resources. The passion, or desire for, or concern [Bekymring]
over, Salighed is synonymous with a passion for transparency. Here we have
Kierkegaard's capricious conjugation of ontology with epistemology. The
ontological dimensions of the pathos of Salighed is a passion for self-unity, the
grammar of which is detailed in the theory of existence-spheres. Epistemologically
the passion of Salighed is a passion for self-knowledge. In either case Salighed
amounts to a passion for transparency—which, as a self-unity in which one truly
knows oneself, expresses the unity of both the epistemic and ontic features of
Salighed. For this reason we find across the entire Kierkegaardian authorship
(veronymous and pseudonymous) that epistemic issues are discussed under ethical-
religious categories such as "earnestness", "salvation", "repentance", "guilt",
"sin", "interest", "concern", and "upbuilding". These all are united as
expressions of Climacus's central thesis that "Truth is Subjectivity", which, as the
axiom of his subjectivity principle, is therefore an expression that captures what we
may call the logic of Salighed. The grammar of the existence-spheres displays this
113 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, 64, 67.
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logic through its phenomenology of Salighed. Marilyn Piety observes that,
"Kierkegaard maintains that we have an essential interest in determining or
choosing the proper interpretation of existence. Our eternal blessedness, or eternal
damnation is, according to Kierkegaard, ultimately dependent upon this choice".114
The Kierkegaardian focus on Salighed subverts the Hegelian-Enlightenment flight
from subjectivity in epistemology.
The main issue is that Kierkegaard does not think that the telos of human
cognitive powers lies in the attainment of a collection of the maximal number of true
propositions regarding the universe. This is precisely his quarrel with the
Enlightenment emphasis on scientific rationality as the final court of appeal for
human belief:
The main objection, the whole objection to the natural sciences [Naturvidenskaberne] can
be expressed formally, simply, and unconditionally in this way: It is incredible that a
human being who has infinitely reflected about [her/]himself as spirit could then think of
choosing the natural sciences (with empirical material) as the task for [her/]his striving.115
If scientific knowledge [Naturvidenskab]116 is the end of human intelligence it
would, first of all, be a purely esthetic existence, lacking a self (subjectivity)—that is,
a "unifying point" or "transparency". Such an esthetic existence draws a better
analogy with a computer than with a human person. Moreover, the kind of
objectivity required for acquiring the maximal set of true propositions precludes
such a state from being available to humans. Humans are subjects, and as such
know in and through their subjectivity. There is a kind of objectivity that is available
to, and appropriate for, humans, and to that degree the sciences play a legitimate role
in human life. This objectivity, however, is not the sort that can yield the maximal
true set of propositions about the universe because it is a situated and provisional
objectivity. Instead Kierkegaard thinks that propositional truths and the human
114
Marilyn Gaye Piety, "Kierkegaard On Rationality", Faith and Philosophy 10: (July 1993), 370.
115 JP III 2820IPap. VII1 A 200. Cf. Vigilius Haufniensis's critique of "science" in KW VIII 9-
lO/SV VI 109, in which he argues that while science has its place, its main shortcoming is it
"forgets itself' and treats that which is not fundamentally objective (actuality) as if it were.
116 The term Naturvidenskab is a compound of Natur (nature) and Videnskab (science, or
scholarship—cf. German wissenschaft) and translates literally as "natural science". For discussion
see Piety, Kierkegaard on Knowledge, 23. The term Videnskab, or "science", comes from the word
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capacity to possess them is valuable as part of the whole person—i.e., the being-in-
truth of the person and the attainment of a unified and deep subjectivity. This being-
in-truth is in turn conditioned by the manner in which we position ourselves in
reality—i.e., propositions ultimately are features of and dependent upon our
involvements in the world as subjects. For this reason Kierkegaard believes that all
human endeavours to attain truth exhibit a teleological structure and actually amount
to a concern over Salighed. Pursuits of truth must ultimately be evaluated in terms of
their ability to achieve Salighed.
As a feature of our subjectivity, the propositional content of belief is given to us
by our actual ways of being in the world. The passions or dispositions that move us
to give cognitive assent to specific propositions are generated as we position
ourselves in specific ways in reality. We believe certain things because we are
positioned in the world in such a way that we are inclined to believe, or "see", some
propositions as true over others. Part of this positioning may include very refined
pieces of rational argumentation, but Kierkegaard reminds us that we only believe
those propositions which we accept, and this acceptance involves the entire human
subject with her concerns and passions, and is not, therefore, a simple matter of
rational inquiry. Even our reasoning is situated in our subjectivity and is temporally
and spatially embodied. Kierkegaard cordons subjectivity off as a separate
conceptual sphere of existence from the sphere of possibility. As thought, reason is
limited in a quasi-Kantian way and deals in possibility, not actuality, and has the
ability only to inform conceptual existence (what Kierkegaard calls "essence"). The
human act of believing, however, is an involvement in the world that stakes a claim
about what is actual—not just possible.
A belief, as a feature of one's subjectivity, is not an abstract entity that exists as a
piece of pure thought whose only legitimate relations to the believing person are
logical ones. In so far as belief-formation occurs as the product of our passions or
dispositions, beliefs are not exclusively to be regulated through the exercise of
Viden, which, as we have already noted earlier, is one of the Danish terms for propositional
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reason—that is, by way of abductive, deductive, or inductive arguments. As we
engage the world we form beliefs simpliciter. These beliefs are "paradoxical" to
reason in that they are neither completely rationally determined (that is, produced
only as the product of the exercise of rational capacities), nor are they rationally
determinable (that is, absolutely certain in Descartes' sense). The consequence of all
this for Kierkegaard's thought is that epistemic issues of doxastic regulation are
now open to a form of evaluation that exceeds purely rational or formal, logical
procedures. What must now be accounted for in doxastic regulation—and this is
precisely what is lacking in a purely rational evaluation of belief—is an account of
the believing person's comportment in reality, or how such-and-such a belief figures
as part of a life. In other words, Kierkegaard has articulated a meta-epistemology in
which the science of belief gives way to an ethics of belief. The Climacean
subjectivity principle sets forth a meta-epistemological position that situates the
rational evaluation of beliefs within the larger context of a human life.
Levels ofBelief
A final feature of the Kierkegaardian account of the nature of belief that emerges
from our discussion is that there several distinguishable levels of belief in his
thought. As a result of the duplex situation of human existence and the resulting gap
between our experience and ideas, our beliefs are fallible and do not have open to
them metaphysical-epistemological justification. Thus they are best approached
descriptively and "grammatically". Beliefs (in one sense) happen to us "in the
stream of life" as we engage reality and correspondingly formulate and use
concepts, which enable us to talk about and describe reality ostensibly. This is in
keeping with the earlier observation that Kierkegaard adopts what Alston terms a
"doxastic practice approach" to epistemology. Kierkegaard analyses beliefs in
terms of the manner in which they are formed in us, according to the cognitive
dispositions and habits that cause us to form beliefs. This doxastic practice approach
knowledge.
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to epistemology derives from two features of Kierkegaard's thought.117 First, it is a
function of Kierkegaard's commitment to the view that the source of a belief is of
vital importance in assessing its epistemic status. Secondly, his rejection of the
Hegelian-Enlightenment "universalist" epistemology, with its single unified system
of justification for all beliefs, entails that the epistemic status of a belief be
determined in isolation, according to its unique mode of formation. As a result,
Kierkegaard's doxastic approach will ultimately be sensitive to the social nature of
justification, but also it acknowledges the fact that there are different levels and
categories of beliefs.
Believing is a complex activity—one that involves a voluntaristic element. One
cannot think of beliefs in isolation to the overall cognitive and passional context in
which they occur. What we think and believe about the world, as well as how we
want to believe about and correspondingly engage the world, plays a role in
informing any particular act of believing. The language of "levels" of belief has
been chosen to indicate that, on Kierkegaard's view, beliefs cannot be evaluated
simply as beliefs simpliciter■—as straightforwardly about matters of fact. These
beliefs about matters of fact are part of a wider context of believing. We shall
identify three levels in this wider context of believing, all of which are genuine
instances of belief for an individual under Kierkegaard's construal of belief.118
There is, first, belief in the typical sense of believing something in the world to
be a particular way that involves a cognitive commitment to the relevant fact about the
universe being just so and is usually conjoined to a propositional attitude expressing
this. We may (after the contemporary trend) refer to these sorts of beliefs, where one
entertains a proposition and judges it to be true, as occurrent beliefs.119 This, we
have noted, is a mental state that we often just find ourselves in as we variously
117 Cf. Alston's discussion of why it is his epistemology "does and does not cany commitments in
substantive epistemology", in "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology", 24-5.
118 This is not to say that Kierkegaard uses these terms or even that he understood or developed his
thought in this way. What is claimed here is that this is a compelling way to understand what
Kierkegaard has to say about believing.
119 Louis Pojman, What Can We Know? An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (London:
Wadsworth, 1995), 246-259.
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engage the world through our miscellaneous modes of being. Thus Kierkegaard
often refers to our beliefs as propositions about some fact. Though he does not
mean by this that these beliefs are (Cartesian) disembodied propositions existing
separately from our praxial engagements with the world.
A second level of belief pertains more generally to the kinds of passions or
dispositions that produce our propositional beliefs. These passions are in a
significant sense products of our wills and therefore are selected in an indirect
fashion. It will be recalled that Climacus refers to belief and doubt as "opposite
passions". In Works of Love Kierkegaard likewise speaks (as himself) about love
and mistrust as that which ultimately gives rise to our cognitive acceptance of
propositions.120 Belief at this level, as the means by which we form our
propositional attitudes, has a functional similarity to Paul Helm's concept of a belief
policy, in so far as he defines this as "a strategy or project for accepting, rejecting or
suspending judgement as to the truth of propositions in accordance with a set of
norms".121 Helm's concept of belief policies and Kierkegaard's concept of
passions that generate propositional attitudes both share the realisation that accepting
a proposition as a matter of fact cannot be done as an evidential concern only. This
is because we must first be able to "see" that the evidence demonstrates or
"shows" us or counts as evidence in favour of a proposition. Belief policies
function as the de facto sources of evidential criteria. While there can be reasons
why one belief policy is superior to others, there can be no purely rational evaluation
of them. This is an intermediate level of belief and, as Helm notes, one's noetic
structure may accommodate many belief policies;122 or, to re-phrase in
Kierkegaardian terminology, there are multiple passions that characterise a human
person's life at any point.
There may be layers of belief-forming passions at this level, which Nicholas
Wolterstorff calls "second-order beliefs", or beliefs we have about our "first-order
120 KW XVI 233-34/SV .
121 Paul Helm, BeliefPolicies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 58.
122 Ibid.
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beliefs" (beliefs about the facts of the universe). These second-order beliefs give us
the ability to evaluate the manner in which we are forming beliefs.123 Kierkegaard's
discussion of passions as dispositions toward belief simpliciter allows us to see
families of passions that subsume various passional genera under them. That is, we
have belief policies about our belief policies, and our passions give rise to other
passions, as a teleological development of their inner logic.
There is a third level of belief in Kierkegaard's thought. Belief at this level is, in
Helm's vocabulary, a global belief policy about the kind of belief policies we
employ-that is, a belief policy by which we adopt other intermediate (level 2) belief
policies. Kierkegaard refers to belief at this level as a life-view, or uses the related
concept of an Archimedean point. Murray Rae carefully traces the concept the
Archimedean point through Kierkegaard's thought,124 and argues that it is related to
the quest for a "hermeneutical principle for understanding the whole world".125 In
this regard Rae explains that Kierkegaard's notion of an Archimedean point refers
to the organisational point for one's thinking: "Thought [for Kierkegaard] requires
an orientation point. It cannot be detached. [For this reason I]t cannot begin from
nothing as Hegel would have it but must be grounded in that which is 'true for
me'".126 More importantly, Rae demonstrates that each existence-sphere entails its
own Archimedean point, its own way of construing the world, so that in the
pseudonyms there is that which may be referred to as an esthetic understanding, an
ethical understanding, and a religious understanding.127 The Archimedean point is,
123 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God
Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 269.
124 Rae, Kierkegaard's Vision of the Incarnation, 150-57. See also Winfield E. Nagley,
"Kierkegaard's Archimedean Point", in Perspectives in Education, Religion, and the Arts, eds. H.E.
Kiefer and M.K. Munitz (Albany: State University of New York, 1970), 163-80; and Harvey Smit,
Kierkegaard's Pilgrimage ofMan (Amsterdam: W.D. Meinema, 1965), 14.
125 Rae, Kierkegaard's Vision of the Incarnation, 150-51. Archimedes was an ancient Greek
mathematician in the 3rd century B.C. who is reputed to have said that he could move the whole
world with a lever and fulcrum if he was given a point on another world from which to do so.
126 Rae, Kierkegaard's Vision of the Incarnation, 152. Rae lifts the last phrase in this quote from
the closing words of Either/Or, Volume II, stated by Judge William's pastor-friend from Jylland in
the "Ultimatum"; KWIV 354/SV III 324.
127 In Either/Or, Volume I, A argues that for the esthete, "the artistically achieved identity is the
Archimedean point with which one lifts the whole world"; KW III 195/SV7 II 271. On the other
hand, in Either/Or, Volume IV, Judge William argues that as he sees things, "When the
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then, closely connected to the manner in which one conceives the world—what we
could also call a life-view. Judge William argues that, "Every human being, no
matter how slightly gifted [s/]he is, however subordinate [her/]his position in life
may be, has a natural need to formulate a life-view, a conception of the meaning of
life and its purposes".128 Whatever our place in existence, however differently our
lives unfold, all of us, Kierkegaard thinks, develop a conception of life that depends
upon a central point of view through which we understand the world. We find, then,
that talk of Archimedean points and life-views are different ways of saying the same
things. As there are different Archimedean points, there are also different life-
129
views.
Kierkegaard further explains the concept of a life-view this way:
A life-view is more than a quintessence or a sum of propositions maintained in it abstract
neutrality; it is more than experience [Erfaring], which as such is always fragmentary. It
is, namely, the transubstantiation of experience [Erfaringens Transubstantiation\\ it is an
unshakeable certainty in itself won from all lived experience [Empirie].130
Kierkegaard believes, in other words, the way we are in the world, or the kinds of
passions in which we invest ourselves, or even the manner in which we act in the
world and process the everyday experiences we have, is a product of our life-view.
Life-views transform our empirical experiences and place them in the context of all
the other experiences we have had, along with a structure through which we make
sense of them all. This is a pre-reflective framework (which nonetheless may be
reflected upon) through which we make existential sense of experience. A life-view
is not a specific set of propositions, nor simply an aggregate of one's experiences to
date, but is an overall orientation to experience, a means of determining (that is, of
providing a determination for) legitimate belief policies. Life-views give a
teleological structure to our cognitive processes that ultimately dictates what counts
personality is absolute, then it is itself the Archimedean point from which one can lift the world";
KWIV 265/SV III 245. Climacus also employs this language and refers to the "Archimedean point
of religiousness"; KW XII. 1 65/SV IX 56.
128 KW IV X19/SV III 169.
I2y For example, Kierkegaard speaks of the "Archimedean point" of science "which is nowhere in
the world and from that point [scientists] have surveyed the whole and seen the details in their
proper light"; JP V 5092/Pap. I A 72.
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as evidence or reasons to believe a given proposition. This concept of a life-view has
a striking resemblance to Wittgenstein's concept of a world-picture, which serves as
the basis or foundation (Grundlage)131 for, or "point of departure"132 of a
community's looking at the world.133 Life-views and world pictures are the de facto
source of both certainties and knowledge-claims.
The suggestion here is that Kierkegaard's concept of "belief' as Tro is most
basically about our personal commitments and involve the whole of our temporally
and spatially embodied persons. These commitments, projected in our above
distinction between differing levels of belief, operate along a continuum. Therefore,
Kierkegaard does not recognise a strict dichotomy between our dispositions to
believe and the propositions we do in fact believe; that is, between the object of belief
(the objective "What"), and the subject of belief (the "How" of subjectivity).
Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle effectively does away with the subject/object
dichotomy with respect to belief. Belief is construed belief as operating along a
continuum of minimal to maximal commitment. There is thus a need for
Kierkegaard to speak of belief in terms of our doxastic states and our propositional
attitudes as the objects of verbal expressions. At the same time he must continue to
speak of belief in terms of passions, or virtues, or dispositions to accept certain
kinds of propositions or form specific propositional attitudes.
At one end of the continuum we have Tro as belief in the ordinary sense of
entertaining some proposition as true. At the furthest extreme this involves a minimal
level of commitment consisting of mere cognitive commitment to propositions to
which intellectual assent does not place much of one's person is at stake. This level
of commitment would involve at most a commitment to accommodate our noetic
structures to the piece of information in order to maintain its logical integrity. (It
130 S0ren Kierkegaard, Early Polemical Writings, trans, and ed. Julia Watkins (Princeton:Princeton
University Press, 1990), 76.
131 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 167.
132Ibid„ 105.
133 Michael Kober, "Certainties of a World-Picture. The Epistemological Investigations in On
Certainty", in eds. H. Sluga and D. G. Stern, The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 418ff.
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may also involve some other low-level commitments such as verbal
acknowledgement, etc.) An attempt to isolate belief at this end of the spectrum and to
consider it in these terms, removed from its temporal and spatial embodiments by
merely analysing the conditions of a subject's belief "that p" is what Kierkegaard
refers to as an attempt at "sheer objectivity". Most of contemporary (and indeed
modem) epistemology is concerned with beliefs only at this end of the commitment
scale—even in the case that historical embodiment is acknowledged and accounted
for. Kierkegaard does not find much value at all in analysing belief solely in these
terms and, when (approximately) veridical, refers to the propositional attitudes
corresponding to these as "accidental" truths.
A maximal level of existential commitment is at the other end of the belief-
commitment continuum and consists of Tro as religious faith. These commitments
involve our ultimate concerns about salvation, or what Kierkegaard calls Scilighed or
"eternal happiness",134 that arise from our interest [Interesse] as historical subjects,
who think, act, reason, value, and feel as temporally qualified persons with spatially
situated bodies. Propositional expressions of these beliefs (when veridical)
Kierkegaard refers to as "essential" truths.133 These essential truths are "related
essentially to the existing person by pertaining essentially to what it means to
exist",136 and therefore are the beliefs which give shape and character to our
passionate, praxial engagements in the world. Because beliefs at this end of the
spectrum are the means to personal transformation Kierkegaard finds them more
interesting and therefore spends the bulk of his analysis discussing these.
In conclusion, we have distinguished three levels of belief in Kierkegaard's
thought. These range from (something very close to) a minimal sense of belief, in
which there is a characterisation of the way things are, to the passionate dispositions
that move us to accept these characterisations, ending with an overarching life-view,
or general belief about how the world is. These are arranged hierarchically according
134 KW XII. 1 94-5/SV IX 80, passim; KW VII/SV VI 7-100; and, "The Expectancy of an Eternal
Salvation [Salighed]", KW V 253-273/SV IV 229-43 .
135 KW XII. 1 205/SV IX 170.
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to the level of existential commitment in which each level involves the believer. The
first level, "ordinary" or occurrent belief, taken by itself, entails a minimum level of
commitment and actually flows from the second, dispositional level of belief. Here
the believer is passionately engaged in her/his world and develops passions and
dispositions that cause her/him to "see" the world in a certain manner. In turn, these
passions and dispositions we cultivate and which move us to have specific beliefs
about the world are a product of a life-view. A life-view may be restated as the total
commitment of a person in her/his over-all existential comportment, from which an
Archimedean point is formed. This Archimedean point shapes our entire view of the
world and organises our perceptions of it—it is the point from which we move the
world.
mKW XII. 1 205/SV IX 170.
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Conclusion to Chapter Seven
Belief has emerged in this chapter as a central force in the establishment of
subjectivity as articulated in the grammar of subjectivity traced in Chapter Five and
Chapter Six. In turn, it has been shown here that the establishment of subjectivity
brings to belief a sub-structure for the warranting and regulation of belief. For
Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms the concept of the existence-spheres are deeply
epistemological in that they provide a phenomenology of, and grammar for, the
movements of human subjectivity towards the attainment of a transversal unity of
self (transparency). In this way the spheres of existence provide the structure or
depth-dimensions of existential out-workings of the passion for Salighed. Having
one's existence qualified under a particular sphere is both a product of cognitive
processes and transformative of them. Kierkegaard's concept of the leap of faith is
best rendered as a leap to faith. The movements between the existence-spheres are
intimately connected with the beliefs a person has, so that they result from beliefs a
person has as well as change the overall cognitive orientation, or belief policies, of
that person.
We noted, then, Jaime Ferreira's observation that this implies a structure to
Kierkegaard's "leaps", so that they have open to them retrospective justification.
The logic of the concept of Salighed entails that the transitions from one stage to the
next are epistemological to the extent that they intermix ontological and doxastic
concerns. In other words, in the process of detailing the existential movements of
subjectivity, Kierkegaard is at the same time discussing constraints on beliefs.
Therefore, to the degree that Kierkegaard thinks there is a better mode of being-in-
and-toward-the-world, to that degree he also believes that the attending cognitive
stance of that mode is superior. Kierkegaard, then, understands human belief and
cognition to occur as aspects of human temporal and spatial embodiment and
refuses to grant human reason the right to claim to operate sub specie aeternis.
Beliefs are historical (temporal) and actual features of human subjectivity and are
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expressions of personal human commitments. They are not just disembodied
propositions. Beliefs are the conjunction of actuality and possibility in human
persons and are interwoven with our praxial engagements with the world. In this way
Kierkegaard undermines the belief/action and theory/practice dichotomies of
modernity and opens the door for what Calvin Schrag calls a "praxial critique" that
is systematic without "the System", and takes our beliefs and epistemic
commitments seriously.137
Kierkegaard's broad approach to epistemology is a doxastic practice approach
to epistemology, because it focuses on how a belief is formed as the central element
in the evaluation of the epistemic appropriateness of belief. An ethics of belief
replaces a science of belief. Kierkegaard's understanding of beliefmay be described
as having levels of belief that are organised according to the level of existential
commitment each involves. Belief, for Kierkegaard, is always a passion, and there are
three types (or levels) of passions we have identified in his thought that may be
legitimately referred to as beliefs.
137 See Schrag, The Resources of Rationality, 9, 57-67. For a different account of how
Kierkegaard's subjectivity functions as critique see Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard's Critique of
Reason and Society (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991),





IMPLICATIONS FOR A KIERKEGAARDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY
Just to make the celebrated distinction between what one understands and what one does
not understand requires passion.
Johannes De Silentio, Fear and Trembling
Knowledge is like an auctioneer who puts existence [Tilvcerelse] on the block. The
auctioneer then says: Ten dollars (the value of the property)—but it means nothing; only
when someone makes a bid, only then is the bid ten dollars.
Spren Kierkegaard, Works ofLove
The task of this dissertation has been to inquire into the epistemological
implications of Spren Kierkegaard's pseudonymous maxim, "truth is subjectivity".
The point of departure for our study was Kierkegaard's claim in his journals that
this statement expresses the "subjectivity principle". Kierkegaard states that his
subjectivity principle is not bald subjectivism and that it is presented throughout his
authorship in such a way that subjectivity, properly developed, becomes a kind of
objectivity. The thesis of this dissertation is that Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle
is epistemologically normative, not for ethical and religious beliefs only, but that it
establishes a basic orientation to general epistemological issues as well. The
introduction identified two questions essential to developing this thesis. First, the
subjectivity principle must be explained and its relationship to modem epistemology
drawn up. The primary question here is, "Does Kierkegaard actually get beyond
modem epistemology with the subjectivity principle?" The epistemological
dimensions of the subjectivity principle must, secondly, be elucidated.
Kierkegaard's Subjectivity Principle
We have argued that "Truth is Subjectivity" is a meta-epistemological principle
that outlines Kierkegaard's broad approach to re-dressing the errors of modem
epistemology. We noted that Kierkegaard does not attempt a substantive
epistemology. In other words, Kierkegaard does not (for the most part) engage in
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the task of analysing the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. We
have shown that there are four good reasons why we should understand
Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle as an epistemological thesis. First, Kierkegaard
develops his subjectivity thesis as a response to the misdirection that modern
philosophy took in following the Cartesian notion of a radically autonomous
epistemological subject. In so far as Kierkegaard redresses the wrongs of modernity
and its epistemological emphases he is epistemological. The subjectivity principle
recommends an approach to epistemological issues that takes the subject's finitude
and situated embodiment seriously. Second, the subjectivity principle is deliberately
recommending an approach to belief-acceptance—what we have called doxastic
formation.
Third, Kierkegaard is explicitly shifting the grounds of belief from metaphysics
to ethics. The grammar of subjectivity runs into a grammar of belief as Kierkegaard
accounts for the existential transitions that take place in the development of a deep
human subjectivity. Beliefs that we have regarding any proposition or set of
propositions (i.e., our beliefs that p) are a product of our dispositions to accept these
propositions. These dispositions to form beliefs are called doxastic pratices. Thus
the mode of being of a person is an important feature of doxastic regulation as the
general context of a specific belief. And lastly, the end or telos of subjectivity, for
Kierkegaard, is Tro [belief or faith]. We know ourselves and achieve transparency in
and through our subjective involvements in the world. This, in turn, entails that
beliefs be evaluated according to the life-context in which they occur, and further,
that we think of beliefs as operating on different levels.
Towards a Kierkegaardian Substantive Epistemology
Kierkegaard's meta-epistemology raises interesting questions for a substantive
epistemology. The rest of this section will focus on sketching the commitments a
substantive epistemology that takes the Kierkegaardian subjectivity principle
seriously both has and does not have. We must keep in mind that for Kierkegaard
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there are two kinds of knowledge: accidental (objective) knowledge and essential
(subjective) knowledge. The first, objective sort of knowledge is that kind for which
we can have no complete warrants, or justifications. This, however, does not limit
them from being epistemically appropriate. What this does mean is that such
objective knowledge can at best be "approximation knowledge". Accidental
knowledge is approximation knowledge because it involves subjective passions (will,
resolution) and therefore cannot completely ground itself (in "objective reason").
Thus, the second type of knowledge, subjective knowledge, is really the source of
warrant for the first type. Essential (subjective) knowledge is that knowledge I have
that pertains essentially to my existence. It is tantamount to Socratic self-knowledge
and is the knowledge I have of myself in and through my praxial engagements with
reality. Thus there are two poles to any human act of propositional belief that
include, first, the objective, "impersonal", elements of that piece of information as
thought-possibility that may be considered in isolation of, second, the subjective
context in which that belief as an actual feature of a human life is ultimately
warranted.
In general, a substantive epistemology that takes the Kierkegaardian subjectivity
principle seriously will be a virtue epistemology. It will, in other words, take
epistemic virtue to be central to the understanding of both justification or warrant for
beliefs and the nature of knowledge. The concept of epistemic virtue is used here to
refer to Kierkegaard's insistence that we view belief (and doubt) as passions that
produce our inclinations to accept certain propositional construals of states of
affairs. Recall that Kierkegaard also employs the language of cognitive
"dispositions", and "organs" of cognition, and other terms that denote that
humans are endowed (by virtue of being human) with cognitive faculties that process
the world in ways that dispose us to see the world in specific ways. An epistemic
virtue is thus (in our Kierkegaardian sense) going to refer to any quality of a human
person that disposes that person towards epistemically appropriate belief (true,
warranted, etc.). In one of his most explicit passages on substantive epistemology
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Kierkegaard details different aspects of human subjectivity, such as love, mistrust,
naivete, light-mindedness, vanity, etc., that, as doxastic practices, are epistemic vices
and hinder one from seeing truth.1 But note as well that this would include
biological features of a person, such as natural capacities to process cognitive inputs,
and not just those personal qualities we normally associate with an ethics of belief. It
is interesting and important to note that Kierkegaard often speaks of our disposition
to belief as something that may be a "gift", almost as if it were a natural capacity. In
his theology, however, this belief-forming capacity is impaired in our post-Adamic
(sinful) situation, so that our natural efforts end in an aporia, and require
regeneration or renewal of this capacity by God.
An obvious result of the concern with doxastic practice is that the source of a
belief is vital for its epistemic status. There are therefore some features of a
substantive epistemology that are eliminated as possible candidates for a
Kierkegaardian approach. Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle rules out any
approach that takes rationality or justification to be determined by universally
binding and infallible cognitive procedures, such as the evidence a person has for
her/his belief.
Like Wittgenstein (and Thomas Reid)2 our Kierkegaardian position will be more
amenable to those approaches to substantive epistemology that see a close
connection between a psychology of belief-formation and epistemology. To use the
current jargon, the Kierkegaardian approach outlined here will be both externalist
and fallibilist. It is externalist in so far as the epistemic appropriateness (or warrant
or justification) for a belief is primarily dependent upon a state of affairs that obtain
outside a person's conscious activities with respect to the belief in
question—namely, the manner in which it is produced and the general context of the
person's life. A Kierkegaardian epistemology will be fallibilist because it rules out
"universalism" in epistemology. That is, it rejects any view that supposes that our
1 KW XVI 226/SV XII 218.
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beliefs form a single, unified, rational structure so that any belief may be
epistemically assessed by reference to this one structure. Kierkegaard does not
believe that there is one common measure for all beliefs. The epistemic status of any
one particular belief will depend in large part upon the doxastic practice(s) that
produced it, and these will each carry with them their own standards of assessment.
Furthermore, in a broad sense, a Kierkegaardian substantive epistemology will also
be foundationalist, in that there will be a contingent, material basis or ground for
belief within the epistemic community in which our doxastic practices arise and from
which they derive their standards for justification. These foundations are, to repeat,
fallible because they lack the metaphysical guarantee of modernity's infallibilist
foundationalism. They are merely the place at which our attempts at justification end.
This type of justification is never absolute and its truth-claims are always open to
revision.
In closing, there are three notable issues in substantive epistemology that
Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle leaves open. First, our Kierkegaardian analysis
does not entail any particular analysis of the major epistemic concepts such as nature
of knowledge, justification, or rationality (although it does, as we have seen, place
some constraints on these concepts). Second, Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle
does not dictate how doxastic practices are understood. It does not assume, for
instance, that all belief-forming mechanisms are the same. And lastly it leaves open
the question of what it takes for a ground of belief to be adequate. The working out
of these details provide the material for further research projects.
2 See William P. Alston, "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology", in Knowledge and
Skepticism, ed. Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1989), 2-29, for
this observation. Alston's analysis heavily informs the approach taken here.
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